74 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Here, there was no reasonable theory to support a charge on felony-murder. ' "The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct." ' White v. State, 587 So. 2d 1218, 1231 (Ala. Cr. 2010(Emphasis added.) As Judge Bowen stated in White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1076 , 112 S.Ct. 979 , 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992): “ ‘ “ ‘The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ W. | 7 | 10 |
Ex Parte Woodallgreen2 sentences2018When considering whether the State provided sufficient evidence demonstrating the defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill, this Court has recently stated: " 'No defendant can be found guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine.' Ex parte Woodall , 730 So.2d 652 , 657 (Ala. 1998). 2018When considering whether the State provided sufficient evidence demonstrating the defendant had the requisite specific intent to kill, this Court has recently stated: " 'No defendant can be found guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony-murder doctrine.' Ex parte Woodall , 730 So.2d 652 , 657 (Ala. 1998). | 6 | 8 |
Beck v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645, 662 (Ala. March 6, 1981)’; Carnes, Alabama’s 1981 Capital Punishment Statute, 42 Ala. Law. 456, 468 (1981). 1988"No defendant is guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony murder doctrine." Lewis v. State , 456 So.2d 413 , 414 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984) (quoting from Beck v. State , 396 So.2d 645 , 662 (Ala. 1981)). "[T]he accomplice liability doctrine may be used to convict a non-triggerman accomplice, if, but only if, the defendant was an accomplice in the intentional killing as opposed to being an accomplice merely in the underlying felony." Ex parte Raines , 429 So.2d 1111 , 1112 (Ala. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1103 , 103 S.Ct. 1 | 5 | 11 |
Womack v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Smith v. State, 908 So.2d 273, 297 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (noting that “the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder”); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (trial court instructed the jury on “the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of non-capital murder”); Womack v. State, 43 2006See Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754, 763 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff 'd, 435 So.2d 766 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983) (the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the ‘intent to kill requirement’ by instructing the jury that the felony murder doctrine was relevant only as a lesser included offense of noncapital murder, and that the jury could not convict the defendant for capital murder without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had possessed the intent to kill); Ex parte Jackson, 674 So.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Ala.1994) (instruction on felony murder as a lesser included offense | 4 | 6 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Smith v. State, 908 So.2d 273, 297 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (noting that “the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder”); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (trial court instructed the jury on “the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of non-capital murder”); Womack v. State, 43 2001Compare Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (‘the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder’), affirmed, 555 So.2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (trial court instructed jury on ‘the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine, and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of noncap | 3 | 4 |
State v. Strauchgreen2 sentences2018See State v. Strauch , 239 Kan. 203 , 718 P.2d 613 (1986), and Note, The Merger Doctrine as a Limitation on the Felony-Murder Rule: A Balance of Criminal Law Principles , 13 Wake Forest L. 2018See State v. Strauch , 239 Kan. 203 , 718 P.2d 613 (1986), and Note, The Merger Doctrine as a Limitation on the Felony-Murder Rule: A Balance of Criminal Law Principles , 13 Wake Forest L. | 3 | 3 |
Ziegler v. Stategreen2 sentences2014App.2000); Flowers v. State, 799 So.2d 966, 984 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Duncan v. State, 827 So.2d 838, 848 (Ala. Crim.App.1999).’ “Ziegler v. State, 886 So.2d 127, 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). • “ ■ “ ‘[N]o defendant' is guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony murder doctrine. 2014E.g., Gamble v. State, 791 So.2d 409, 444 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000); Flowers v. State, 799 So.2d 966, 984 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Duncan v. State, 827 So.2d 838, 848 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999).’ ” (Quoting Ziegler v. State, 886 So.2d 127, 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).) Further, “ ‘ “ ‘no defendant is guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony murder doctrine. | 3 | 3 |
Duncan v. Stategreen2 sentences2014App.2000); Flowers v. State, 799 So.2d 966, 984 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Duncan v. State, 827 So.2d 838, 848 (Ala. Crim.App.1999).’ “Ziegler v. State, 886 So.2d 127, 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). • “ ■ “ ‘[N]o defendant' is guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony murder doctrine. 2014E.g., Gamble v. State, 791 So.2d 409, 444 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000); Flowers v. State, 799 So.2d 966, 984 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Duncan v. State, 827 So.2d 838, 848 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999).’ ” (Quoting Ziegler v. State, 886 So.2d 127, 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).) Further, “ ‘ “ ‘no defendant is guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony murder doctrine. | 3 | 3 |
