felony-murder doctrine in New York

1997Victory v New York, 416 US 905 ).

1976Victory v New York, 416 US 905 .) The felony murder doctrine infers from the intent to commit one of nine serious felonies the intent to commit, if necessary, a murder in order to achieve the criminal purpose.

1996Even more to the point, we observed in People v Berzups ( 49 NY2d 417, 427 , supra) that both the "historical development of the felony murder doctrine and the legislative policy reflected in its current statutory descendant * * * underscore the fact that the corpus of the crime is the killing of another.” * As a matter of policy, New York has an interest in deterring and punishing dangerous and destructive acts that result in a death within its borders.

1981This view accords with the historical development of the felony murder doctrine and the legislative policy reflected in its current statutory descendant, both of which underscore the fact that the corpus of the crime is the killing of another.” (People v Berzups, 49 NY2d 417, 427 .) Thus, even were we to hold the Sandstrom charge improper, it would not affect the outcome for it was not necessary for the prosecution here to establish an intent to kill.

1972People v. Cline ( 270 Cal. App. 2d 328 , Ann. 32 ALR 3d 582 [1969]) applied the felony murder doctrine as the basis for a homicide prosecution against a seller of dangerous drugs where death ensued from the use thereof.

1972People v. Cline ( 270 Cal. App. 2d 328 , Ann. 32 ALR 3d 582 [1969]) applied the felony murder doctrine as the basis for a homicide prosecution against a seller of dangerous drugs where death ensued from the use thereof.

2019People v Matos ( 83 NY2d 509 [1994]), holds that the felony murder rule applies to a defendant whose rooftop flight from the police resulted in the falling death of a pursuing officer because “it should also be foreseeable that someone might fall while in hot pursuit across urban roofs in the middle of the night” (id. at 512).

2019Matter of Anthony M. ( 63 NY2d 270 [1984]), held that defendants could be held to have caused the cardiac-arrest deaths of their assault victims, who had no prior history of cardiac trouble, where medical evidence supported the conclusion that the stress of the assaults caused the fatal heart attacks days later.

2018Intent to kill plays no role in a finding of felony murder ( see People v Howard , 241 AD2d 920 , 921 [4th Dept 1997], lv denied 90 NY2d 940 [1997]; see Matter of King v New York State Div. of Parole , 190 AD2d 423, 433-434 [1st Dept 1993] [holding that BOP erred in relying on felony murder conviction as aggravating factor supporting denial of parole], affd 83 NY2d 788 [1994]).

2003The very purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to utilize the underlying felony as a substitute for the defendant's murderous intent and thereby raise an unintentional killing to the level of murder ( see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585 [1997]; People v Lytton, 257 NY 310 [1931]).

2003The very purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to utilize the underlying felony as a substitute for the defendant’s murderous intent and thereby raise an unintentional killing to the level of murder (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585 [1997]; People v Lytton, 257 NY 310 [1931]).

2003I can only reply that expanding "merger" is what we called what we refused to do in Miller and what the majority does here; and that when the California Supreme Court did exactly what the majority now does, that court talked in terms of "merger" ( see n 10, supra ).

2003The very purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to utilize the underlying felony as a substitute for the defendant's murderous intent and thereby raise an unintentional killing to the level of murder ( see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585 [1997]; People v Lytton, 257 NY 310 [1931]).

2003The very purpose of the felony murder doctrine is to utilize the underlying felony as a substitute for the defendant’s murderous intent and thereby raise an unintentional killing to the level of murder (see People v Chico, 90 NY2d 585 [1997]; People v Lytton, 257 NY 310 [1931]).

2003In rejecting this contention, the court noted that a similar argument had been rejected in Hamilton , and quoted the passage from Hamilton in which it had declined to adopt what it referred to as New York’s “independent felony test” (Talbot, 64 Cal 2d at 703, 414 P2d at 641 ). .

