49 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1963–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Aarongreen2 sentences2026Specifically, in cases in which “the death was purely accidental, application of the felony-murder doctrine is unjust and should be precluded.” Id. at 731 . 2025The issue in Aaron was “whether Michigan has a felony murder rule which allows the element of malice required for murder to be satisfied by the intent to commit the underlying felony” and what mens rea was “required to support a conviction under Michigan’s first-degree murder statute.” Aaron, 409 Mich at 687 . | 7 | 15 |
People v. Podolskigreen2 sentences1968See People v. Podolski (1952), 332 Mich 508 . * *440 Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by a patent application of the felony-murder rule to bim as an accomplice as the result of the fatal shooting of a police officer by his partner when the 2 men were attempting to escape from a bank in Benton Harbor where they had just committed a robbery. 1963If the lethal act is in furtherance of their common purpose, the accomplice is guilty even though there was an express agreement not to kill, and even if he actually attempts to prevent the homicide (People v. Friedman, 205 NY 161 [ 98 NE 471 , 45 LRA NS 55]). * * * “Although several jurisdictions (People v. Wilburn [Cal App], 314 P2d 590 affirmed 49 Cal 2d 714 [ 321 P2d 452 ] ; People v. Podolski, 332 Mich 508 ; cf. People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal App 2d 52 [87 *31 P2d 364]) would, by application of the proximate cause theory, hold a felon responsible for a homicide committed, by someone other th | 2 | 6 |
People v. Morringreen2 sentences1980In the context of the felony-murder rule, proof of a "basic" or "evidentiary" fact, that is, the intent to commit a felony, establishes, as a matter of law, the existence of the "ultimate" or "elemental" fact, malice. [13] See, e.g., Justice FITZGERALD'S opinion, p 714. [14] See id., Perkins on Criminal Law (2d ed), p 46, quoted in People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 322, fn 28 ; Moreland, Law of Homicide (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952), pp 205-206. 1977See, e.g., People v Carter, 387 Mich 397 ; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), People v Austin, 370 Mich 12 ; 120 NW2d 766 (1963), People v Podolski, 332 Mich 508 ; 52 NW2d 201 (1952). [9] People v Morrin, 31 Mich App 301, 310 ; 187 NW2d 434, 439 (1971). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Tillgreen2 sentences1980People v Till, 80 Mich App 16 ; 263 NW2d 586 (1977) (Michigan does have a felony-murder rule). 1980People v Till, 80 Mich App 16 ; 263 NW2d 586 (1977) (Michigan does have a felony-murder rule). | 1 | 5 |
People v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1995In Wilson , the California Supreme Court adopted the merger doctrine to ameliorate the perceived harshness and injustice of the common-law felony-murder rule codified by the California legislature: "The purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from killing negligently or accidentally by holding them strictly responsible for killings they commit.” People v Washington, 62 Cal 2d 777, 781; 44 Cal Rptr 442; 402 P2d 130 (1965). 1980Nothing could be farther from the common-law concept which is that one perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a dangerous felony "possesses a malevolent state of mind which the law calls ’malice’; * * *” in other words the intent to engage in such a felony is malice aforethought.’” In support of the last sentence in this quotation, Perkins cites, in fn 19 at p 45, these authorities: " 'The felony-murder doctrine ascribes malice aforethought to the felon who kills in the perpetration of an inherently dangerous felony.’ People v Washington, 62 Cal 2d 777, 780; 44 Cal Rptr 442, 445; 402 P2d 130 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Cartergreen2 sentences1980It would appear, by virtue of this Court’s decision in People v Jeffrey Carter, 387 Mich 397 ; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), that the felony-murder rule, if it existed at all in Michigan, applied only upon proof of the intent to commit a statutorily enumerated felony. 1980It would appear, by virtue of this Court’s decision in People v Jeffrey Carter, 387 Mich 397 ; 197 NW2d 57 (1972), that the felony-murder rule, if it existed at all in Michigan, applied only upon proof of the intent to commit a statutorily enumerated felony. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Dumasgreen2 sentences2020See also id. at 689-698 (discussing the historical development of the common-law felony-murder doctrine). 10 Id. at 733 (holding that under the Michigan felony-murder statute, the mental element of murder is not satisfied by proof of the intention to commit the underlying felony, but instead must be separately shown). 