felony-murder rule in Wyoming

2017Subsequently, in Bouwkamp, 833 P.2d at 491 , we addressed the propriety of a jury instruction providing that “For the purposes of establishing the crime of felony murder, a killing which occurred in the perpetration of a robbery, the sequence of events is unimportant and the killing may precede, coincide with or follow the robbery and still be committed in its perpetration.” The defendant claimed that the instruction dictated that the jury apply the felony murder rule even where both the intent to commit the felony and the act itself followed the murder as a separate transaction.

2017Id. at 492 .

1992The applicable statutory authority for this case would read: "Whoever ... in the perpetration of ... robbery ... kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree." The definitive interpretation of the felony murder rule was announced by this court in Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (1976), reh'g denied 558 P.2d 509 (1977).

1992The applicable statutory authority for this case would read: “Whoever ... in the perpetration of ... robbery ... kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree.” The definitive interpretation of the felony murder rule was announced by this court in Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (1976), reh’g denied 558 P.2d 509 (1977).

2025Bear Cloud III, ¶¶ 46- 47, 334 P.3d at 146 .

2017(Internal citation omitted.) Similarly, in Amado, 756 A.2d at 284 , the court explained: [O]ur holding [that a defendant charged with felony murder may not rely on a claim of self-defense] is consistent with the purpose underlying felony murder, which is “to punish those whose conduct brought about an unintended death in the commission or attempted commission of a felony....

2017For example, in People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 170 , 226 Cal.Rptr. at 219 , the court reasoned that: The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter even accidental killings in the commission of designated felonies by holding the felon strictly liable for murder.

2017For example, in People v. Loustaunau, 181 Cal. App. 3d at 170 , 226 Cal.Rptr. at 219 , the court reasoned that: The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter even accidental killings in the commission of designated felonies by holding the felon strictly liable for murder.

2007We held a defendant is not entitled to such an instruction because "that approach has no place in the felony murder doctrine." Id.

1995In Cloman, 574 P.2d at 420 , we also quoted from People v. Jentry, 69 Cal.App.3d 615 ,138 CaLRptr. 250, 258 (1977), a ease involving facts similar to this case: “ * ⅜ * We have concluded, however, that the fact that the victim was dead does not render inapplicable the felony-murder doctrine when, as here, the blows causing the death and the maiming took place as part of one continuous transaction.” We have held the determination of the existence of a “continuous transaction” is a question for the jury.

1992Death must be a consequence of the felony ... and not merely coincidence.' (Citing authority.)" (Emphasis in original.) Weinberger, 671 P.2d at 569 .

1992Death must be a consequence of the felony ... and not merely coincidence.’ (Citing authority.)” (Emphasis in original.) Weinberger, 671 P.2d at 569 .

1992We conclude that the same bootstrapping is involved in instructing a jury that the intent to assault makes the entry burglary and that the burglary raises the homicide resulting from the assault to first degree murder without proof of malice aforethought and premeditation." ( People v. Wilson (1969) 1 *532 Cal.3d 431, 441, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 .) We thus concluded that "a burglary based on intent to assault ... cannot support a felony-murder instruction." ( Ibid.; see also People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 804 , 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 .) Although the instruction was err

1992We conclude that the same bootstrapping is involved in instructing a jury that the intent to assault makes the entry burglary and that the burglary raises the homicide resulting from the assault to first degree murder without proof of malice aforethought and premeditation." ( People v. Wilson (1969) 1 *532 Cal.3d 431, 441, 82 Cal.Rptr. 494 , 462 P.2d 22 .) We thus concluded that "a burglary based on intent to assault ... cannot support a felony-murder instruction." ( Ibid.; see also People v. Smith (1984) 35 Cal.3d 798, 804 , 201 Cal.Rptr. 311 , 678 P.2d 886 .) Although the instruction was err

1992The applicable statutory authority for this case would read: "Whoever ... in the perpetration of ... robbery ... kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree." The definitive interpretation of the felony murder rule was announced by this court in Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (1976), reh'g denied 558 P.2d 509 (1977).

1992The applicable statutory authority for this case would read: “Whoever ... in the perpetration of ... robbery ... kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree.” The definitive interpretation of the felony murder rule was announced by this court in Richmond v. State, 554 P.2d 1217 (1976), reh’g denied 558 P.2d 509 (1977).

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United *159 States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide." That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction ( Sandstrom ), or a form of criminal strict liability ( Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United *159 States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide." That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction ( Sandstrom ), or a form of criminal strict liability ( Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible “that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide.” That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction (Sandstrom), or a form of criminal strict liability (Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United States

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United *159 States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide." That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction ( Sandstrom ), or a form of criminal strict liability ( Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible “that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide.” That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction (Sandstrom), or a form of criminal strict liability (Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United States

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United *159 States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide." That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction ( Sandstrom ), or a form of criminal strict liability ( Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United *159 States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide." That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction ( Sandstrom ), or a form of criminal strict liability ( Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United

1991Despite the widespread criticism, the felony-murder rule persists in the vast majority of states. * * * The United *159 States thus remains virtually the only western country still recognizing a rule which makes it possible "that the most serious sanctions known to law might be imposed for accidental homicide." That article examines two constitutional concepts as challenging the Eighth Amendment and Due Process: a presumptive device in criminal conviction ( Sandstrom ), or a form of criminal strict liability ( Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and United

1991Cf. People v. Land, 169 Ill.App.3d 342 , 119 Ill.Dec. 955 , 523 N.E.2d 711 (1988) (intent in the underlying felony); and Jones v. State, 523 N.E.2d 750 (Ind.1988).

1991Cf. People v. Land, 169 Ill.

1991Cf. People v. Land, 169 Ill.App.3d 342 , 119 Ill.Dec. 955 , 523 N.E.2d 711 (1988) (intent in the underlying felony); and Jones v. State, 523 N.E.2d 750 (Ind.1988).

1991We distinguish Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 , reh. denied 485 U.S. 944 , 108 S.Ct. 1126 , 99 L.Ed.2d 286 (1988), which involved the killing of three persons and a conviction of three counts of first degree murder in Louisiana.

1991We distinguish Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 , reh. denied 485 U.S. 944 , 108 S.Ct. 1126 , 99 L.Ed.2d 286 (1988), which involved the killing of three persons and a conviction of three counts of first degree murder in Louisiana.

1991We distinguish Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 , reh. denied 485 U.S. 944 , 108 S.Ct. 1126 , 99 L.Ed.2d 286 (1988), which involved the killing of three persons and a conviction of three counts of first degree murder in Louisiana.

1991We distinguish Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 246 , 108 S.Ct. 546 , 98 L.Ed.2d 568 , reh. denied 485 U.S. 944 , 108 S.Ct. 1126 , 99 L.Ed.2d 286 (1988), which involved the killing of three persons and a conviction of three counts of first degree murder in Louisiana.