12 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Millergreen2 sentences2017“This voluntariness requirement is in addition to the intelligent waiver mandate of Miranda.” Id. at 380 , 652 S.E.2d at 449 . 2017“This voluntariness requirement is in addition to the intelligent waiver mandate of Miranda.” Id. at 380 , 652 S.E.2d at 449 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Easlergreen2 sentences2012As to whether Stewart was in custody at the time of his confession: State v. Evans, 354 S.C. 579, 583 , 582 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2003) ("Appellate review of whether a person is in custody is confined to a determination of whether the ruling by the trial [court] is supported by the record."); State v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 340 , 471 S.E.2d 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The fact that the investigation has focused on the suspect does not trigger Miranda warnings unless he is in custody."); Evans, 354 S.C. at 583 , 582 S.E.2d at 410 ("The custodial determination is an objective analysis based on whether 2012As to whether Stewart was in custody at the time of his confession: State v. Evans, 354 S.C. 579, 583 , 582 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2003) ("Appellate review of whether a person is in custody is confined to a determination of whether the ruling by the trial [court] is supported by the record."); State v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 340 , 471 S.E.2d 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The fact that the investigation has focused on the suspect does not trigger Miranda warnings unless he is in custody."); Evans, 354 S.C. at 583 , 582 S.E.2d at 410 ("The custodial determination is an objective analysis based on whether | 2 | 2 |
State v. Middletongreen2 sentences2007See State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 25 , 339 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1986) (“In order to secure the admission of a defendant’s statement, the State must affirmatively show the statement was voluntary and taken in compliance with Miranda.”) (citations omitted). 2007See State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 25 , 339 S.E.2d 692, 694 (1986) (“In order to secure the admission of a defendant’s statement, the State must affirmatively show the statement was voluntary and taken in compliance with Miranda.”) (citations omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Dickerson v. United Statesred2 sentences2024The United States Supreme Court has observed that the requirement of warnings regarding the Fifth Amendment in Miranda "does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 . 2021"Prior to Miranda, [the courts] evaluated the admissibility of a suspect's confession under a voluntariness test." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432-33 (2000). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Whitegreen1 sentence2015See e.g., United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir.2002) (holding “an ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself’); Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir.2005) (“We therefore hold that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver.”); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Cockerhamgreen1 sentence2015See e.g., United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir.2002) (holding “an ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself’); Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir.2005) (“We therefore hold that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver.”); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3 | 1 | 1 |
Kevin Washington v. Robert O. Lampertgreen1 sentence2015See e.g., United States v. White, 307 F.3d 336, 343 (5th Cir.2002) (holding “an ineffective assistance of counsel argument survives a waiver of appeal only when the claimed assistance directly affected the validity of that waiver or the plea itself’); Washington v. Lampert, 422 F.3d 864, 871 (9th Cir.2005) (“We therefore hold that a plea agreement that waives the right to file a federal habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is unenforceable with respect to an [ineffective assistance of counsel] claim that challenges the voluntariness of the waiver.”); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Goodwingreen2 sentences2012As to whether the confession was voluntary: State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601 , 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When reviewing a trial [court]'s ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court]'s ruling is supported by any evidence."); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 384 , 652 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the given statement." (internal quo 2012As to whether the confession was voluntary: State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601 , 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When reviewing a trial [court]'s ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court]'s ruling is supported by any evidence."); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 384 , 652 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the given statement." (internal quo | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howardgreen2 sentences2012As to whether the confession was voluntary: State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601 , 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When reviewing a trial [court]'s ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court]'s ruling is supported by any evidence."); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 384 , 652 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the given statement." (internal quo 2012As to whether the confession was voluntary: State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601 , 683 S.E.2d 500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When reviewing a trial [court]'s ruling concerning voluntariness, the appellate court does not re-evaluate the facts based on its own view of the preponderance of the evidence, but simply determines whether the trial [court]'s ruling is supported by any evidence."); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 384 , 652 S.E.2d 444, 451 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The test of voluntariness is whether a defendant's will was overborne by the circumstances surrounding the given statement." (internal quo | 1 | 1 |
