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28 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1977–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Aarongreen2 sentences2016But see Garringer v. State, 909 P.2d 1142 , 1148–49 n.11 (Haw. 1996) (noting that Hawaii’s felony murder statute was repealed); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) (“With the adoption of the penal code, the felony murder doctrine was abandoned as an independent basis for establishing an offense of homicide in Kentucky.”); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980) (abolishing the common-law doctrine of felony murder). 2016But see Garringer v. State, 909 P.2d 1142 , 1148–49 n.11 (Haw. 1996) (noting that Hawaii’s felony murder statute was repealed); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) (“With the adoption of the penal code, the felony murder doctrine was abandoned as an independent basis for establishing an offense of homicide in Kentucky.”); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980) (abolishing the common-law doctrine of felony murder). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Waynegreen2 sentences1997On appeal, this Court found that the lower court “did not err ... by permitting the jury to consider the two robberies that occurred inside the penitentiary to invoke the felony-murder rule.” Wayne at 788 , 289 S.E.2d at 482 . 1985It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies." This holding, however, has been reaffirmed in State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480, 482 (W.Va.1982); State v. Hatfield, 286 S.E.2d 402 , 408 n. 2 (W.Va.1982); State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d 635, 637 (W.Va.1981); and, Syl. pt. 8, State v. Grimmer, 162 W.Va. 588 , 251 S.E.2d 780 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 273 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.Va.1980), and, as we tersely noted in thinly disguised exasperation in State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d at 637: "Onc | 2 | 3 |
State v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1985It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies." This holding, however, has been reaffirmed in State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480, 482 (W.Va.1982); State v. Hatfield, 286 S.E.2d 402 , 408 n. 2 (W.Va.1982); State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d 635, 637 (W.Va.1981); and, Syl. pt. 8, State v. Grimmer, 162 W.Va. 588 , 251 S.E.2d 780 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 273 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.Va.1980), and, as we tersely noted in thinly disguised exasperation in State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d at 637: "Onc 1985It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies." This holding, however, has been reaffirmed in State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480, 482 (W.Va.1982); State v. Hatfield, 286 S.E.2d 402 , 408 n. 2 (W.Va.1982); State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d 635, 637 (W.Va.1981); and, Syl. pt. 8, State v. Grimmer, 162 W.Va. 588 , 251 S.E.2d 780 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 273 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.Va.1980), and, as we tersely noted in thinly disguised exasperation in State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d at 637: "Onc | 2 | 3 |
Bennett v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2016But see Garringer v. State, 909 P.2d 1142 , 1148–49 n.11 (Haw. 1996) (noting that Hawaii’s felony murder statute was repealed); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) (“With the adoption of the penal code, the felony murder doctrine was abandoned as an independent basis for establishing an offense of homicide in Kentucky.”); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980) (abolishing the common-law doctrine of felony murder). 2016But see Garringer v. State, 909 P.2d 1142 , 1148–49 n.11 (Haw. 1996) (noting that Hawaii’s felony murder statute was repealed); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) (“With the adoption of the penal code, the felony murder doctrine was abandoned as an independent basis for establishing an offense of homicide in Kentucky.”); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980) (abolishing the common-law doctrine of felony murder). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Goodsealgreen2 sentences1978See State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 (1976); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976); and Warren v. State, 29 Md.App. 560 , 350 A.2d 173 (Ct.Spec.App.1976). 1978See State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 (1976); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976); and Warren v. State, 29 Md.App. 560 , 350 A.2d 173 (Ct.Spec.App.1976). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Simsgreen2 sentences1986It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies.” Specifically, this Court stated in Sims : The defendant’s trial counsel competently advised him as to the guilty plea, as there could be no reasonable expectation under the settled principles of our law that an unintended homicide committed in the course of an attempted burglary would constitute a defense to first degree murder arising out of the felony-murder rule. 162 W.Va. at 229 , 248 S.E.2d at 844 . 1986It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies.” Specifically, this Court stated in Sims : The defendant’s trial counsel competently advised him as to the guilty plea, as there could be no reasonable expectation under the settled principles of our law that an unintended homicide committed in the course of an attempted burglary would constitute a defense to first degree murder arising out of the felony-murder rule. 162 W.Va. at 229 , 248 S.E.2d at 844 . | 1 | 6 |