Flowers v. Stategreen2 sentences2014App.2000); Flowers v. State, 799 So.2d 966, 984 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Duncan v. State, 827 So.2d 838, 848 (Ala. Crim.App.1999).’ “Ziegler v. State, 886 So.2d 127, 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003). • “ ■ “ ‘[N]o defendant' is guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony murder doctrine. 2014E.g., Gamble v. State, 791 So.2d 409, 444 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000); Flowers v. State, 799 So.2d 966, 984 (Ala.Crim.App.1999); Duncan v. State, 827 So.2d 838, 848 (Ala.Crim.App. 1999).’ ” (Quoting Ziegler v. State, 886 So.2d 127, 140 (Ala.Crim.App.2003).) Further, “ ‘ “ ‘no defendant is guilty of a capital offense unless he had an intent to kill, and that intent to kill cannot be supplied by the felony murder doctrine. | 3 | 3 |
Freeman v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Smith v. State, 908 So.2d 273, 297 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Crim.App.1988) (noting that “the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder”); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Crim.App.1983) (trial court instructed the jury on “the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of non-capital murder”); Womack v. State, 43 2001Compare Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (‘the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder’), affirmed, 555 So.2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (trial court instructed jury on ‘the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine, and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of noncap | 3 | 3 |
Bellcourt v. Stategreen2 sentences2009In Minnesota the felony-murder rule applies whenever the felony and the homicide ‘are part of one continuous transaction.’ Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn.1986) [quoting Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680 , 686-87 n. 4 (Minn.1979)]. 2003In Minnesota the felony-murder rule applies whenever the felony and the homicide "are part of one continuous transaction." Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn.1986) [quoting Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680 , 686-87 n. 4 (Minn.1979)]. | 3 | 3 |
Ex Parte State of Alabamagreen2 sentences1996See also Connolly v. State , 500 So.2d 57 , 62 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985) (doctrine of felony murder 'has no place in securing a conviction' for capital robbery-murder), affirmed, 500 So.2d 68 (Ala. 1986); Daniel v. Thigpen , 742 F. Supp. 1535 , 1549 (M.D.Ala. 1990) (reckless murder not sufficient to support a conviction where defendant was charged with the capital offense of murder of a police officer under former § 13A-5-31(a)(5)). ". . . . 1995App.1985), aff'd, 500 So.2d 68 (1986)." "In a capital murder case, intent to kill may not be supplied by the felony murder doctrine, that is, should the circumstances fall short of proving an intentional killing during the course of a robbery, and should the circumstances fall short of proving that an intent to rob was formed prior to the victim being killed, then the crime is not capital murder but some lesser included offense thereof." A review of the charge given by the trial court to the jury indicates that the jury was fully informed of the elements of the offense of capital murder during | 2 | 4 |
| Coulter v. Stategreen | 2 | 3 |
| Ex Parte Jesse Lee Morrisongreen | 2 | 3 |
| Gamble v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Nielsengreen | 2 | 2 |
| Ex Parte Freemangreen | 2 | 2 |
| In re McFaddengreen | 2 | 2 |
| Acosta v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Tucker v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Womackgreen2 sentences2006See Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754, 763 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff 'd, 435 So.2d 766 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983) (the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the ‘intent to kill requirement’ by instructing the jury that the felony murder doctrine was relevant only as a lesser included offense of noncapital murder, and that the jury could not convict the defendant for capital murder without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had possessed the intent to kill); Ex parte Jackson, 674 So.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Ala.1994) (instruction on felony murder as a lesser included offense 2001Compare Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (‘the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder’), affirmed, 555 So.2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (trial court instructed jury on ‘the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine, and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of noncap | 1 | 5 |
Salser v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2006See Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754, 763 (Ala.Crim.App.), aff 'd, 435 So.2d 766 (Ala.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983) (the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the ‘intent to kill requirement’ by instructing the jury that the felony murder doctrine was relevant only as a lesser included offense of noncapital murder, and that the jury could not convict the defendant for capital murder without finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he had possessed the intent to kill); Ex parte Jackson, 674 So.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Ala.1994) (instruction on felony murder as a lesser included offense 2001Compare Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (‘the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder’), affirmed, 555 So.2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (trial court instructed jury on ‘the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine, and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of noncap | 1 | 5 |
