felony-murder rule in Pennsylvania

2020Moreover, it was stated by the court in [Legg, 417 A.2d at 1154 ]: When an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact the actor was engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to the standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony.[] In Commonwealth v. Melton, [] 178 A.2d 728, 731 ([Pa.] 1962), [] our Supreme Court explained that not only the killer, but

2020Moreover, it was stated by the court in [Legg, 417 A.2d at 1154 ]: When an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact the actor was engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to the standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony.[] In Commonwealth v. Melton, [] 178 A.2d 728, 731 ([Pa.] 1962), [] our Supreme Court explained that not only the killer, but

2026Rev. 1087 (Fall 2013). [J-60-2024] - 28 points out that the felony murder rule has faced harsh condemnation, including an admonishment by our Court in Myers, 261 A.2d at 553-54 (recognizing criticism of the rule as “highly punitive and objectionable as imposing the consequences of murder upon a death wholly unintended,” characterizing it as “non-essential,” and offering that it is “very doubtful that it has the deterrent effect its proponents assert”).

2021Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 553-55 (Pa. 1970) (detailing the “harsh criticism, most of it thoroughly warranted” of the felony-murder rule, finding it “non-essential,” a doubtful deterrent, and “a hold-over from the days of our barbarian Anglo-Saxon ancestors of pre-Norman days, [having] very little right to existence in modern society[,]” so as to “make clear how shaky are the basic premises on which [the rule] rests.”) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). - 24 -

2015Since Redline supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held "[w]hen an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact that the actor engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to a standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony." Commonwealth v. Legg, 491 Pa. 78, 82 , 417 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1980) citing Commonwealth v. Yuknavich supra 448 Pa. at 506 , 295 A.

2015Since Redline supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held "[w]hen an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact that the actor engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to a standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony." Commonwealth v. Legg, 491 Pa. 78, 82 , 417 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1980) citing Commonwealth v. Yuknavich supra 448 Pa. at 506 , 295 A.

2020Moreover, it was stated by the court in [Legg, 417 A.2d at 1154 ]: When an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact the actor was engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to the standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony.[] In Commonwealth v. Melton, [] 178 A.2d 728, 731 ([Pa.] 1962), [] our Supreme Court explained that not only the killer, but

2020Moreover, it was stated by the court in [Legg, 417 A.2d at 1154 ]: When an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact the actor was engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to the standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony.[] In Commonwealth v. Melton, [] 178 A.2d 728, 731 ([Pa.] 1962), [] our Supreme Court explained that not only the killer, but

1983In Commonwealth v. Red-line, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A.2d 472 (1958), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the felony-murder rule would not operate to hold a defendant responsible for the death of a co-felon who was shot by police while attempting to flee from the scene of a crime.

1983In Commonwealth v. Red-line, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A.2d 472 (1958), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the felony-murder rule would not operate to hold a defendant responsible for the death of a co-felon who was shot by police while attempting to flee from the scene of a crime.

2022In Lambert, supra, we explained: The co-conspirator rule assigns legal culpability equally to all members of the conspiracy.

2016The felony-murder rule permits the fact-finder to infer the killing was malicious from the fact the [defendant] was engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to the standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known, that death might result from the felony.’ Lambert, 795 A.2d at 1023 (quoting Commonwealth v. Legg, 417 A.2d 1152 (Pa. 1980)).

2015"The felony-murder rule thus holds one responsible for the consequences resulting from the malice which accompanies the perpetration of the initial felony." Commonwealth v. Olds supra 322 Pa.Super. at 450 , 469 A.2d at 1076 .

2015"The felony-murder rule thus holds one responsible for the consequences resulting from the malice which accompanies the perpetration of the initial felony." Commonwealth v. Olds supra 322 Pa.Super. at 450 , 469 A.2d at 1076 .

