felony-murder rule in Tennessee

2025“The felony murder rule applies when the killing is ‘done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.’” State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 223 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1956)).

2025“The felony murder rule applies when the killing is ‘done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.’” State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 223 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1956)).

2021“Moreover, requiring a close nexus between the [underlying felony] and the killing is particularly appropriate given that the felony murder rule is ‘a legal fiction in which the intent and the malice to commit the underlying felony is “transferred” to elevate an unintentional killing to first-degree murder.’” Id. (quoting Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 107 ).

2020“Moreover, requiring a close nexus between the [underlying felony] and the killing is particularly appropriate given that the felony murder rule is ‘a legal fiction in which the intent and the malice to commit the underlying felony is ‘transferred’ to elevate an unintentional killing to first-degree murder.’” Id. (quoting Buggs, 995 S.W.2d at 107 ). 2 During oral argument, the State noted that the charge of first degree felony murder in the indictment did not specify whether the victim of the underlying kidnapping was Ms. Taylor or Mr. Lampkin and that the evidence was sufficient to show that

2025“The felony murder rule applies when the killing is ‘done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.’” State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 223 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1956)).

2025“The felony murder rule applies when the killing is ‘done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.’” State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 223 (Tenn. 2005) (quoting Farmer v. State, 296 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1956)).

2025If, however, there “is a break in the chain of events between the felony and the killing, the felony murder rule does not apply.” Id. at 295 .

2025An important factor “to consider in determining whether there has been a break in the chain of events that would preclude application of the felony murder rule is whether the felon has reached a place of temporary safety.” Id.

1997A ‘“natural and probable consequence” in the “ordinary course of things” presupposes an outcome within a reasonably predictable range.’” Id. at 955 (citations omitted). 15 In Carson, the supreme court declared in dicta that the “[natural and probable consequences] principle also has been applied to accomplices under the felony murder doctrine: ‘A defendant who is a willing and active participant in a robbery becomes accountable for all of the [natural and probable] consequences flowing from the robbery and may be convicted of first-degree murder where a co- perpetrator of the felony is the act

1997The principle also has been applied to accomplices under the felony murder doctrine: "A defendant who is a willing and active participant in a robbery becomes accountable for all of the consequences flowing from the robbery and may be convicted of first-degree murder where a co-perpetrator of the felony is the actual killer.” State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 336 (Tenn.1992); Dupes v. State, 209 Tenn. 506, 512 , 354 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1962). 6 .

2013Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, while driving a stolen vehicle, was involved in a car accident that resulted in the other motorist’s death); Doane v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 797, 798 (Va. 1977) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply where the defendant stole a car one day and the next day had an automobile accident in the stolen vehicle which resulted in the death of one of the passengers in the stolen vehicle); Montague v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 379, 381 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the felony murder rule does not app

2000See Lester, 737 So.2d at 1151 (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, fleeing from police in a vehicle stolen by another person, collided with another car, Wiling the driver); Allen, 690 So.2d at 1334 (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, while driving a stolen vehicle, was involved in a car accident that resulted in the other motorist’s death); Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500 , 237 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1977) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply where the defendant stole a car one day and the next day had an automo

2019The felony murder rule applies when the killing is “‘done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.’” State v. Banks, 271 S.W.3d 90, 140 (Tenn. 2008) (quoting Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 663 ).

2018The felony murder rule applies when the killing is “‘done in pursuance of the unlawful act, and not collateral to it.’” Banks, 271 S.W.3d at 140 (quoting Rice, 184 S.W.3d at 663 ).

2013Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, while driving a stolen vehicle, was involved in a car accident that resulted in the other motorist’s death); Doane v. Commonwealth, 237 S.E.2d 797, 798 (Va. 1977) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply where the defendant stole a car one day and the next day had an automobile accident in the stolen vehicle which resulted in the death of one of the passengers in the stolen vehicle); Montague v. Commonwealth, 522 S.E.2d 379, 381 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the felony murder rule does not app

2000See Lester, 737 So.2d at 1151 (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, fleeing from police in a vehicle stolen by another person, collided with another car, Wiling the driver); Allen, 690 So.2d at 1334 (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, while driving a stolen vehicle, was involved in a car accident that resulted in the other motorist’s death); Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500 , 237 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1977) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply where the defendant stole a car one day and the next day had an automo

2013Ct. App. 1999) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, fleeing from police in a vehicle stolen by another person, collided with another car, killing the driver); Allen v. State, 690 So. 2d 1332, 1334 (Fla. Dist.

