14 Oregon opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Blairgreen2 sentences2026See Blair, 348 Or at 77-78 (noting that the felony-murder rule “was first codified in Oregon in 1864” and that the rule “long had operated to impose responsibility for homicides that occur during the commission of a felony, without the separate and additional requirement that the defendant acted with a mens rea in causing the death of another person”); Burkhart, 325 Mont at 37-38 , 103 P3d at 1044 (tracing the common law felony-mur- der rule to a sixteenth-century case, Mansell & Herbert’s Case, 2 Dyer 128b; 73 Eng Rep 279 (KB 1558); Roth and Sundby, 70 Cornell L Rev at 449 (noting that some c 2026See Blair, 348 Or at 77-78 (noting that the felony-murder rule “was first codified in Oregon in 1864” and that the rule “long had operated to impose responsibility for homicides that occur during the commission of a felony, without the separate and additional requirement that the defendant acted with a mens rea in causing the death of another person”); Burkhart, 325 Mont at 37-38 , 103 P3d at 1044 (tracing the common law felony- murder rule to a sixteenth-century case, Mansell & Herbert’s Case, 2 Dyer 128b; 73 Eng Rep 279 (KB 1558); Roth and Sundby, 70 Cornell L Rev at 449 (noting that some co | 2 | 4 |
State v. Reamsgreen2 sentences2009Platt of the University of Oregon School of Law, one of the authors of the Code, see State v. Reams, 292 Or 1, 9 , 636 P2d 913 (1981), explained that the proposed draft rejected the Model Penal Code’s abrogation of the felony murder rule in favor of New York’s “less liberal” approach. 2009Platt of the University of Oregon School of Law, one of the authors of the Code, see State v. Reams, 292 Or 1, 9 , 636 P2d 913 (1981), explained that the proposed draft rejected the Model Penal Code’s abrogation of the felony murder rule in favor of New York’s “less liberal” approach. | 2 | 3 |
State v. Burkhartgreen2 sentences2026Thus, the court concluded, “because the felony-murder rule does not in fact raise a presumption of the existence of an element of the crime, it does not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” Id. at 42 , 103 P3d at 1047 . 2026Thus, the court concluded, “because the felony-murder rule does not in fact raise a presumption of the existence of an element of the crime, it does not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” Id. at 42 , 103 P3d at 1047 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Blairgreen2 sentences2026First, after recounting the historical application of the felony-murder rule in Oregon, that court concluded that, at least prior to the enactment of ORS 163.115(1) in 1971 as part of the new Oregon Criminal Code, the legisla- ture and this court had long recognized the “implied mal- ice” rule, under which the state could obtain a conviction for felony murder “without the necessity of proving the rela- tionship between the homicide and the defendant’s state of mind.” Blair I, 230 Or App at 46 (“Rather, the defendant’s 5 To be clear, the majority does seem to recognize in a footnote that, by ju 2010Second, although the 1971 revisions effected two very significant changes to the felony-murder rule — neither of which is germane to this case 5 — the minutes from a Senate committee reiterated that “[t]he felony-murder doctrine (a killing arising in the course of committing certain very violent felonies) is present law and is continued under the proposal.” Minutes, Senate Criminal Law and Procedure Committee, Feb 16, 1971, 7 (emphasis added); see State v. Blair, 230 Or App 36, 52 , 214 P3d 47 , rev allowed, 347 Or 348 (2009) (reiterating history concerning changes to the felony *232 murder ru | 2 | 2 |
State v. Browngreen2 sentences2024Historically, the court had “consistently incorporated an ‘implied malice’ rule into felony murder,” such that “felony murder contain[ed] no distinct or indepen- dent mens rea requirement in relation to the cause of death of the victim.” Id. at 78 (citing case law from 1879, 1939, and 1966); see, e.g., State of Oregon v. Brown, 7 Or 186, 198, 204 (1879) (“The indictment having alleged the killing in the perpetration of a robbery, it is only required that the robbery and the killing, in the manner alleged, during the robbery, be proven to make out the case. 2024Historically, the court had “consistently incorporated an ‘implied malice’ rule into felony murder,” such that “felony murder contain[ed] no distinct or indepen- dent mens rea requirement in relation to the cause of death of the victim.” Id. at 78 (citing case law from 1879, 1939, and 1966); see, e.g., State of Oregon v. Brown, 7 Or 186, 198, 204 (1879) (“The indictment having alleged the killing in the perpetration of a robbery, it is only required that the robbery and the killing, in the manner alleged, during the robbery, be proven to make out the case. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Amos Branchgreen2 sentences2009Following Brown , Oregon courts consistently construed the felony murder rule, incorporated in both the first- and second-degree murder statutes, to contain no distinct or independent mens rea requirement in relation to the death of the victim. 