voluntariness requirement in Minnesota

2016“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000).

2016Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). 7 “The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674 (quotation omitted). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971).

2015The purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to ensure that a defendant is not pleading guilty because of “improper pressures.” Trott, 338 N.W.2d at 251 .

2015The voluntariness requirement ensures “that the defendant is not pleading guilty because of improper pressures.” State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983).

2026See Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 (“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper pressure or coercion.”).

2017“The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper pressure or coercion.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 .

2014The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any “improper pressures or inducements.” Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989).

2014Appellant argues only that her plea was not “voluntarily entered” because she was “improperly pressured to plead guilty.” “The voluntariness requirement helps insure that the defendant does not plead guilty because of any improper pressures or inducements.” Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989).

2016To support this contention, appellant cites to Hirt v. State, 214 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1974), and State v. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998), neither of which support appellant’s position.2 Hirt involved a defendant who pleaded guilty and then sought postconviction relief alleging that his plea was not freely and voluntarily made.

2002“The voluntariness requirement insures that the guilty plea is not in response to improper pressures or inducements.” Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 577 .

2023State v. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2010); see also State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn. 1995) (stating that the voluntariness requirement is separate from the Miranda requirement).

1998Sirvio’s final claim relating to the admissibility of his incriminating statements is that they were “involuntary.” Our decision in State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 286-88 (Minn.1995), summarizes the relevant case-law dealing with the issue of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights and with the issue of the voluntariness of a confession.

2016Carey v. State, 765 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009).

2014Carey v. State, 765 N.W.2d 396, 400 (Minn. App. 2009) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Aug. 11, 2009).

2016State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “[T]he government may not produce a plea 2 Appellant’s attorney stated earlier in his affidavit that “[i]n late July of 2013 the state extended an offer for 60-month concurrent sentences on both counts.” 5 through actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion ‘overbearing the will of the defendant’ . . . .” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51 , 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970)).

2015To analyze the voluntariness requirement, “the court examines what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement.” Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96 . “[T]he government may not produce a plea through actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.” Ecker, 524 N.W.2d at 719 (quotation omitted).

1987State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Minn.1978) (determination of the voluntariness of a waiver involves “the same kind of inquiry basically that is made to determine whether a statement is ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the traditional voluntariness requirement”).

1987State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Minn.1978) (determination of the voluntariness of a waiver involves “the same kind of inquiry basically that is made to determine whether a statement is ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the traditional voluntariness requirement”).

2026We are particularly concerned about potential coercion when a defendant enters into a contingent plea agreement—a special type of plea agreement in which a defendant pleads guilty in exchange for leniency for a third party.4 State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Minn. 1994).

2014State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).

2005"Allowing the government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process." United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.1994)).

2005“Allowing the government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process.” United States v. Van Thoum-out, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.1994)).

2005"Allowing the government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process." United States v. Van Thournout, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.1994)).

2005“Allowing the government to breach a promise that induced a guilty plea violates due process.” United States v. Van Thoum-out, 100 F.3d 590, 594 (8th Cir.1996) (quoting Margalli-Olvera v. INS, 43 F.3d 345, 351 (8th Cir.1994)).

2016Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). 7 “The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674 (quotation omitted). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971).

2016Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). 7 “The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674 (quotation omitted). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971).

2023State v. Zabawa, 787 N.W.2d 177, 182 (Minn. 2010); see also State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn. 1995) (stating that the voluntariness requirement is separate from the Miranda requirement).

2023“It is well settled that an unqualified promise which is part of a plea arrangement must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.” Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 1979).

2023“It is well settled that an unqualified promise which is part of a plea arrangement must be honored or else the guilty plea may be withdrawn.” Kochevar v. State, 281 N.W.2d 680, 687 (Minn. 1979).

