voluntariness inquiry in Michigan

1998While the police could not rely on Wright , they could rely on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Moran v Burbine, supra. As noted in Moran , the Court held that a defendant’s knowledge of his attorney’s presence is irrelevant to the voluntariness of a waiver.

1996Keeping in mind that fact, and the fact that Connelly was decided after Fare v Michael C, 442 US 707 ; 99 S Ct 2560 ; 61 L Ed 2d 197 (1979), Edwards v Arizona, and Moran v Burbine, supra (among others, all of which unequivocally posit the discrete nature of the voluntariness inquiry from the knowing and intelligent inquiry), creating an “apparent inconsistency between the voluntary and knowing and intelligent prongs of the waiver analysis,” ante, p 26, is an indefensible position.

2023“The voluntariness requirement mandates that a defendant entering a plea be fully aware of the direct consequences of the plea.” People v Brown, 492 Mich 684 , 694 n 35; 822 NW2d 208 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023“The voluntariness requirement mandates that a defendant entering a plea be fully aware of the direct consequences of the plea.” People v Brown, 492 Mich 684 , 694 n 35; 822 NW2d 208 (2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2016Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that “the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72, 86 ; 97 S Ct 2497 ; 53 L Ed 2d 594 (1977).

2016Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has specifically recognized that “the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v Sykes, 433 US 72, 86 ; 97 S Ct 2497 ; 53 L Ed 2d 594 (1977).

1981Noting that defendant’s signature on the waiver form is "usually strong proof’ of the voluntariness of the waiver, North Carolina v Butler, 441 US 369 ; 99 S Ct 1755, 1757 ; 60 L Ed 2d 286 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the circumstances in that case indicated the waiver was voluntary.

1981Noting that defendant’s signature on the waiver form is "usually strong proof’ of the voluntariness of the waiver, North Carolina v Butler, 441 US 369 ; 99 S Ct 1755, 1757 ; 60 L Ed 2d 286 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the circumstances in that case indicated the waiver was voluntary.

2025Tierney, 266 Mich App at 707 .

2025Sabin, 242 Mich App at 657 .

2023Id. at 615 .

2016While whether the accused was physically assaulted is considered in the voluntariness analysis, if the accused was physically abused by the police a Miranda waiver is still voluntary if “there is no causal connection between the events at the time of arrest and the giving of a subsequent statement . . . [and] the other circumstances show that the defendant gave his confession freely and voluntarily.” People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 389 ; 605 NW2d 374 (1999) (internal citations omitted).

2016While whether the accused was physically assaulted is considered in the voluntariness analysis, if the accused was physically abused by the police a Miranda waiver is still voluntary if “there is no causal connection between the events at the time of arrest and the giving of a subsequent statement . . . [and] the other circumstances show that the defendant gave his confession freely and voluntarily.” People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383, 389 ; 605 NW2d 374 (1999) (internal citations omitted).

2015See, e.g., People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334 ; 429 NW2d 781 (1988) (setting forth factors that a trial court “should consider” in determining whether a statement was voluntary) (emphasis added); People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 264 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010) (noting that a trial court’s factual findings during a voluntariness inquiry are reviewed for clear error).

2015People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 335 ; 429 NW2d 781 (1988) (setting forth factors that a trial court “should consider” in determining whether a statement is voluntary) (emphasis added); People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 264 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010) (noting that a trial court’s factual findings during a voluntariness inquiry are reviewed for clear error).

2015See, e.g., People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334 ; 429 NW2d 781 (1988) (setting forth factors that a trial court “should consider” in determining whether a statement was voluntary) (emphasis added); People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 264 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010) (noting that a trial court’s factual findings during a voluntariness inquiry are reviewed for clear error).

2015People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 335 ; 429 NW2d 781 (1988) (setting forth factors that a trial court “should consider” in determining whether a statement is voluntary) (emphasis added); People v Gipson, 287 Mich App 261, 264 ; 787 NW2d 126 (2010) (noting that a trial court’s factual findings during a voluntariness inquiry are reviewed for clear error).

2015In short, the dissent’s contention that consideration of factors is distinct from making findings about those factors is a difference without any real meaning, illustrates the tenuous nature of the dissent’s flawed analysis, and “ignore [s] reality and the actual text of the statute.” Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397, 438 ; 774 NW2d 1 (2009) (YOUNG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2015In short, the dissent’s contention that consideration of factors is distinct from making findings about those factors is a difference without any real meaning, illustrates the tenuous nature of the dissent’s flawed analysis, and “ignore [s] reality and the actual text of the statute.” Potter v McLeary, 484 Mich 397, 438 ; 774 NW2d 1 (2009) (YOUNG, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2014As Miranda had not yet introduced the concept of a waiver made “knowingly and intelligently,” it is highly unlikely that Cavanaugh contemplated such a requirement, or that the ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution perceived Cavanaugh as setting forth such a requirement, particularly in view of the fact that Cavanaugh performed the traditional totality of the circumstances voluntary analysis that was routinely undertaken in determining the admissibility of a confession at that time. 30 As even Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent acknowl edges, “when interpreting the Michigan Constitution, we must recognize

2014As Miranda had not yet introduced the concept of a waiver made “knowingly and intelligently,” it is highly unlikely that Cavanaugh contemplated such a requirement, or that the ratifiers of the 1963 Constitution perceived Cavanaugh as setting forth such a requirement, particularly in view of the fact that Cavanaugh performed the traditional totality of the circumstances voluntary analysis that was routinely undertaken in determining the admissibility of a confession at that time. 30 As even Justice CAVANAGH’s dissent acknowl edges, “when interpreting the Michigan Constitution, we must recognize

2012Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 755 ; 90 S Ct 1463 ; 25 L Ed 2d 747 (1970).

