voluntariness hearing in Arizona

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2016State v. Smith, 114 Ariz. 415, 419 , 561 P.2d 739, 743 (1977). ¶13 Here, Linares did not request a voluntariness hearing, object to the confession’s admission, or otherwise raise issue of involuntariness.

2016State v. Smith, 114 Ariz. 415, 419 , 561 P.2d 739, 743 (1977). ¶13 Here, Linares did not request a voluntariness hearing, object to the confession’s admission, or otherwise raise issue of involuntariness.

2022“But the United States Constitution ‘does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.’” Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); see also State v. Alvarado, 121 Ariz. 485, 487 (1979) (“[A]bsent some objection by the defendant to the admission of his confession, the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing to be held.”); State v. Snee, 244 Ariz. 37 , 38-39, ¶¶ 6, 10 (App. 2018) (holding courts are neither constitutionally nor statutorily obligated to conduct voluntariness hearings unless “voluntariness is

2022P. 16.1; State v. Alvarado, 121 Ariz. 485, 487-88 (1979) (affirming 20-day pretrial deadline to file voluntariness motions and noting that "[i]n light of [Supreme Court precedent], we conclude that although it is the defendant who must move for a voluntariness hearing, it is not mandated that he be allowed to so move at all stages of the proceedings"); see also State v. Bush, 244 Ariz. 575 , 590, ¶ 61 (2018) (disavowing statements in other cases "inconsistent" with Alvarado). ¶8 At trial, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, th

2022“But the United States Constitution ‘does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.’” Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); see also State v. Alvarado, 121 Ariz. 485, 487 (1979) (“[A]bsent some objection by the defendant to the admission of his confession, the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing to be held.”); State v. Snee, 244 Ariz. 37 , 38-39, ¶¶ 6, 10 (App. 2018) (holding courts are neither constitutionally nor statutorily obligated to conduct voluntariness hearings unless “voluntariness is

2018But the United States Constitution "does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession." Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 86, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977).

2017State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116 , 126 ¶ 25, 140 P.3d 899, 909 (2006). ¶9 The record fails to reflect that any of the statements made by the interrogating officers resulted in Tracy’s will being overborne.

2017See State v. Boggs, 218 Ariz. 325, 335, ¶ 43 (2008) (citing State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 126, ¶ 25 (2006)). ¶7 However, because Belvin never requested a voluntariness hearing, nor objected to the admission of her statements at trial, the State was not required to prove the statements were freely and voluntarily made.

2017State v. Fassler, 103 Ariz. 511, 513 (1968). ¶7 The State presented direct and circumstantial evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to convict Yazzie.

2017State v. Fassler, 103 Ariz. 511, 513 (1968). ¶5 The State presented evidence sufficient to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mejia violated the terms of his probation.

2024Peaslee testified that the BIGASUO projector picked up by Sedona police looked “exactly like the projector that we had.” Peaslee also testified the projector she bought was unusual because it had a DVD player and Bluetooth connectivity. ¶13 On January 26, 2023, the court held a voluntariness hearing as to whether admitting Hamlet’s statements in the public park to Sedona police would violate Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2019The court held appropriate pretrial hearings. ¶11 Dunn requested a voluntariness hearing, arguing the court should have suppressed his statements to police under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004).

2023Although this requires a court to instruct the jury appropriately when voluntariness is genuinely at issue, the “court may refuse [a] request for a voluntariness instruction if the evidence has not raised a question of whether his statements were voluntary.” State v. Stone, 122 Ariz. 304, 311 (App. 1979); see State v. Williams, 120 Ariz. 600, 601-02 (1978) (affirming a trial court’s refusal to instruct on voluntariness even though the defendant moved to suppress a confession and requested a voluntariness instruction, because the defendant “failed to present any evidence from which the jury cou

2023Although this requires a court to instruct the jury appropriately when voluntariness is genuinely at issue, the “court may refuse [a] request for a voluntariness instruction if the evidence has not raised a question of whether his statements were voluntary.” State v. Stone, 122 Ariz. 304, 311 (App. 1979); see State v. Williams, 120 Ariz. 600, 601-02 (1978) (affirming a trial court’s refusal to instruct on voluntariness even though the defendant moved to suppress a confession and requested a voluntariness instruction, because the defendant “failed to present any evidence from which the jury cou

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2018See State v. Finn , 111 Ariz. 271 , 275, 528 P.2d 615 , 619 (1974) (stating that a trial court is not required to order a voluntariness hearing sua sponte when "the question of voluntariness is not raised either by the evidence or the defense counsel"); State v. Armstrong , 103 Ariz. 280 , 281, 440 P.2d 307 , 308 (1968) (stating that "[i]t is the duty of a trial court to hold a hearing as to voluntariness of a statement or confession, if a question as to its voluntariness is raised-either by the attorneys, or one is presented by the evidence" (quoting State v. Goodyear , 100 Ariz. 244 , 248, 4

2000Although “personal circumstances, such as intelligence and mental or emotional status, may be considered in a voluntariness inquiry, the critical element ... is whether police conduct constituted overreaching.” State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 524 , 809 P.2d 944, 949 (1991); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate” to an involuntariness finding); Scott, 177 Ariz. at 136 , 865 P.2d at 797 .

