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9 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Norrisred2 sentences2018Although Appellant's Notice of Appeal references all of his convictions and sentences, his appellate brief seeks reversal of only his attempted murder conviction. 285 S.C. 86 , 92, 328 S.E.2d 339 , 343 (1985) (setting forth an example of a proper jury instruction on the felony murder rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher , 385 S.C. 597 , 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009) and State v. Torrence , 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). 385 S.C. 597 , 610, 685 S.E.2d 802 , 809 (2009) ("[T]he 'use of a deadly weapon' implied malice instruction has no place in a murder (or assault and battery with 2018Although Appellant's Notice of Appeal references all of his convictions and sentences, his appellate brief seeks reversal of only his attempted murder conviction. 285 S.C. 86 , 92, 328 S.E.2d 339 , 343 (1985) (setting forth an example of a proper jury instruction on the felony murder rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher , 385 S.C. 597 , 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009) and State v. Torrence , 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). 385 S.C. 597 , 610, 685 S.E.2d 802 , 809 (2009) ("[T]he 'use of a deadly weapon' implied malice instruction has no place in a murder (or assault and battery with | 1 | 2 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2025In Smith, we held "felony attempted-murder is not a recognized crime." 430 S.C. at 232, 845 S.E.2d at 498. not apply and Smith could be guilty of attempted murder if the State proved he specifically intended to kill one or more of the rival gang members but unintentionally hit and injured the young woman. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Middletongreen2 sentences2018See State v. Middleton , 407 S.C. 312 , 317, 755 S.E.2d 432 , 435 (2014) (holding the circuit court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); id. ("When considering whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.' " (quoting State v. Kerr , 330 S.C. 132 , 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212 , 218 (Ct.App.1998) ) ). 2018See State v. Middleton , 407 S.C. 312 , 317, 755 S.E.2d 432 , 435 (2014) (holding the circuit court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); id. ("When considering whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.' " (quoting State v. Kerr , 330 S.C. 132 , 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212 , 218 (Ct.App.1998) ) ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Perrygreen1 sentence2018See Young , 420 S.C. at 628, 803 S.E.2d at 899 ("The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error." (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673 , 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) ) ). | 1 | 1 |
Keys v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See King , 422 S.C. at 57 , 810 S.E.2d at 23 ("One cannot be guilty of attempted murder by implied malice because implied malice does not encompass the essential specific intent to kill." (quoting Keys , 766 P.2d at 273 ) ). | 1 | 1 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen2 sentences2018See Young , 420 S.C. at 628, 803 S.E.2d at 899 ("The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error." (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673 , 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) ) ). 2018See Young , 420 S.C. at 628, 803 S.E.2d at 899 ("The harmless-error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence, and promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error." (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall , 475 U.S. 673 , 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) ) ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2018See King , 422 S.C. at 57 , 810 S.E.2d at 23 ("One cannot be guilty of attempted murder by implied malice because implied malice does not encompass the essential specific intent to kill." (quoting Keys , 766 P.2d at 273 ) ). 2018See King , 422 S.C. at 57 , 810 S.E.2d at 23 ("One cannot be guilty of attempted murder by implied malice because implied malice does not encompass the essential specific intent to kill." (quoting Keys , 766 P.2d at 273 ) ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gore v. Leeke
green
2 sentences2018Appellant cites Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 316, 199 S.E.2d 755 , 758 (1973) for the proposition that the felony murder rule should not be charged to the jury unless the underlying felony is inherently *198 dangerous. 2018Appellant cites Gore v. Leeke , 261 S.C. 308 , 316, 199 S.E.2d 755 , 758 (1973) for the proposition that the felony murder rule should not be charged to the jury unless the underlying felony is inherently *198 dangerous. | 3 | 1975–2018 |
State v. Torrence
green