2023In considering whether a statement was involuntary, “courts inquire whether police conduct, together with other circumstances surrounding the interrogation, was so coercive, so manipulative, and so overpowering as to deprive a defendant of his ability to make an unconstrained and wholly autonomous decision to speak as he did.” State v. Clark, 738 N.W.2d 316, 333 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

2016Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). 7 “The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” Brown, 606 N.W.2d at 674 (quotation omitted). “[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 , 92 S. Ct. 495, 499 (1971).

2016State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “[T]he government may not produce a plea 2 Appellant’s attorney stated earlier in his affidavit that “[i]n late July of 2013 the state extended an offer for 60-month concurrent sentences on both counts.” 5 through actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion ‘overbearing the will of the defendant’ . . . .” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51 , 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970)).

2016State v. Trott, 338 N.W.2d 248, 251 (Minn. 1983). “[T]he government may not produce a plea 2 Appellant’s attorney stated earlier in his affidavit that “[i]n late July of 2013 the state extended an offer for 60-month concurrent sentences on both counts.” 5 through actual or threatened physical harm, or by mental coercion ‘overbearing the will of the defendant’ . . . .” State v. Ecker, 524 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Minn. 1994) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51 , 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970)).

2015Maddox argues that his guilty plea was not voluntary because it was “induced by the district court’s refusal to consider his pro se motions.” “The voluntariness requirement insures that the guilty plea is not in response to improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Jumping Eagle, 620 N.W.2d 42, 43 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

2009“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered because of any improper pressures or inducements.” James v. State, 699 N.W.2d 723, 728 (Minn.2005) (quotation omitted).

2004See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-44 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052-56 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1994) (noting police advisory on right to refuse consent to search is only one factor in determining voluntariness of consent).

2004See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-44 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052-56 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1994) (noting police advisory on right to refuse consent to search is only one factor in determining voluntariness of consent).

2004See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236-44 , 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2052-56 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Dezso, 512 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1994) (noting police advisory on right to refuse consent to search is only one factor in determining voluntariness of consent).

2003State v. Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn.1991).

2003State v. Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 319 (Minn.1991).

2002See, e.g., Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 419 (almost 18-year-old juvenile who was “familiar with the criminal justice system” held to have waived Miranda rights); Jones, 566 N.W.2d at 325 (namely 18-year-old juvenile who had been previously adjudicated delinquent on ten prior felony offenses held to have voluntarily waived Miranda rights); Ouk, 516 N.W.2d at 185 (15-year-old juvenile who had been given Miranda advisory on three prior occasions held to have voluntarily waived Miranda rights).

2002See, e.g., Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 419 (almost 18-year-old juvenile who was “familiar with the criminal justice system” held to have waived Miranda rights); Jones, 566 N.W.2d at 325 (namely 18-year-old juvenile who had been previously adjudicated delinquent on ten prior felony offenses held to have voluntarily waived Miranda rights); Ouk, 516 N.W.2d at 185 (15-year-old juvenile who had been given Miranda advisory on three prior occasions held to have voluntarily waived Miranda rights).

2002See, e.g., Scott, 584 N.W.2d at 419 (almost 18-year-old juvenile who was “familiar with the criminal justice system” held to have waived Miranda rights); Jones, 566 N.W.2d at 325 (namely 18-year-old juvenile who had been previously adjudicated delinquent on ten prior felony offenses held to have voluntarily waived Miranda rights); Ouk, 516 N.W.2d at 185 (15-year-old juvenile who had been given Miranda advisory on three prior occasions held to have voluntarily waived Miranda rights).

1998State v. Williams, 535 N.W.2d 277, 287 (Minn.1995); cf. Linder, 268 N.W.2d at 735 ; and Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d at 333-34 .

1998Cf. State v. Linder, 268 N.W.2d 734, 735 (Minn.1978), and State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 333-34 (Minn.1991).

1993“A defendant who has entered a plea of guilty to a criminal complaint does not have the absolute right to withdraw it.” State v. Brant, 407 N.W.2d 696, 697 (Minn.App.1987).