11 Id.; see also People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 397 ; 563 NW2d 31 (1997) (opinion by RILEY, J.) (noting that after Aaron, “the people must prove one of the three intents that define malice in every murder case”); id. at 414 (BOYLE, J., dissenting) (“The teaching of Aaron is that m 2020See also id. at 689-698 (discussing the historical development of the common-law felony-murder doctrine). 10 Id. at 733 (holding that under the Michigan felony-murder statute, the mental element of murder is not satisfied by proof of the intention to commit the underlying felony, but instead must be separately shown). 11 Id.; see also People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 397 ; 563 NW2d 31 (1997) (opinion by RILEY, J.) (noting that after Aaron, “the people must prove one of the three intents that define malice in every murder case”); id. at 414 (BOYLE, J., dissenting) (“The teaching of Aaron is that m | 1 | 1 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen2 sentences2006The felony-murder rule was adopted by the colonies and, following the American Revolution, “became a part of the common law or statutory provisions of [nearly] every American state.” Rodriguez v State, 953 SW2d 342, 346 (Tex App, 1997). 2006The felony-murder rule was adopted by the colonies and, following the American Revolution, "became a part of the common law or statutory provisions of [nearly] every American state." Rodriguez v. State, 953 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex.App., 1997). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Bossgreen2 sentences2006Bizup v People, 150 Colo 214, 218; 371 P2d 786 (1962) (holding that the felony-murder rule applies to a murder committed after the elements of armed robbery were met); see also People v Boss, 210 Cal 245, 251; 290 P 881 (1930) (holding that a murder committed during an escape from the scene of an armed robbery is felony murder because “[t]he escape of the robbers with the loot, by means of arms, necessarily is as important to the execution of the plan as gaining possession of the property”). 2006Bizup v. People, 150 Colo. 214, 218 , 371 P.2d 786 (1962) (holding that the felony-murder rule applies to a murder committed after the elements of armed robbery were met); see also People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 251 , 290 P. 881 (1930) (holding that a murder committed during an escape from the scene of an armed robbery is felony murder because "[t]he escape of the robbers with the loot, by means of arms, necessarily is as important to the execution of the plan as gaining possession of the property"). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Kellygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Louisville, Evansville, & St. Louis Railroad v. Clarkegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Smith v. Myersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lockett v. Ohiogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Arnettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Allensworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Cookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Orlewicz
green
2 sentences2020“The felony-murder doctrine does not apply if the intent to steal the victim’s property was not formed until after the homicide.” People v Orlewicz, 293 Mich App 96, 111 ; 809 NW2d 194 (2011). 2020“The felony-murder doctrine does not apply if the intent to steal the victim’s property was not formed until after the homicide.” People v Orlewicz, 293 Mich App 96, 111 ; 809 NW2d 194 (2011). | 6 | 2017–2020 |
People v. Brannon
green
2 sentences2022To the contrary, this Court has previously held that “the felony-murder doctrine will not apply if the intent to steal property of the victim was not formed until after the homicide.” People v Brannon, 194 Mich App 121, 125 ; 486 NW2d 83 (1992). 2022To the contrary, this Court has previously held that “the felony-murder doctrine will not apply if the intent to steal property of the victim was not formed until after the homicide.” People v Brannon, 194 Mich App 121, 125 ; 486 NW2d 83 (1992). | 4 | 2011–2022 |
People v. Austin
green
2 sentences1980In People v William Austin, 370 Mich 12 ; 120 NW2d 766 (1963), this Court adopted the Pennsylvania Redline 116 limitation on the felony-murder rule. 117 The Austin Court held that the killing of a felon by the intended robbery victim was a justifiable homicide and that the felony-murder rule would not be extended to hold the co-felons accountable for the death. 1980In People v William Austin, 370 Mich 12 ; 120 NW2d 766 (1963), this Court adopted the Pennsylvania Redline 116 limitation on the felony-murder rule. 117 The Austin Court held that the killing of a felon by the intended robbery victim was a justifiable homicide and that the felony-murder rule would not be extended to hold the co-felons accountable for the death. | 4 | 1973–1980 |
