voluntariness analysis in Illinois

2020Moreover, even with a voluntary confession, “a defendant may still present evidence to the jury that affects its credibility or weight or that challenges its reliability or truth. [Citations.] The jury’s credibility inquiry will often turn on largely the same evidence as the judge’s voluntariness inquiry, but the two are nonetheless ‘separate inquires,’ and the latter, a factual matter, is ‘exclusively for the jury to assess.’ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986).” People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶ 129 . ¶ 105 To get around the fact defendant was not raising a defense to the

2020Moreover, even with a voluntary confession, - 49 - 1-17-0500 “a defendant may still present evidence to the jury that affects its credibility or weight, or that challenges its reliability or truth. [Citations.] The jury’s credibility inquiry will often turn on largely the same evidence as the judge’s voluntariness inquiry, but the two are nonetheless ‘separate inquires’; and the latter, a factual matter, is ‘exclusively for the jury to assess.’ Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688 (1986).” People v. James, 2017 IL App (1st) 143391, ¶¶ 129-130 . ¶ 105 To get around the fact defendant was not ra

2015Thus, the “greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prude, 66 Ill. 2d at 476 (quoting People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)). ¶ 61 In light of these concerns, we view respondent’s age as a key factor in the voluntariness analysis.

2015Thus, the “greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prude, 66 Ill. 2d at 476 (quoting People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)). ¶ 61 In light of these concerns, we view respondent’s age as a key factor in the voluntariness analysis.

2015Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (self-incrimination), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (due process)); see also People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 252 (2009) (discussing the constitutional underpinnings of the voluntariness requirement).

2015Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (self-incrimination), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (due process)); see also People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 252 (2009) (discussing the constitutional underpinnings of the voluntariness requirement).

2015As the Supreme Court has acknowledged: “A child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); accord, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. - 17 - 38, 58 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).

2015As the Supreme Court has acknowledged: “A child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); accord, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. - 17 - 38, 58 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).

2015Unlike the Miranda custody analysis in this case, which considers a hypothetical reasonable juvenile (see J.D.B., 564 U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2402 ; Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 508-10 ), the voluntariness analysis is based on a particular juvenile.

2015See generally J.D.B., 564 U.S. at ___ , 131 S. Ct. at 2410 (Alito, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J., Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (observing that the “all-encompassing nature of the voluntariness inquiry” allows courts to make a “highly individualized determination”).

2015As the Supreme Court has acknowledged: “A child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); accord, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. - 17 - 38, 58 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).

2015As the Supreme Court has acknowledged: “A child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); accord, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. - 17 - 38, 58 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).

2015Generally, the question in voluntariness cases “is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed.” Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).

2015Generally, the question in voluntariness cases “is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed.” Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963).

2015Thus, the “greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prude, 66 Ill. 2d at 476 (quoting People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)). ¶ 61 In light of these concerns, we view respondent’s age as a key factor in the voluntariness analysis.

2015Thus, the “greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Prude, 66 Ill. 2d at 476 (quoting People v. Simmons, 60 Ill. 2d 173, 180 (1975), quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967)). ¶ 61 In light of these concerns, we view respondent’s age as a key factor in the voluntariness analysis.

2015Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (self-incrimination), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (due process)); see also People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 252 (2009) (discussing the constitutional underpinnings of the voluntariness requirement).

2015Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 607 (2004) (citing Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (self-incrimination), and Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (due process)); see also People v. Richardson, 234 Ill. 2d 233, 252 (2009) (discussing the constitutional underpinnings of the voluntariness requirement).

2015As the Supreme Court has acknowledged: “A child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); accord, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. - 17 - 38, 58 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).

2015As the Supreme Court has acknowledged: “A child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact.’ Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982); accord, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. - 17 - 38, 58 (2007); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993).

2005See Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d at 177 , citing People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996).

2005See Ballard , 206 Ill. 2d at 177 , citing People v. Gilliam , 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996).