Seaton v. Stategreen2 sentences2018However, ' "[i]ntent, ... being a state or condition of the mind, is rarely, if ever, susceptible of direct or positive proof, and must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by witnesses and the circumstances as developed by the evidence." ' Seaton v. State , 645 So.2d 341 , 343 (Ala. Crim. 2018However, ' "[i]ntent, ... being a state or condition of the mind, is rarely, if ever, susceptible of direct or positive proof, and must usually be inferred from the facts testified to by witnesses and the circumstances as developed by the evidence." ' Seaton v. State , 645 So.2d 341 , 343 (Ala. Crim. | 1 | 3 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Crowe v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Enmund v. Floridagreen | 1 | 2 |
| Hall v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Donald Dwayne Whatley v. State of Alabama.green | 1 | 1 |
| Contreras v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Scott v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| McCord v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Glenngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Woodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pearson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jenkins v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Smith v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ex Parte Jacksongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wallacegreen | 1 | 1 |
| MacEwan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hansenred | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ex Parte White
green
2 sentences2010(Emphasis added.) As Judge Bowen stated in White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1076 , 112 S.Ct. 979 , 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992): “ ‘ “ ‘The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ W. 2010Here, there was no reasonable theory to support a charge on felony-murder. “ ‘The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ ” White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1076 , 112 S.Ct. 979 , 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992). | 9 | 1992–2024 |
Thomas v. 3201 Caughey Road
green
2 sentences2010(Emphasis added.) As Judge Bowen stated in White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1076 , 112 S.Ct. 979 , 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992): “ ‘ “ ‘The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ W. 2010(Emphasis added.) As Judge Bowen stated in White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1076 , 112 S.Ct. 979 , 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992): “ ‘ “ ‘The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ W. | 8 | 1992–2024 |
Schulz v. Washington County
green
2 sentences2010(Emphasis added.) As Judge Bowen stated in White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1076 , 112 S.Ct. 979 , 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992): “ ‘ “ ‘The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ W. 2010Here, there was no reasonable theory to support a charge on felony-murder. “ ‘The purpose of the felony-murder doctrine is to hold felons accountable for unintended deaths caused by their dangerous conduct.’ ” White v. State, 587 So.2d 1218, 1231 (Ala.Cr.App.1990), affd, 587 So.2d 1236 (Ala.1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1076 , 112 S.Ct. 979 , 117 L.Ed.2d 142 (1992). | 7 | 1994–2024 |
Ex Parte Ritter
green
2 sentences1990"Now, you would also, at that point consider the intent, consider what I said about that. [The trial court then repeated the instructions on intent quoted above]." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in his instructions did the trial court charge the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of the capital offense charged in the indictment, the jury had to find that the defendant was an accomplice in the intentional killing as opposed to being an accomplice merely in the robbery. "[I]n a prosecution for a capital offense, the felony-murder doctrine has no place in securing a conviction of the offe 1985Although, in a prosecution for a capital offense, the felony-murder doctrine has no place in securing a conviction of the offense charged, Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-5-40 (c); Ex parte Ritter , 375 So.2d 270 , 273-75 (Ala. 1979), vacated on other grounds, Ritter v. Alabama , 448 U.S. 903 , 100 S.Ct. 3044 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1980), this same principle is applicable in a capital case — an accused is not guilty of capital robbery-murder where the intent to rob was formed only after the victim was killed. | 7 | 1980–1990 |
Mitchell v. State
green
2 sentences2013Felony murder, on the other hand, does not require the specific intent to kill; it requires only the intent to commit the underlying felony. § 13A-6 — 2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975; Mitchell v. State, 706 So.2d 787 (Ala.Crim.App. 1997). 2010Felony murder, on the other hand, does not require the specific intent to kill; it requires only the intent to commit the underlying felony. § 13A-6-2(a)(3), Ala.Code 1975; Mitchell v. State, 706 So.2d 787 (Ala.Crim.App.1997). | 5 | 2007–2013 |
Hydroculture, Inc. v. Coopers
green