People v. Pavlic
green
2 sentences1995As in the case of gross negligence, there is a culpable mental state, "the intent to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury.” Pavlic, supra at 566 . c The inequities and harsh results possible under the felony-murder rule, where malice was imputed from underlying felonies absent any culpable intent, are not present when the unlawful act is assault and battery as currently defined. 1980Although there are no Michigan cases which specifically abrogate the felony-murder rule, there exists a number of decisions of this Court which have significantly restricted the doctrine in Michigan and which lead us to conclude that the rule should be abolished. 112 The first of these decisions is People v Pavlic, 227 Mich 562 ; 199 NW 373 (1924), cited by Perkins as the leading American decision regarding the types of felony included within the felony-murder rule. 113 In Pavlic , defendant was convicted of involuntary manslaughter as a result of selling moonshine whiskey to the deceased, the | 3 | 1980–2004 |
People v. Fountain
green
2 sentences1982This Court has refused to give retroactive effect to Aaron despite the fact that one panel of this Court rejected the felony-murder rule four years before the Aaron decision, People v Fountain, 71 Mich App 491, 505-506 ; 248 NW2d 589 (1976), People v Bradley, 106 Mich App 373, 381 ; 308 NW2d 216 (1981), People v Brady Smith, 108 Mich App 338, 341-342 ; 310 NW2d 235 (1981). 1982This Court has refused to give retroactive effect to Aaron despite the fact that one panel of this Court rejected the felony-murder rule four years before the Aaron decision, People v Fountain, 71 Mich App 491, 505-506 ; 248 NW2d 589 (1976), People v Bradley, 106 Mich App 373, 381 ; 308 NW2d 216 (1981), People v Brady Smith, 108 Mich App 338, 341-342 ; 310 NW2d 235 (1981). | 3 | 1978–1982 |
People v. Gillis
green
2 sentences2018“However, ‘a murder committed during the unbroken chain of events surrounding the predicate felony is committed ‘in the perpetration of’ that felony. . . . .’” Id., quoting People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 121 ; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). 2018“However, ‘a murder committed during the unbroken chain of events surrounding the predicate felony is committed ‘in the perpetration of’ that felony. . . . .’” Id., quoting People v Gillis, 474 Mich 105, 121 ; 712 NW2d 419 (2006). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Matter of Allstate Ins. Co.(stolarz-Njm)
green
2 sentences2013In re Arbitration Between Allstate Ins Co & Stolarz, 81 NY2d 219, 226 ; 597 NYS2d 904 ; 613 NE2d 936 (1993) (noting that the common law evolves through the “incremental process of common-law adjudication as a response to the facts presented”); 1 see also People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 , *244 727; 299 NW2d 304 (1980) (“Abrogation of the felony-murder rule is not a drastic move in light of the significant restrictions this Court has already imposed. 2010In re Arbitration Between Allstate Ins Co & Stolarz, 81 NY2d 219, 226 ; 597 NYS2d 904 ; 613 NE2d 936 (1993) (noting that the law evolves through the “incremental process of common-law adjudication as a response to the facts presented”); 6 see also People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672, 727 ; 299 NW2d 304 (1980) (“Abrogation of the felony-murder rule is not a drastic move in light of the significant restrictions this Court has already imposed. | 2 | 2010–2013 |
In re the Arbitration between Allstate Insurance & Stolarz
green
2 sentences2013In re Arbitration Between Allstate Ins Co & Stolarz, 81 NY2d 219, 226 ; 597 NYS2d 904 ; 613 NE2d 936 (1993) (noting that the common law evolves through the “incremental process of common-law adjudication as a response to the facts presented”); 1 see also People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 , *244 727; 299 NW2d 304 (1980) (“Abrogation of the felony-murder rule is not a drastic move in light of the significant restrictions this Court has already imposed. 2013In re Arbitration Between Allstate Ins Co & Stolarz, 81 NY2d 219, 226 ; 597 NYS2d 904 ; 613 NE2d 936 (1993) (noting that the common law evolves through the “incremental process of common-law adjudication as a response to the facts presented”); 1 see also People v Aaron, 409 Mich 672 , *244 727; 299 NW2d 304 (1980) (“Abrogation of the felony-murder rule is not a drastic move in light of the significant restrictions this Court has already imposed. | 2 | 2010–2013 |
People v. Smith
green