State v. Rodoussakisgreen2 sentences2019Syllabus Point 3, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58 , 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998); Syllabus Point 12, State v. Jenkins, 229 W. 2019Syllabus Point 3, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58 , 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998); Syllabus Point 12, State v. Jenkins, 229 W. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Younggreen2 sentences1998However, this Court held in State v. Young, 173 W.Va. 1, 16-17 , 311 S.E.2d 118, 134 (1983) that under the felony murder rule "where a homicide occurs in the course of, or as a result of, a separate, distinct felony, the felonious intent involved in the underlying felony may be transferred to supply the intent to kill necessary to characterize the homicide as murder." (Citations omitted.) 4 . 1998However, this Court held in State v. Young, 173 W.Va. 1, 16-17 , 311 S.E.2d 118, 134 (1983) that under the felony murder rule "where a homicide occurs in the course of, or as a result of, a separate, distinct felony, the felonious intent involved in the underlying felony may be transferred to supply the intent to kill necessary to characterize the homicide as murder." (Citations omitted.) 4 . | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Redlinegreen2 sentences1991The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine.” Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A.2d 472, 476 (1958). 1 A homicide may be murder of the first degree, of the second degree, or voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter or it may be justifiable. 1991The mere coincidence of homicide and felony is not enough to satisfy the requirements of the felony-murder doctrine.” Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486 , 137 A.2d 472, 476 (1958). 1 A homicide may be murder of the first degree, of the second degree, or voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter or it may be justifiable. | 1 | 2 |
Head v. Stategreen1 sentence2019See White v. State , 266 Ark. 499 , 585 S.W.2d 952 , 953-54 (1979). 11 See Kimbrough , 924 S.W.2d at 891-92 (providing that "[c]onsidering that the legislature has already enacted specific offenses covering situations in which death or injury is threatened or occurs during the commission of certain felonies, we conclude that to extend the felony-murder rule to cases in which no death occurs would 'extend the scope of the doctrine beyond the pale of its statutory design and logical underpinnings.' Head v. State , 443 N.E.2d 44 , 51 (Ind. 1982)."). 1 The Florida attempted felony murder statute, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Darbygreen2 sentences2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort 2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort | 1 | 1 |
White v. Statered2 sentences2019See White v. State , 266 Ark. 499 , 585 S.W.2d 952 , 953-54 (1979). 11 See Kimbrough , 924 S.W.2d at 891-92 (providing that "[c]onsidering that the legislature has already enacted specific offenses covering situations in which death or injury is threatened or occurs during the commission of certain felonies, we conclude that to extend the felony-murder rule to cases in which no death occurs would 'extend the scope of the doctrine beyond the pale of its statutory design and logical underpinnings.' Head v. State , 443 N.E.2d 44 , 51 (Ind. 1982)."). 1 The Florida attempted felony murder statute, 2019See White v. State , 266 Ark. 499 , 585 S.W.2d 952 , 953-54 (1979). 11 See Kimbrough , 924 S.W.2d at 891-92 (providing that "[c]onsidering that the legislature has already enacted specific offenses covering situations in which death or injury is threatened or occurs during the commission of certain felonies, we conclude that to extend the felony-murder rule to cases in which no death occurs would 'extend the scope of the doctrine beyond the pale of its statutory design and logical underpinnings.' Head v. State , 443 N.E.2d 44 , 51 (Ind. 1982)."). 1 The Florida attempted felony murder statute, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kimbroughgreen1 sentence2019See White v. State , 266 Ark. 499 , 585 S.W.2d 952 , 953-54 (1979). 11 See Kimbrough , 924 S.W.2d at 891-92 (providing that "[c]onsidering that the legislature has already enacted specific offenses covering situations in which death or injury is threatened or occurs during the commission of certain felonies, we conclude that to extend the felony-murder rule to cases in which no death occurs would 'extend the scope of the doctrine beyond the pale of its statutory design and logical underpinnings.' Head v. State , 443 N.E.2d 44 , 51 (Ind. 1982)."). 1 The Florida attempted felony murder statute, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gaygreen1 sentence2019It follows that a charge of attempted felony murder is illogical in that it burdens the State with the necessity of proving that the defendant intended to commit a crime that does not have an element of intent."); State v. Briggs, 218 Wis.2d 61 , 579 N.W.2d 783 , 786 (Ct. App. 1998) (determining that "there is no crime of attempted felony murder in the State of Wisconsin"); see also State v. Gay , 830 So.2d 356 , 364 (La. