voluntariness test in Tennessee

2026As to whether Sergeant Bibbs tricked the Defendant into giving his statement by telling him that he was detained rather than arrested, in order for a statement to be admissible, it must be “‘free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overbor

2026In conducting the voluntariness inquiry, courts examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding a suspect’s confession, considering “both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (citations omitted).

2026As to whether Sergeant Bibbs tricked the Defendant into giving his statement by telling him that he was detained rather than arrested, in order for a statement to be admissible, it must be “‘free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overbor

2026“The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda.” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 434- 35 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Id. (citing Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 ).

2026“The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda.” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 434- 35 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Id. (citing Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 ).

2026“The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda.” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 434- 35 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Id. (citing Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 ).

2026“The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda.” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 434- 35 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Id. (citing Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 ).

2026“The issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, whereas the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Davidson, 509 S.W.3d at 189 (first citing State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 815 (Tenn. 2014); and then citing State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)).

2010See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994).

2010See State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994).

2026As to whether Sergeant Bibbs tricked the Defendant into giving his statement by telling him that he was detained rather than arrested, in order for a statement to be admissible, it must be “‘free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overbor

2026As to whether Sergeant Bibbs tricked the Defendant into giving his statement by telling him that he was detained rather than arrested, in order for a statement to be admissible, it must be “‘free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overbor

2025Thus, the central inquiry in a voluntariness analysis is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, “the behavior of the State’s law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined.” State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).

2015The determinative question is “whether the behavior of the State‟s law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant‟s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined.” Kelly, 603 S.W.2d at 728 (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)); see also Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (“[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect‟s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-35 ; Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455 )).

2023Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).

2019Id. (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)).

2026As to whether Sergeant Bibbs tricked the Defendant into giving his statement by telling him that he was detained rather than arrested, in order for a statement to be admissible, it must be “‘free and voluntary; that is, [it] must not be extracted by any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overbor

2025“A defendant’s subjective perception alone is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense.” Id. (citing State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tenn. 1994)). - 22 - “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not voluntary.” Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 79 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013) (citing fir

2018See Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991); see also State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013) (stating “the voluntariness test remains distinct from Miranda”).

2017See Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991); see also State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (stating “the voluntariness test remains distinct from Miranda”).

2018A confession is involuntary if it results from “‘any sort of threats or violence, . . . any direct or implied promises, however slight, [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tenn. Crim. - 22 - App. 2000) (quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 .

2017See Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279, 286-88 (1991); see also State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013) (stating “the voluntariness test remains distinct from Miranda”). - 13 - A confession is involuntary if it results from “‘any sort of threats or violence, . . . any direct or implied promises, however slight, . . . [or] by the exertion of any improper influence.’” State v. Smith, 42 S.W.3d 101, 109 (Tenn. Crim.

2015In order to determine the voluntariness of a statement, a court must “examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession, „both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.‟” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 ); see also Monts v. State, 400 S.W.2d 722, 733 (Tenn. 1966).

2015In order to determine the voluntariness of a statement, a court must “examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession, „both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.‟” Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 ); see also Monts v. State, 400 S.W.2d 722, 733 (Tenn. 1966).

2001Thus, if the trial court’s findings of fact are incomplete or not to be found at all, and these findings cannot be substantially 1 “[W]e agree with those jurisdictions that have rejected the voluntariness test and have applied inste ad a ‘fruit of the poison tre e’ analysis in deter mining wheth er or not a state ment o btained d uring an illegal detention must be suppressed.” State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d at 674 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 , 48 8, 83 S. C t. 407, 417 (1963)). -5- supplemented by the record, an appellate court is prevented from completing any meaningful r

2000Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 591-592 , 95 S.Ct. 2254 ; State v. Huddleston, 924 S.W.2d 666, 674 (Tenn.1996).

2025“A defendant’s subjective perception alone is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense.” Id. (citing State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tenn. 1994)). - 22 - “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not voluntary.” Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 79 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013) (citing fir

2025“A defendant’s subjective perception alone is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense.” Id. (citing State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tenn. 1994)). - 22 - “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not voluntary.” Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 79 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013) (citing fir

2005Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285-87 , 111 S.Ct. at 1251-52 ; State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 271 (Tenn.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 905 , 113 S.Ct. 298 , 121 L.Ed.2d 221 (1992). *249 The voluntariness test under the Tennessee Constitution has been held to be more protective of individual rights than the test under the United States Constitution.

1997State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994); see State v. Crump, 834 S.W.2d 265, 268 (Tenn. 1992); State v. S mith, 834 S.W .2d 915 (Te nn. 1992).

2026“The due process voluntariness test is distinct from Miranda.” State v. Davidson, 509 S.W.3d 156, 189 (Tenn. 2016) (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 434- 35 (2000); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Id. (citing Freeland, 451 S.W.3d at 815 ).

2026“The issue under Miranda is whether a suspect received certain warnings and knowingly and voluntarily waived certain rights, whereas the essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” Davidson, 509 S.W.3d at 189 (first citing State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 815 (Tenn. 2014); and then citing State v. Smith, 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 1996)).

2025Thus, the central inquiry in a voluntariness analysis is whether, based on the totality of the circumstances, “the behavior of the State’s law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant’s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined.” State v. Kelly, 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980) (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).

2015The determinative question is “whether the behavior of the State‟s law enforcement officials was such as to overbear [the defendant‟s] will to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined.” Kelly, 603 S.W.2d at 728 (quoting Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)); see also Climer, 400 S.W.3d at 568 (“[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect‟s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433-35 ; Smith, 933 S.W.2d at 455 )).

2004Accordingly, Davis's contentions cannot be reviewed in this appeal and must await the appropriate proceedings. [13] Accordingly, Davis's reliance on two unpublished decisions that did not involve capital sentencing hearings is misplaced. [1] Appellant had been hospitalized for two days at Vanderbilt Hospital for anemia as a result of a spider bite approximately ten days prior to his arrest. [2] This Court had previously adopted the voluntariness test by adopting the Cipriano test in State v. Readus, 764 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). [3] The Appellant's application for permission to app

1996For example, in State v. Readus, 764 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988), the Court of Criminal Appeals discussed the effect of a violation of Rule 5(a) on the admissibility of a confession obtained during the period of “unnecessary delay.” Rejecting the trial court’s ruling that any confession obtained within the period of “unnecessary delay” must be excluded, the Readus court instead held that the admissibility of such a confession is to be determined by the traditional voluntariness test.

2025“A defendant’s subjective perception alone is not sufficient to justify a conclusion of involuntariness in the constitutional sense.” Id. (citing State v. Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d 75, 79 (Tenn. 1994)). - 22 - “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not voluntary.” Brimmer, 876 S.W.2d at 79 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986)). “[T]he essential inquiry under the voluntariness test is whether a suspect’s will was overborne so as to render the confession a product of coercion.” State v. Climer, 400 S.W.3d 537, 568 (Tenn. 2013) (citing fir

2024See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969) (an officer’s misrepresentation of evidence, though it does not alone render a confession inadmissible, is relevant to the voluntariness analysis).

2016App. Nov. 20, 2013), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Apr. 14, 2014) (quoting State v. Thacker, 164 S.W.3d 208, 248 (Tenn. 2005)).

2016State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 208 (Tenn. 2000).

2014Id. (citing Stephenson, 828 S.W.2d at 547).