2 sentences2006The escape ceases to be a continuous part of the original felony when the escaping felon reaches a point of at least temporary safety or [has been successfully taken into police custody].”) (citations omitted); People v Smith, 55 Mich App 184, 189 ; 222 NW2d 172 (1974) (stating that “if a murder is committed while attempting to escape from or prevent detection of the felony, it is felony murder, but only if it is committed as a part of a continuous transaction with, or is otherwise ‘immediately connected’ with, the underlying felony”); People v Goddard, 135 Mich App 128, 135 ; 352 NW2d 367 (19 2006The escape ceases to be a continuous part of the original felony when the escaping felon reaches a point of at least temporary safety or [has been successfully taken into police custody].”) (citations omitted); People v Smith, 55 Mich App 184, 189 ; 222 NW2d 172 (1974) (stating that “if a murder is committed while attempting to escape from or prevent detection of the felony, it is felony murder, but only if it is committed as a part of a continuous transaction with, or is otherwise ‘immediately connected’ with, the underlying felony”); People v Goddard, 135 Mich App 128, 135 ; 352 NW2d 367 (19 | 2 | 1993–2006 |
People v. Andrus
green
2 sentences1978However, after citing People v Utter, 217 Mich 74 ; 185 NW 830 (1921), People v Treichel, 229 Mich 303 ; 200 NW 950 (1924), and People v Andrus, 331 Mich 535 ; 50 NW2d 310 (1951), felony-murder cases involving issues as to proper instructions on lesser included offenses, the Fountain opinion concludes that those decisions are inconsistent with a felony-murder rule. 1978However, after citing People v Utter, 217 Mich 74 ; 185 NW 830 (1921), People v Treichel, 229 Mich 303 ; 200 NW 950 (1924), and People v Andrus, 331 Mich 535 ; 50 NW2d 310 (1951), felony-murder cases involving issues as to proper instructions on lesser included offenses, the Fountain opinion concludes that those decisions are inconsistent with a felony-murder rule. | 2 | 1978–2004 |
People v. Utter
green
2 sentences1978However, after citing People v Utter, 217 Mich 74 ; 185 NW 830 (1921), People v Treichel, 229 Mich 303 ; 200 NW 950 (1924), and People v Andrus, 331 Mich 535 ; 50 NW2d 310 (1951), felony-murder cases involving issues as to proper instructions on lesser included offenses, the Fountain opinion concludes that those decisions are inconsistent with a felony-murder rule. 1978However, after citing People v Utter, 217 Mich 74 ; 185 NW 830 (1921), People v Treichel, 229 Mich 303 ; 200 NW 950 (1924), and People v Andrus, 331 Mich 535 ; 50 NW2d 310 (1951), felony-murder cases involving issues as to proper instructions on lesser included offenses, the Fountain opinion concludes that those decisions are inconsistent with a felony-murder rule. | 2 | 1978–1978 |
Commonwealth v. Redline
green
2 sentences1973On appeal the defendant contends that the felony-murder rule has no application to a case where the deceased is a co-felon, relying on Commonwealth v Redline, 391 Pa 486; 137 A2d 472 (1958), and People v Austin, 370 Mich 12 (1963). 1963(Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa 486, 508 [ 137 A2d 472 ].) Formerly the leading decision in that jurisdiction (Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa 596 [ 68 A2d 595 , 12 ALR2d 183]) held the defendant liable for the killing of an innocent bystander by a police officer, because it was defendant’s act which set in motion the chain of events which resulted in the homicide. | 2 | 1963–1973 |
People v. Nowack
green
2 sentences2020See also id. at 689-698 (discussing the historical development of the common-law felony-murder doctrine). 10 Id. at 733 (holding that under the Michigan felony-murder statute, the mental element of murder is not satisfied by proof of the intention to commit the underlying felony, but instead must be separately shown). 11 Id.; see also People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 397 ; 563 NW2d 31 (1997) (opinion by RILEY, J.) (noting that after Aaron, “the people must prove one of the three intents that define malice in every murder case”); id. at 414 (BOYLE, J., dissenting) (“The teaching of Aaron is that m 2020See also id. at 689-698 (discussing the historical development of the common-law felony-murder doctrine). 10 Id. at 733 (holding that under the Michigan felony-murder statute, the mental element of murder is not satisfied by proof of the intention to commit the underlying felony, but instead must be separately shown). 11 Id.; see also People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 397 ; 563 NW2d 31 (1997) (opinion by RILEY, J.) (noting that after Aaron, “the people must prove one of the three intents that define malice in every murder case”); id. at 414 (BOYLE, J., dissenting) (“The teaching of Aaron is that m | 1 | 2020–2020 |
People v. Carines
green