2000Although “personal circumstances, such as intelligence and mental or emotional status, may be considered in a voluntariness inquiry, the critical element ... is whether police conduct constituted overreaching.” State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 524 , 809 P.2d 944, 949 (1991); see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that “coercive police activity is a necessary predicate” to an involuntariness finding); Scott, 177 Ariz. at 136 , 865 P.2d at 797 .

1989See State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 72 , 673 P.2d 1, 10 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), and State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 42 , 579 P.2d 542, 546 (1978) (for purposes of reviewing trial court’s determination of the voluntariness of a confession, appellate court looks only to evidence presented at the voluntariness hearing). 2 .

1989See State v. Lambright, 138 Ariz. 63, 72 , 673 P.2d 1, 10 (1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 892 , 105 S.Ct. 267 , 83 L.Ed.2d 203 (1984), and State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38, 42 , 579 P.2d 542, 546 (1978) (for purposes of reviewing trial court’s determination of the voluntariness of a confession, appellate court looks only to evidence presented at the voluntariness hearing). 2 .

2023Although this requires a court to instruct the jury appropriately when voluntariness is genuinely at issue, the “court may refuse [a] request for a voluntariness instruction if the evidence has not raised a question of whether his statements were voluntary.” State v. Stone, 122 Ariz. 304, 311 (App. 1979); see State v. Williams, 120 Ariz. 600, 601-02 (1978) (affirming a trial court’s refusal to instruct on voluntariness even though the defendant moved to suppress a confession and requested a voluntariness instruction, because the defendant “failed to present any evidence from which the jury cou

2023Although this requires a court to instruct the jury appropriately when voluntariness is genuinely at issue, the “court may refuse [a] request for a voluntariness instruction if the evidence has not raised a question of whether his statements were voluntary.” State v. Stone, 122 Ariz. 304, 311 (App. 1979); see State v. Williams, 120 Ariz. 600, 601-02 (1978) (affirming a trial court’s refusal to instruct on voluntariness even though the defendant moved to suppress a confession and requested a voluntariness instruction, because the defendant “failed to present any evidence from which the jury cou

2023The passage of time, the change in location, and the fact that the interview was conducted by a different officer supports the superior court’s finding that “the struggle on the ground at the crime scene had no discernible impact on the detective’s interview of [Navarro] hours later at the police station.” See State v. Strayhand, 184 Ariz. 571, 581 (App. 1995) (“[W]hether there was any change in the place of interrogation” or “change in the identity of the interrogators” are factors that may be considered in “determin[ing] whether coercive pressures have been dispelled.”). ¶24 At the voluntari

1995I do not think it sufficient to say, as does the majority, that "even in the absence of an explicit statement by the Defendant at the hearing on the motion to suppress that he confessed because the detectives persisted in questioning him and threatened him, that conclusion is inescapable on this record." Supra at 582, 911 P.2d at 588 (emphasis added).

2023State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995).

2023State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 309 (1995).

2007Furthermore, her report was insufficient to establish that his statements were “so unreliable that they [should have] be[en] excluded under the evi-dentiary laws of the forum.” State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 445-46 , 759 P.2d 579, 591-92 (1988).

2007Furthermore, her report was insufficient to establish that his statements were “so unreliable that they [should have] be[en] excluded under the evi-dentiary laws of the forum.” State v. Tucker, 157 Ariz. 433, 445-46 , 759 P.2d 579, 591-92 (1988).

1979See State v. Sutton, 115 Ariz. 417 , 565 P.2d 1278 (1977); State v. Finn, 111 Ariz. 271 , 528 P.2d 615 (1974).

1979See State v. Sutton, 115 Ariz. 417 , 565 P.2d 1278 (1977); State v. Finn, 111 Ariz. 271 , 528 P.2d 615 (1974).