State v. Evansgreen2 sentences2012As to whether Stewart was in custody at the time of his confession: State v. Evans, 354 S.C. 579, 583 , 582 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2003) ("Appellate review of whether a person is in custody is confined to a determination of whether the ruling by the trial [court] is supported by the record."); State v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 340 , 471 S.E.2d 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The fact that the investigation has focused on the suspect does not trigger Miranda warnings unless he is in custody."); Evans, 354 S.C. at 583 , 582 S.E.2d at 410 ("The custodial determination is an objective analysis based on whether 2012As to whether Stewart was in custody at the time of his confession: State v. Evans, 354 S.C. 579, 583 , 582 S.E.2d 407, 409 (2003) ("Appellate review of whether a person is in custody is confined to a determination of whether the ruling by the trial [court] is supported by the record."); State v. Easler, 322 S.C. 333, 340 , 471 S.E.2d 745, 749 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The fact that the investigation has focused on the suspect does not trigger Miranda warnings unless he is in custody."); Evans, 354 S.C. at 583 , 582 S.E.2d at 410 ("The custodial determination is an objective analysis based on whether | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Easler
green
2 sentences2002In contrast to the subjective nature of a voluntariness inquiry, custody is determined by an objective analysis of “whether a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood himself to be in custody.” Id. at 128, 489 S.E.2d 617 , 489 S.E.2d at 621 . 2002In contrast to the subjective nature of a voluntariness inquiry, custody is determined by an objective analysis of “whether a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood himself to be in custody.” Id. at 128, 489 S.E.2d 617 , 489 S.E.2d at 621 . | 2 | 2001–2002 |
Elmore v. State
green
2 sentences2020Nevertheless, in State v. White, 305 S.C. 455 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991), the State argued an unrepresented defendant failed to preserve the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel to the trial court, and "this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 305 S.C. at 455 , 409 S.E.2d at 397 . 2020Nevertheless, in State v. White, 305 S.C. 455 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991), the State argued an unrepresented defendant failed to preserve the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel to the trial court, and "this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 305 S.C. at 455 , 409 S.E.2d at 397 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. White
green
2 sentences2020Nevertheless, in State v. White, 305 S.C. 455 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991), the State argued an unrepresented defendant failed to preserve the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel to the trial court, and "this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 305 S.C. at 455 , 409 S.E.2d at 397 . 2020Nevertheless, in State v. White, 305 S.C. 455 , 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991), the State argued an unrepresented defendant failed to preserve the voluntariness of his waiver of counsel to the trial court, and "this issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." 305 S.C. at 455 , 409 S.E.2d at 397 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2017Under Miranda v. Arizona, a statement obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the defendant was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights. 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2017Under Miranda v. Arizona, a statement obtained as a result of a custodial interrogation is inadmissible unless the defendant was advised of and voluntarily waived his rights. 384 U.S. 436, 498-99 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Creech
green
1 sentence2001Id. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Peake
green
2 sentences1996“A statement induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise.” Peake, 291 S.C. at 139 , 352 S.E.2d at 488 . *306 In State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704 , 258 S.E.2d 896 (1979), our Supreme Court addressed the voluntariness requirement of a waiver of rights: The signing of the waiver form alone is not conclusive; the State still has the burden of showing the waiver was voluntary. 1996“A statement induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise.” Peake, 291 S.C. at 139 , 352 S.E.2d at 488 . *306 In State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704 , 258 S.E.2d 896 (1979), our Supreme Court addressed the voluntariness requirement of a waiver of rights: The signing of the waiver form alone is not conclusive; the State still has the burden of showing the waiver was voluntary. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Franklin
green
2 sentences1996VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENT In State v. Franklin, 299 S.C. 133 , 382 S.E.2d 911 (1989), our Supreme Court discussed the voluntariness requirement: The test of admissibility of a statement is voluntariness. 1996VOLUNTARINESS OF STATEMENT In State v. Franklin, 299 S.C. 133 , 382 S.E.2d 911 (1989), our Supreme Court discussed the voluntariness requirement: The test of admissibility of a statement is voluntariness. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Doby
green
2 sentences1996“A statement induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise.” Peake, 291 S.C. at 139 , 352 S.E.2d at 488 . *306 In State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704 , 258 S.E.2d 896 (1979), our Supreme Court addressed the voluntariness requirement of a waiver of rights: The signing of the waiver form alone is not conclusive; the State still has the burden of showing the waiver was voluntary. 1996“A statement induced by a promise of leniency is involuntary only if so connected with the inducement as to be a consequence of the promise.” Peake, 291 S.C. at 139 , 352 S.E.2d at 488 . *306 In State v. Doby, 273 S.C. 704 , 258 S.E.2d 896 (1979), our Supreme Court addressed the voluntariness requirement of a waiver of rights: The signing of the waiver form alone is not conclusive; the State still has the burden of showing the waiver was voluntary. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Washington
green
2 sentences1996If a defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the “burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived.” State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (emphasis in original); State v. Neeley, 271 S.C. 33 , 244 S.E.2d 522 (1978). 1996If a defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the “burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived.” State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (emphasis in original); State v. Neeley, 271 S.C. 33 , 244 S.E.2d 522 (1978). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Neeley
green
2 sentences1996If a defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the “burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived.” State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (emphasis in original); State v. Neeley, 271 S.C. 33 , 244 S.E.2d 522 (1978). 1996If a defendant was advised of his Miranda rights, but nevertheless chose to make a statement, the “burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his rights were voluntarily waived.” State v. Washington, 296 S.C. 54 , 370 S.E.2d 611 (1988) (emphasis in original); State v. Neeley, 271 S.C. 33 , 244 S.E.2d 522 (1978). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.