2 sentences2020See also id. at 689-698 (discussing the historical development of the common-law felony-murder doctrine). 10 Id. at 733 (holding that under the Michigan felony-murder statute, the mental element of murder is not satisfied by proof of the intention to commit the underlying felony, but instead must be separately shown). 11 Id.; see also People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 397 ; 563 NW2d 31 (1997) (opinion by RILEY, J.) (noting that after Aaron, “the people must prove one of the three intents that define malice in every murder case”); id. at 414 (BOYLE, J., dissenting) (“The teaching of Aaron is that m 2020See also id. at 689-698 (discussing the historical development of the common-law felony-murder doctrine). 10 Id. at 733 (holding that under the Michigan felony-murder statute, the mental element of murder is not satisfied by proof of the intention to commit the underlying felony, but instead must be separately shown). 11 Id.; see also People v Dumas, 454 Mich 390, 397 ; 563 NW2d 31 (1997) (opinion by RILEY, J.) (noting that after Aaron, “the people must prove one of the three intents that define malice in every murder case”); id. at 414 (BOYLE, J., dissenting) (“The teaching of Aaron is that m | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Woodman v. Kera LLC
green
2 sentences2013Further, it is a logical extension of our decisions ....”); Woodman v Kera LLC, 486 Mich 228, 267-268 ; 785 NW2d 1 (2010) (MARKMAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 2013Further, it is a logical extension of our decisions ....”); Woodman v Kera LLC, 486 Mich 228, 267-268 ; 785 NW2d 1 (2010) (MARKMAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Bizup v. People
green
2 sentences2006Bizup v People, 150 Colo 214, 218; 371 P2d 786 (1962) (holding that the felony-murder rule applies to a murder committed after the elements of armed robbery were met); see also People v Boss, 210 Cal 245, 251; 290 P 881 (1930) (holding that a murder committed during an escape from the scene of an armed robbery is felony murder because “[t]he escape of the robbers with the loot, by means of arms, necessarily is as important to the execution of the plan as gaining possession of the property”). 2006Bizup v. People, 150 Colo. 214, 218 , 371 P.2d 786 (1962) (holding that the felony-murder rule applies to a murder committed after the elements of armed robbery were met); see also People v. Boss, 210 Cal. 245, 251 , 290 P. 881 (1930) (holding that a murder committed during an escape from the scene of an armed robbery is felony murder because "[t]he escape of the robbers with the loot, by means of arms, necessarily is as important to the execution of the plan as gaining possession of the property"). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Goddard
green
2 sentences2006The escape ceases to be a continuous part of the original felony when the escaping felon reaches a point of at least temporary safety or [has been successfully taken into police custody].”) (citations omitted); People v Smith, 55 Mich App 184, 189 ; 222 NW2d 172 (1974) (stating that “if a murder is committed while attempting to escape from or prevent detection of the felony, it is felony murder, but only if it is committed as a part of a continuous transaction with, or is otherwise ‘immediately connected’ with, the underlying felony”); People v Goddard, 135 Mich App 128, 135 ; 352 NW2d 367 (19 2006The escape ceases to be a continuous part of the original felony when the escaping felon reaches a point of at least temporary safety or [has been successfully taken into police custody].") (citations omitted); People v. Smith, 55 Mich. App. 184, 189 , 222 N.W.2d 172 (1974) (stating *431 that "if a murder is committed while attempting to escape from or prevent detection of the felony, it is felony murder, but only if it is committed as a part of a continuous transaction with, or is otherwise `immediately connected' with, the underlying felony"); People v. Goddard, 135 Mich.App. 128, 135 , 352 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Goddard
green
2 sentences2006The escape ceases to be a continuous part of the original felony when the escaping felon reaches a point of at least temporary safety or [has been successfully taken into police custody].”) (citations omitted); People v Smith, 55 Mich App 184, 189 ; 222 NW2d 172 (1974) (stating that “if a murder is committed while attempting to escape from or prevent detection of the felony, it is felony murder, but only if it is committed as a part of a continuous transaction with, or is otherwise ‘immediately connected’ with, the underlying felony”); People v Goddard, 135 Mich App 128, 135 ; 352 NW2d 367 (19 2006The escape ceases to be a continuous part of the original felony when the escaping felon reaches a point of at least temporary safety or [has been successfully taken into police custody].”) (citations omitted); People v Smith, 55 Mich App 184, 189 ; 222 NW2d 172 (1974) (stating that “if a murder is committed while attempting to escape from or prevent detection of the felony, it is felony murder, but only if it is committed as a part of a continuous transaction with, or is otherwise ‘immediately connected’ with, the underlying felony”); People v Goddard, 135 Mich App 128, 135 ; 352 NW2d 367 (19 | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Stubenvoll
