felony-murder rule in District of Columbia

2020Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1041-42 (Md. 1982) (declining to extend felony-murder doctrine beyond “traditional common law limitation” holding defendants liable only for their own acts and those of their accomplices); State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 29 (N.J. 1977) (“Most modern progressive thought in criminal jurisprudence favors restriction rather than expansion of the felony murder rule.”); Commonwealth ex rel.

2020Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Md. 1982); see also id. at 1040–41 (explaining that the “present trend has been for courts to employ the agency theory”); Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 807 (D.C. 1978) (rejecting proximate cause theory of felony murder in D.C. and endorsing agency theory instead).

2020Smith v. Myers, 261 A.2d 550, 555 (Pa. 1970) (given felony-murder doctrine’s “weak . . . foundation, . . . it behooves us not to extend it further”); State v. O’Kelly, 84 P.3d 88, 97 (N.M.

2020Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1041-42 (Md. 1982) (declining to extend felony-murder doctrine beyond “traditional common law limitation” holding defendants liable only for their own acts and those of their accomplices); State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 29 (N.J. 1977) (“Most modern progressive thought in criminal jurisprudence favors restriction rather than expansion of the felony murder rule.”); Commonwealth ex rel.

2020Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Md. 1982); see also id. at 1040–41 (explaining that the “present trend has been for courts to employ the agency theory”); Waller v. United States, 389 A.2d 801, 807 (D.C. 1978) (rejecting proximate cause theory of felony murder in D.C. and endorsing agency theory instead).

2013There must, however, be a “causal connection between the homicide and the underlying felony.” Johnson v. United States, 671 A.2d 428, 433 (D.C.1995).

2013We recently reiterated “the underlying purpose of the felony murder doctrine, which is designed to deter the commission of certain especially dangerous felonies because these particular crimes create an unacceptably high risk of death.... ” Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 835 (D.C.2006) (en banc).

1995See Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 670 (D.C.1979) (medical malpractice not intervening cause of victim’s death in homicide case where defendant’s action — a blow to the side rupturing spleen — “contributed substantially to death”); cf. Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 41-42 (D.C.1991) (in legal malpractice action, liability predicated on finding injury proximately caused by tortious act that played “central role,” or was “substantial factor,” in injury) (quoting District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713 , 716 & n. 9 (D.C.1984)); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C.1980

1995See Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 670 (D.C.1979) (medical malpractice not intervening cause of victim's death in homicide case where defendant's action — a blow to the side rupturing spleen — "contributed substantially to death"); cf. Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 41-42 (D.C.1991) (in legal malpractice action, liability predicated on finding injury proximately caused by tortious act that played "central role," or was "substantial factor," in injury) (quoting District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713 , 716 & n. 9 (D.C.1984)); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C.1980

1995See Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 670 (D.C.1979) (medical malpractice not intervening cause of victim’s death in homicide case where defendant’s action — a blow to the side rupturing spleen — “contributed substantially to death”); cf. Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 41-42 (D.C.1991) (in legal malpractice action, liability predicated on finding injury proximately caused by tortious act that played “central role,” or was “substantial factor,” in injury) (quoting District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713 , 716 & n. 9 (D.C.1984)); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C.1980

1995See Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 670 (D.C.1979) (medical malpractice not intervening cause of victim's death in homicide case where defendant's action — a blow to the side rupturing spleen — "contributed substantially to death"); cf. Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 41-42 (D.C.1991) (in legal malpractice action, liability predicated on finding injury proximately caused by tortious act that played "central role," or was "substantial factor," in injury) (quoting District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713 , 716 & n. 9 (D.C.1984)); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C.1980

1995See Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 670 (D.C.1979) (medical malpractice not intervening cause of victim’s death in homicide case where defendant’s action — a blow to the side rupturing spleen — “contributed substantially to death”); cf. Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 41-42 (D.C.1991) (in legal malpractice action, liability predicated on finding injury proximately caused by tortious act that played “central role,” or was “substantial factor,” in injury) (quoting District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713 , 716 & n. 9 (D.C.1984)); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C.1980

