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12 Virginia opinions name it 4 courts 1992–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences2014“As with the assessment of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, ‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not “voluntary”....’” Id. at 157-58, 578 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). “ ‘Inasmuch as the degree of pressure necessary to crush one’s will varies with the individual and the circumstances of the arrest and detention, a finding of coercion and involuntariness must be based upon a careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Commonwealt 2014“As with the assessment of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, ‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not “voluntary”....’” Id. at 157-58, 578 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). “ ‘Inasmuch as the degree of pressure necessary to crush one’s will varies with the individual and the circumstances of the arrest and detention, a finding of coercion and involuntariness must be based upon a careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Commonwealt | 1 | 4 |
Hill v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024In a voluntariness analysis the “question in each case is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed,” Hill, 52 Va. App. at 318 (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)), or “whether ‘the statement is the “product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,”’” Roberts v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 557 (1994) (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140 (1984)). 2014“As with the assessment of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, ‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not “voluntary”....’” Id. at 157-58, 578 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). “ ‘Inasmuch as the degree of pressure necessary to crush one’s will varies with the individual and the circumstances of the arrest and detention, a finding of coercion and involuntariness must be based upon a careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Commonwealt | 1 | 2 |
State v. Mattoxgreen2 sentences2024Mills explained that every federal circuit to have considered the question had so held, and it was time for the Seventh Circuit “to join the rest of the Country.” Id. at 349-50 & n.3 (collecting cases); see also State v. Mattox, 124 P.3d 6, 13 (Kan. 2005) (“[A]ll the federal circuit courts of appeal regard the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights as an issue of law.”). 2024Mills explained that every federal circuit to have considered the question had so held, and it was time for the Seventh Circuit “to join the rest of the Country.” Id. at 349-50 & n.3 (collecting cases); see also State v. Mattox, 124 P.3d 6, 13 (Kan. 2005) (“[A]ll the federal circuit courts of appeal regard the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights as an issue of law.”). | 1 | 1 |
Lynumn v. Illinoisgreen1 sentence2024In a voluntariness analysis the “question in each case is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed,” Hill, 52 Va. App. at 318 (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)), or “whether ‘the statement is the “product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,”’” Roberts v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 557 (1994) (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Dickerson v. United Statesred1 sentence2024Va. 2010) (second and subsequent alterations in original) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 444 (2000)). | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2024Harrison, 244 Va. at 581 . 2024Harrison, 244 Va. at 581, 583 (stating that “[u]nlike the voluntariness inquiry relevant to the admissibility - 42 - of a confession where the question is one of law . . . the inquiry whether a waiver of Miranda rights was made knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact” and finding that the defendant made a “knowing and intelligent waiver” and that “the confession was voluntary and properly admitted” (emphases added)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Holmesgreen1 sentence2024Further, “[w]hile ‘[t]he requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not . . . dispense with the voluntariness inquiry,’ statements made following a Miranda warning will ‘rare[ly]’ be deemed involuntary.” United States v. Holmes, 699 F. Supp. 2d 818, 836 (E.D. | 1 | 1 |
Stockton v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024In a voluntariness analysis the “question in each case is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed,” Hill, 52 Va. App. at 318 (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)), or “whether ‘the statement is the “product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,”’” Roberts v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 557 (1994) (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024In a voluntariness analysis the “question in each case is whether the defendant’s will was overborne at the time he confessed,” Hill, 52 Va. App. at 318 (quoting Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963)), or “whether ‘the statement is the “product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker,”’” Roberts v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 557 (1994) (quoting Stockton v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 124, 140 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Herbert Levi Ferguson v. F. C. Boydgreen1 sentence2014“As with the assessment of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, ‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not “voluntary”....’” Id. at 157-58, 578 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). “ ‘Inasmuch as the degree of pressure necessary to crush one’s will varies with the individual and the circumstances of the arrest and detention, a finding of coercion and involuntariness must be based upon a careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Commonwealt | 1 | 1 |
Grogg v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2002Cf. Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 614 , 371 S.E.2d at 557 (considering the fact that the juvenile was not in handcuffs during questioning in determining whether the interrogation was coercive). 2002Cf. Grogg, 6 Va. App. at 614 , 371 S.E.2d at 557 (considering the fact that the juvenile was not in handcuffs during questioning in determining whether the interrogation was coercive). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Coopergreen2 sentences2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respect 2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Dcerghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respec | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carrollgreen2 sentences2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respect 2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respect | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCulloughgreen2 sentences2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respect 2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respect | 1 | 1 |
Darghty v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Darghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respect 2002See id. at 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515 (holding that coercive police activity is necessary predicate for finding that confession is not voluntary); Commonwealth v. Cooper, 899 S.W.2d 75, 75 (Ky.1995) (rejecting argument that state constitution or common law required suppression of confession improperly obtained by private party); Dcerghty v. State, 530 So.2d 27, 31 (Miss.1988) (conduct by third party will not vitiate voluntariness confession); State v. Carroll, 138 N.H. 687 , 645 A.2d 82, 85 (1994) (holding that state constitution, which offered greater protection than federal constitution with respec | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1999See Jackson, 255 Va. at 638 , 499 S.E.2d at 546 (holding that a juvenile defendant's confession was not involuntary merely because, unbeknownst to the defendant, his mother was initially denied access to him). 1999See Jackson, 255 Va. at 638 , 499 S.E.2d at 546 (holding that a juvenile defendant's confession was not involuntary merely because, unbeknownst to the defendant, his mother was initially denied access to him). | 1 | 1 |
