voluntariness waiver in California

2024We question whether this argument was preserved for appeal, since it was not clearly articulated below.2 (See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 (Williams) [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below”].) In any event, even assuming it was preserved, we reject it on the merits because there was no denial of due process here. 3.

2024(See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”]; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited argument that his statements to police were involuntary].) By exempting from general admissibility determinations evidence admitted at a prior trial, section 1172.6(d)(3) effectively extends the general forfeiture rule to resentencing hearings.

2026“Appellate waivers contained within plea agreements are generally enforceable.” (People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178, 186 .) “Defendants . . . benefit from plea agreements by gaining concessions from the People. [Citation.] The benefits of a plea agreement would be eliminated if courts disallowed the waiver of the right of appeal to which the parties have agreed.” (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1658 .) “To be enforceable, a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 ; see also Peopl

2025(People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 504 [guilty plea].) “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [waiver of appeal]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 735 [Faretta2 waiver].) A jury waiver is valid only “ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and 2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 6 intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels).) “ ‘[W]hether or not there is an

2025(People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 504 [guilty plea].) “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [waiver of appeal]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 735 [Faretta2 waiver].) A jury waiver is valid only “ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and 2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 6 intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels).) “ ‘[W]hether or not there is an

2025(People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 504 [guilty plea].) “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [waiver of appeal]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 735 [Faretta2 waiver].) A jury waiver is valid only “ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and 2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 6 intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels).) “ ‘[W]hether or not there is an

2025(See Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 309 [trial court’s “assurances” to defendant that waiver would “benefit” him “presented a ‘substantial danger of unintentional coercion’” “at odds with its judicial obligation to remain neutral and detached in evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver”]; cf. Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 757 [affirming waiver where “nothing in the record” suggested defendant was “pressured . . . into waiving a jury”].) These circumstances were compounded by the fact that Altamirano was self-represented at the time he gave his waiver, his appointed counsel for sentencin

2025(See Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 309 [trial court’s “assurances” to defendant that waiver would “benefit” him “presented a ‘substantial danger of unintentional coercion’” “at odds with its judicial obligation to remain neutral and detached in evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver”]; cf. Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 757 [affirming waiver where “nothing in the record” suggested defendant was “pressured . . . into waiving a jury”].) These circumstances were compounded by the fact that Altamirano was self-represented at the time he gave his waiver, his appointed counsel for sentencin

2026“Appellate waivers contained within plea agreements are generally enforceable.” (People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178, 186 .) “Defendants . . . benefit from plea agreements by gaining concessions from the People. [Citation.] The benefits of a plea agreement would be eliminated if courts disallowed the waiver of the right of appeal to which the parties have agreed.” (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1658 .) “To be enforceable, a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 ; see also Peopl

2026(Id. at pp. 169–170.) “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which [appellate courts] review de novo.” (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1660 .) A jury waiver is valid only if the record shows it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.

1978(See People v. Jetter (1975) 15 Cal.3d. 407, 408-409 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 540 P.2d 1217 ].) However, since any error as to the standard of proof applied in determining the voluntariness of a confession relates only to a question of preliminary fact, we have concluded that the effect of any such error should be measured in accordance with the standard enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; thus when it appears after looking at the whole record of the voluntariness hearing that there is no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the appealing p

1978(See People v. Jetter (1975) 15 Cal.3d. 407, 408-409 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 633 , 540 P.2d 1217 ].) However, since any error as to the standard of proof applied in determining the voluntariness of a confession relates only to a question of preliminary fact, we have concluded that the effect of any such error should be measured in accordance with the standard enunciated in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]; thus when it appears after looking at the whole record of the voluntariness hearing that there is no reasonable probability that a result more favorable to the appealing p

2002Because, as the majority concedes, defendant did not raise this claim below (maj. opn., ante, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 125, fn. 10 , 52 P.3d at p. 65, fn. 10 ), he has not preserved it for our review. ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 511-512 , 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285 , 49 P.3d 1032 ; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339 , *135 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 914 P.2d 846 .) Therefore, I see no need here to apply the voluntariness analysis this court articulated in People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 .

2002Because, as the majority concedes, defendant did not raise this claim below (maj. opn., ante, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 125, fn. 10 , 52 P.3d at p. 65, fn. 10 ), he has not preserved it for our review. ( People v. Michaels (2002) 28 Cal.4th 486, 511-512 , 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 285 , 49 P.3d 1032 ; People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 339 , *135 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296 , 914 P.2d 846 .) Therefore, I see no need here to apply the voluntariness analysis this court articulated in People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005 , 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225 , 929 P.2d 544 .

