felony-murder doctrine in Oklahoma

2021With this hyper-truncated view of the felony-murder doctrine and liberal interpretation of 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 701.7(B), the dissenters contend "[l]iability rests not on whether a buyer/recipient aids or abets a seller/distributor, but upon the buyer/recipient's own life-threatening or life-destroying conduct under 'the facts and circumstances surrounding both the felony and the homicide.'" Lewis at ¶ 7 (quoting Wade v. State , 1978 OK CR 77, ¶ 4, 581 P.2d 914, 916).

2021With this hyper-truncated view of the felony-murder doctrine and liberal interpretation of 21 O.S.Supp.2012, § 701.7(B), the dissenters contend "[l]iability rests not on whether a buyer/recipient aids or abets a seller/distributor, but upon the buyer/recipient's own life-threatening or life-destroying conduct under 'the facts and circumstances surrounding both the felony and the homicide.'" Lewis at ¶ 7 (quoting Wade v. State , 1978 OK CR 77, ¶ 4, 581 P.2d 914, 916).

2021The Court determined, "[t]he legislature's definition of murder in 701.7(B) is a reflection of the policy that one who, by his willful criminal conduct, sets in motion a chain of events so perilous to the sanctity of human life that death results therefrom; must bear the ultimate responsibility for his actions." The felony murder doctrine was also applied in Brogie v. State, 1985 OK CR 2, ¶ 45, 695 P.2d 538, 547-548, to an appellant who was present at the time of the murder, but who did not actually kill the victim by slashing her throat. ¶3 Subsequent to Hatch and Brogie , this Court applied

2021The Court determined, "[t]he legislature's definition of murder in 701.7(B) is a reflection of the policy that one who, by his willful criminal conduct, sets in motion a chain of events so perilous to the sanctity of human life that death results therefrom; must bear the ultimate responsibility for his actions." The felony murder doctrine was also applied in Brogie v. State, 1985 OK CR 2, ¶ 45, 695 P.2d 538, 547-548, to an appellant who was present at the time of the murder, but who did not actually kill the victim by slashing her throat. ¶3 Subsequent to Hatch and Brogie , this Court applied

2021This history reveals the legislative intent for § 701.7(B) to be applied broadly to all persons connected with the commission of the enumerated crimes. ¶2 In Hatch v. State, 1983 OK CR 47, ¶ 32, 662 P.2d 1377, 1384 this Court applied the felony murder doctrine to the appellant who was sent out of the victims' home by his accomplice while his accomplice carried out two murders inside the home.

2021This history reveals the legislative intent for § 701.7(B) to be applied broadly to all persons connected with the commission of the enumerated crimes. ¶2 In Hatch v. State, 1983 OK CR 47, ¶ 32, 662 P.2d 1377, 1384 this Court applied the felony murder doctrine to the appellant who was sent out of the victims' home by his accomplice while his accomplice carried out two murders inside the home.

2021In 1996, section 701.7(B) was amended and the language broadened to include deaths, which occur at the hands of the intended victim of the underlying felony, police officers, or innocent bystanders. 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d at 683. ¶7 This Court noted, "[t]he amended language is consistent with [this Court's] long-standing interpretation of the felony murder doctrine." Id . 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d at 683 (citing Hatch v. State , 1983 OK CR 47, 662 P.2d 1377. ¶8 In Dickens v. State , 2005 OK CR 4, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 599, 601, the Court made it clear that "first degree murder occurs 'when that

2021In 1996, section 701.7(B) was amended and the language broadened to include deaths, which occur at the hands of the intended victim of the underlying felony, police officers, or innocent bystanders. 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d at 683. ¶7 This Court noted, "[t]he amended language is consistent with [this Court's] long-standing interpretation of the felony murder doctrine." Id . 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d at 683 (citing Hatch v. State , 1983 OK CR 47, 662 P.2d 1377. ¶8 In Dickens v. State , 2005 OK CR 4, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 599, 601, the Court made it clear that "first degree murder occurs 'when that

2018See Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (requiring "major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life" for defendant to be subject to the death penalty under the felony-murder rule); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (reversing death penalty where the defendant neither killed, attempted to kill, or intended the killing to take place or the use of lethal force).

1994Appellant relies on Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), where the Supreme Court recognized that one who is convicted of first degree murder through the felony murder doctrine must be *332 accorded an “individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence”.