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Knucklesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Abbottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cookgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Stevensongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Shaffergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Paintergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lassitergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Petrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Phillipsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Salasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bragggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. MacDonaldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Garringer v. Stategreen2 sentences2016But see Garringer v. State, 909 P.2d 1142 , 1148–49 n.11 (Haw. 1996) (noting that Hawaii’s felony murder statute was repealed); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) (“With the adoption of the penal code, the felony murder doctrine was abandoned as an independent basis for establishing an offense of homicide in Kentucky.”); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980) (abolishing the common-law doctrine of felony murder). 2016But see Garringer v. State, 909 P.2d 1142 , 1148–49 n.11 (Haw. 1996) (noting that Hawaii’s felony murder statute was repealed); Bennett v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 322, 327 (Ky. 1998) (“With the adoption of the penal code, the felony murder doctrine was abandoned as an independent basis for establishing an offense of homicide in Kentucky.”); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 324 (Mich. 1980) (abolishing the common-law doctrine of felony murder). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Simsgreen2 sentences1986It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies.” Specifically, this Court stated in Sims : The defendant’s trial counsel competently advised him as to the guilty plea, as there could be no reasonable expectation under the settled principles of our law that an unintended homicide committed in the course of an attempted burglary would constitute a defense to first degree murder arising out of the felony-murder rule. 162 W.Va. at 229 , 248 S.E.2d at 844 . 1986It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies.” Specifically, this Court stated in Sims : The defendant’s trial counsel competently advised him as to the guilty plea, as there could be no reasonable expectation under the settled principles of our law that an unintended homicide committed in the course of an attempted burglary would constitute a defense to first degree murder arising out of the felony-murder rule. 162 W.Va. at 229 , 248 S.E.2d at 844 . | 1 | 6 |
State v. Grimmergreen2 sentences1985It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies." This holding, however, has been reaffirmed in State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480, 482 (W.Va.1982); State v. Hatfield, 286 S.E.2d 402 , 408 n. 2 (W.Va.1982); State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d 635, 637 (W.Va.1981); and, Syl. pt. 8, State v. Grimmer, 162 W.Va. 588 , 251 S.E.2d 780 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 273 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.Va.1980), and, as we tersely noted in thinly disguised exasperation in State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d at 637: "Onc 1985It is deemed sufficient if the homicide occurs accidentally during the commission of, or the attempt to commit, one of the enumerated felonies." This holding, however, has been reaffirmed in State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480, 482 (W.Va.1982); State v. Hatfield, 286 S.E.2d 402 , 408 n. 2 (W.Va.1982); State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d 635, 637 (W.Va.1981); and, Syl. pt. 8, State v. Grimmer, 162 W.Va. 588 , 251 S.E.2d 780 (1979), overruled on other grounds, State v. Petry, 273 S.E.2d 346, 352 (W.Va.1980), and, as we tersely noted in thinly disguised exasperation in State v. Taylor, 285 S.E.2d at 637: "Onc | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Peacher v. Sencindiver
green
2 sentences1999Peacher v. Sencindiver, 160 W.Va. 314 , 233 S.E.2d 425 (1977). 1978Va. 585, 600 , 87 S.E.2d 689, 699 (1955), the Court examined the three statutory definitions of first degree murder. ‘... [T]his case was prosecuted on the theory that the defendant shot and killed Gullett in the commission of a robbery, [and] the question whether the killing was a “wilful, deliberate and premeditated” killing under Code 61-2-1, does not enter into this case.’ ” [ 233 S.E.2d at 426 ] Several cases from other jurisdictions were cited in Peacher and the following statement was made: “In none of these cases, however, did a court hold that application of the felony-murder rule den | 2 | 1978–1999 |
State v. Pendry
green
2 sentences1981Va. 738 , 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976), requested that we declare the felony-murder rule unconstitutional because it presumes a material element of murder-intent. 1978Ed. 2d 508 , 95 S.Ct. 1881 (1975), and State v. Pendry, _ W.Va. _, 227 S.E.2d 210 (1976). | 2 | 1978–1981 |