2 sentences2001Compare Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (‘the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder’), affirmed, 555 So.2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (trial court instructed jury on ‘the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine, and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of noncap 1997Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1083 , 104 S.Ct. 1452 , 79 L.Ed.2d 770 (1984) (the trial court had properly charged the jury as to the intent necessary for capital murder, the felony murder doctrine, and as to the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and that required for the lesser included offense of non-capital murder); Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754, 763 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 435 So.2d 766 (Ala.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 , 104 S.Ct. 436 , 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983) (the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the | 4 | 1990–2001 |
Dick v. Kemp
green
2 sentences2001Compare Freeman v. State, 555 So.2d 196, 208 (Ala.Cr.App.1988) (‘the trial judge extensively instructed the jury on the difference between capital murder, felony murder, and intentional murder’), affirmed, 555 So.2d 215 (Ala.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990); Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App.1983) (trial court instructed jury on ‘the intent required for a capital felony, on the felony murder doctrine, and on the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and the intent required for the lesser included offense of noncap 1997Davis v. State, 440 So.2d 1191, 1194 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1083 , 104 S.Ct. 1452 , 79 L.Ed.2d 770 (1984) (the trial court had properly charged the jury as to the intent necessary for capital murder, the felony murder doctrine, and as to the distinction between the intent required for a capital felony and that required for the lesser included offense of non-capital murder); Womack v. State, 435 So.2d 754, 763 (Ala.Cr.App.), aff'd, 435 So.2d 766 (Ala.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 , 104 S.Ct. 436 , 78 L.Ed.2d 367 (1983) (the trial court properly instructed the jury as to the | 4 | 1990–2001 |
Crawford v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1990"Now, you would also, at that point consider the intent, consider what I said about that. [The trial court then repeated the instructions on intent quoted above]." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in his instructions did the trial court charge the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of the capital offense charged in the indictment, the jury had to find that the defendant was an accomplice in the intentional killing as opposed to being an accomplice merely in the robbery. "[I]n a prosecution for a capital offense, the felony-murder doctrine has no place in securing a conviction of the offe 1985Although, in a prosecution for a capital offense, the felony-murder doctrine has no place in securing a conviction of the offense charged, Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-5-40 (c); Ex parte Ritter , 375 So.2d 270 , 273-75 (Ala. 1979), vacated on other grounds, Ritter v. Alabama , 448 U.S. 903 , 100 S.Ct. 3044 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1980), this same principle is applicable in a capital case — an accused is not guilty of capital robbery-murder where the intent to rob was formed only after the victim was killed. | 4 | 1983–1990 |
Williamson v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1990"Now, you would also, at that point consider the intent, consider what I said about that. [The trial court then repeated the instructions on intent quoted above]." (Emphasis added.) Nowhere in his instructions did the trial court charge the jury that in order to find the defendant guilty of the capital offense charged in the indictment, the jury had to find that the defendant was an accomplice in the intentional killing as opposed to being an accomplice merely in the robbery. "[I]n a prosecution for a capital offense, the felony-murder doctrine has no place in securing a conviction of the offe 1985Although, in a prosecution for a capital offense, the felony-murder doctrine has no place in securing a conviction of the offense charged, Alabama Code 1975, § 13A-5-40 (c); Ex parte Ritter , 375 So.2d 270 , 273-75 (Ala. 1979), vacated on other grounds, Ritter v. Alabama , 448 U.S. 903 , 100 S.Ct. 3044 , 65 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1980), this same principle is applicable in a capital case — an accused is not guilty of capital robbery-murder where the intent to rob was formed only after the victim was killed. | 4 | 1983–1990 |
People v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018Barnett explains the merger doctrine as follows: " 'We have concluded that the utilization of the felony-murder rule in circumstances such as those before us[, a felonious assault,] extends the operation of [the felony-murder] rule "beyond any rational function it is designed to serve." ( People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777 , 783, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 446, 402 P.2d 130 , 134.) To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault-a 2018Barnett explains the merger doctrine as follows: " 'We have concluded that the utilization of the felony-murder rule in circumstances such as those before us[, a felonious assault,] extends the operation of [the felony-murder] rule "beyond any rational function it is designed to serve." ( People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal. 2d 777 , 783, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442 , 446, 402 P.2d 130 , 134.) To allow such use of the felony-murder rule would effectively preclude the jury from considering the issue of malice aforethought in all cases wherein homicide has been committed as a result of a felonious assault-a | 3 | 2000–2018 |
Barnett v. State
