voluntariness waiver in Mississippi

2014Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss.1985) (citations omitted).

2009See Kircher v. State, 753 So. 2d 1017, 1023-24 (¶ 28) (Miss. 1999) (“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.”) (citing O'Halloran v. State, 731 So. 2d 565, 570 (Miss.1999); Gavin v. State, 473 So. 2d 952, 954 (Miss.1985); Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 1984)). ¶69.

2012Gavin v. State, 473 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss.1985) (citing Stevens v. State, 458 So.2d 726, 729 (Miss.1984)).

2009See Kircher v. State, 753 So. 2d 1017, 1023-24 (¶ 28) (Miss. 1999) (“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.”) (citing O'Halloran v. State, 731 So. 2d 565, 570 (Miss.1999); Gavin v. State, 473 So. 2d 952, 954 (Miss.1985); Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 1984)). ¶69.

2009See Kircher v. State, 753 So. 2d 1017, 1023-24 (¶ 28) (Miss. 1999) (“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.”) (citing O'Halloran v. State, 731 So. 2d 565, 570 (Miss.1999); Gavin v. State, 473 So. 2d 952, 954 (Miss.1985); Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 1984)). ¶69.

2002"The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances." O'Halloran v. State, 731 So.2d 565, 570 (Miss.1999).

2020Sylvester, 113 So. 3d at 623 (¶17) (citing Thomas, 881 So. 2d at 917 (¶13)).

2015Id. at 917 (¶18). ¶ 11.

2009“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.” Hicks v. State, 812 So.2d 179, 191 (¶ 32) (Miss.2002).

2009“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.” Hicks v. State, 812 So.2d 179, 191 (¶ 32) (Miss.2002). ¶ 16. “[T]he judge should ascertain, under a totality of the circumstances and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily given, and was not the result of force, threat, or intimidation.” Baldwin v. State, 757 So.2d 227, 234-35 (¶ 28) (Miss.2000).

2008Holland v. State, 587 So.2d 848, 860 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted).

2007Holland v. State, 587 So. 2d 848, 860 (Miss. 1991) (citations omitted).

2002"The applicable standard for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice." Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 956 (Miss. 1997).

2000"The applicable standard for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances, the statement is the product of the accused's free and rational choice." Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 956 (Miss. 1997).

1997In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion." See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [ 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818 , 52 L.Ed.2d 238 ] (1977); Miranda, supra, [ 384 U.S. at 460 , 86 S.Ct. at 1602 [1620], 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 Ohio Misc. 9 , 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237,

1997In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion." See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [ 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818 , 52 L.Ed.2d 238 ] (1977); Miranda, supra, [ 384 U.S. at 460 , 86 S.Ct. at 1602 [1620], 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 Ohio Misc. 9 , 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237,

2006A criminal “defendant may waive effectuation of [the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney], provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 62 A criminal defendant who challenges the voluntariness of the waiver has a 62 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

2006A criminal “defendant may waive effectuation of [the right to remain silent and the right to the presence of an attorney], provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” 62 A criminal defendant who challenges the voluntariness of the waiver has a 62 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 16 L.

1997In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion." See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [ 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818 , 52 L.Ed.2d 238 ] (1977); Miranda, supra, [ 384 U.S. at 460 , 86 S.Ct. at 1602 [1620], 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 Ohio Misc. 9 , 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237,

1997In Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 523 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986), the United States Supreme Court, addressing the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver under the Fourteenth Amendment clearly held: The "sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)] was based is governmental coercion." See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 [ 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818 , 52 L.Ed.2d 238 ] (1977); Miranda, supra, [ 384 U.S. at 460 , 86 S.Ct. at 1602 [1620], 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 10 Ohio Misc. 9 , 36 Ohio Ops 2d 237,

2019This Court unanimously held that "[i]t is important to recognize that a clear distinction exists between the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda and the voluntariness of a confession itself under both the federal Due Process Clause and Mississippi law." Id. at 1261 (quoting Keller v. State , 138 So.3d 817 , 850 (Miss. 2014) ).

2017It is important to recognize that “[a] clear distinction exists between the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda and the voluntariness of a confession itself under both the federal Due Process Clause and Mississippi law.” Keller v. State, 138 So. 3d 817, 850 (Miss. 2014).

2022Moreover, “a misunderstanding created by the erroneous advice of defense counsel may be corrected by the circuit court during the voluntariness inquiry.” Castro v. State, 159 So. 3d 1217, 1220 (¶10) (Miss.