green
2 sentences2004But if the act, though dangerous, is not directly so [i.e., is not directly dangerous to life], yet sufficiently dangerous to come under condemnation of the law [i.e., yet it is unlawful], and death unintended results from it, the offense is manslaughter; or if it is one of a nature to be lawful properly performed, and it is performed improperly, and death comes from it unexpectedly, the offense still is manslaughter. [People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329, 340 ; 28 NW 883 (1886) (quoting 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, § 689).][ 4 ] In 1923, in recognition of the felony-murder doctrine, which was by then 2004But if the act, though dangerous, is not directly so [i.e., is not directly dangerous to life], yet sufficiently dangerous to come under condemnation of the law [i.e., yet it is unlawful], and death unintended results from it, the offense is manslaughter; or if it is one of a nature to be lawful properly performed, and it is performed improperly, and death comes from it unexpectedly, the offense still is manslaughter. [People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329, 340 ; 28 NW 883 (1886) (quoting 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, § 689).][ 4 ] In 1923, in recognition of the felony-murder doctrine, which was by then | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Datema
green
1 sentence2004“Malice aforethought,” which is the type of malice specifically related to the crime of murder, is defined as “encompassing any one of the following: (1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to inflict grievous bodily harm, (3) extremely reckless indifference to the value of human life (the so-called ‘abandoned and malignant heart’), or (4) the intent to commit a felony (which leads to culpability under the felony-murder rule).” Id. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
People v. Ryczek
green
2 sentences2004But if the act, though dangerous, is not directly so [i.e., is not directly dangerous to life], yet sufficiently dangerous to come under condemnation of the law [i.e., yet it is unlawful], and death unintended results from it, the offense is manslaughter; or if it is one of a nature to be lawful properly performed, and it is performed improperly, and death comes from it unexpectedly, the offense still is manslaughter. [People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329, 340 ; 28 NW 883 (1886) (quoting 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, § 689).][ 4 ] In 1923, in recognition of the felony-murder doctrine, which was by then 2004But if the act, though dangerous, is not directly so [i.e., is not directly dangerous to life], yet sufficiently dangerous to come under condemnation of the law [i.e., yet it is unlawful], and death unintended results from it, the offense is manslaughter; or if it is one of a nature to be lawful properly performed, and it is performed improperly, and death comes from it unexpectedly, the offense still is manslaughter. [People v Stubenvoll, 62 Mich 329, 340 ; 28 NW 883 (1886) (quoting 2 Bishop, Criminal Law, § 689).][ 4 ] In 1923, in recognition of the felony-murder doctrine, which was by then | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| People v. Rockwell green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Joeseype Johnson green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Tommolino green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Reed green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Jones v. Barnes green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Ford green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. David Wells green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Carl Johnson green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Roeder neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| People v. Bradley green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| People v. Brady Smith green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Simpson v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Hardy green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Doss green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Van Wyck green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| People v. Treichel green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| People v. Thompson neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Stewart v. Alvis green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Shannon v. Union Barge Line Corp. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.