2 sentences2018Although Appellant's Notice of Appeal references all of his convictions and sentences, his appellate brief seeks reversal of only his attempted murder conviction. 285 S.C. 86 , 92, 328 S.E.2d 339 , 343 (1985) (setting forth an example of a proper jury instruction on the felony murder rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher , 385 S.C. 597 , 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009) and State v. Torrence , 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). 385 S.C. 597 , 610, 685 S.E.2d 802 , 809 (2009) ("[T]he 'use of a deadly weapon' implied malice instruction has no place in a murder (or assault and battery with 2018Although Appellant's Notice of Appeal references all of his convictions and sentences, his appellate brief seeks reversal of only his attempted murder conviction. 285 S.C. 86 , 92, 328 S.E.2d 339 , 343 (1985) (setting forth an example of a proper jury instruction on the felony murder rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher , 385 S.C. 597 , 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009) and State v. Torrence , 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). 385 S.C. 597 , 610, 685 S.E.2d 802 , 809 (2009) ("[T]he 'use of a deadly weapon' implied malice instruction has no place in a murder (or assault and battery with | 2 | 2008–2018 |
State v. Crowe
green
2 sentences1978At the post-conviction hearing, LoPiano testified that he was given the following explanation of the felony-murder rule: *566 “[H]e used an example to where if me and another person or individual was in the act of committing a crime, and going there to commit that crime armed, then during that crime someone had gotten killed, that by me being there, whether I did it or not, indicates that I was just as guilty as he is, therefore, I am being charged just like he does.” This explanation is consistent with our previous pronouncements of the felony-murder rule, State v. Crowe, 258 S. C. 258, 188 S 1978At the post-conviction hearing, LoPiano testified that he was given the following explanation of the felony-murder rule: *566 “[H]e used an example to where if me and another person or individual was in the act of committing a crime, and going there to commit that crime armed, then during that crime someone had gotten killed, that by me being there, whether I did it or not, indicates that I was just as guilty as he is, therefore, I am being charged just like he does.” This explanation is consistent with our previous pronouncements of the felony-murder rule, State v. Crowe, 258 S. C. 258, 188 S | 2 | 1975–1978 |
State v. Cherry
green
2 sentences2018Likewise, on appeal, "this [c]ourt must affirm the [circuit] court's decision to submit the case to the jury" when "the [S]tate has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending **28 to prove the guilt of the accused.' " State v. Hepburn , 406 S.C. 416 , 429, 753 S.E.2d 402 , 409 (2013) (quoting State v. Cherry , 361 S.C. 588 , 593, 606 S.E.2d 475 , 478 (2004) ). 2018Likewise, on appeal, "this [c]ourt must affirm the [circuit] court's decision to submit the case to the jury" when "the [S]tate has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending **28 to prove the guilt of the accused.' " State v. Hepburn , 406 S.C. 416 , 429, 753 S.E.2d 402 , 409 (2013) (quoting State v. Cherry , 361 S.C. 588 , 593, 606 S.E.2d 475 , 478 (2004) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Hepburn
green
2 sentences2018Likewise, on appeal, "this [c]ourt must affirm the [circuit] court's decision to submit the case to the jury" when "the [S]tate has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending **28 to prove the guilt of the accused.' " State v. Hepburn , 406 S.C. 416 , 429, 753 S.E.2d 402 , 409 (2013) (quoting State v. Cherry , 361 S.C. 588 , 593, 606 S.E.2d 475 , 478 (2004) ). 2018Likewise, on appeal, "this [c]ourt must affirm the [circuit] court's decision to submit the case to the jury" when "the [S]tate has presented 'any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending **28 to prove the guilt of the accused.' " State v. Hepburn , 406 S.C. 416 , 429, 753 S.E.2d 402 , 409 (2013) (quoting State v. Cherry , 361 S.C. 588 , 593, 606 S.E.2d 475 , 478 (2004) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Butler
green
2 sentences2018Did the circuit court's felony murder rule instruction violate State v. Belcher ? 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW Directed Verdict "[W]hen ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the [circuit court] is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight." State v. Butler , 407 S.C. 376 , 381, 755 S.E.2d 457 , 460 (2014) (quoting State v. Wiggins , 330 S.C. 538 , 545, 500 S.E.2d 489 , 493 (1998) ). 2018Did the circuit court's felony murder rule instruction violate State v. Belcher ? 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW Directed Verdict "[W]hen ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the [circuit court] is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight." State v. Butler , 407 S.C. 376 , 381, 755 S.E.2d 457 , 460 (2014) (quoting State v. Wiggins , 330 S.C. 538 , 545, 500 S.E.2d 489 , 493 (1998) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Kinard