2003In rejecting this contention, the court noted that a similar argument had been rejected in Hamilton , and quoted the passage from Hamilton in which it had declined to adopt what it referred to as New York's "independent felony test" ( Talbot, 64 Cal 2d at 703, 414 P2d at 641 ). [10] The California Supreme Court continues to hew the Wilson line.

1997Under the felony murder doctrine, an accomplice in the underlying act may be vicariously liable for the act of another participant under common-law principles of accessorial and conspiratorial liability (see, People v Bornholdt, 33 NY2d 75, 85 , cert denied sub nom.

1994Under the felony murder rule, felons fleeing in a speeding car which crashes and kills an innocent person are all equally responsible for that obviously foreseeable consequence, regardless of which felon was actually driving and notwithstanding the possibility that police conduct during the chase may have been a contributing cause of the crash (People v Falu, 138 AD2d 510 , lv denied 71 NY2d 1026 ).

1993Variations on the felony murder doctrine were widespread in American jurisprudence, with liability turning on such factors as whether the victim was one of the felons, whether the felons initiated the gun battle and whether the deceased had been used as a shield by defendant (see, People v Washington, 62 Cal 2d 777, 402 P2d 130 , supra; Commonwealth v Redline, supra).

1993Under the traditional felony murder doctrine, the malice necessary to make the killing murder was constructively imputed from the mens rea incidental to perpetration of the underlying felony (Commonwealth v Redline, 391 Pa 486, 493-494, 137 A2d 472, 475 , supra; IV Blackstone, Commentaries, at 200-201).

1991(People v Miller, 32 NY2d 157, 160 .) In the case at bar, the felony murder charge is predicated on robbery in the first degree, the third count of the indictment.

1988Statutory provisions enacted by the Legislature and signed into law by the Governor stand for what their words manifest rather than the inner thoughts of a draftsman or adviser, irrespective of the contents of any memorandum written by a drafter of the legislation (People v Graham, 55 NY2d 144, 151 ; accord, Matter of Daniel C., 99 AD2d 35, 41 , affd 63 NY2d 927 ).

1984Smith v Myers, 438 Pa 218, supra; Evans v State, 28 Md App 640, affd 278 Md 197; State v Galoway, 275 NW2d 736 [Iowa]; Grant v State, 60 Tex Crim Rep 358; State v Millette, 112 NH 458; Commonwealth v Watkins, 375 Mass 472; People v Aaron, supra; State v Doucette, supra).

1984Smith v Myers, 438 Pa 218, supra; Evans v State, 28 Md App 640, affd 278 Md 197; State v Galoway, 275 NW2d 736 [Iowa]; Grant v State, 60 Tex Crim Rep 358; State v Millette, 112 NH 458; Commonwealth v Watkins, 375 Mass 472; People v Aaron, supra; State v Doucette, supra).

1984As a result of the criticism, Hawaii, Kentucky and England (the originators of the felony murder doctrine) abolished the felony murder doctrine (see State v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 , supra; State v Doucette, 143 Vt 573, supra).

1981(See, e.g., Rex v Jarmain, 1 KB 74 [1946]; State v Thorne, 39 Utah 208 ; Rex v Elnick, 33 Can Crim Cases 174.) In People v Morlock (46 Cal 2d 141), for example, the aimless, accidental, and unpredictable discharge of a firearm wielded by a robber was enough to trigger that State’s felony murder rule.

1981For example, in People v Wood ( 8 NY2d 48 ) defendant and several accomplices engaged in a gun battle with a police officer.

1980Manifesting this analysis is our recent decision in People v Davis ( 46 NY2d 780 ), which held the corroboration requirement imposed by CPL 60.50 inapplicable to the underlying felony of robbery in a felony murder conviction (see People v Murray, 40 NY2d 327 ).

1980Manifesting this analysis is our recent decision in People v Davis ( 46 NY2d 780 ), which held the corroboration requirement imposed by CPL 60.50 inapplicable to the underlying felony of robbery in a felony murder conviction (see People v Murray, 40 NY2d 327 ).