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10 Missouri opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2017 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Schnellegreen2 sentences2003State v. Schnelle, 924 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo.App. 1996). 2003State v. Schnelle, 924 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Mo.App.1996). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Heathergreen2 sentences1999“Rather, the fact of intoxication goes to the weight and credibility to be accorded the statement.” Loazia, 829 S.W.2d at 566 ; State v. Gullett, 606 S.W.2d 796, 807 (Mo.App.1980); see also State v. Heather, 498 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo.App.1973)(“Intox-ication is a factor to be considered, but is not determinative of the voluntariness of waiver of rights issues.”) Here, the testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Defendant was read his Miranda rights at least twice while he was at the Jiffy Mart. 1975Intoxication, though a factor to be considered, is not determinative “of the voluntariness of waiver of rights issues.” State v. Heather, 498 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo.App.1973). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Russell Weissgreen1 sentence2017U.S. v. Weiss, 599 F.2d 730, 737 (5th Cir. 1979). | 1 | 1 |
Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp.green2 sentences2011In Difattar-Wheaton, the claimant appealed the Commission’s denial of her claim for unemployment benefits on the grounds that she left work voluntarily under the terms of section 288.050.1(1) when she failed to return to work after an authorized leave due to serious health complications associated with ovarian cancer. 271 S.W.3d at 595-96 . 2011We find that the Missouri Supreme Court’s voluntariness analysis in Difatta-Wheaton v. Dolphin Capital Corp., 271 S.W.3d 594, 595 (Mo. banc 2008), is controlling. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gullettgreen1 sentence1999“Rather, the fact of intoxication goes to the weight and credibility to be accorded the statement.” Loazia, 829 S.W.2d at 566 ; State v. Gullett, 606 S.W.2d 796, 807 (Mo.App.1980); see also State v. Heather, 498 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo.App.1973)(“Intox-ication is a factor to be considered, but is not determinative of the voluntariness of waiver of rights issues.”) Here, the testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Defendant was read his Miranda rights at least twice while he was at the Jiffy Mart. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacksongreen1 sentence1982State v. Jackson, 448 S.W.2d 895, 896 (Mo.1970). | 1 | 1 |
Wainwright v. Sykesgreen2 sentences1980Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 915 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964) enunciated the constitutional rule that a defendant has a “right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of volun-tariness.” However, “[l]anguage in subse *678 quent decisions of this Court has reaffirmed the view that the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 , 1980Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 915 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964) enunciated the constitutional rule that a defendant has a “right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of volun-tariness.” However, “[l]anguage in subse *678 quent decisions of this Court has reaffirmed the view that the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 , | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence1975In State v. Smith, 342 S.W.2d 940, 941 [3] (Mo.1961) our Supreme Court held that the fact that a defendant was “more or less” intoxicated when he confessed did not render the confession inadmissible if he had sufficient mental capacity to know what he was saying. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Schompertgreen2 sentences1973The standard is whether the statement is reliable and whether there is such a lack of awareness or understanding so that in the rare case where it clearly appears, the defendant was so intoxicated so as to be “unable to appreciate the nature and consequences of his statements.” People v. Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300 , 279 N.Y.S.2d 515, 519 , 226 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1967). 1973The standard is whether the statement is reliable and whether there is such a lack of awareness or understanding so that in the rare case where it clearly appears, the defendant was so intoxicated so as to be “unable to appreciate the nature and consequences of his statements.” People v. Schompert, 19 N.Y.2d 300 , 279 N.Y.S.2d 515, 519 , 226 N.E.2d 305, 308 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2013However, the State “does not need to show that a waiver of Miranda rights was express.” Id. “[WJaivers can be established even absent formal or express statements of waiver....” Id. 6 Nevertheless, the language in the circuit court’s suppression order suggests that it improperly based its decision on the absence of an express waiver. 2013Pennington did not challenge the voluntariness of his waiver and, thus, the only issue before the circuit court was whether he made his uncoerced statements knowingly and intelligently. 5 Although there may be proof that the accused made an uncoerced statement after a Miranda warning was given, “this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights.” Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2261 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 , 86 5.Ct. 1602). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Berghuis v. Thompkins
green
1 sentence2013Pennington did not challenge the voluntariness of his waiver and, thus, the only issue before the circuit court was whether he made his uncoerced statements knowingly and intelligently. 5 Although there may be proof that the accused made an uncoerced statement after a Miranda warning was given, “this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate ‘a valid waiver’ of Miranda rights.” Berghuis, 130 S.Ct. at 2261 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 , 86 5.Ct. 1602). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Loazia
green
1 sentence1999“Rather, the fact of intoxication goes to the weight and credibility to be accorded the statement.” Loazia, 829 S.W.2d at 566 ; State v. Gullett, 606 S.W.2d 796, 807 (Mo.App.1980); see also State v. Heather, 498 S.W.2d 300, 304 (Mo.App.1973)(“Intox-ication is a factor to be considered, but is not determinative of the voluntariness of waiver of rights issues.”) Here, the testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that Defendant was read his Miranda rights at least twice while he was at the Jiffy Mart. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences1980Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 915 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964) enunciated the constitutional rule that a defendant has a “right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of volun-tariness.” However, “[l]anguage in subse *678 quent decisions of this Court has reaffirmed the view that the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 , 1980Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-377 , 84 S.Ct. 1774, 1780-1781 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 915 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964) enunciated the constitutional rule that a defendant has a “right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of the confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issue of volun-tariness.” However, “[l]anguage in subse *678 quent decisions of this Court has reaffirmed the view that the Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86 , | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.