42 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carter v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1230-32 (Ind.2000) (conducting separate analyses); Carter, 686 N.E.2d at 1257-60 (same); cf. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry."). [11] The State's burden of proving voluntariness is greater under Indiana law than it is under the federal constitution, which requires only that the prosecution prove by a preponderance of the evidence that both the waiver and the statement were voluntary. 2011See, e.g., Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1230-32 (Ind.2000) (conducting separate analyses); Carter, 686 N.E.2d at 1257-60 (same); cf. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.”). .The State's burden of proving voluntariness is greater under Indiana law than it is under the federal constitution, which requires only that the prosecution prove by a preponderance of the evidence that both the waiver and the statement were voluntary. | 7 | 7 |
Cherrone v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Cherrone v. State, 726 N.E.2d 251, 253 (Ind.2000). 2006Cherrone v. State, 726 N.E.2d 251, 253 (Ind.2000). | 3 | 3 |
Tingle v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind.1997) (citing Tingle v. State, 632 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ind.1994)). 1998Tingle v. State , 632 N.E.2d 345, 352 (Ind. 1994). | 3 | 3 |
Dickerson v. United Statesred2 sentences2014Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (citing Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind.1989); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry."). 2014Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (citing Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind.1989); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry."). | 2 | 4 |
Magley v. Stategreen2 sentences1982The court may focus on exactly the same set of basic facts in resolving the two questions, Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811 , and the waiver standard includes the application of the traditional voluntariness standard. 1982The court may focus on exactly the same set of basic facts in resolving the two questions, Magley v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 618 , 335 N.E.2d 811 , and the waiver standard includes the application of the traditional voluntariness standard. | 2 | 4 |
Crain v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (citing Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind.1989); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry."). 2011See, e.g., Crain v. State, 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1230-32 (Ind.2000) (conducting separate analyses); Carter, 686 N.E.2d at 1257-60 (same); cf. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444 , 120 S.Ct. 2326 ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.”). .The State's burden of proving voluntariness is greater under Indiana law than it is under the federal constitution, which requires only that the prosecution prove by a preponderance of the evidence that both the waiver and the statement were voluntary. | 2 | 3 |
Colorado v. Connellygreen2 sentences1991The voluntariness of a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege has always depended "on the absence of police overreaching...." Id. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. at 523 . 1991The voluntariness of a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege has always depended "on the absence of police overreaching...." Id. at 170 , 107 S.Ct. at 523 . | 2 | 3 |
Gregory v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Crain, 736 N.E.2d at 1230 (citing Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind.1989); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 , 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) ("The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry."). 2000See Gregory v. State, 540 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Ind.1989); see also Dickerson v. United States, — U.S.-, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2336 , 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000) (“The requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.”). | 2 | 2 |
Davidson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Because the Model Penal Code’s list of such conditions was not imported into our Code, we have recognized that certain conditions not included in the ALI model can be covered under the Indiana statute. 849 N.E.2d at 594 (citations omitted); see also Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (Ind.2001) (‘‘McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement”). 2012Because the Model Penal Code's list of such conditions was not imported into our Code, we have recognized that certain conditions not included in the ALI model can be covered under the Indiana statute. 849 N.E.2d at 594 (citations omitted); see also Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (Ind.2001) (" McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement"). | 2 | 2 |
Marley v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Because the Model Penal Code’s list of such conditions was not imported into our Code, we have recognized that certain conditions not included in the ALI model can be covered under the Indiana statute. 849 N.E.2d at 594 (citations omitted); see also Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (Ind.2001) (‘‘McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement”). 2012Because the Model Penal Code's list of such conditions was not imported into our Code, we have recognized that certain conditions not included in the ALI model can be covered under the Indiana statute. 849 N.E.2d at 594 (citations omitted); see also Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 1128 (Ind.2001) (" McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement"). | 2 | 2 |