2022“But the United States Constitution ‘does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.’” Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 (1977); see also State v. Alvarado, 121 Ariz. 485, 487 (1979) (“[A]bsent some objection by the defendant to the admission of his confession, the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing to be held.”); State v. Snee, 244 Ariz. 37 , 38-39, ¶¶ 6, 10 (App. 2018) (holding courts are neither constitutionally nor statutorily obligated to conduct voluntariness hearings unless “voluntariness is

2018Nonetheless, for reasons that are unclear, the trial court (without objection) instructed the jury in the guilt phase to "not consider any statements made by the defendant to a law enforcement officer" unless the jurors "determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant made the statements voluntarily." ¶55 In Jackson , the United States Supreme Court concluded that the defendant in that case had a due process right to a voluntariness hearing. 378 U.S. at 391 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 .

2022Id. at 749-50 (guilty plea); Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 (speedy trial); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-29, 233 (1973) (consent to search); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 483 (right to counsel); Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421-22 (rights to remain silent and to presence of counsel); Spring, 479 U.S. at 572-74 (same). ¶47 The Arizona Supreme Court has approved use of the same language—probing the presence or absence of coercive pressures or promises—as the proper voluntariness inquiry in the context of the specific constitutional waiver here.

1983The trial court will look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statements in question, as . presented at the voluntariness hearing, and decide whether the state has met its burden. 1 State v. Arnett, 119 Ariz. 38 , 579 P.2d 542 (1978), citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

2017See State v. Alvarado, 121 Ariz. 485, 488 (1979) (noting the burden shifts to the State to prove the defendant’s statements were freely and voluntarily 2 Belvin was also charged with one count of misconduct involving weapons, but that charge was severed and then later dismissed. 3 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version. 3 STATE v. BELVIN Decision of the Court made only after the defendant requests a voluntariness hearing) (citing State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 538 (1977), and State v. Edwards, 111 Ariz. 357, 361 (1974)).

1979State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531 , 562 P.2d 704 (1977); State v. Edwards, 111 Ariz. 357 , 529 P.2d 1174 (1974).

2017See State v. Alvarado, 121 Ariz. 485, 488 (1979) (noting the burden shifts to the State to prove the defendant’s statements were freely and voluntarily 2 Belvin was also charged with one count of misconduct involving weapons, but that charge was severed and then later dismissed. 3 Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current version. 3 STATE v. BELVIN Decision of the Court made only after the defendant requests a voluntariness hearing) (citing State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531, 538 (1977), and State v. Edwards, 111 Ariz. 357, 361 (1974)).

1979State v. Knapp, 114 Ariz. 531 , 562 P.2d 704 (1977); State v. Edwards, 111 Ariz. 357 , 529 P.2d 1174 (1974).

2023See State v. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. 485, 488 (App. 1988) (noting that accommodation of interviewee’s physical needs supports finding of voluntariness), vacated in part on other grounds by State v. Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. 141 (1989).

1991State v. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. 485 , 759 P.2d 631 (App.1988), rev’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 161 Ariz. 141 , 776 P.2d 1067 (1989).

2023See State v. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. 485, 488 (App. 1988) (noting that accommodation of interviewee’s physical needs supports finding of voluntariness), vacated in part on other grounds by State v. Lundstrom, 161 Ariz. 141 (1989).

1991State v. Lundstrom, 157 Ariz. 485 , 759 P.2d 631 (App.1988), rev’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 161 Ariz. 141 , 776 P.2d 1067 (1989).

2022Id. at 749-50 (guilty plea); Barker, 407 U.S. at 529 (speedy trial); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227-29, 233 (1973) (consent to search); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 483 (right to counsel); Burbine, 475 U.S. at 421-22 (rights to remain silent and to presence of counsel); Spring, 479 U.S. at 572-74 (same). ¶47 The Arizona Supreme Court has approved use of the same language—probing the presence or absence of coercive pressures or promises—as the proper voluntariness inquiry in the context of the specific constitutional waiver here.

2002Even if Defendant was operating under some degree of perceptual impairment, he need not have foreseen and understood every possible consequence of waiving his Fifth Amendment privileges as long as “he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the state’s intention to use his statements to secure a conviction.” Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 , 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1141 , 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986).

2018Therefore, the statute only requires courts to determine whether a confession was involuntary when voluntariness is disputed by the defense, and not, as Snee contends, in every case in which the State seeks to introduce a confession. ¶7 Our interpretation is consistent with Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 16.1, which governs pretrial motions and requires parties “to make all motions no later than 20 days before trial . . . .” See also State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 200, 201 (1978) (“Inasmuch as appellant had not made a motion to suppress prior to the trial, and did not object to the questions

1982The fact that defendant, by not raising the issue, may have waived his right to a voluntariness hearing, see State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 200 , 580 P.2d 338 (1978), at the first trial does not discharge the trial court’s obligation at the second trial to make a specific determination on the record as to the defendant at the second trial.