2020A circuit court may summarily dismiss a movant’s PCR motion without conducting 5 See Sylvester, 113 So. 3d at 623 (¶19) (finding that Sylvester’s eligibility for trusty- earned time was “analogous to eligibility for parole or the [regimented-inmate-discipline] program”). 13 an evidentiary hearing if the misunderstanding that was created by the erroneous advice was corrected by the circuit court during a voluntariness inquiry.

2020Sylvester, 113 So. 3d at 623 (¶17) (citing Thomas, 881 So. 2d at 917 (¶13)).

2020“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.” Pinter v. State, 221 So. 3d 378, 387 (¶21) (Miss. 2017) (quoting Houston v. State, 170 So. 3d 542, 545 (¶12) (Miss.

2020“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.” Pinter v. State, 221 So. 3d 378, 387 (¶21) (Miss. 2017) (quoting Houston v. State, 170 So. 3d 542, 545 (¶12) (Miss.

2019Just as in this case, the defendant's "arguments challenging the admissibility of his confession before the trial court were limited wholly to Miranda ; he never argued that his confession was involuntary because it had been induced by threats or promises, or for any other reason." See id. at 1262 ; see also Fleming v. State , 604 So.2d 280 , 292 (Miss. 1992) ("[A]n objection on one or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds."). ¶11.

2015In Goff, 14 So.3d at 641 (¶49), the supreme court acknowledged that “as a consequence of adopting the voluntariness test for consent searches ... the subject's knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, [but] the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.” See and compare Green v. State, 710 So.2d 862, 864-66 (¶¶ 6-11) (Miss.1998). 12 .

2015In Goff, 14 So.3d at 641 (¶49), the supreme court acknowledged that “as a consequence of adopting the voluntariness test for consent searches ... the subject's knowledge of the right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, [but] the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent.” See and compare Green v. State, 710 So.2d 862, 864-66 (¶¶ 6-11) (Miss.1998). 12 .

2014The trial judge, sitting as the finder of fact, “should ascertain, under the totality of the circumstances and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily given, and was not the result of force, threat, or intimidation.” Chim, 972 So.2d at 603 (¶ 9).

2014“A criminal defendant who challenges the voluntariness of his waiver of rights has a due process right to a reliable judicial review of whether the confession was, in fact, voluntarily given.” Jennings v. State, 127 So.3d 185, 190 (¶ 8) (Miss.2013).

2012See Williams v. State, 770 So.2d 1048, 1051 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2000). ¶ 7.

2009“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.” Hicks v. State, 812 So.2d 179, 191 (¶ 32) (Miss.2002). ¶ 16. “[T]he judge should ascertain, under a totality of the circumstances and beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant’s statement was freely and voluntarily given, and was not the result of force, threat, or intimidation.” Baldwin v. State, 757 So.2d 227, 234-35 (¶ 28) (Miss.2000).

2009The trial court in Morris v. State, 798 So.2d 603, 606 (¶ 9) (Miss.Ct.App.2001) held that: *894 When a defendant challenges the volun-tariness of his statement, the trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing outside the jury’s presence to determine the admissibility of the confession.

2009See Kircher v. State, 753 So. 2d 1017, 1023-24 (¶ 28) (Miss. 1999) (“The voluntariness of a waiver, or of a confession, is a factual inquiry that must be determined by the trial judge from the totality of the circumstances.”) (citing O'Halloran v. State, 731 So. 2d 565, 570 (Miss.1999); Gavin v. State, 473 So. 2d 952, 954 (Miss.1985); Stevens v. State, 458 So. 2d 726, 729 (Miss. 1984)). ¶69.

2009In Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 858 (Miss. 2003), the Court rejected the notion that an illegally obtained confession necessarily requires the exclusion of a subsequent voluntary confession.

1991Holland's intoxication nor lack of sleep impaired his ability to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights: Five witnesses testified that Holland did not appear to be impaired by alcohol and did not slur his speech. [9] See Kniep, 525 So.2d at 389 (Rejecting the defendant's claim that intoxication (and other specified factors) affected the voluntariness of her waiver, this Court cited the testimony of one witness who "noticed an odor of alcohol on [the defendant's] breath" but felt the defendant "appeared to know what she was doing and what she was talking about."); Stevens, 4

1991Holland's intoxication nor lack of sleep impaired his ability to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights: Five witnesses testified that Holland did not appear to be impaired by alcohol and did not slur his speech. [9] See Kniep, 525 So.2d at 389 (Rejecting the defendant's claim that intoxication (and other specified factors) affected the voluntariness of her waiver, this Court cited the testimony of one witness who "noticed an odor of alcohol on [the defendant's] breath" but felt the defendant "appeared to know what she was doing and what she was talking about."); Stevens, 4