2000See Lester, 737 So.2d at 1151 (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, fleeing from police in a vehicle stolen by another person, collided with another car, Wiling the driver); Allen, 690 So.2d at 1334 (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply when the defendant, while driving a stolen vehicle, was involved in a car accident that resulted in the other motorist’s death); Doane v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 500 , 237 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1977) (holding that the felony murder rule does not apply where the defendant stole a car one day and the next day had an automo

2003“Proof that such intent to commit the underlying felony existed before, or concurrent with, the act of killing is a question of fact to be decided by the jury after consideration of all the facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing Hall v. State, 490 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn.1973); State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim.

2002“Proof that such -10- intent to commit the underlying felony existed before, or concurrent with, the act of killing is a question of fact to be decided by the jury after consideration of all the facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing Hall v. State, 490 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn.1973); State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim.

2003“Proof that such intent to commit the underlying felony existed before, or concurrent with, the act of killing is a question of fact to be decided by the jury after consideration of all the facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing Hall v. State, 490 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn.1973); State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim.

2002“Proof that such -10- intent to commit the underlying felony existed before, or concurrent with, the act of killing is a question of fact to be decided by the jury after consideration of all the facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing Hall v. State, 490 S.W.2d 495, 496 (Tenn.1973); State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 59 (Tenn. Crim.

2008The Court, in State v. Buggs, 995 S.W.2d 102 (Tenn. 1992), citing State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1996) stated: “The prevailing view is that in order for the felony-murder doctrine to be invoked, the actor must intend to commit the underlying felony at the time the killing occurs; there is no felony- murder where the felony occurs as an afterthought following the killing. . .

2001Even more recently in State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn.1996), we described the felony murder doctrine as follows: In the typical case of felony-murder, there is no malice in ‘fact’ with respect to the homicide; the malice is supplied by the ‘law5.

1997The principle also has been applied to accomplices under the felony murder doctrine: "A defendant who is a willing and active participant in a robbery becomes accountable for all of the consequences flowing from the robbery and may be convicted of first-degree murder where a co-perpetrator of the felony is the actual killer.” State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 336 (Tenn.1992); Dupes v. State, 209 Tenn. 506, 512 , 354 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1962). 6 .

1997The principle also has been applied to accomplices under the felony murder doctrine: "A defendant who is a willing and active participant in a robbery becomes accountable for all of the consequences flowing from the robbery and may be convicted of first-degree murder where a co-perpetrator of the felony is the actual killer.” State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 336 (Tenn.1992); Dupes v. State, 209 Tenn. 506, 512 , 354 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1962). 6 .

1997Id.., citing People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 , 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 (1965).

1997Id.., citing People v. Washington, 62 Cal.2d 777 , 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 , 402 P.2d 130 (1965).

1992See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1991). 6 The minimum standards for determining whether a sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed under the United States Constitution for felony murder are indicated by the United States Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 5.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), which dealt with the problem of imposing the death penalty in cases of vicarious liability for felony murder, i.e., where an accomplice in the felony, one who did not actually kill the victim, is c

1992See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1991). 6 The minimum standards for determining whether a sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed under the United States Constitution for felony murder are indicated by the United States Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 5.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), which dealt with the problem of imposing the death penalty in cases of vicarious liability for felony murder, i.e., where an accomplice in the felony, one who did not actually kill the victim, is c

1992See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1991). 6 The minimum standards for determining whether a sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed under the United States Constitution for felony murder are indicated by the United States Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 5.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), which dealt with the problem of imposing the death penalty in cases of vicarious liability for felony murder, i.e., where an accomplice in the felony, one who did not actually kill the victim, is c

1992See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(2) (1991). 6 The minimum standards for determining whether a sentence of death may be constitutionally imposed under the United States Constitution for felony murder are indicated by the United States Supreme Court in Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 5.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), which dealt with the problem of imposing the death penalty in cases of vicarious liability for felony murder, i.e., where an accomplice in the felony, one who did not actually kill the victim, is c

2013When determining whether a killing falls within the felony murder rule, the courts of this state “have noted that consideration of such factors as time, place, and causation is helpful.” Patrick Wingate, slip op. at 9 (citing State v. Lee, 969 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tenn. Crim.