Rodgers v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1995As the Court of Appeals recently noted in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373 (1995): While “[a] deliberate falsehood by a police officer in the course of his duties may undermine the respect that significant segments of the public may have for law enforcement and the system of justice[,]” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. at 554, 413 S.E.2d at 658, “ ‘a lie on the part of an interrogating police officer does not, in and of itself, require a finding that a resulting confession was involuntary’.” Id. at 555, 413 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 616 , 318 S.E.2d 1995As the Court of Appeals recently noted in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373 (1995): While “[a] deliberate falsehood by a police officer in the course of his duties may undermine the respect that significant segments of the public may have for law enforcement and the system of justice[,]” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. at 554, 413 S.E.2d at 658, “ ‘a lie on the part of an interrogating police officer does not, in and of itself, require a finding that a resulting confession was involuntary’.” Id. at 555, 413 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 616 , 318 S.E.2d | 1 | 1 |
Sink v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1995As the Court of Appeals recently noted in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373 (1995): While “[a] deliberate falsehood by a police officer in the course of his duties may undermine the respect that significant segments of the public may have for law enforcement and the system of justice[,]” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. at 554, 413 S.E.2d at 658, “ ‘a lie on the part of an interrogating police officer does not, in and of itself, require a finding that a resulting confession was involuntary’.” Id. at 555, 413 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 616 , 318 S.E.2d 1995As the Court of Appeals recently noted in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373 (1995): While “[a] deliberate falsehood by a police officer in the course of his duties may undermine the respect that significant segments of the public may have for law enforcement and the system of justice[,]” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. at 554, 413 S.E.2d at 658, “ ‘a lie on the part of an interrogating police officer does not, in and of itself, require a finding that a resulting confession was involuntary’.” Id. at 555, 413 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 616 , 318 S.E.2d | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2004To implement these protections of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained in Miranda , that the ‘Voluntariness doctrine ... encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely to exert such pressure on an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.” 384 U.S. at 464-65 , 86 S.Ct. at 1623 . 2004To implement these protections of the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court explained in Miranda , that the ‘Voluntariness doctrine ... encompasses all interrogation practices which are likely to exert such pressure on an individual as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.” 384 U.S. at 464-65 , 86 S.Ct. at 1623 . | 2 | 2004–2024 |
Miller v. Fenton
green
2 sentences2024Harrison held that the two standards are different and that a Miranda waiver is a finding “of fact” that carries a “presumption of correctness”: - 12 - Unlike the voluntariness inquiry relevant to the admissibility of a confession where the question is one of law subject to an independent review by an appellate court, Miller, 474 U.S. at 115 , the inquiry whether a waiver of Miranda rights was made knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact, and the trial court’s resolution of that question is entitled on appeal to a presumption of correctness. 1992Unlike the voluntariness inquiry relevant to the admissibility of a confession where the question is one of law subject to an independent review by an appellate court, Miller, 474 U.S. at 115 , the inquiry whether a waiver of Miranda rights was made knowingly and intelligently is a question of fact, and the trial court’s resolution of that question is entitled on appeal to a presumption of correctness. 1 [The trial court] evaluates the credibility of the witnesses, resolves any conflicts in the testimony, and weighs the evidence as a whole. | 2 | 1992–2024 |
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2014“As with the assessment of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights, ‘coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding that a confession is not “voluntary”....’” Id. at 157-58, 578 S.E.2d at 84 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 , 107 S.Ct. 515, 522 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). “ ‘Inasmuch as the degree of pressure necessary to crush one’s will varies with the individual and the circumstances of the arrest and detention, a finding of coercion and involuntariness must be based upon a careful consideration of the totality of the circumstances.’ ” Hill v. Commonwealt 2009Rodriguez, supra, 40 Va. App. at 156-58, 578 S.E.2d at 83 . | 2 | 2009–2014 |
Moran v. Burbine
green
1 sentence2024But whether these considerations warrant overruling Harrison is a matter for our Supreme Court to decide, not this Court. - 15 - “Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived.” Tirado, 296 Va. at 28 (quoting Moran, 475 U.S. at 421 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Alton Mills
green
2 sentences2024But the Seventh Circuit changed the standard of review a decade later in United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1997), holding that “the ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights ought to be reviewed de novo by an appellate court.” Id. at 350 . 2024But the Seventh Circuit changed the standard of review a decade later in United States v. Mills, 122 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1997), holding that “the ultimate issue of the voluntariness of a waiver of Miranda rights ought to be reviewed de novo by an appellate court.” Id. at 350 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Terrell v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Appellant first contends that his confession was involuntary because of the detectives’ use of coercive “minimization techniques.” Although this Court has held that “psychological pressure” is a factor relevant to the voluntariness inquiry, Terrell, 12 Va. App. at 291 , we have not specifically addressed the use of minimization interrogation tactics. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Novak v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1995As the Court of Appeals recently noted in Novak v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 373 (1995): While “[a] deliberate falsehood by a police officer in the course of his duties may undermine the respect that significant segments of the public may have for law enforcement and the system of justice[,]” Wilson v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. at 554, 413 S.E.2d at 658, “ ‘a lie on the part of an interrogating police officer does not, in and of itself, require a finding that a resulting confession was involuntary’.” Id. at 555, 413 S.E.2d at 658 (quoting Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 605, 616 , 318 S.E.2d | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.