voluntariness waiver in Nebraska

2025Id.

2025Dec. 174 (2024). 66 Dickerson v. United States, supra note 29, 530 U.S. at 444 . - 612 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 319 Nebraska Reports STATE V.

2025SUTTON Cite as 319 Neb. 581 We acknowledge that refusing to allow a suspect to contact an attorney is a relevant circumstance in the totality of the circumstances surrounding the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights. 65 But it is not decisive and must be weighed in light of all the surrounding circumstances.

2025As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dickerson v. United States, 66 “The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.” However, “‘[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was “compelled” despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the 65 See, e.g., People v. Leverson, 2024 IL App (1st) 211083 , 256 N.E.3d 1138 , 482 Ill.

2025As explained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dickerson v. United States, 66 “The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.” However, “‘[c]ases in which a defendant can make a colorable argument that a self-incriminating statement was “compelled” despite the fact that the law enforcement authorities adhered to the 65 See, e.g., People v. Leverson, 2024 IL App (1st) 211083 , 256 N.E.3d 1138 , 482 Ill.

2023See State v. Burries, supra. The analysis is the same to determine the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights or a confession: the focus is on the conduct of governmental actors, and relevant factors include tactics used by police, characteristics known to police - 823 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 31 Nebraska Appellate Reports STATE v. WYRICK Cite as 31 Neb.

2022VANDERFORD Cite as 312 Neb. 580 and detached in evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver,” 41 and the defendant’s conviction was reversed.

2014We first turn to Robinson’s arguments that counsel was ineffective for failing to request a hearing on the voluntariness of Robinson’s statements and for failing to file to suppress those statements. 11 See id. 12 State v. Poe, supra note 5. 13 State v. Watt, supra note 10 .

1989Ed. 2d 416 (1975), considered a statement which satisfied the voluntariness requirement of the fifth amendment, notwithstanding an illegal arrest, and stated: In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto, to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be “sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.” 371 U.S. at 486 .

1985App. 28 , 210 S.E.2d 84 (1974) (the voluntariness requirement applies to statements made to private individuals as well as to those made to law enforcement personnel); cf. United States v. Rojas, 458 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1972) (in a bench trial a bank employee’s damaging admission to a bank official regarding misapplication of bank funds was admissible, after the court determined that the statement was voluntary).

1985App. 28 , 210 S.E.2d 84 (1974) (the voluntariness requirement applies to statements made to private individuals as well as to those made to law enforcement personnel); cf. United States v. Rojas, 458 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1972) (in a bench trial a bank employee’s damaging admission to a bank official regarding misapplication of bank funds was admissible, after the court determined that the statement was voluntary).