State v. Swift
green
2 sentences1978See State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 (1976); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976); and Warren v. State, 29 Md.App. 560 , 350 A.2d 173 (Ct.Spec.App.1976). 1978See State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 (1976); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976); and Warren v. State, 29 Md.App. 560 , 350 A.2d 173 (Ct.Spec.App.1976). | 2 | 1977–1978 |
Warren v. State
green
2 sentences1978See State v. Goodseal, 220 Kan. 487 , 553 P.2d 279 (1976); State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383 , 226 S.E.2d 652 (1976); and Warren v. State, 29 Md.App. 560 , 350 A.2d 173 (Ct.Spec.App.1976). 1978App. 560 , 350 A.2d 173 (1976), the court states: *226 “That reasoning was equally applicable to the common law felony-murder rule which requires no intent to kill or injure. “ ‘Even without an intent to kill or injure, or an act done in wanton and wilful disregard of the obvious likelihood of causing such harm, homicide is murder if it falls within the scope of the felony-murder rule. | 2 | 1977–1978 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2021The circuit court noted that these convictions were obtained under the felony murder rule; accordingly, pursuant to State v. Williams, 172 W. 2021The trial court sentenced petitioner to life without mercy for each first-degree murder conviction, circuit court noted that these convictions were obtained tmder the felony murder rule; accordingly, pursuant to State v. Williams, 172 W.Va. 295 , 305 S.E.2d 251 (1983), petitioner was not sentenced for the underlying robbery or burglary convictions? | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Goodson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2019Therefore, we also hold that attempted felony-murder does not exist as a crime in Utah."); Goodson v. Commonwealth , 22 Va.App. 61 , 467 S.E.2d 848 , 856 (1996) (concluding that "[t]o allow use of the felony murder doctrine to impute specific intent from the intent to commit the underlying felony [in an attempted felony-murder case] would eliminate the Commonwealth's burden to prove a specific intent to kill as an element of attempted murder."); In re Richey , 162 Wash.2d 865 , 175 P.3d 585 , 587 (2008) (concluding that the crime of attempted felony-murder does not exist in Washington because 2019Therefore, we also hold that attempted felony-murder does not exist as a crime in Utah."); Goodson v. Commonwealth , 22 Va.App. 61 , 467 S.E.2d 848 , 856 (1996) (concluding that "[t]o allow use of the felony murder doctrine to impute specific intent from the intent to commit the underlying felony [in an attempted felony-murder case] would eliminate the Commonwealth's burden to prove a specific intent to kill as an element of attempted murder."); In re Richey , 162 Wash.2d 865 , 175 P.3d 585 , 587 (2008) (concluding that the crime of attempted felony-murder does not exist in Washington because | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Kersey v. Hatch
green
2 sentences2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort 2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Robinson
green
2 sentences2019In other words, absent death the applicability of the felony-murder rule is never triggered."); State v. Robinson, 256 Kan. 133 , 883 P.2d 764 , 767 (1994) (stating that "Kansas does not recognize the crime of attempted felony murder."); Bruce v. State , 317 Md. 642 , 566 A.2d 103 , 105 (1989) (holding that "[b]ecause a conviction for felony murder requires no specific intent to kill, it follows that because a criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, attempted felony murder is not a crime in Maryland."); State v. Rhett , 127 N.J. 3 , 601 A.2d 689 , 692 (1992) (reversing attempted murder co 2019In other words, absent death the applicability of the felony-murder rule is never triggered."); State v. Robinson, 256 Kan. 133 , 883 P.2d 764 , 767 (1994) (stating that "Kansas does not recognize the crime of attempted felony murder."); Bruce v. State , 317 Md. 642 , 566 A.2d 103 , 105 (1989) (holding that "[b]ecause a conviction for felony murder requires no specific intent to kill, it follows that because a criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, attempted felony murder is not a crime in Maryland."); State v. Rhett , 127 N.J. 3 , 601 A.2d 689 , 692 (1992) (reversing attempted murder co | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| In re the Personal Restraint of Richey green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Bruce v. State
green
2 sentences2019In other words, absent death the applicability of the felony-murder rule is never triggered."); State v. Robinson, 256 Kan. 133 , 883 P.2d 764 , 767 (1994) (stating that "Kansas does not recognize the crime of attempted felony murder."); Bruce v. State , 317 Md. 642 , 566 A.2d 103 , 105 (1989) (holding that "[b]ecause a conviction for felony murder requires no specific intent to kill, it follows that because a criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, attempted felony murder is not a crime in Maryland."); State v. Rhett , 127 N.J. 3 , 601 A.2d 689 , 692 (1992) (reversing attempted murder co 2019In other words, absent death the applicability of the felony-murder rule is never triggered."); State v. Robinson, 256 Kan. 133 , 883 P.2d 764 , 767 (1994) (stating that "Kansas does not recognize the crime of attempted felony murder."); Bruce v. State , 317 Md. 642 , 566 A.2d 103 , 105 (1989) (holding that "[b]ecause a conviction for felony murder requires no specific intent to kill, it follows that because a criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, attempted felony murder is not a crime in Maryland."); State v. Rhett , 127 N.J. 3 , 601 A.2d 689 , 692 (1992) (reversing attempted murder co | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Commonwealth v. Griffin green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Ortega