9 See, e.g., State v. Branch, 244 Or 97, 100 , 415 P2d 766 (1966) (“[A] malignant purpose is established by proof of the defendant’s other felony * * *.”); State v. Dorland, 161 Or 403, 404 , 89 P2d 595 (1939) (“[I]t is not necessary for the indictment to allege or the state to prove that [the killing] was done purposely or with deliberate and premedita 2009Following Brown , Oregon courts consistently construed the felony murder rule, incorporated in both the first- and second-degree murder statutes, to contain no distinct or independent mens rea requirement in relation to the death of the victim. 9 See, e.g., State v. Branch, 244 Or 97, 100 , 415 P2d 766 (1966) (“[A] malignant purpose is established by proof of the defendant’s other felony * * *.”); State v. Dorland, 161 Or 403, 404 , 89 P2d 595 (1939) (“[I]t is not necessary for the indictment to allege or the state to prove that [the killing] was done purposely or with deliberate and premedita | 1 | 3 |
State v. Monacogreen2 sentences2026Cite as 375 Or 1 (2026) 29 Given how firmly entrenched the felony-murder rule is in Oregon and the common law, we cannot conclude that the felony-murder rule is so contrary to a fundamental principle of justice that it must be proscribed by the Due Process Clause in this context. 2026The felony-murder rule has been criticized for having a disparate racial impact, see Perry Moriearty, Cite as 375 Or 1 (2026) 31 Kat Albrecht, & Caitlin Glass, Race, Racial Bias, and Imputed Liability Murder, 51 Fordham Urb L J 675 (2024); G. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 182 Or 681, 691-92 , 189 P2d 403 (1948) (holding that the accidental discharge of the defendant’s gun during the commission of a robbery constituted first-degree murder under the felony murder rule). 2009See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 182 Or 681, 691-92 , 189 P2d 403 (1948) (holding that the accidental discharge of the defendant’s gun during the commission of a robbery constituted first-degree murder under the felony murder rule). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Burrowgreen2 sentences2026See State v. Burrow, 293 Or 691, 708 , 653 P2d 226 (1982) (Linde, J., dissenting) (cautioning that Patterson “is far from holding that legis- latures are wholly free to transfer burdens to prove facts on which a defendant’s Cite as 375 Or 1 (2026) 29 Given how firmly entrenched the felony-murder rule is in Oregon and the common law, we cannot conclude that the felony-murder rule is so contrary to a fundamental principle of justice that it must be proscribed by the Due Process Clause in this context. 2026See State v. Burrow, 293 Or 691, 708 , 653 P2d 226 (1982) (Linde, J., dissenting) (cautioning that Patterson “is far from holding that legis- latures are wholly free to transfer burdens to prove facts on which a defendant’s Cite as 375 Or 1 (2026) 29 Given how firmly entrenched the felony-murder rule is in Oregon and the common law, we cannot conclude that the felony-murder rule is so contrary to a fundamental principle of justice that it must be proscribed by the Due Process Clause in this context. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Farleygreen2 sentences2010Rather, [the statute] applies the felony-murder rule to all burglaries” and that “nothing in the language of [the statute] supports the application of the merger doctrine to its terms.” Id. at 1118, 1119, 210 P3d at 409 (emphasis in original). 2010Further, the court reasoned that it is the legislature’s responsibility to define crimes and fix penalties and that, where the text of a statute is clear, any “[p]olicy concerns regarding the inclusion of burglary in the first degree felony-murder statute remain within the Legislature’s domain, and do not authorize this court to limit the plain language of the statute.” Id. at 1121, 210 P3d at 411 . 12 In reaching a contrary conclusion, the trial court referred to Cahill . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carlsongreen1 sentence2010Second, although the 1971 revisions effected two very significant changes to the felony-murder rule — neither of which is germane to this case 5 — the minutes from a Senate committee reiterated that “[t]he felony-murder doctrine (a killing arising in the course of committing certain very violent felonies) is present law and is continued under the proposal.” Minutes, Senate Criminal Law and Procedure Committee, Feb 16, 1971, 7 (emphasis added); see State v. Blair, 230 Or App 36, 52 , 214 P3d 47 , rev allowed, 347 Or 348 (2009) (reiterating history concerning changes to the felony *232 murder ru | 1 | 1 |