green
2 sentences2018The Kinard court noted that our supreme court's opinion in State v. Harris , 340 S.C. 59 , 64, 530 S.E.2d 626 , 628 (2000) found that the definition of 'malice aforethought' in Black's Law Dictionary "does not vary in a meaningful way from a proper jury instruction." 373 S.C. at 504 n.3, 646 S.E.2d at 169 n.3. 2018The Kinard court noted that our supreme court's opinion in State v. Harris , 340 S.C. 59 , 64, 530 S.E.2d 626 , 628 (2000) found that the definition of 'malice aforethought' in Black's Law Dictionary "does not vary in a meaningful way from a proper jury instruction." 373 S.C. at 504 n.3, 646 S.E.2d at 169 n.3. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Belcher
green
2 sentences2018Although Appellant's Notice of Appeal references all of his convictions and sentences, his appellate brief seeks reversal of only his attempted murder conviction. 285 S.C. 86 , 92, 328 S.E.2d 339 , 343 (1985) (setting forth an example of a proper jury instruction on the felony murder rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher , 385 S.C. 597 , 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009) and State v. Torrence , 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). 385 S.C. 597 , 610, 685 S.E.2d 802 , 809 (2009) ("[T]he 'use of a deadly weapon' implied malice instruction has no place in a murder (or assault and battery with 2018Although Appellant's Notice of Appeal references all of his convictions and sentences, his appellate brief seeks reversal of only his attempted murder conviction. 285 S.C. 86 , 92, 328 S.E.2d 339 , 343 (1985) (setting forth an example of a proper jury instruction on the felony murder rule), overruled on other grounds by State v. Belcher , 385 S.C. 597 , 685 S.E.2d 802 (2009) and State v. Torrence , 305 S.C. 45 , 406 S.E.2d 315 (1991). 385 S.C. 597 , 610, 685 S.E.2d 802 , 809 (2009) ("[T]he 'use of a deadly weapon' implied malice instruction has no place in a murder (or assault and battery with | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Kerr
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Middleton , 407 S.C. 312 , 317, 755 S.E.2d 432 , 435 (2014) (holding the circuit court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); id. ("When considering whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.' " (quoting State v. Kerr , 330 S.C. 132 , 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212 , 218 (Ct.App.1998) ) ). 2018See State v. Middleton , 407 S.C. 312 , 317, 755 S.E.2d 432 , 435 (2014) (holding the circuit court's error in refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt"); id. ("When considering whether an error with respect to a jury instruction was harmless, we must 'determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict.' " (quoting State v. Kerr , 330 S.C. 132 , 144-45, 498 S.E.2d 212 , 218 (Ct.App.1998) ) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2018The Kinard court noted that our supreme court's opinion in State v. Harris , 340 S.C. 59 , 64, 530 S.E.2d 626 , 628 (2000) found that the definition of 'malice aforethought' in Black's Law Dictionary "does not vary in a meaningful way from a proper jury instruction." 373 S.C. at 504 n.3, 646 S.E.2d at 169 n.3. 2018The Kinard court noted that our supreme court's opinion in State v. Harris , 340 S.C. 59 , 64, 530 S.E.2d 626 , 628 (2000) found that the definition of 'malice aforethought' in Black's Law Dictionary "does not vary in a meaningful way from a proper jury instruction." 373 S.C. at 504 n.3, 646 S.E.2d at 169 n.3. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Wiggins
green
2 sentences2018Did the circuit court's felony murder rule instruction violate State v. Belcher ? 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW Directed Verdict "[W]hen ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the [circuit court] is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight." State v. Butler , 407 S.C. 376 , 381, 755 S.E.2d 457 , 460 (2014) (quoting State v. Wiggins , 330 S.C. 538 , 545, 500 S.E.2d 489 , 493 (1998) ). 2018Did the circuit court's felony murder rule instruction violate State v. Belcher ? 7 STANDARD OF REVIEW Directed Verdict "[W]hen ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, the [circuit court] is concerned with the existence of evidence, not its weight." State v. Butler , 407 S.C. 376 , 381, 755 S.E.2d 457 , 460 (2014) (quoting State v. Wiggins , 330 S.C. 538 , 545, 500 S.E.2d 489 , 493 (1998) ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Russell v. United States
green