green
2 sentences2018App. 2000), in which we held 'that felonious assaults that result in the victim's death merge with the homicide and therefore cannot serve as an underlying felony for purposes of the felony-murder rule.' Id. at 930 . 2018"The majority quotes extensively from this Court's opinion in Barnett , including the following: " ' "[U]nder the merger doctrine, the elements of the underlying felony must be independent of the homicide.... " ' "To read the 'clearly dangerous to human life' language in the felony-murder rule as allowing an assault on the homicide victim to be the predicate felony for felony murder would offend the statutory construction of Alabama's homicide laws...." ' " 257 So.3d at 341 (quoting Barnett , 783 So.2d at 930 ). " Barnett also says: " '[a]n examination of Alabama's murder and manslaughter stat | 3 | 2000–2018 |
Kochevar v. State
green
2 sentences2009In Minnesota the felony-murder rule applies whenever the felony and the homicide ‘are part of one continuous transaction.’ Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn.1986) [quoting Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680 , 686-87 n. 4 (Minn.1979)]. 2003In Minnesota the felony-murder rule applies whenever the felony and the homicide "are part of one continuous transaction." Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 274 (Minn.1986) [quoting Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680 , 686-87 n. 4 (Minn.1979)]. | 3 | 1994–2009 |
State v. LaTourelle
green
2 sentences2009Thus, the felony-murder rule applies even though the underlying felony is completed after the homicide, provided the felony and homicide are parts of a single ‘continuous transaction.’ Compare State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277 (Minn. *169 1984) (defendant convicted of first degree felony-murder where defendant intended to rape victim prior to the homicide but the rape took place after the homicide) with State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn.1983) (defendant acquitted of first degree felony-murder where defendant pai'ticipated in murder of victim, then returned to murder scene a short time la 2003Thus, the felony-murder rule applies even though the underlying felony is completed after the homicide, provided the felony and homicide are parts of a single "continuous transaction." Compare State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277 (Minn.1984) (defendant convicted of first degree felony-murder where defendant intended to rape victim prior to the homicide but the rape took place after the homicide) with State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn.1983) (defendant acquitted of first degree felony-murder where defendant participated in murder of victim, then returned to murder scene a short time later to | 3 | 1994–2009 |
State v. Givens
green
2 sentences2009Thus, the felony-murder rule applies even though the underlying felony is completed after the homicide, provided the felony and homicide are parts of a single ‘continuous transaction.’ Compare State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277 (Minn. *169 1984) (defendant convicted of first degree felony-murder where defendant intended to rape victim prior to the homicide but the rape took place after the homicide) with State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn.1983) (defendant acquitted of first degree felony-murder where defendant pai'ticipated in murder of victim, then returned to murder scene a short time la 2003Thus, the felony-murder rule applies even though the underlying felony is completed after the homicide, provided the felony and homicide are parts of a single "continuous transaction." Compare State v. LaTourelle, 343 N.W.2d 277 (Minn.1984) (defendant convicted of first degree felony-murder where defendant intended to rape victim prior to the homicide but the rape took place after the homicide) with State v. Givens, 332 N.W.2d 187 (Minn.1983) (defendant acquitted of first degree felony-murder where defendant participated in murder of victim, then returned to murder scene a short time later to | 3 | 1994–2009 |
| Ex Parte Travis green | 3 | 2002–2005 |
Travis v. State
green
2 sentences2005Travis v. State , 776 So.2d 819 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), aff'd, 776 So.2d 874 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1081 , 121 S.Ct. 785 , 148 L.Ed.2d 681 (2001). 2003Travis v. State , 776 So.2d 819 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998), aff'd, 776 So.2d 874 (Ala. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1081 , 121 S.Ct. 785 , 148 L.Ed.2d 681 (2001). | 3 | 2002–2005 |
| Travis v. Alabama green | 3 | 2002–2005 |
| Perez Davila v. United States green | 3 | 2002–2005 |
| Grimes v. Heckler green | 3 | 1991–2001 |
| Malik v. California green | 3 | 1991–2001 |
| Ex Parte Coulter green | 3 | 1994–1999 |
| People v. Ireland green | 2 | 2016–2018 |
| Daniel v. Thigpen green | 2 | 1991–1996 |
| Lewis v. State green | 2 | 1988–1990 |
| Evans v. State green | 2 | 1979–1990 |
| Jones v. State green | 2 | 1979–1980 |
| State v. Mitchell green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Washington v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Ex Parte State green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Lashley green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Malaske v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Parks v. State neutral | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| State v. Correra green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Thompson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Ex Parte Dobyne green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Conway v. State green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Ex Parte Johnson green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.