2023See Malaske v. State , 2004 OK CR 18, ¶ 5 , 89 P.3d 1116, 1118 (and cases cited therein) (Oklahoma case law requires a nexus between the underlying felony and the decedent's death in order for the felony murder doctrine to be applicable). ¶17 Further, contrary to Appellant's summary of the evidence, the record shows that Appellant and co-defendant Martinez went to the homeless camp together intentionally to kill the decedent.

2023See Malaske v. State , 2004 OK CR 18, ¶ 5 , 89 P.3d 1116, 1118 (and cases cited therein) (Oklahoma case law requires a nexus between the underlying felony and the decedent's death in order for the felony murder doctrine to be applicable). ¶17 Further, contrary to Appellant's summary of the evidence, the record shows that Appellant and co-defendant Martinez went to the homeless camp together intentionally to kill the decedent.

2018See Tison v. Arizona , 481 U.S. 137, 158 (1987) (requiring "major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life" for defendant to be subject to the death penalty under the felony-murder rule); Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (reversing death penalty where the defendant neither killed, attempted to kill, or intended the killing to take place or the use of lethal force).

1994Appellant relies on Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982) and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 , 107 S.Ct. 1676 , 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), where the Supreme Court recognized that one who is convicted of first degree murder through the felony murder doctrine must be *332 accorded an “individualized consideration as a constitutional requirement in imposing the death sentence”.

2004See also Lampkin v. State, 1991 OK CR 33 , 808 P.2d 694, 695 ("It is true that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim in order for the felony-murder doctrine to apply."); Diaz v. State, 1986 OK CR 167 , 728 P.2d 503, 509 (finding a nexus between the death and the underlying felony); Irvin v. State, 1980 OK CR 70 , 617 P.2d 588, 597 (nexus recognized).

2004See also Lampkin v. State, 1991 OK CR 33 , 808 P.2d 694, 695 ("It is true that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim in order for the felony-murder doctrine to apply."); Diaz v. State, 1986 OK CR 167 , 728 P.2d 503, 509 (finding a nexus between the death and the underlying felony); Irvin v. State, 1980 OK CR 70 , 617 P.2d 588, 597 (nexus recognized).

2004See also Lampkin v. State, 1991 OK CR 33 , 808 P.2d 694, 695 ("It is true that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim in order for the felony-murder doctrine to apply."); Diaz v. State, 1986 OK CR 167 , 728 P.2d 503, 509 (finding a nexus between the death and the underlying felony); Irvin v. State, 1980 OK CR 70 , 617 P.2d 588, 597 (nexus recognized).

2004See also Lampkin v. State, 1991 OK CR 33 , 808 P.2d 694, 695 ("It is true that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim in order for the felony-murder doctrine to apply."); Diaz v. State, 1986 OK CR 167 , 728 P.2d 503, 509 (finding a nexus between the death and the underlying felony); Irvin v. State, 1980 OK CR 70 , 617 P.2d 588, 597 (nexus recognized).

2004See also Lampkin v. State, 1991 OK CR 33 , 808 P.2d 694, 695 ("It is true that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim in order for the felony-murder doctrine to apply."); Diaz v. State, 1986 OK CR 167 , 728 P.2d 503, 509 (finding a nexus between the death and the underlying felony); Irvin v. State, 1980 OK CR 70 , 617 P.2d 588, 597 (nexus recognized).

2004See also Lampkin v. State, 1991 OK CR 33 , 808 P.2d 694, 695 ("It is true that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony and the death of the victim in order for the felony-murder doctrine to apply."); Diaz v. State, 1986 OK CR 167 , 728 P.2d 503, 509 (finding a nexus between the death and the underlying felony); Irvin v. State, 1980 OK CR 70 , 617 P.2d 588, 597 (nexus recognized).