green
2 sentences2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort 2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Lea
green
2 sentences2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort 2019See State v. Darby , 200 N.J.Super. 327 , 331, 491 A.2d 733 (App. Div. 1984) ('attempted felony murder' cannot be a crime because it is a self-contradiction; one does not intend an unintended result)."); State v. Ortega , 112 N.M. 554 , 817 P.2d 1196 , 1202 (1991) (acknowledging that crime of attempted felony murder is not recognized in New Mexico), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Kersey v. Hatch , 148 N.M. 381 , 237 P.3d 683 (2010) ; State v. Lea , 126 N.C.App. 440 , 485 S.E.2d 874 , 880 (1997) (holding that "offense of 'attempted first degree felony murder' does not exist" under Nort | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Rhett
green
2 sentences2019In other words, absent death the applicability of the felony-murder rule is never triggered."); State v. Robinson, 256 Kan. 133 , 883 P.2d 764 , 767 (1994) (stating that "Kansas does not recognize the crime of attempted felony murder."); Bruce v. State , 317 Md. 642 , 566 A.2d 103 , 105 (1989) (holding that "[b]ecause a conviction for felony murder requires no specific intent to kill, it follows that because a criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, attempted felony murder is not a crime in Maryland."); State v. Rhett , 127 N.J. 3 , 601 A.2d 689 , 692 (1992) (reversing attempted murder co 2019In other words, absent death the applicability of the felony-murder rule is never triggered."); State v. Robinson, 256 Kan. 133 , 883 P.2d 764 , 767 (1994) (stating that "Kansas does not recognize the crime of attempted felony murder."); Bruce v. State , 317 Md. 642 , 566 A.2d 103 , 105 (1989) (holding that "[b]ecause a conviction for felony murder requires no specific intent to kill, it follows that because a criminal attempt is a specific intent crime, attempted felony murder is not a crime in Maryland."); State v. Rhett , 127 N.J. 3 , 601 A.2d 689 , 692 (1992) (reversing attempted murder co | 1 | 2019–2019 |
In Re Richey
green
1 sentence2019Therefore, we also hold that attempted felony-murder does not exist as a crime in Utah."); Goodson v. Commonwealth , 22 Va.App. 61 , 467 S.E.2d 848 , 856 (1996) (concluding that "[t]o allow use of the felony murder doctrine to impute specific intent from the intent to commit the underlying felony [in an attempted felony-murder case] would eliminate the Commonwealth's burden to prove a specific intent to kill as an element of attempted murder."); In re Richey , 162 Wash.2d 865 , 175 P.3d 585 , 587 (2008) (concluding that the crime of attempted felony-murder does not exist in Washington because | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Briggs green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Jenkins
green
1 sentence2019Syllabus Point 3, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W.Va. 58 , 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998); Syllabus Point 12, State v. Jenkins, 229 W. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Nolan (Slip Opinion) green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Davis v. Fox green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. England green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Cokeley green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Local Lodge No. 1836, District 38, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Local No. 1505, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Missouri ex rel. Johnson v. Clay green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Goff green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Hatfield green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Galloway green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Commonwealth Ex Rel. Smith v. Myers green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Downs green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Lockett green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Harrison red | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Lockett v. Ohio green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| State v. Millette green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Frazier v. United States green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Woods v. Ohio green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Bizup v. People green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Adams green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Artis green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| State v. Squire green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Geer v. Bowers green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Pugh v. Virginia green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.