People v. Woodgreen2 sentences2009The New York statute retained the historical feature of imputing mens rea with respect to the victim’s death from the defendant’s commission or attempted commission of the predicate felony, see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 82 NY 2d 309, 317 , 624 NE 2d 661, 665 (NY 1993) (“[T]he mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing * * (citing People v. Wood, 8 NY 2d 48, 51 , 167 NE 2d 736, 738 (NY 1960)), but created an affirmative defense that could be raised by the defendant under certain circumstances when *54 the death was caused by a co-felon. 2009The New York statute retained the historical feature of imputing mens rea with respect to the victim’s death from the defendant’s commission or attempted commission of the predicate felony, see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 82 NY 2d 309, 317 , 624 NE 2d 661, 665 (NY 1993) (“[T]he mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing * * (citing People v. Wood, 8 NY 2d 48, 51 , 167 NE 2d 736, 738 (NY 1960)), but created an affirmative defense that could be raised by the defendant under certain circumstances when *54 the death was caused by a co-felon. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2009The New York statute retained the historical feature of imputing mens rea with respect to the victim’s death from the defendant’s commission or attempted commission of the predicate felony, see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 82 NY 2d 309, 317 , 624 NE 2d 661, 665 (NY 1993) (“[T]he mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing * * (citing People v. Wood, 8 NY 2d 48, 51 , 167 NE 2d 736, 738 (NY 1960)), but created an affirmative defense that could be raised by the defendant under certain circumstances when *54 the death was caused by a co-felon. 2009The New York statute retained the historical feature of imputing mens rea with respect to the victim’s death from the defendant’s commission or attempted commission of the predicate felony, see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 82 NY 2d 309, 317 , 624 NE 2d 661, 665 (NY 1993) (“[T]he mens rea of the underlying felony is imputed to the participant responsible for the killing * * (citing People v. Wood, 8 NY 2d 48, 51 , 167 NE 2d 736, 738 (NY 1960)), but created an affirmative defense that could be raised by the defendant under certain circumstances when *54 the death was caused by a co-felon. | 1 | 1 |
Cannon v. Gladdengreen2 sentences1992See Cannon v. Gladden, supra, 203 Or. at 632, 281 P.2d 233 (setting that standard for holding that *498 a sentence is disproportionate to the offense). 1992See Cannon v. Gladden, supra, 203 Or. at 632, 281 P.2d 233 (setting that standard for holding that *498 a sentence is disproportionate to the offense). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hazelettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Zaunergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dorland
neutral
2 sentences2026Thus, when the legislature adopted ORS 163.005 and ORS 163.115 in 1971, “the felony murder rule, as construed and applied by this court, long had operated to impose responsibility for homi- cides that occur during the commission or attempted com- mission of a felony, without the separate and additional requirement that the defendant acted with a mens rea in causing the death of another person.” Id. (emphasis added). 2026Thus, when the legislature adopted ORS 163.005 and ORS 163.115 in 1971, “the felony murder rule, as construed and applied by this court, long had operated to impose responsibility for homi- cides that occur during the commission or attempted com- mission of a felony, without the separate and additional requirement that the defendant acted with a mens rea in causing the death of another person.” Id. (emphasis added). | 3 | 2009–2026 |
State v. Wanrow
red
2 sentences2026In State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash 2d 301, 588 P2d 1320 (1978), superseded by statute, 1975 Wash Sess Laws 863, as recognized in In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash 2d 602, 56 P3d 981 (2002), the Washington Supreme Court addressed a due process challenge to the prior version of Washington’s felony-murder statute.7 The court noted that, under the Washington statute, where a willful assault resulted in death, a prosecutor can allege and prove felony murder “and not have to show intent to kill.” 91 Wash 2d at 307, 588 P2d at 1323 . 2026In State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash 2d 301, 588 P2d 1320 (1978), superseded by statute, 1975 Wash Sess Laws 863, as recognized in In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash 2d 602, 56 P3d 981 (2002), the Washington Supreme Court addressed a due process challenge to the prior version of Washington’s felony-murder statute.7 The court noted that, under the Washington statute, where a willful assault resulted in death, a prosecutor can allege and prove felony murder “and not have to show intent to kill.” 91 Wash 2d at 307, 588 P2d at 1323 . | 2 | 2026–2026 |
McDuffie v. State
green
2 sentences2026That is consistent with our observation that the United States Supreme Court, “in applying the federal con- stitution, has generally refused to interfere with the histor- ical state power to create strict liability offenses.” State v. Buttrey, 293 Or 575, 587 , 651 P2d 1055 (1982) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 US 514, 536 , 88 S Ct 2145 , 20 L Ed 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion), and other cases). 2026That is consistent with our observation that the United States Supreme Court, “in applying the federal con- stitution, has generally refused to interfere with the histor- ical state power to create strict liability offenses.” State v. Buttrey, 293 Or 575, 587 , 651 P2d 1055 (1982) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 US 514, 536 , 88 S Ct 2145 , 20 L Ed 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion), and other cases). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Buttrey