2022(Williams, at p. 425; People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 668 .) Thus, an evaluation of the voluntariness of the waiver “requires an evaluation of both the defendant’s state of mind and circumstances surrounding the questioning.” (People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831 , 843.) We independently review the trial court’s legal determination, and we rely on its findings on disputed facts as long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

2014“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below. [Citations.]” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 (Williams); see also People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 666 ; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 387-388 .) His claim also fails on the merits.

2025(People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 504 [guilty plea].) “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [waiver of appeal]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 735 [Faretta2 waiver].) A jury waiver is valid only “ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and 2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 6 intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels).) “ ‘[W]hether or not there is an

2025(People v. Harty (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 493, 504 [guilty plea].) “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 [waiver of appeal]; People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 735 [Faretta2 waiver].) A jury waiver is valid only “ ‘ “if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and 2 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 . 6 intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.” ’ ” (People v. Daniels (2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels).) “ ‘[W]hether or not there is an

2025(United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 204 (Drayton) [identifying such factors in considering the voluntariness inquiry]; see also United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 424 (Watson) [suggesting promises and “more subtle forms of coercion” might be found to 12 flaw one’s judgment].) Consent to a search may be voluntary, even if the defendant was in custody or under arrest at the time consent was given.

1996(Ibid.; see also United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 424-425 [ 46 L.Ed.2d 598, 609 , 96 S.Ct. 820 ]; U.S. v. Barahona (8th Cir. 1993) 990 F.2d 412, 417 ].) Professor LaFave amplifies this point in his respected treatise on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence: “[A]t least since Schneckloth .... it cannot be said that . . . deception [as to the purpose of the search] is inherently incompatible with consent, for in Schneckloth the Court adopted the voluntariness test from the coerced confession cases, which has not been deemed to compel the exclusion of statements obtained by police misrepres

2024(See People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”]; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited argument that his statements to police were involuntary].) By exempting from general admissibility determinations evidence admitted at a prior trial, section 1172.6(d)(3) effectively extends the general forfeiture rule to resentencing hearings.

2023(People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 992 [defendant forfeited claim that statements were involuntary by failing to object]; People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 [“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below.”].) Here, as the People correctly note, the record does not suggest that defendant ever objected to the admission of his parole hearing testimony on the basis that the testimony was coerced or involuntary.

1980While under well settled law a minor, like an adult, may waive his Miranda rights if his waiver is knowing and intelligent (In re Robert H. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; People v. McFarland, supra, at p. 816 ), in determining the voluntariness of the waiver, the age of the minor must be seriously considered and weighed along with other factors such as his mental state, education, degree of intelligence, experience, familiarity with the law, etc. (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 462-463 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; People v. McFarland, supra.) And as emphasize

1980While under well settled law a minor, like an adult, may waive his Miranda rights if his waiver is knowing and intelligent (In re Robert H. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; People v. McFarland, supra, at p. 816 ), in determining the voluntariness of the waiver, the age of the minor must be seriously considered and weighed along with other factors such as his mental state, education, degree of intelligence, experience, familiarity with the law, etc. (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 462-463 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; People v. McFarland, supra.) And as emphasize

1980While under well settled law a minor, like an adult, may waive his Miranda rights if his waiver is knowing and intelligent (In re Robert H. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; People v. McFarland, supra, at p. 816 ), in determining the voluntariness of the waiver, the age of the minor must be seriously considered and weighed along with other factors such as his mental state, education, degree of intelligence, experience, familiarity with the law, etc. (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 462-463 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; People v. McFarland, supra.) And as emphasize

1980While under well settled law a minor, like an adult, may waive his Miranda rights if his waiver is knowing and intelligent (In re Robert H. (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 894, 899 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 565 ]; People v. McFarland, supra, at p. 816 ), in determining the voluntariness of the waiver, the age of the minor must be seriously considered and weighed along with other factors such as his mental state, education, degree of intelligence, experience, familiarity with the law, etc. (In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 462-463 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; People v. McFarland, supra.) And as emphasize

1980While under well settled law a minor, like an adult, may waive his Miranda rights if his waiver is knowing and intelligent ( In re Robert H. (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 894, 899 [ 144 Cal. Rptr. 565 ]; People v. McFarland, supra, at p. 816 ), in determining the voluntariness of the waiver, the age of the minor must be seriously considered and weighed along with other factors such as his mental state, education, degree of intelligence, experience, familiarity with the law, etc. ( In re Dennis M. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 444, 462-463 [ 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 , 450 P.2d 296 ]; People v. McFarland, supra . ) And as em

1980(People v. Lara, supra, 67 Cal.2d 365 at pp. 387, 389; In re Robert H., supra, 78 Cal.App.3d 894 .) Finally, it bears emphasis that in reviewing the finding of the lower court, this court is obligated to examine the uncontradicted facts and make an independent determination whether the trial court’s finding of voluntariness is supported by the requisite quantum of evidence.