1995See Baylor v. United States, 407 A.2d 664, 670 (D.C.1979) (medical malpractice not intervening cause of victim's death in homicide case where defendant's action — a blow to the side rupturing spleen — "contributed substantially to death"); cf. Dalo v. Kivitz, 596 A.2d 35, 41-42 (D.C.1991) (in legal malpractice action, liability predicated on finding injury proximately caused by tortious act that played "central role," or was "substantial factor," in injury) (quoting District of Columbia v. Freeman, 477 A.2d 713 , 716 & n. 9 (D.C.1984)); Lacy v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317, 319 (D.C.1980

1992The Felony-Murder Doctrine As the Supreme Court of Michigan has observed, “[t]he existence and scope of the felony-murder doctrine have perplexed generations of law students, commentators, and jurists.” People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672 , 299 N.W.2d 304, 306 (1980).

1992The Felony-Murder Doctrine As the Supreme Court of Michigan has observed, “[t]he existence and scope of the felony-murder doctrine have perplexed generations of law students, commentators, and jurists.” People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672 , 299 N.W.2d 304, 306 (1980).

1992See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 313-14 ; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 232 , 414 P.2d 353, 360 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel.

1992See Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 313-14 ; People v. Phillips, 64 Cal.2d 574 , 51 Cal.Rptr. 225, 232 , 414 P.2d 353, 360 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel.

1990See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 72 App.D.C. 147, 150 , 112 F.2d 46, 49 (1940) (death resulting during commission of "illegal transportation of untax-paid liquor, an offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary" constituted second-degree murder).

1990See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 72 App.D.C. 147, 150 , 112 F.2d 46, 49 (1940) (death resulting during commission of "illegal transportation of untax-paid liquor, an offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary" constituted second-degree murder).

1990Id. at § 7.5 at 206, 208-11, 213-21; Model Penal Code, supra, § 210.2 comment 6, at 32-35; see also Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 , 503 n. 12, 436 N.E.2d 400 , 408 n. 12 (1982) (describing statutory and judicial limitations on the felony-murder rule and explaining that such limitations "'reflect dissatisfaction with the harshness and injustice of the rule’ ” (citation omitted)).

1990Id. at § 7.5 at 206, 208-11, 213-21; Model Penal Code, supra, § 210.2 comment 6, at 32-35; see also Commonwealth v. Matchett, 386 Mass. 492 , 503 n. 12, 436 N.E.2d 400 , 408 n. 12 (1982) (describing statutory and judicial limitations on the felony-murder rule and explaining that such limitations "'reflect dissatisfaction with the harshness and injustice of the rule’ ” (citation omitted)).

1977For an excellent discussion of the felony murder rule, see State v. Chambers, 524 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. 1975) (en banc). 6 .

1976In contrast, the instant case presents no issue concerning the possibility of “mere coincidence” in time and place between the killing and the commission of the robbery, see United States v. Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 157, 167 , 490 F.2d 725, 735 (1973); there was neither evidence adduced nor argument presented by appellant that the robbery was an afterthought to the murder of the decedent or “that the homicidal act fell outside the scope of the felonious crime which the parties undertook to commit”, United States v. Heinlein, supra at 169, 490 F.2d at 737 , and hence, the felony-murder rule w

1976In contrast, the instant case presents no issue concerning the possibility of “mere coincidence” in time and place between the killing and the commission of the robbery, see United States v. Heinlein, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 157, 167 , 490 F.2d 725, 735 (1973); there was neither evidence adduced nor argument presented by appellant that the robbery was an afterthought to the murder of the decedent or “that the homicidal act fell outside the scope of the felonious crime which the parties undertook to commit”, United States v. Heinlein, supra at 169, 490 F.2d at 737 , and hence, the felony-murder rule w