green
2 sentences2026That is consistent with our observation that the United States Supreme Court, “in applying the federal con- stitution, has generally refused to interfere with the histor- ical state power to create strict liability offenses.” State v. Buttrey, 293 Or 575, 587 , 651 P2d 1055 (1982) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 US 514, 536 , 88 S Ct 2145 , 20 L Ed 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion), and other cases). 2026That is consistent with our observation that the United States Supreme Court, “in applying the federal con- stitution, has generally refused to interfere with the histor- ical state power to create strict liability offenses.” State v. Buttrey, 293 Or 575, 587 , 651 P2d 1055 (1982) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 US 514, 536 , 88 S Ct 2145 , 20 L Ed 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion), and other cases). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Powell v. Texas
green
2 sentences2026That is consistent with our observation that the United States Supreme Court, “in applying the federal con- stitution, has generally refused to interfere with the histor- ical state power to create strict liability offenses.” State v. Buttrey, 293 Or 575, 587 , 651 P2d 1055 (1982) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 US 514, 536 , 88 S Ct 2145 , 20 L Ed 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion), and other cases). 2026That is consistent with our observation that the United States Supreme Court, “in applying the federal con- stitution, has generally refused to interfere with the histor- ical state power to create strict liability offenses.” State v. Buttrey, 293 Or 575, 587 , 651 P2d 1055 (1982) (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 US 514, 536 , 88 S Ct 2145 , 20 L Ed 1254 (1968) (plurality opinion), and other cases). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Quinn
green
2 sentences2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). 2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Link
green
2 sentences2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). 2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Zweigart
green
2 sentences2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). 2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Hall
green
2 sentences2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). 2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Quinn
green
2 sentences2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). 2026And we further noted that this court, in cases decided after those statutes were adopted in 1971, had “continued to treat felony murder as requiring no dis- tinct or independent mens rea with respect to the cause of the victim’s death.” Id. (citing State v. Link, 346 Or 187, 205 , 208 P3d 936 (2009); State v. Zweigart, 344 Or 619, 626 , 188 P3d 242 (2008), cert den, 558 US 829 (2009); State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383 , 405 n 8, 623 P2d 630 (1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hall, 339 Or 7 , 115 P3d 908 (2005)). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
In Re Personal Restraint of Andress
red
2 sentences2026In State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash 2d 301, 588 P2d 1320 (1978), superseded by statute, 1975 Wash Sess Laws 863, as recognized in In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash 2d 602, 56 P3d 981 (2002), the Washington Supreme Court addressed a due process challenge to the prior version of Washington’s felony-murder statute.7 The court noted that, under the Washington statute, where a willful assault resulted in death, a prosecutor can allege and prove felony murder “and not have to show intent to kill.” 91 Wash 2d at 307, 588 P2d at 1323 . 2026In State v. Wanrow, 91 Wash 2d 301, 588 P2d 1320 (1978), superseded by statute, 1975 Wash Sess Laws 863, as recognized in In re Personal Restraint of Andress, 147 Wash 2d 602, 56 P3d 981 (2002), the Washington Supreme Court addressed a due process challenge to the prior version of Washington’s felony-murder statute.7 The court noted that, under the Washington statute, where a willful assault resulted in death, a prosecutor can allege and prove felony murder “and not have to show intent to kill.” 91 Wash 2d at 307, 588 P2d at 1323 . | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Lockett v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2024A half-century ago, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court described the states’ authority to enact felony-murder statutes as “beyond constitutional challenge,” Lockett, 438 US at 602 , and the Court has not called that statement into question in the intervening decades. 2024A half-century ago, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court described the states’ authority to enact felony-murder statutes as “beyond constitutional challenge,” Lockett, 438 US at 602 , and the Court has not called that statement into question in the intervening decades. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Morris