2012Brady v United States, 397 US 742, 755 ; 90 S Ct 1463 ; 25 L Ed 2d 747 (1970).

2000In Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78, 114 ; 29 S Ct 14 ; 53 L Ed 97 (1908), the Court held that “exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution” (emphasis added).

2000In Twining v New Jersey, 211 US 78, 114 ; 29 S Ct 14 ; 53 L Ed 97 (1908), the Court held that “exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the states is not secured by any part of the Federal Constitution” (emphasis added).

2000People v *388 Garwood, 205 Mich App 553, 555-557 ; 517 NW2d 843 (1994).

2000People v *388 Garwood, 205 Mich App 553, 555-557 ; 517 NW2d 843 (1994).

1996Keeping in mind that fact, and the fact that Connelly was decided after Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), Edwards v. Arizona, and Moran v. Burbine, supra (among others, all of which unequivocally posit the discrete nature of the voluntariness inquiry from the knowing and intelligent inquiry), creating an "apparent inconsistency between the voluntary and knowing and intelligent prongs of the waiver analysis," op., p. 366, is an indefensible position.

1996Keeping in mind that fact, and the fact that Connelly was decided after Fare v. Michael C, 442 U.S. 707 , 99 S.Ct. 2560 , 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979), Edwards v. Arizona, and Moran v. Burbine, supra (among others, all of which unequivocally posit the discrete nature of the voluntariness inquiry from the knowing and intelligent inquiry), creating an "apparent inconsistency between the voluntary and knowing and intelligent prongs of the waiver analysis," op., p. 366, is an indefensible position.

1996Justice Brickley's opinion never mentions the terms "knowing and intelligent," and even goes so far as to state: In sum, voluntariness forms the touchstone of the inquiry concerning the validity of the waivers made while in police custody. [ Id. at 168 , 490 N.W.2d 351 .] Thus, if there is any support for the proposition that the Michigan Constitution requires a more demanding standard, the increased stringency has been engrafted only onto the voluntariness inquiry.

1996Justice Brickley's opinion never mentions the terms "knowing and intelligent," and even goes so far as to state: In sum, voluntariness forms the touchstone of the inquiry concerning the validity of the waivers made while in police custody. [ Id. at 168 , 490 N.W.2d 351 .] Thus, if there is any support for the proposition that the Michigan Constitution requires a more demanding standard, the increased stringency has been engrafted only onto the voluntariness inquiry.

1992People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 558 ; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). hi Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s knowledge of his attorney’s presence is irrelevant to the voluntariness of a waiver, we disagree.

1992People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551, 558 ; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). hi Although the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s knowledge of his attorney’s presence is irrelevant to the voluntariness of a waiver, we disagree.

1992As Justice Cooley explained in People v Wolcott, 51 Mich 612, 615 ; 17 NW 78 (1883), "No reliance can be placed upon admissions of guilt so obtained; for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them.” Statements made under these circumstances easily may lose their quality as conscience-laden admissions of guilt, Minnick v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 156-158 ; 111 S Ct 486 ; 112 L Ed 2d 489 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and become an attempt to please the interrogating

1992As Justice COOLEY explained in People v Wolcott, 51 Mich 612, 615 ; 17 NW 78 (1883), "No reliance can be placed upon admissions of guilt so obtained; for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them." Statements made under these circumstances easily may lose their quality as conscience-laden admissions of guilt, Minnick v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 156-158 ; 111 S Ct 486 ; 112 L Ed 2d 489 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and become an attempt to please the interrogating

1992As Justice Cooley explained in People v Wolcott, 51 Mich 612, 615 ; 17 NW 78 (1883), "No reliance can be placed upon admissions of guilt so obtained; for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them.” Statements made under these circumstances easily may lose their quality as conscience-laden admissions of guilt, Minnick v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 156-158 ; 111 S Ct 486 ; 112 L Ed 2d 489 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and become an attempt to please the interrogating

1992As Justice COOLEY explained in People v Wolcott, 51 Mich 612, 615 ; 17 NW 78 (1883), "No reliance can be placed upon admissions of guilt so obtained; for the very obvious reason that they are not made because they are true, but because, whether true or false, the accused is led to believe it is for his interest to make them." Statements made under these circumstances easily may lose their quality as conscience-laden admissions of guilt, Minnick v Mississippi, 498 US 146, 156-158 ; 111 S Ct 486 ; 112 L Ed 2d 489 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting), and become an attempt to please the interrogating