felony-murder rule in Missouri

2020If the legislature had wanted to exclude from the otherwise all-encompassing “any felony” language in Section 565.021.1(2) specific felonies or types of felonies—as it had done in prior iterations of the felony-murder rule in earlier versions of the statutes—it certainly could have used less expansive language than “any felony.” The only limitation on what felonies can predicate felony-murder—as the Western and Southern Districts have found— is set out in Section 565.021.2, which expressly permits the punishment for felony-murder to be cumulative to punishment for an underlying felony “other t

2018See id. ; *862 Burrell , 160 S.W.3d at 803 ("Under Missouri law, a defendant is responsible for any deaths that are the natural and proximate result of the commission of the felony.") (emphasis added); State v. Moore , 580 S.W.2d 747 , 752 (Mo. banc 1979) ("Whether the fatal act was done by the defendant, an accomplice, another victim, or a bystander is, under the facts here, not controlling."); State v. Williams , 24 S.W.3d 101 , 110 (Mo. App. 2000) ("The purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter the commission of homicides during felonious activity by holding the felon liable for murder,

2020If the legislature had wanted to exclude from the otherwise all-encompassing “any felony” language in Section 565.021.1(2) specific felonies or types of felonies—as it had done in prior iterations of the felony-murder rule in earlier versions of the statutes—it certainly could have used less expansive language than “any felony.” The only limitation on what felonies can predicate felony-murder—as the Western and Southern Districts have found— is set out in Section 565.021.2, which expressly permits the punishment for felony-murder to be cumulative to punishment for an underlying felony “other t

2016“The felony-murder rule permits the felonious intent necessary to a murder conviction to be shown by the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony.” State v. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Mo. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2001The felony murder rule “permits the felonious intent necessary for a murder conviction to be shown by the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony.” State v. Bouser, 17 S.W.3d 130, 135 (Mo. App.1999); citing State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. banc 1975).

2000The felony-murder rule “permits the felonious intent necessary to a murder conviction to be shown by the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony.” State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. banc 1975), overruled on other grounds by State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Mo. banc 1980).

2018"A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree [felony murder] if he [or she] ... commits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of such felony ... another person is killed as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony...." § 565.021.1(2). "[T]he practical effect of the felony murder rule ... is that [it] permits the felonious intent necessary to a murder conviction to be shown by the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony." State v. Rumble , 680 S.W.2d 939 , 942 (Mo. banc 1984) (internal quotes

2017Analysis “A person commits the offense of murder in the second degree [felony murder] if he or she ... commits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of such felony ... another person is killed as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony ...Section 566.021.1(2) (emphasis added). 3 “[T]he practical effect of the felony-murder rule [is that it] permits the felonious intent necessary to a murder conviction to be shown by the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony.” State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Mo. b

2018See id. ; *862 Burrell , 160 S.W.3d at 803 ("Under Missouri law, a defendant is responsible for any deaths that are the natural and proximate result of the commission of the felony.") (emphasis added); State v. Moore , 580 S.W.2d 747 , 752 (Mo. banc 1979) ("Whether the fatal act was done by the defendant, an accomplice, another victim, or a bystander is, under the facts here, not controlling."); State v. Williams , 24 S.W.3d 101 , 110 (Mo. App. 2000) ("The purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter the commission of homicides during felonious activity by holding the felon liable for murder,

1982Judge Smith in the direct appeal opinion (State v. Blackmon, supra) pointed out that our Supreme Court in State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. banc 1979) held that where a person is killed during the course of a felony, the felony murder rule is applicable whether the fatal shot is delivered by the defendant, a co-participant, a victim or a bystander, unless there has been an independent intervening act.

1986The court rejected the contention, citing and quoting from State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926 , 98 S.W.2d 632, 637 [5] (1936), which held that the statute applies where the initial crime and the homicide were parts of one continuous transaction, and were closely connected in point of time, place and causal relation, and “The same rule has been followed in cases of attempted robbery where there was no asportation, * * See also State v. Fulsom, 534 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.App.1976), where the defendant claimed that there was no evidence that he announced a holdup, or demanded any money or property, and did not a

1986The court rejected the contention, citing and quoting from State v. Adams, 339 Mo. 926 , 98 S.W.2d 632, 637 [5] (1936), which held that the statute applies where the initial crime and the homicide were parts of one continuous transaction, and were closely connected in point of time, place and causal relation, and “The same rule has been followed in cases of attempted robbery where there was no asportation, * * See also State v. Fulsom, 534 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.App.1976), where the defendant claimed that there was no evidence that he announced a holdup, or demanded any money or property, and did not a

2008See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 647-48 , 111 S.Ct. 2491 , 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991); State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 517 (Mo. banc 1994), overruled on other grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885 (Mo. banc 2008).

