voluntariness waiver in Connecticut

2022Under subsection (h) of the statute, the state may overcome the presumption of inadmissibility in any case by prov- ing by a preponderance of the evidence that the state- ment ‘was voluntarily given and is reliable, based on the totality of the circumstances.’ General Statutes § 54- 1o (h).’’ State v. Christopher S., 338 Conn. 255 , 258–59, 257 A.3d 912 (2021). ‘‘The voluntariness inquiry addresses a defendant’s constitutional right to due pro- cess and, potentially, those rights protected by Miranda, without regard to whether a confession is true.

2011The defendant requests review of her unpreserved claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or alternatively, our supervisory authority over the administration of justice or the plain error doctrine.

2011The defendant requests review of her unpreserved claim under State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989), or alternatively, our supervisory authority over the administration of justice or the plain error doctrine.

2009Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Servello, 59 Conn. App. 362, 375-76 , 757 A.2d 36 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940 , 761 A.2d 764 (2000).

2009Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Servello, 59 Conn. App. 362, 375-76 , 757 A.2d 36 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940 , 761 A.2d 764 (2000).

2009Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Servello, 59 Conn. App. 362, 375-76 , 757 A.2d 36 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940 , 761 A.2d 764 (2000).

2009Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Servello, 59 Conn. App. 362, 375-76 , 757 A.2d 36 , cert. denied, 254 Conn. 940 , 761 A.2d 764 (2000).

2007See State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 78-79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22, 49-50 , 554 A.2d 263 (1989); State v. Barrett, supra, 205 Conn. 450 -51; State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 583 , 504 A.2d 1036 (1986); State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 697 , 501 A.2d 370 (1985).

2007See State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 78-79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22, 49-50 , 554 A.2d 263 (1989); State v. Barrett, supra, 205 Conn. 450 -51; State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 583 , 504 A.2d 1036 (1986); State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 697 , 501 A.2d 370 (1985).

2007See State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 78-79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22, 49-50 , 554 A.2d 263 (1989); State v. Barrett, supra, 205 Conn. 450 -51; State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 583 , 504 A.2d 1036 (1986); State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 697 , 501 A.2d 370 (1985).

2007See State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 78-79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22, 49-50 , 554 A.2d 263 (1989); State v. Barrett, supra, 205 Conn. 450 -51; State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 583 , 504 A.2d 1036 (1986); State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 697 , 501 A.2d 370 (1985).

2007The defendant said to Davis that he understood his rights, and then continued to speak with Davis; this fulfills the requirement that there be a “ ‘requisite level of comprehension’ ” and “ ‘an explicit affirmative act . . . .’ ” Id.

2007See State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 78-79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22, 49-50 , 554 A.2d 263 (1989); State v. Barrett, supra, 205 Conn. 450 -51; State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 583 , 504 A.2d 1036 (1986); State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 697 , 501 A.2d 370 (1985).

2007See State v. Rasmussen, 225 Conn. 55, 78-79 , 621 A.2d 728 (1993); State v. Madera, 210 Conn. 22, 49-50 , 554 A.2d 263 (1989); State v. Barrett, supra, 205 Conn. 450 -51; State v. Toste, 198 Conn. 573, 583 , 504 A.2d 1036 (1986); State v. Aversa, 197 Conn. 685, 697 , 501 A.2d 370 (1985).

2007With respect to the defendant's claim that a voluntariness determination serves the important public interest of ensuring the accuracy of a jury's verdict, we noted that we previously had rejected this claim in State v. Staples, supra, 175 Conn. at 405 , 399 A.2d 1269 , because it "is not the primary *253 purpose of the voluntariness inquiry and . . . the reasonable doubt standard is not mandated in order to satisfy the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the ultimate issue of guilt." State v. James, supra, 237 Conn. at 421 , 678 A.2d 1338 .

2007With respect to the defendant's claim that a voluntariness determination serves the important public interest of ensuring the accuracy of a jury's verdict, we noted that we previously had rejected this claim in State v. Staples, supra, 175 Conn. at 405 , 399 A.2d 1269 , because it "is not the primary *253 purpose of the voluntariness inquiry and . . . the reasonable doubt standard is not mandated in order to satisfy the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the ultimate issue of guilt." State v. James, supra, 237 Conn. at 421 , 678 A.2d 1338 .

