9 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Arriaga-Lunagreen1 sentence2019But the voluntariness analysis requires an inquiry into the “totality of the circumstances” of the individual case to understand whether the “free will of the witness was overborne.” Arriaga-Luna, 2013 UT 56, ¶ 9 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Allen Murdockgreen1 sentence2018But "a Miranda violation may be considered in a voluntariness analysis." State v. Kozlov , 2012 UT App 114 , ¶ 56, 276 P.3d 1207 ; see also Murdock , 667 F.3d at 1306 ("The detective's failure to honor [the defendant's] Miranda right is certainly relevant to whether [the defendant's] statements were voluntary, but it is insufficient by itself to establish involuntariness."). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mabegreen1 sentence2013See State v. Mabe, 864 P.2d 890, 894 (Utah 1993) (''The passage of time [between two interrogations] ... would tend to dissipate any lingering effects of police coercion."). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Earl Young, Sr.green1 sentence2005“It is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant ‘must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.’ ” Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ¶ 31 , 984 P.2d 382 (quoting United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)). | 1 | 1 |
Marbury v. Madisongreen1 sentence2001III, § 2, cl. 1; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 187, 177 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1808) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."). 147 Accordingly, to the degree it hinges consent upon waiver-and to the extent our prior cases have not made our position perfectly clear-we today explicitly reject the court of appeals' voluntariness test as enunciated in Marshall and its progeny. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Whittenbackgreen1 sentence2001When assessing whether consent to a war-rantless search was given voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schmeckloth: Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ; see also, eg., Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 ; State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harmongreen1 sentence2001When assessing whether consent to a war-rantless search was given voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schmeckloth: Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ; see also, eg., Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 ; State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mooregreen2 sentences1991See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). 1991See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Meinhartgreen2 sentences1986In State v. Meinhart, Utah, 617 P.2d 355 (1980), we said that it is the district court’s “duty and prerogative ... to determine the question of the voluntariness of a waiver of the right to remain silent and to have counsel,” and because of that court’s advantaged position, we reverse such a ruling only where clear error or abuse of discretion has been shown. 1986Id. at 357-58 (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Oregon v. Elstad
green
2 sentences2012Although a Miranda violation may be considered in a voluntariness analysis, see id., the issue of the voluntariness of Defendant’s statements under the Fifth Amendment was not argued or considered. 2012Although a Miranda violation may be considered in a voluntariness analysis, see id., the issue of the voluntariness of Defendant's statements under the Fifth Amendment was not argued or considered. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Kozlov
green
2 sentences2018But "a Miranda violation may be considered in a voluntariness analysis." State v. Kozlov , 2012 UT App 114 , ¶ 56, 276 P.3d 1207 ; see also Murdock , 667 F.3d at 1306 ("The detective's failure to honor [the defendant's] Miranda right is certainly relevant to whether [the defendant's] statements were voluntary, but it is insufficient by itself to establish involuntariness."). 2018But "a Miranda violation may be considered in a voluntariness analysis." State v. Kozlov , 2012 UT App 114 , ¶ 56, 276 P.3d 1207 ; see also Murdock , 667 F.3d at 1306 ("The detective's failure to honor [the defendant's] Miranda right is certainly relevant to whether [the defendant's] statements were voluntary, but it is insufficient by itself to establish involuntariness."). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Lovell
green
2 sentences2005“It is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant ‘must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.’ ” Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ¶ 31 , 984 P.2d 382 (quoting United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)). 2005“It is well established that to warrant substitution of counsel, a defendant ‘must show good cause, such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.’ ” Lovell, 1999 UT 40 at ¶ 31 , 984 P.2d 382 (quoting United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973)). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte
green
2 sentences2001When assessing whether consent to a war-rantless search was given voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schmeckloth: Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ; see also, eg., Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 ; State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 2001When assessing whether consent to a war-rantless search was given voluntarily, courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schmeckloth: Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as "the product of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 ; see also, eg., Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206 ; State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.