9 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Coopergreen2 sentences2006See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 31 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 (detailing the analytical distinction between a Miranda analysis and a voluntariness analysis). 2006See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 31 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 (detailing the analytical distinction between a Miranda analysis and a voluntariness analysis). | 2 | 2 |
Frazier v. Cuppgreen2 sentences2006See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 , 89 S.Ct. 1420 , 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (noting that while it was relevant that police had falsely told the defendant that co-conspirator had already confessed, such circumstances were “insufficient ... to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible”); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir.1992) (explaining why official deceit about the strength of the case against a defendant does not necessarily rise to the level of official coercion). {14} More importantly, the record does not support Defendant’s contentions. 2006See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 , 89 S.Ct. 1420 , 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (noting that while it was relevant that police had falsely told the defendant that co-conspirator had already confessed, such circumstances were “insufficient ... to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible”); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir.1992) (explaining why official deceit about the strength of the case against a defendant does not necessarily rise to the level of official coercion). {14} More importantly, the record does not support Defendant’s contentions. | 1 | 1 |
Daniel Holland v. Kenneth McGinnis Warden, and Michael P. Lane, Director, Illinois Department of Correctionsgreen1 sentence2006See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737, 739 , 89 S.Ct. 1420 , 22 L.Ed.2d 684 (1969) (noting that while it was relevant that police had falsely told the defendant that co-conspirator had already confessed, such circumstances were “insufficient ... to make this otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible”); Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir.1992) (explaining why official deceit about the strength of the case against a defendant does not necessarily rise to the level of official coercion). {14} More importantly, the record does not support Defendant’s contentions. | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Mississippigreen2 sentences2000See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 31 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 (detailing the analytical distinction between a Miranda analysis and a voluntariness analysis); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) (seminal case holding that a confession obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). {6} We review the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession based on the totality of the circumstances. 2000See State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 31 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 (detailing the analytical distinction between a Miranda analysis and a voluntariness analysis); see also Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 , 56 S.Ct. 461 , 80 L.Ed. 682 (1936) (seminal case holding that a confession obtained by brutality and violence was constitutionally invalid under the Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). {6} We review the voluntariness of a defendant’s confession based on the totality of the circumstances. | 1 | 1 |
Arizona v. Fulminantegreen2 sentences2000See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (reaffirming the “totality of the circumstances” as the proper inquiry); Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 26 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 . 2000See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (reaffirming the “totality of the circumstances” as the proper inquiry); Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 26 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boeglingreen2 sentences1997See Boeglin, 100 N.M. at 132 , 666 P.2d at 1279 . 1997See Boeglin, 100 N.M. at 132 , 666 P.2d at 1279 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Benavidezgreen2 sentences1988See State v. Benavidez, 87 N.M. 223 , 531 P.2d 957 (Ct.App. 1975). 1988See State v. Benavidez, 87 N.M. 223 , 531 P.2d 957 (Ct.App. 1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Colorado v. Connelly
green
2 sentences1997“The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’, in any broader sense of the word.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. at 523 . 47 Cooper was most likely in a weakened mental state, and it is true that Detective Anderson conceded that the SWAT team used “a technique of trying to break down” Cooper’s will. 1997“The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on ‘free choice’, in any broader sense of the word.” Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. at 523 . 47 Cooper was most likely in a weakened mental state, and it is true that Detective Anderson conceded that the SWAT team used “a technique of trying to break down” Cooper’s will. | 2 | 1994–1997 |
State v. Grogan
green
2 sentences2021Defendant Has Not Established a Prima Facie Case of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel {46} Defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel because Defendant’s trial counsel failed to (1) prepare Defendant to testify during cross- examination regarding his interrogation statements, (2) present exculpatory evidence, (3) object during trial, (4) present expert testimony on Defendant’s behalf, (5) “properly” cross-examine Dr. Williams, (6) present a coerced confession defense, (7) correct the district court regarding the law of the case doctrine, (8) request a voluntariness instruct 2021Defendant Has Not Established a Prima Facie Case of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel {46} Defendant argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel because Defendant’s trial counsel failed to (1) prepare Defendant to testify during cross- examination regarding his interrogation statements, (2) present exculpatory evidence, (3) object during trial, (4) present expert testimony on Defendant’s behalf, (5) “properly” cross-examine Dr. Williams, (6) present a coerced confession defense, (7) correct the district court regarding the law of the case doctrine, (8) request a voluntariness instruct | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Roybal
green
2 sentences2021“When an ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, we evaluate the facts that are part of the record.” State v. Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027, ¶ 19 , 132 N.M. 657 , 54 P.3d 61 . 2021“When an ineffective assistance claim is first raised on direct appeal, we evaluate the facts that are part of the record.” State v. Roybal, 2002-NMSC-027, ¶ 19 , 132 N.M. 657 , 54 P.3d 61 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Michigan v. Tucker
green
2 sentences1978Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) stated that “Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared . that a defendant’s statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) states: In the Miranda case this Court promulgated a set of safeguards to protect the there-delineated constitutional rights of persons subjected to custodial police interrogation. 1978Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) stated that “Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared . that a defendant’s statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) states: In the Miranda case this Court promulgated a set of safeguards to protect the there-delineated constitutional rights of persons subjected to custodial police interrogation. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Michigan v. Mosley
green
2 sentences1978Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) stated that “Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared . that a defendant’s statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) states: In the Miranda case this Court promulgated a set of safeguards to protect the there-delineated constitutional rights of persons subjected to custodial police interrogation. 1978Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 , 94 S.Ct. 2357 , 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974) stated that “Miranda, for the first time, expressly declared . that a defendant’s statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles.” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 , 96 S.Ct. 321 , 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975) states: In the Miranda case this Court promulgated a set of safeguards to protect the there-delineated constitutional rights of persons subjected to custodial police interrogation. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.