2007The Connecticut Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the voluntariness of waiver based on emotional state and intoxication in State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007The Connecticut Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the voluntariness of waiver based on emotional state and intoxication in State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007We rejected this claim because it relied on the “unjustified assumption that a voluntariness hearing [is] designed to enhance the reliability of jury verdicts or to implement the presumption of innocence.” Id., 405 , citing Lego v. Twomey, supra, 404 U.S. 482 , 485, 487.

2007We rejected this claim because it relied on the "unjustified assumption that a voluntariness hearing [is] designed to enhance the reliability of jury verdicts or to implement the presumption of innocence." Id., at 405 , 399 A.2d 1269 , citing Lego v. Twomey, supra, 404 U.S. at 482, 485, 487 , 92 S.Ct. 619 .

2007We relied on Lego for the proposition that a guilty verdict is not rendered less reliable or less consonant with In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , simply because the admissibility of a confession is determined by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

2007We relied on Lego for the proposition that a guilty verdict is not rendered less reliable or less consonant with In re Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , simply because the admissibility of a confession is determined by a fair preponderance of the evidence.

2007The Connecticut Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the voluntariness of waiver based on emotional state and intoxication in State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007The Connecticut Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the voluntariness of waiver based on emotional state and intoxication in State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2007The Connecticut Supreme Court dealt with the issue of the voluntariness of waiver based on emotional state and intoxication in State v. Harris, 188 Conn. 574, 582 , 452 A.2d 634 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1089 , 103 S. Ct. 1785 , 76 L.

2002It contends, quoting State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 300 , 636 A.2d 351 (1994), that neither it nor the trial court was alerted to a voluntariness claim, “thereby depriving the state, the trial court and the reviewing court ‘of a complete factual inquiry into the defendant’s mental condition at the time his statements were made.’ ” In his reply brief, the defendant argues that he “has not claimed that his statement was coerced; he has claimed that his statement was involuntary.” The defendant further argues that “[w]hile police coercion is a part of voluntariness, it is not a separate claim on

2002It contends, quoting State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 300 , 636 A.2d 351 (1994), that neither it nor the trial court was alerted to a voluntariness claim, “thereby depriving the state, the trial court and the reviewing court ‘of a complete factual inquiry into the defendant’s mental condition at the time his statements were made.’ ” In his reply brief, the defendant argues that he “has not claimed that his statement was coerced; he has claimed that his statement was involuntary.” The defendant further argues that “[w]hile police coercion is a part of voluntariness, it is not a separate claim on

2001In ascertaining the voluntariness of the waiver by a juvenile of his Miranda rights, a court should inquire into the" `juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings give him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.' " State v. Whitaker , 215 Conn. 739 , 754 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990), quoting Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 725 , 99 S.Ct. 21560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); see also State v. Perez , supra, 218 Conn. 714 , 728 .

2001In ascertaining the voluntariness of the waiver by a juvenile of his Miranda rights, a court should inquire into the" `juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings give him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.' " State v. Whitaker , 215 Conn. 739 , 754 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990), quoting Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 725 , 99 S.Ct. 21560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); see also State v. Perez , supra, 218 Conn. 714 , 728 .

2001In ascertaining the voluntariness of the waiver by a juvenile of his Miranda rights, a court should inquire into the" `juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings give him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.' " State v. Whitaker , 215 Conn. 739 , 754 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990), quoting Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 725 , 99 S.Ct. 21560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); see also State v. Perez , supra, 218 Conn. 714 , 728 .

2001In ascertaining the voluntariness of the waiver by a juvenile of his Miranda rights, a court should inquire into the" `juvenile's age, experience, education, background and intelligence and into whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings give him, the nature of his Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.' " State v. Whitaker , 215 Conn. 739 , 754 , 578 A.2d 1031 (1990), quoting Fare v. Michael C. , 442 U.S. 707 , 725 , 99 S.Ct. 21560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979); see also State v. Perez , supra, 218 Conn. 714 , 728 .

2000Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.’ ” State v. Kelly, 23 Conn. App. 160, 165 , 580 A.2d 520 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 831 , 583 A.2d 130 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 981 , 111 S. Ct. 1635 , 113 L.

2000Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.’ ” State v. Kelly, 23 Conn. App. 160, 165 , 580 A.2d 520 , cert. denied, 216 Conn. 831 , 583 A.2d 130 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 981 , 111 S. Ct. 1635 , 113 L.