voluntariness waiver in Massachusetts

2025"The voluntariness of the waiver on the basis of Miranda and the voluntariness of the statements on due process grounds are separate and distinct issues but they arc both determined in light of the totality of the circumstances and they share many of the same relevant factors." Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666,673 (1995); sec also Commonwealth v. Newson, 471 Mass. 222, 229 (2015) (voluntariness of Miranda waiver and statements are distinct but the test for both is essentially the same).

2013“The voluntariness of the waiver on the basis of Miranda and the voluntariness of the statements on due process grounds are separate and distinct issues but they are both determined in light of the totality of the circumstances and they share many of the same relevant factors.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 673 (1995).

2026"The Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's waiver of Miranda rights was valid, and 'must demonstrate not only what warnings were provided to the defendant, but also that the defendant understood such warnings.'" Commonwealth v. Escobar, 493 Mass. 694 , 700 (2024), quoting Delossantos, supra. "In reviewing a judge's determination regarding a valid waiver of Miranda rights and voluntariness, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error,[4] give 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966). 3 The defendant does not challenge the volun

2019See Commonwealth v. Cunneen , 389 Mass. 216 , 227, 449 N.E.2d 658 (1983). 7 The officers asked: "Where were you?" and "What was supposed to happen?" 8 In Commonwealth v. Souza , 428 Mass. 478 , 494, 702 N.E.2d 1167 (1998), we held that, in certain circumstances, use of a motor vehicle without authority is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. 9 The indictment listed the following items in the conjunctive: "$ 143.00 U.S. Currency, car, car keys, and food." 10 We note that prior to its decision in Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States

1998In determining the voluntariness of a waiver, “the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the waiver.” Commonwealth v. Magee, supra at 386 , quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 670 .

1998In determining the voluntariness of a waiver, “the court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the waiver.” Commonwealth v. Magee, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra. The relevant factors include “promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the defendant’s age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the re

2025Under the totality of the circumstances test, the court considers "'all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the interrogation and the individual characteristics and conduct of the defendant,' including 'promises or other inducements , conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings."' N

2012See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tremblay, 460 Mass. 199, 205-206 (2011); Commonwealth v. O’Brian, 445 Mass. 720, 724-725 , cert. denied, 549 U.S. 898 (2006).

2024See Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663 (1995) ("Relevant factors [to a voluntariness inquiry] include . . . the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings").

2012In determining whether the defendant’s statements were voluntary, we consider whether the statements “were the product of a ‘rational intellect’ and a ‘free will.’ ” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 662 (1995).

2019Commonwealth v. Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720, 729 (2012).

2013“In determining whether the defendant’s statements were voluntary, we consider whether the statements were the product of a ‘rational intellect’ and a ‘free will.’ ” Commonwealth v. Woodbine, 461 Mass. 720 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra. The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving beyond a reason able doubt that the defendant voluntarily waived his rights and voluntarily made his statement to police.

2026The plaintiffs further contend that the commission did not meet what the plaintiffs assert is its burden under Garrity, 462 Mass. at 788-789 , of showing that proper public notice of the waiver was given.

2026See Garrity, supra at 790 .

2025Under the totality of the circumstances test, the court considers "'all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the interrogation and the individual characteristics and conduct of the defendant,' including 'promises or other inducements , conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings."' N

2025Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481 Mass. 662, 668 (2019).

2025"The voluntariness of the waiver on the basis of Miranda and the voluntariness of the statements on due process grounds are separate and distinct issues but they arc both determined in light of the totality of the circumstances and they share many of the same relevant factors." Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666,673 (1995); sec also Commonwealth v. Newson, 471 Mass. 222, 229 (2015) (voluntariness of Miranda waiver and statements are distinct but the test for both is essentially the same).

2025Under the totality of the circumstances test, the court considers "'all of the relevant circumstances surrounding the interrogation and the individual characteristics and conduct of the defendant,' including 'promises or other inducements , conduct of the defendant, the defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation of Miranda warnings."' N

2019See Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428 , 432-433, 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000).

2019See Dickerson v. United States , 530 U.S. 428 , 432-433, 120 S.Ct. 2326 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000).

2019See Commonwealth v. Cunneen , 389 Mass. 216 , 227, 449 N.E.2d 658 (1983). 7 The officers asked: "Where were you?" and "What was supposed to happen?" 8 In Commonwealth v. Souza , 428 Mass. 478 , 494, 702 N.E.2d 1167 (1998), we held that, in certain circumstances, use of a motor vehicle without authority is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. 9 The indictment listed the following items in the conjunctive: "$ 143.00 U.S. Currency, car, car keys, and food." 10 We note that prior to its decision in Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States

2019See Commonwealth v. Cunneen , 389 Mass. 216 , 227, 449 N.E.2d 658 (1983). 7 The officers asked: "Where were you?" and "What was supposed to happen?" 8 In Commonwealth v. Souza , 428 Mass. 478 , 494, 702 N.E.2d 1167 (1998), we held that, in certain circumstances, use of a motor vehicle without authority is a lesser included offense of armed robbery. 9 The indictment listed the following items in the conjunctive: "$ 143.00 U.S. Currency, car, car keys, and food." 10 We note that prior to its decision in Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States

2017Therefore, [consideration] of the defendant’s motion based on the voluntariness analysis ... set forth in [Scott] should be sufficient to dispose of [these claims].” Scott, supra at 361-362 (citations omitted).

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2014While, as this case shows, good arguments can be made that the “solemnizing” of a contemporaneous waiver protocol is desirable “in aid of sound judicial administration,” Cium-mei v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 504, 508-509 (1979), such rule-making falls within the ambit of the Supreme Judicial Court and outside the purview of this court.

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2014See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 747 F.3d 516, 519 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283, 291 (3d Cir. 2013) (“rigid or specific collogu[y]” not required in parole revocation hearing); United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 2006) *493 (“Although a thorough colloquy. . . . may be the most precise means of evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver, the failure ... to engage in a comprehensive colloquy is not of itself, fatal to the defendant’s waiver”); United States v. Farrell, 393 F.3d 498, 500 (4th Ci

2010See part 4.a, infra. [7] Although the motion judge found that Buso first contacted the Salem police station at 10:32 A.M., Buso's telephone records indicate otherwise, and there is no dispute on appeal that the contact occurred at 10:31 A.M. [8] The defendant renewed his claim of error under Commonwealth v. Mavredakis, 430 Mass. 848, 859-860 (2000) ( Mavredakis ), in his motion for a new trial.

2007As we said in Commonwealth v. Boateng, 438 Mass. 498, 504 (2003), “While the rule [requiring voluntariness hearings] covers statements made by defendants to private parties in the aftermath of their criminal conduct ... we have never applied it to statements made by a defendant during the commission of his crime.” Accord Commonwealth v. Netto, 438 Mass. 686, 699 (2003).