1997See, e.g., State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 517 (Mo. banc 1994); State v. Six, 805 S.W.2d 159, 164 (Mo. banc 1991).

1964In the case of State v. Bradley, supra, 234 S.W.2d 556, 558 (1) the court said: ‘* * * the proof that the homicide was committed in the perpetration of robbery was tantamount to proof of the constituent elements of the crime of murder in the first degree.’ And see State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181 , 188 S.W.2d 43 , 189 S.W.2d 541 ; State v. Meadows, supra [ 330 Mo. 1020 ], 51 S.W.2d 1033, 1037 (11) ; State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304, 308 (4).” Defendant contends that under the facts .and circumstances of this case there can be no application of the felony-murder doctrine because there wa

1964In the case of State v. Bradley, supra, 234 S.W.2d 556, 558 (1) the court said: ‘* * * the proof that the homicide was committed in the perpetration of robbery was tantamount to proof of the constituent elements of the crime of murder in the first degree.’ And see State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181 , 188 S.W.2d 43 , 189 S.W.2d 541 ; State v. Meadows, supra [ 330 Mo. 1020 ], 51 S.W.2d 1033, 1037 (11) ; State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304, 308 (4).” Defendant contends that under the facts .and circumstances of this case there can be no application of the felony-murder doctrine because there wa

1964In the case of State v. Bradley, supra, 234 S.W.2d 556, 558 (1) the court said: ‘* * * the proof that the homicide was committed in the perpetration of robbery was tantamount to proof of the constituent elements of the crime of murder in the first degree.’ And see State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181 , 188 S.W.2d 43 , 189 S.W.2d 541 ; State v. Meadows, supra [ 330 Mo. 1020 ], 51 S.W.2d 1033, 1037 (11) ; State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304, 308 (4).” Defendant contends that under the facts .and circumstances of this case there can be no application of the felony-murder doctrine because there wa

1964In the case of State v. Bradley, supra, 234 S.W.2d 556, 558 (1) the court said: ‘* * * the proof that the homicide was committed in the perpetration of robbery was tantamount to proof of the constituent elements of the crime of murder in the first degree.’ And see State v. Cole, 354 Mo. 181 , 188 S.W.2d 43 , 189 S.W.2d 541 ; State v. Meadows, supra [ 330 Mo. 1020 ], 51 S.W.2d 1033, 1037 (11) ; State v. Reese, 364 Mo. 1221 , 274 S.W.2d 304, 308 (4).” Defendant contends that under the facts .and circumstances of this case there can be no application of the felony-murder doctrine because there wa

2013Point II: No Error in Giving Instructions No. 8 and No. 9 In his second point, Simino raises the “merger doctrine” as grounds for arguing the trial court erred in submitting a conventional second-degree murder instruction (Instruction 6) and the alternative felony-murder instruction (Instruction 8) based on domestic assault. 9 The “merger doctrine” is a judicially created “ ‘means of limiting or barring application of the felony-murder rule’ when the act causing the homicide is indivisible from the act providing the basis for the underlying felony.” State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Mo. A

2013Point II: No Error in Giving Instructions No. 8 and No. 9 In his second point, Simino raises the “merger doctrine” as grounds for arguing the trial court erred in submitting a conventional second-degree murder instruction (Instruction 6) and the alternative felony-murder instruction (Instruction 8) based on domestic assault. 9 The “merger doctrine” is a judicially created “ ‘means of limiting or barring application of the felony-murder rule’ when the act causing the homicide is indivisible from the act providing the basis for the underlying felony.” State v. Williams, 24 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Mo. A

2000The felony-murder rule “permits the felonious intent necessary to a murder conviction to be shown by the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate a felony.” State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. banc 1975), overruled on other grounds by State v. Morgan, 592 S.W.2d 796, 801 (Mo. banc 1980).

1980She could not thereafter be convicted of robbery because, under Morgan, supra , the murder (submitted under the felony-murder doctrine) and the robbery were the same offense and she had been acquitted by a jury of the murder.

1987See State v. Daugherty, 631 S.W.2d 637, 645 (Mo.1982); State v. Fuhr, 626 S.W.2d 379 (Mo.1982); State v. Gardner, 618 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Mo.1981). 3 Therefore it was not error to give the felony-murder instruction at movant’s trial.

1983We find the authority of State v. Daugherty, 631 S.W.2d 637 (Mo.1982) to be controlling.