2018See Appellant’s Brief at 1-9. -5- J-S05008-18 Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d 1266 , 1270 n.3 (“[i]n order to preserve an issue related to the guilty plea, an appellant must either object at the sentence colloquy or otherwise raise the issue at the sentencing hearing or through a post-sentence motion”) (internal quotations, citations, and corrections omitted); Commonwealth v. May, 402 A.2d 1008 , 1009 n.3 (Pa. 1979) (where, in the trial court, appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea based upon the specific claim that appellant “did not fully understand the significance of the sentence t

2018See also Commonwealth v. May, 402 A.2d 1008 , 1009 n.3 (Pa. 1979) (holding that where, in the trial court, appellant sought to withdraw his guilty plea based upon the specific claim that appellant “did not fully understand the significance of the sentence to be imposed,” appellant waived, for appellate review, the additional claim that he was entitled to withdraw his guilty plea because he “did not understand the felony murder rule and his plea was[, therefore, not] knowingly entered.”).

1983Under the common law doctrine of felony-murder as applied in Pennsylvania, “the malice necessary to make a killing, even an accidental one, murder, is constructively inferred from the malice incident to the perpetration of the *449 initial felony.” Commonwealth v. Tarver, 493 Pa. 320, 328 , 426 A.2d 569, 573 (1981), quoting Commonwealth ex rel.

1983Under the common law doctrine of felony-murder as applied in Pennsylvania, “the malice necessary to make a killing, even an accidental one, murder, is constructively inferred from the malice incident to the perpetration of the *449 initial felony.” Commonwealth v. Tarver, 493 Pa. 320, 328 , 426 A.2d 569, 573 (1981), quoting Commonwealth ex rel.

2023See Rivera, 238 A.3d at 501-503 (rejecting the appellant’s claims that his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for second-degree murder “constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because under the felony-murder rule, no regard is given to the culpability or the mental state of a defendant who causes the death of another person, and thus the rule dictates a punishment that is without proportionality between the crime and has little legitimate deterrent or retributive rationale”) (quotation marks, citations, and corrections omitted).

2023Because the precise focus of Appellant’s laconic, half-page argument is difficult to grasp, we view the instant claim as analogous to those raised recently in Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482 (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal denied, 250 A.3d 1158 (Pa. 2021), and Commonwealth v. Lee, 2023 WL 3961802 (Pa. Super. 2023), where Rivera and Lee challenged their mandatory life sentences under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, arguing that the penalties imposed upon them inflicted cruel and unusual punishments since the felony-murder rule did not account for diminished culpability or

2021“The purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter one about to commit a felony in which a reasonable man knows, or should know, that death may result, by making him criminally responsible for any such deaths.” Commonwealth v. Spallone, 406 A.2d 1146, 1147-48 (Pa. Super. 1979).

2016It is certainly true that, “[i]n felony-murder, the malice necessary to sustain a conviction for murder is inferred from the underlying felonious act.” Commonwealth v. Spallone, 406 A.2d 1146, 1147 (Pa. Super. 1979).

1989Our Court explained further: *238 [E]ach crime enumerated in the felony-murder statute is a crime of specific intent____ Once such intent is shown, the felony-murder doctrine merely imputes the malice incident to the intentional felony over to the killing Commonwealth v. Rawls, 328 Pa.Super. 469, 473-74 , 477 A.2d 540, 543 (1984).

1989Our Court explained further: *238 [E]ach crime enumerated in the felony-murder statute is a crime of specific intent____ Once such intent is shown, the felony-murder doctrine merely imputes the malice incident to the intentional felony over to the killing Commonwealth v. Rawls, 328 Pa.Super. 469, 473-74 , 477 A.2d 540, 543 (1984).

2002Moreover, it was stated by the court in Commonwealth v. Legg, 491 Pa. at 82 , 417 A.2d at 1154: When an actor engages in one of the statutorily enumerated felonies and a killing occurs, the law, via the felony-murder rule, allows the finder of fact to infer the killing was malicious from the fact the actor was engaged in a felony of such a dangerous nature to human life because the actor, as held to the standard of a reasonable man, knew or should have known that death might result from the felony, (footnote omitted) Middleton, 467 A.2d at 848 .

1984Moreover, I take this opportunity to reassert the position set forth in my authored concurring and dissenting opinion filed in Commonwealth v. Waters, 491 Pa. 85, 100-101 , 418 A.2d 312, 319-320 (1980), that any inquiry into whether the homicide was perpetrated "in furtherance of" the underlying felony cannot advance the felony-murder doctrine. "[S]o long as the energy initiating the felonious undertaking continues to pervade the felonious atmosphere . . . any result engendered by that felonious energy is within the purview of the felony murder doctrine." Id.