2025(See Collins, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 309 [trial court’s “assurances” to defendant that waiver would “benefit” him “presented a ‘substantial danger of unintentional coercion’” “at odds with its judicial obligation to remain neutral and detached in evaluating the voluntariness of the waiver”]; cf. Morelos, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 757 [affirming waiver where “nothing in the record” suggested defendant was “pressured . . . into waiving a jury”].) These circumstances were compounded by the fact that Altamirano was self-represented at the time he gave his waiver, his appointed counsel for sentencin

2024(In re Ronald E. (1977) 19 Cal.3d 315, 321 .) 10 plea was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. [Citations.]” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1178 , fn. omitted.) A defendant’s waiver of his rights is knowing and intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 305 , internal quotation marks omitted.) It is voluntary if “it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or decept

2014“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below. [Citations.]” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 (Williams); see also People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 666 ; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 387-388 .) His claim also fails on the merits.

2013“A defendant ordinarily forfeits elements of a voluntariness claim that were not raised below. [Citations.]” (People v. Williams (2010) 49 Cal.4th 405, 435 (Williams); see also People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 666 ; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 387-388 .) His claim also fails on the merits.

1985It is true that in a voluntariness hearing "the trial court will often have to decide which one of two self-serving accounts to believe, as the testimony presented at [such a] hearing ordinarily consists of conflicting versions by the defendant and law enforcement officers as to what occurred during the interrogation of the defendant...." ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 606 .) However, where self-defense is asserted to a charge of battery on a police officer or resisting arrest, a similar task is performed by the trier of fact.

1985It is true that in a voluntariness hearing “the trial court will often have to decide which one of two self-serving accounts to believe, as the testimony presented at [such a] hearing ordinarily consists of conflicting versions by the defendant and law enforcement officers as to what occurred during the interrogation of the defendant . . . .” (People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 606 .) However, where self-defense is asserted to a charge of battery on a police officer or resisting arrest, a similar task is performed by the trier of fact.

2026“Appellate waivers contained within plea agreements are generally enforceable.” (People v. Becerra (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 178, 186 .) “Defendants . . . benefit from plea agreements by gaining concessions from the People. [Citation.] The benefits of a plea agreement would be eliminated if courts disallowed the waiver of the right of appeal to which the parties have agreed.” (People v. Vargas (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1653, 1658 .) “To be enforceable, a defendant’s waiver of the right to appeal must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 80 ; see also Peopl

2023(Ibid.) “Absent something in the record raising a doubt defendant understood and knowingly waived his appeal rights, a written waiver of those rights by defendant, coupled with defendant’s and his attorney’s attestations to the court that defendant understood and voluntarily relinquished each right, is sufficient to establish a defendant’s waiver of his right to appeal was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.” (People v. Cisneros-Ramirez (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 393, 400 .) “The voluntariness of a waiver is a question of law which appellate courts review de novo.” (Panizzon, at p. 80.)

2024The Call Did Not Include Any Coerced Admissions “It long has been held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution makes inadmissible any involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion.” (People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 79 (Neal).) “[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167 , italics added.) Even “[t]he most outrag

1998(See Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 164 [ 107 S.Ct. at p. 520 ] [“Absent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law.” (Fn. omitted.)]; Fare, supra, 442 U.S. at pp. 726-727 [99 S.Ct. at pp. 2572-2573]; Moran, supra, 475 U.S. at pp. 421-422 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1140-1141].) We next turn to the second component of the analysis, which focuses on whether defendant was aware of the rights he was abandoning and of the consequences of his decision to do so.

2025(United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 204 (Drayton) [identifying such factors in considering the voluntariness inquiry]; see also United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 424 (Watson) [suggesting promises and “more subtle forms of coercion” might be found to 12 flaw one’s judgment].) Consent to a search may be voluntary, even if the defendant was in custody or under arrest at the time consent was given.

2025(United States v. Drayton (2002) 536 U.S. 194, 204 (Drayton) [identifying such factors in considering the voluntariness inquiry]; see also United States v. Watson (1976) 423 U.S. 411, 424 (Watson) [suggesting promises and “more subtle forms of coercion” might be found to 12 flaw one’s judgment].) Consent to a search may be voluntary, even if the defendant was in custody or under arrest at the time consent was given.

2025(E.g., Watson, at p. 424; People v. Monterroso (2004) 34 Cal.4th 743, 758 (Monterroso).) “[W]e view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, deferring to those express or implied findings of fact supported by substantial evidence.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 969 .) Here, there is substantial evidence supporting the voluntariness of defendant’s consent.