voluntariness waiver in Kansas

2025Parker, 311 Kan. at 257; Mattox, 305 Kan. at 1042; State v. Kirtdoll, 281 Kan. 1138, 1144 , 136 P.3d 417 (2006).

2025Parker, 311 Kan. at 257; Mattox, 305 Kan. at 1042; State v. Kirtdoll, 281 Kan. 1138, 1144 , 136 P.3d 417 (2006).

2025In Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 , the Kansas Supreme Court held that "[u]nwarned inculpatory statements obtained through noncustodial interrogation, although not barred by Miranda, may nevertheless be inadmissible if they were obtained in violation of the due process voluntariness requirement." Meaning, even though "'the Miranda standard is the first line of inquiry in every case, . . . [c]onformity with Miranda . . . triggers the second line of analysis—the voluntariness standard.'" Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 (quoting 3 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 24:5 [2d ed.1993]).

2025In Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 , the Kansas Supreme Court held that "[u]nwarned inculpatory statements obtained through noncustodial interrogation, although not barred by Miranda, may nevertheless be inadmissible if they were obtained in violation of the due process voluntariness requirement." Meaning, even though "'the Miranda standard is the first line of inquiry in every case, . . . [c]onformity with Miranda . . . triggers the second line of analysis—the voluntariness standard.'" Morton, 286 Kan. at 649 (quoting 3 Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 24:5 [2d ed.1993]).

2025And this court recently conveyed a similar message in State v. G.O., 318 Kan. 386 , 403, 543 P.3d 1096 (2024), by articulating a list of "potential" factors to be considered in a voluntariness inquiry while making clear that "trial judges need not address every factor" so long as judges articulate the factors on which their findings are based.

2024In doing so, McCarther did not discuss the United States Supreme Court's holding five years earlier that use of an evidentiary standard "that [takes] into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity . . . is not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 , 81 S. Ct. 735 , 5 L.

2024In doing so, McCarther did not discuss the United States Supreme Court's holding five years earlier that use of an evidentiary standard "that [takes] into account the circumstance of probable truth or falsity . . . is not a permissible standard under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543-44 , 81 S. Ct. 735 , 5 L.

2024The Court concluded "[t]his hybrid quality of the voluntariness inquiry, subsuming, as it does, a 'complex of values,' [citation omitted] itself militates against treating the question as one of simple historical fact" that would warrant deference to the trial judge's decision. 474 U.S. at 116 .

2024The Court concluded "[t]his hybrid quality of the voluntariness inquiry, subsuming, as it does, a 'complex of values,' [citation omitted] itself militates against treating the question as one of simple historical fact" that would warrant deference to the trial judge's decision. 474 U.S. at 116 .

2022State v. Parker, 311 Kan. 255 , 257-58, 459 P.3d 793 (2020).

2018Analysis of the voluntariness of a waiver depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 295 Kan. at 858 , 286 P.3d 876 .

2018Analysis of the voluntariness of a waiver depends on the particular facts and circumstances of the case. 295 Kan. at 858 , 286 P.3d 876 .

2018State v. Bridges , 297 Kan. 989 , 1004, 306 P.3d 244 (2013).

2018State v. Bridges , 297 Kan. 989 , 1004, 306 P.3d 244 (2013).

2018Lowery argues that there were two additional factors, based upon his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that impact the voluntariness analysis.

2018Lowery argues that there were two additional factors, based upon his rights under Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that impact the voluntariness analysis.

2013Appellate courts have developed a nonexclusive list of factors to aid in the voluntariness analysis: “(1) the accused’s mental condition; (2) the manner and duration of the interrogation; (3) the ability of the accused to communicate on request with the outside world; (4) the accused’s age, intellect, and background; (5) the fairness of the officers in conducting the interrogation; and (6) the accused’s fluency with the English language.” Robinson, 293 Kan. 1002 , Syl. ¶ 7.

2013The judge also relied on a passage from United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 , 97 S. Ct. 1814 , 52 L.

2013The judge also relied on a passage from United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 , 97 S. Ct. 1814 , 52 L.

2011In support of Thomas' argument that the call for back-up is a factor relevant to our determination, she cites Falls v. State, 953 So.2d 627 (Fla.Dist.App.2007), and Morrow v. State, 848 So.2d 1290 (Fla.Dist.App.2003).

2011In support of Thomas' argument that the call for back-up is a factor relevant to our determination, she cites Falls v. State, 953 So.2d 627 (Fla.Dist.App.2007), and Morrow v. State, 848 So.2d 1290 (Fla.Dist.App.2003).

2005We stand alone in using a deferential standard of review with respect to the ultimate issue of voluntariness.” The Seventh Circuit then concluded: “We believe that Ornelas [v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 , 134 L.

2005Ed. 2d 911 , 116 S. Ct. 1657 (1996)] makes it clear that we ought to join the rest of the Country in holding that the ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights ought to be reviewed de novo by an appellate court.

2001The court in State v. Bornholdt, 261 Kan. 644, 651 , 932 P.2d 964 (1997), was asked to review whether the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted the defendant’s statements to officers without holding a voluntariness hearing.

2001The court in State v. Bornholdt, 261 Kan. 644, 651 , 932 P.2d 964 (1997), was asked to review whether the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted the defendant’s statements to officers without holding a voluntariness hearing.

1997The State concedes that Bomholdt’s statements to Cunningham and Wheeler and the letter to Wheeler are in effect confessions under K.S.A. 60-460(f) and our holding in State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 682-84 , 867 P.2d 366 (1994).

1997The State concedes that Bomholdt’s statements to Cunningham and Wheeler and the letter to Wheeler are in effect confessions under K.S.A. 60-460(f) and our holding in State v. Green, 254 Kan. 669, 682-84 , 867 P.2d 366 (1994).

1997To the contrary, the Court prefaced its entire discussion of the merits of the case with a statement of the constitutional rule that was to prove dispositive — that a defendant has a ‘right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness . . . .’ [Citation omitted.] Language in subsequent decisions of this Court has reaffirmed the view that the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Our court followed W

1997To the contrary, the Court prefaced its entire discussion of the merits of the case with a statement of the constitutional rule that was to prove dispositive — that a defendant has a ‘right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of voluntariness . . . .’ [Citation omitted.] Language in subsequent decisions of this Court has reaffirmed the view that the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Our court followed W

1983“We therefore conclude that Florida procedure did, consistently with the United States Constitution, require that respondent’s confession be challenged at trial or not at all, and thus his failure to timely object to its admission amounted to an independent and adequate state procedural ground which would have prevented direct review here.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. at 86-87 .