1 sentence2004We have recognized that “a finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates 'a more calculated and cold-blooded crime.’ ” State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 161 , 449 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1994) (quoting State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 297 , 439 S.E.2d 547, 575 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891 , 130 L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Lee
green
2 sentences2004We have recognized that “a finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates 'a more calculated and cold-blooded crime.’ ” State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 161 , 449 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1994) (quoting State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 297 , 439 S.E.2d 547, 575 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891 , 130 L. 2004We have recognized that “a finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates 'a more calculated and cold-blooded crime.’ ” State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 161 , 449 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1994) (quoting State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 297 , 439 S.E.2d 547, 575 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891 , 130 L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Harris
green
2 sentences2004We have recognized that “a finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates 'a more calculated and cold-blooded crime.’ ” State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 161 , 449 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1994) (quoting State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 297 , 439 S.E.2d 547, 575 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891 , 130 L. 2004We have recognized that “a finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates 'a more calculated and cold-blooded crime.’ ” State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 129, 161 , 449 S.E.2d 371, 387 (1994) (quoting State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 297 , 439 S.E.2d 547, 575 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891 , 130 L. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Yates
green
1 sentence1985State v. Yates, 280 S. C. 29, 310 S. E. (2d) 805 (1982); State v. Thompson, supra, State v. Judge, 208 S. C. 497, 38 S. E. (2d) 715 (1946). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Judge
green
1 sentence1985State v. Yates, 280 S. C. 29, 310 S. E. (2d) 805 (1982); State v. Thompson, supra, State v. Judge, 208 S. C. 497, 38 S. E. (2d) 715 (1946). | 1 | 1985–1985 |
J & L OIL CO. v. City of Carrollton
green
2 sentences1973State v. Cannon, supra; State v. Williams, supra. Under the facts of this case we are not called upon to decide whether or not the felony-murder rule should, or should not, be applied as to, every homicide committed in connection with the commission of any and every felony whether or not inherently or foreseeably dangerous. 1973State v. Cannon, supra; State v. Williams, supra. Under the facts of this case we are not called upon to decide whether or not the felony-murder rule should, or should not, be applied as to, every homicide committed in connection with the commission of any and every felony whether or not inherently or foreseeably dangerous. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
State v. Thompson
yellow
2 sentences1973A well reasoned decision adopting the latter view is that of State v. Thompson (1972), 280 N. C. 202 , 185 S. E. (2d) 666 , in which the opinion was written by Chief Justice Bobbitt. 1973A well reasoned decision adopting the latter view is that of State v. Thompson (1972), 280 N. C. 202 , 185 S. E. (2d) 666 , in which the opinion was written by Chief Justice Bobbitt. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Tot v. United States
green
2 sentences1973In support of this contention he cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court such as Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 , 63 S. Ct. 1241 , 87 L. 1973In support of this contention he cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court such as Tot v. United States, 319 U. S. 463 , 63 S. Ct. 1241 , 87 L. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Paul v. Southern Railway Co.
green
2 sentences1973State v. Cannon, supra; State v. Williams, supra. Under the facts of this case we are not called upon to decide whether or not the felony-murder rule should, or should not, be applied as to, every homicide committed in connection with the commission of any and every felony whether or not inherently or foreseeably dangerous. 1973State v. Cannon, supra; State v. Williams, supra. Under the facts of this case we are not called upon to decide whether or not the felony-murder rule should, or should not, be applied as to, every homicide committed in connection with the commission of any and every felony whether or not inherently or foreseeably dangerous. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.