2013App. 1997) (holding that when victim was killed in a collision that followed a high-speed chase as defendant fled from the scene of a robbery, the homicide occurred in the furtherance of the robbery because flight from the scene of a crime is an integral part of the crime); State v. Brown, 756 S.W.2d 700, 702-03 (Tenn. Crim.

2012See Smith v. State, 13 McCanless 499 , 209 Tenn. 499 , 354 S.W.2d 450 (1961) (stating that “the person who kills another while engaged in committing a felony cannot escape conviction from murder in the first degree, by showing that his intent was not to kill, but to defend his own life or person, or to escape arrest, or to avoid pursuit or death.); see also, People v. Mills, 624 N.E.2d 384, 389-390 (Ill.

2012See Smith v. State, 13 McCanless 499 , 209 Tenn. 499 , 354 S.W.2d 450 (1961) (stating that “the person who kills another while engaged in committing a felony cannot escape conviction from murder in the first degree, by showing that his intent was not to kill, but to defend his own life or person, or to escape arrest, or to avoid pursuit or death.); see also, People v. Mills, 624 N.E.2d 384, 389-390 (Ill.

2012See Smith v. State, 13 McCanless 499 , 209 Tenn. 499 , 354 S.W.2d 450 (1961) (stating that “the person who kills another while engaged in committing a felony cannot escape conviction from murder in the first degree, by showing that his intent was not to kill, but to defend his own life or person, or to escape arrest, or to avoid pursuit or death.); see also, People v. Mills, 624 N.E.2d 384, 389-390 (Ill.

2012See Faulkner, 154 S.W.3d at 58 .

2011Id. “[W]here the offense is committed in the perpetration of a designated felony, the elements of malice, deliberation and premeditation are implied.” State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 336 (Tenn. 1992) (citing State v. Barber, 753 S.W.2d 659, 671 (Tenn.1988); State v. Norris, 684 -13- S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tenn. Crim.

2001More broadly, “the merger doctrine bars the use of the felony murder rule when the underlying felony directly results in, or is an integral part of, the homicide.” Barnett v. State, 783 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); see also State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148 , 921 P.2d 1266, 1270-72 (1996)(outlining varying applications of the merger doctrine in different jurisdictions).

2001More broadly, “the merger doctrine bars the use of the felony murder rule when the underlying felony directly results in, or is an integral part of, the homicide.” Barnett v. State, 783 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); see also State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148 , 921 P.2d 1266, 1270-72 (1996)(outlining varying applications of the merger doctrine in different jurisdictions).

2001More broadly, “the merger doctrine bars the use of the felony murder rule when the underlying felony directly results in, or is an integral part of, the homicide.” Barnett v. State, 783 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala.Crim.App.2000); see also State v. Campos, 122 N.M. 148 , 921 P.2d 1266, 1270-72 (1996)(outlining varying applications of the merger doctrine in different jurisdictions).

2001More broadly, "the merger doctrine bars the use of the felony murder rule when the underlying felony directly results in, or is an integral part of, the homicide." Barnett v. State, 783 So.2d 927, 930 (Ala. Crim.

2000See, e.g., State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10 , 918 P.2d 1028, 1033 (1996); Owens v. State, 313 Ark. 520 , 856 S.W.2d 288, 292 (1993); People v. Gimotty, 216 Mich.App. 254 , 549 N.W.2d 39, 41 (1996); State v. *295 Russell, 503 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Minn.1993); State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428 , 509 S.E.2d 178, 192 (1998); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284 , 725 A.2d 106, 118 (App.Div.1999); Wade, 490 S.E.2d at 738 .

2000See, e.g., State v. Miles, 186 Ariz. 10 , 918 P.2d 1028, 1033 (1996); Owens v. State, 313 Ark. 520 , 856 S.W.2d 288, 292 (1993); People v. Gimotty, 216 Mich.App. 254 , 549 N.W.2d 39, 41 (1996); State v. *295 Russell, 503 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Minn.1993); State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428 , 509 S.E.2d 178, 192 (1998); State v. Spencer, 319 N.J.Super. 284 , 725 A.2d 106, 118 (App.Div.1999); Wade, 490 S.E.2d at 738 .