green
2 sentences2010Id. 1980In State v. Tremblay, however, 4 Or App 512, 517 , 479 P2d 507 , rev den (1971), we said that felony murder does apply where burglary is based on intent to commit assault, for "it is obvious that the legislature intended to give added protection to persons who are within a dwelling place.” We also noted, supra at 519, n 2, that "[wjhatever the holding may be in other states, our decision depends upon our own statute and the decision in Morris. ” In State v. Morris, 241 Or at 255, 405 P2d 369 (1965), the Supreme Court upheld a felony murder conviction based on burglary, although the burglary ma | 2 | 1980–2010 |
People v. Wilson
red
2 sentences1981In reversing both convictions, the California court was critical ( 82 Cal. Rptr. at 500 , 462 P.2d at p. 28 ) of the felony murder rule as "a highly artificial concept which deserves no extension beyond its required application"; that its purpose was to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit; that the rule serves that purpose only when applied to a felony independent of homicide, and that the only distinction between a first degree felony murder based upon the felony of burglary and a second degree felony murder based 1981In reversing both convictions, the California court was critical ( 82 Cal. Rptr. at 500 , 462 P.2d at p. 28 ) of the felony murder rule as "a highly artificial concept which deserves no extension beyond its required application"; that its purpose was to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit; that the rule serves that purpose only when applied to a felony independent of homicide, and that the only distinction between a first degree felony murder based upon the felony of burglary and a second degree felony murder based | 2 | 1980–1981 |
State v. Morris
green
2 sentences2009It is sufficient if it be alleged and proved that the killing was done while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempt to commit any of [the enumerated felonies][.]”); State v. Morris, 83 Or 429, 445 , 163 P 567 (1917) (affirming correctness of instruction that, if the state proves that the defendant committed larceny, “the intent to kill is implied”). *46 Those holdings comported with the overarching purpose of the felony murder rule — that is, “to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation or malice whenever the victim’s death [was] caused by the killer while the k 2009It is sufficient if it be alleged and proved that the killing was done while the defendant was engaged in the commission or attempt to commit any of [the enumerated felonies][.]”); State v. Morris, 83 Or 429, 445 , 163 P 567 (1917) (affirming correctness of instruction that, if the state proves that the defendant committed larceny, “the intent to kill is implied”). *46 Those holdings comported with the overarching purpose of the felony murder rule — that is, “to relieve the state of the burden of proving premeditation or malice whenever the victim’s death [was] caused by the killer while the k | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Farrar
green
2 sentences1992ORS 163.095(2)(d) provides: “Notwithstanding ORS 163.115(l)(b) [the felony murder rule], the defendant personally and intentionally committed the homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115(l)(b).” ORS 163.095(2)(e) provides: “The murder was committed in an effort to conceal the commission of a crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of a crime.” In State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 184-85 , 786 P2d 161 (1990), this court held that two aggravating factors in Oregon’s aggravated murder statute, ORS 163.095(2)(d) and (2)(e), were not unconstitutionally vague under the Eight 1992ORS 163.095(2)(d) provides: “Notwithstanding ORS 163.115(l)(b) [the felony murder rule], the defendant personally and intentionally committed the homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115(l)(b).” ORS 163.095(2)(e) provides: “The murder was committed in an effort to conceal the commission of a crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of a crime.” In State v. Farrar, 309 Or 132, 184-85 , 786 P2d 161 (1990), this court held that two aggravating factors in Oregon’s aggravated murder statute, ORS 163.095(2)(d) and (2)(e), were not unconstitutionally vague under the Eight | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Redeman green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Patterson v. New York green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Whipple v. Howser green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Tremblay green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| State v. Jensen green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| State v. Reyes green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.