2005See Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d at 177 , citing People v. Gilliam, 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996).

2005See Ballard , 206 Ill. 2d at 177 , citing People v. Gilliam , 172 Ill. 2d 484, 500-01 (1996).

2003In State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 274 , 645 A.2d 111, 119 (1994), the Supreme Court of New Jersey followed Perez-Bustamante and, based on the voluntariness test, held McLaughlin did not require the court to suppress the defendant’s confession despite a 72-hour detention between arrest and the probable cause hearing.

2003In State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 274 , 645 A.2d 111, 119 (1994), the Supreme Court of New Jersey followed Perez-Bustamante and, based on the voluntariness test, held McLaughlin did not require the court to suppress the defendant’s confession despite a 72-hour detention between arrest and the probable cause hearing.

1998Easley, 148 Ill.2d at 312-13 , 170 Ill.Dec. 356 , 592 N.E.2d 1036 ; Mays, 176 Ill.App.3d at 1034-35 , 127 Ill.Dec. 14 , 532 N.E.2d 843 (both cases discussing Connelly ).

1998Easley, 148 Ill. 2d at 312-13 ; Mays, 176 Ill.

2008As the Seventh Circuit explained: "What emerges from the split opinions in Seibert is this: at least as to deliberate two-step interrogations in which Miranda warnings are intentionally withheld until after the suspect confesses, the central voluntariness inquiry of Elstad has been replaced by a presumptive rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test for change in time, place, and circumstances from the first statement to the second. * * * Where the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert . " (Em

2008As the Seventh Circuit explained: “What emerges from the split opinions in Seibert is this: at least as to deliberate two-step interrogations in which Miranda warnings are intentionally withheld until after the suspect confesses, the central voluntariness inquiry of Elstad has been replaced by a presumptive rule of exclusion, subject to a multifactor test for change in time, place, and circumstances from the first statement to the second. *** Where the initial violation of Miranda was not part of a deliberate strategy to undermine the warnings, Elstad appears to have survived Seibert.” (Emphas

2025See People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 528 (2005). ¶ 47 In Illinois, when a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation occurs, the remedy is not automatic suppression but, rather, to “ask simply whether the confession was voluntary—whether the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station was the impetus for the confession or whether it was the product of free will.” Id. at 535 ; see also People v. Suggs, 2016 IL App (2d) 140040, ¶ 75 (noting that “a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation is appropriately accounted for in the voluntariness analysis”).

2025See People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 528 (2005). ¶ 47 In Illinois, when a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation occurs, the remedy is not automatic suppression but, rather, to “ask simply whether the confession was voluntary—whether the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station was the impetus for the confession or whether it was the product of free will.” Id. at 535 ; see also People v. Suggs, 2016 IL App (2d) 140040, ¶ 75 (noting that “a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation is appropriately accounted for in the voluntariness analysis”).

2025See People v. Willis, 215 Ill. 2d 517, 528 (2005). ¶ 47 In Illinois, when a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation occurs, the remedy is not automatic suppression but, rather, to “ask simply whether the confession was voluntary—whether the inherently coercive atmosphere of the police station was the impetus for the confession or whether it was the product of free will.” Id. at 535 ; see also People v. Suggs, 2016 IL App (2d) 140040, ¶ 75 (noting that “a Gerstein/McLaughlin violation is appropriately accounted for in the voluntariness analysis”).

2016Accordingly we - 24 - 2016 IL App (2d) 140040 reject defendant’s contention insofar as he is making a Gerstein/McLaughlin argument outside of the proper voluntariness analysis. ¶ 77 Defendant argues that, if we determine that Gerstein/McLaughlin concerns are not implicated in this case, we are effectively using the probable-cause determination for one offense to stand in place of the necessary probable-cause determination for another offense.

2024See Salamon, 2022 IL 125722, ¶ 81 ; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226 .