1981The law conclusively presumes the intent to kill.” In State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 719-20 , 50 S.W.2d 1049, 1053 (1932), a case involving application of the felony-murder rule to murder in the first degree, the Court cited Wieners with approval, and then articulated the standard “that even though the homicide be unintentional, yet if it be committed in course of perpetrating the felony, and is a natural and proximate result thereof, such as the defendant reasonably was bound to anticipate — and therefore especially where the felony is dangerous and betokens a reckless disregard of human life

1981The law conclusively presumes the intent to kill.” In State v. Glover, 330 Mo. 709, 719-20 , 50 S.W.2d 1049, 1053 (1932), a case involving application of the felony-murder rule to murder in the first degree, the Court cited Wieners with approval, and then articulated the standard “that even though the homicide be unintentional, yet if it be committed in course of perpetrating the felony, and is a natural and proximate result thereof, such as the defendant reasonably was bound to anticipate — and therefore especially where the felony is dangerous and betokens a reckless disregard of human life

1977State v. Mudgett, 531 S.W.2d 275, 278-279 (Mo. banc 1975); State v. Jasper, 486 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Mo. banc 1972); State v. Lindsey, 333 Mo. 139 , 62 S.W.2d 420, 425 (1933); State v. *168 Robinett, 279 S.W. 696 , 700 (Mo.1926).

1977State v. Mudgett, 531 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. banc 1975).

2020Bouser, 17 S.W.3d at 140 . 10 While there is no case in the Eastern District explicitly holding that the merger doctrine is no longer viable under the current statute, we have acknowledged that “modern precedent” such as Williams “suggests that the merger doctrine has been abrogated.” State v. Gray, 347 S.W.3d 490, 508 (Mo. App. E.D. 2011).

2020If the legislature had wanted to exclude from the otherwise all-encompassing “any felony” language in Section 565.021.1(2) specific felonies or types of felonies—as it had done in prior iterations of the felony-murder rule in earlier versions of the statutes—it certainly could have used less expansive language than “any felony.” The only limitation on what felonies can predicate felony-murder—as the Western and Southern Districts have found— is set out in Section 565.021.2, which expressly permits the punishment for felony-murder to be cumulative to punishment for an underlying felony “other t

2020If the legislature had wanted to exclude from the otherwise all-encompassing “any felony” language in Section 565.021.1(2) specific felonies or types of felonies—as it had done in prior iterations of the felony-murder rule in earlier versions of the statutes—it certainly could have used less expansive language than “any felony.” The only limitation on what felonies can predicate felony-murder—as the Western and Southern Districts have found— is set out in Section 565.021.2, which expressly permits the punishment for felony-murder to be cumulative to punishment for an underlying felony “other t

2018See id. ; *862 Burrell , 160 S.W.3d at 803 ("Under Missouri law, a defendant is responsible for any deaths that are the natural and proximate result of the commission of the felony.") (emphasis added); State v. Moore , 580 S.W.2d 747 , 752 (Mo. banc 1979) ("Whether the fatal act was done by the defendant, an accomplice, another victim, or a bystander is, under the facts here, not controlling."); State v. Williams , 24 S.W.3d 101 , 110 (Mo. App. 2000) ("The purpose of the felony murder rule is to deter the commission of homicides during felonious activity by holding the felon liable for murder,

2017Cf. State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998) (“In order to apply the felony-murder doctrine: the underlying felony must be one which is inherently dangerous to human life , where K.S.A.

2017Cf. State v. Smallwood, 264 Kan. 69 , 955 P.2d 1209 (1998) (“In order to apply the felony-murder doctrine: the underlying felony must be one which is inherently dangerous to human life , where K.S.A.

2016State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 37 (Mo. banc 1992); see also State v. Immekus, 28 S.W.3d 421, 432-33 (Mo. App. 2000); State v. Binnington, 978 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Mo. App. 1998); State v. Powers, 913 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Colson, 926 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Mo. App. 1996). 6 The trial court also stated that it was refusing Mr. Blurton’s second degree felony murder instruction because the state had not charged Mr. Blurton with the underlying felony of robbery in the second degree, robbery in the second degree was inconsistent with Mr. Blurton’s alibi defense, and the facts in evide

2016State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 37 (Mo. banc 1992); see also State v. Immekus, 28 S.W.3d 421, 432-33 (Mo. App. 2000); State v. Binnington, 978 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Mo. App. 1998); State v. Powers, 913 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Colson, 926 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Mo. App. 1996). 6 The trial court also stated that it was refusing Mr. Blurton’s second degree felony murder instruction because the state had not charged Mr. Blurton with the underlying felony of robbery in the second degree, robbery in the second degree was inconsistent with Mr. Blurton’s alibi defense, and the facts in evide

2016State v. Parkhurst, 845 S.W.2d 31, 37 (Mo. banc 1992); see also State v. Immekus, 28 S.W.3d 421, 432-33 (Mo. App. 2000); State v. Binnington, 978 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Mo. App. 1998); State v. Powers, 913 S.W.2d 138, 142 (Mo. App. 1996); State v. Colson, 926 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Mo. App. 1996). 6 The trial court also stated that it was refusing Mr. Blurton’s second degree felony murder instruction because the state had not charged Mr. Blurton with the underlying felony of robbery in the second degree, robbery in the second degree was inconsistent with Mr. Blurton’s alibi defense, and the facts in evide