2021The Court determined, "[t]he legislature's definition of murder in 701.7(B) is a reflection of the policy that one who, by his willful criminal conduct, sets in motion a chain of events so perilous to the sanctity of human life that death results therefrom; must bear the ultimate responsibility for his actions." The felony murder doctrine was also applied in Brogie v. State, 1985 OK CR 2, ¶ 45, 695 P.2d 538, 547-548, to an appellant who was present at the time of the murder, but who did not actually kill the victim by slashing her throat. ¶3 Subsequent to Hatch and Brogie , this Court applied

2021The Court determined, "[t]he legislature's definition of murder in 701.7(B) is a reflection of the policy that one who, by his willful criminal conduct, sets in motion a chain of events so perilous to the sanctity of human life that death results therefrom; must bear the ultimate responsibility for his actions." The felony murder doctrine was also applied in Brogie v. State, 1985 OK CR 2, ¶ 45, 695 P.2d 538, 547-548, to an appellant who was present at the time of the murder, but who did not actually kill the victim by slashing her throat. ¶3 Subsequent to Hatch and Brogie , this Court applied

2021In 1996, section 701.7(B) was amended and the language broadened to include deaths, which occur at the hands of the intended victim of the underlying felony, police officers, or innocent bystanders. 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d at 683. ¶7 This Court noted, "[t]he amended language is consistent with [this Court's] long-standing interpretation of the felony murder doctrine." Id . 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d at 683 (citing Hatch v. State , 1983 OK CR 47, 662 P.2d 1377. ¶8 In Dickens v. State , 2005 OK CR 4, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 599, 601, the Court made it clear that "first degree murder occurs 'when that

2021In 1996, section 701.7(B) was amended and the language broadened to include deaths, which occur at the hands of the intended victim of the underlying felony, police officers, or innocent bystanders. 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 6, 81 P.3d at 683. ¶7 This Court noted, "[t]he amended language is consistent with [this Court's] long-standing interpretation of the felony murder doctrine." Id . 2003 OK CR 28, ¶ 7, 81 P.3d at 683 (citing Hatch v. State , 1983 OK CR 47, 662 P.2d 1377. ¶8 In Dickens v. State , 2005 OK CR 4, ¶ 8, 106 P.3d 599, 601, the Court made it clear that "first degree murder occurs 'when that

2020Because Newman's argument is "more about public policy than controlling law, it is better directed to our state legislature." Harris v. State , 2019 OK CR 22, ¶ 93, 450 P.3d 933, 966. ¶22 This case is controlled by the reasoning in Brown v. State, 1987 OK CR 181, ¶ 16, 743 P.2d 133, 138 wherein this Court addressed a similar issue in regard to a jury instruction challenge: [A]ppellant urges that the trial court erred in refusing to give requested instructions on first degree manslaughter.

2020Because Newman's argument is "more about public policy than controlling law, it is better directed to our state legislature." Harris v. State , 2019 OK CR 22, ¶ 93, 450 P.3d 933, 966. ¶22 This case is controlled by the reasoning in Brown v. State, 1987 OK CR 181, ¶ 16, 743 P.2d 133, 138 wherein this Court addressed a similar issue in regard to a jury instruction challenge: [A]ppellant urges that the trial court erred in refusing to give requested instructions on first degree manslaughter.

2020Because Newman's argument is "more about public policy than controlling law, it is better directed to our state legislature." Harris v. State , 2019 OK CR 22, ¶ 93, 450 P.3d 933, 966. ¶22 This case is controlled by the reasoning in Brown v. State, 1987 OK CR 181, ¶ 16, 743 P.2d 133, 138 wherein this Court addressed a similar issue in regard to a jury instruction challenge: [A]ppellant urges that the trial court erred in refusing to give requested instructions on first degree manslaughter.

2020Because Newman's argument is "more about public policy than controlling law, it is better directed to our state legislature." Harris v. State , 2019 OK CR 22, ¶ 93, 450 P.3d 933, 966. ¶22 This case is controlled by the reasoning in Brown v. State, 1987 OK CR 181, ¶ 16, 743 P.2d 133, 138 wherein this Court addressed a similar issue in regard to a jury instruction challenge: [A]ppellant urges that the trial court erred in refusing to give requested instructions on first degree manslaughter.

2018See also Johnson v. State , 1963 OK CR 91 , 386 P.2d 336 , (homicide committed during resistance by defendant after burglary attempt was thwarted by pursuing officers constitutes murder); Oxendine v. State , 1960 OK CR 26 , 350 P.2d 606 (homicide committed to avoid detection and identification of perpetrators of felony constitutes murder).

2018See also Johnson v. State , 1963 OK CR 91 , 386 P.2d 336 , (homicide committed during resistance by defendant after burglary attempt was thwarted by pursuing officers constitutes murder); Oxendine v. State , 1960 OK CR 26 , 350 P.2d 606 (homicide committed to avoid detection and identification of perpetrators of felony constitutes murder).