1978See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 272-73 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Alston, 458 Pa. 412, 417-18 , 317 A.2d 229 (1974); Commonwealth v. Carey, 368 Pa. 157 , 82 A.2d 240 (1951); Commonwealth v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259 , 66 A.2d 663 (1949); Commonwealth v. Hough, 358 Pa. 247 , 56 A.2d 84 (1948); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 337 Pa. 171 , 10 A.2d 431 (1940); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280 , 4 A.2d 805 (1939); Commonwealth v. Tauza, 300 Pa. 375 , 150 A. 649 (1930).

1978See, e. g., Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 265, 272-73 , 361 A.2d 282 (1976); Commonwealth v. Alston, 458 Pa. 412, 417-18 , 317 A.2d 229 (1974); Commonwealth v. Carey, 368 Pa. 157 , 82 A.2d 240 (1951); Commonwealth v. Darcy, 362 Pa. 259 , 66 A.2d 663 (1949); Commonwealth v. Hough, 358 Pa. 247 , 56 A.2d 84 (1948); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 337 Pa. 171 , 10 A.2d 431 (1940); Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280 , 4 A.2d 805 (1939); Commonwealth v. Tauza, 300 Pa. 375 , 150 A. 649 (1930).

1976In order for the felony-murder rule to apply, there must be “ ‘such actual legal relationship between the killing and the crime committed or attempted, that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part of the perpetration of the crime, or in furtherance of an attempt or purpose to commit it.’ ” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 285-86 , 4 A.2d 805, 807 (1939) (quoting 13 R.C.L. § 148); accord Commonwealth v. Robinson, 450 Pa. 145, 147-48 , 299 A.2d 220, 222 (1973).

1976In order for the felony-murder rule to apply, there must be “ ‘such actual legal relationship between the killing and the crime committed or attempted, that the killing can be said to have occurred as a part of the perpetration of the crime, or in furtherance of an attempt or purpose to commit it.’ ” Commonwealth v. Kelly, 333 Pa. 280, 285-86 , 4 A.2d 805, 807 (1939) (quoting 13 R.C.L. § 148); accord Commonwealth v. Robinson, 450 Pa. 145, 147-48 , 299 A.2d 220, 222 (1973).

2026Finally, Appellant challenges the broad application our 1982 decision in Zettlemoyer, in which we found the federal constitutional right against cruel and unusual punishment, and the state constitutional right against cruel punishment, to be co-extensive; he offers that members of our Court have suggested that the decision was claim specific and did not foreclose the possibility that our Constitution provides greater protection than the federal charter, citing Baker, 78 A.3d at 1053 (Castille, C.J., concurring) (explaining that “[t]his Court is not obliged by existing precedent to proceed in l

2019See Commonwealth v. Weeden , 457 Pa. 436 , 322 A.2d 343 , 346 (1974) (finding defendants knowingly waived Miranda although the police did not explain that they could be liable under the felony murder rule); Reaves , 421 A.2d at 354 (finding officers' Miranda warning that defendant's statements could be used against him in a juvenile proceeding did not constitute a promise that defendant would be treated as a juvenile, and resulting waiver effective).

2019See Commonwealth v. Weeden , 457 Pa. 436 , 322 A.2d 343 , 346 (1974) (finding defendants knowingly waived Miranda although the police did not explain that they could be liable under the felony murder rule); Reaves , 421 A.2d at 354 (finding officers' Miranda warning that defendant's statements could be used against him in a juvenile proceeding did not constitute a promise that defendant would be treated as a juvenile, and resulting waiver effective).

2019See Commonwealth v. Weeden , 457 Pa. 436 , 322 A.2d 343 , 346 (1974) (finding defendants knowingly waived Miranda although the police did not explain that they could be liable under the felony murder rule); Reaves , 421 A.2d at 354 (finding officers' Miranda warning that defendant's statements could be used against him in a juvenile proceeding did not constitute a promise that defendant would be treated as a juvenile, and resulting waiver effective).

2019See Commonwealth v. Weeden , 457 Pa. 436 , 322 A.2d 343 , 346 (1974) (finding defendants knowingly waived Miranda although the police did not explain that they could be liable under the felony murder rule); Reaves , 421 A.2d at 354 (finding officers' Miranda warning that defendant's statements could be used against him in a juvenile proceeding did not constitute a promise that defendant would be treated as a juvenile, and resulting waiver effective).