Wilkes v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ; Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind.2009). [12] Moreover, under direct examination she claimed that the police had been questioning D.M. before Quigley arrived, but, aside from this testimony, there is absolutely nothing in the record to suggest that this was true, and Mother could have had no personal knowledge because she admitted she had not been present. 2011See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ; Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind.2009). . | 2 | 2 |
Sauerheber v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 803 (Ind.1998). 2001Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796 (Ind.1998). | 1 | 2 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences2000In judging the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of rights, we will look to the totality of the circumstances, see Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 , 119 S.Ct. 807 , 142 L.Ed.2d 667 (1999), to ensure that a defendant’s self-incriminating statement was not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant’s free will, see Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.1993). 1998Id. | 1 | 2 |
Reed v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See id. (“McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement.”) (emphases supplied); McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108-09 (holding that automatism is not a species of the insanity defense and that evidence of such may be presented to dispute whether the defendant engaged in voluntary conduct, as required by Ind. Code § 35-41-2-1 (a)); Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[B]ecause the State must prove that a defendan | 1 | 1 |
McClain v. Stategreen1 sentence2024See id. (“McClain staked out a small area of mental states, e.g., sleepwalking, epilepsy, and metabolic disorders, that are not attributable to any mental disease or defect but nevertheless negate the voluntariness requirement.”) (emphases supplied); McClain, 678 N.E.2d at 108-09 (holding that automatism is not a species of the insanity defense and that evidence of such may be presented to dispute whether the defendant engaged in voluntary conduct, as required by Ind. Code § 35-41-2-1 (a)); Reed v. State, 693 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“[B]ecause the State must prove that a defendan | 1 | 1 |
Cornelious v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Appellee’s Br. pp. 14-15 (treating ineffective assistance and voluntariness claims as indistinguishable). “[V]oluntariness [of pleas] is distinct from ineffective assistance of counsel.” Cornelious v. State, 846 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mooregreen1 sentence2017See Appellee’s Br. pp. 14-15 (treating ineffective assistance and voluntariness claims as indistinguishable). “[V]oluntariness [of pleas] is distinct from ineffective assistance of counsel.” Cornelious v. State, 846 N.E.2d 354, 358 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing State v. Moore, 678 N.E.2d 1258, 1266 (Ind. 1997)), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Wilcoxen v. Stategreen1 sentence2000In judging the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of rights, we will look to the totality of the circumstances, see Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 , 119 S.Ct. 807 , 142 L.Ed.2d 667 (1999), to ensure that a defendant’s self-incriminating statement was not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant’s free will, see Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.1993). | 1 | 1 |
| Morgan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. State
green
2 sentences2011The issues of voluntariness of a waiver and voluntariness of a confession are similar in that they both require evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind.1997), and often times the arguments made as to one issue may be applicable to the other, Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618, 627 , 335 N.E.2d 811, 817 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238 , 1246 n. 11 (Ind. 1997). 2011The issues of volun-tariness of a waiver and voluntariness of a confession are similar in that they both require evaluation of the totality of the circumstances, Carter v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1254, 1257 (Ind.1997), and often times the arguments made as to one issue may be applicable to the other, Magley v. State, 263 Ind. 618, 627 , 335 N.E.2d 811, 817 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Smith v. State, 689 N.E.2d 1238 , 1246 n. 11 (Ind.1997). | 3 | 1998–2011 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1986The appellant asserts that the mandates of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 467-479 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-30 , 16 L.Ed.2d 1149 , were not satisfied because the arresting officers failed to inform the appellant of the nature of and penalties for the crime charged, and that the appellant's silence would not be used against him. 1978Over Holt’s objections, Officer Minor testified that he asked Holt, “His name, which was Curtis Lee Holt; ... his date of birth, and he gave me December 2,1954; and I asked him his address, which he gave me as 1028 North Central Apartment 13.” Holt contends the trial court erred in admitting this testimony, arguing specifically that: (1) he was not adequately advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436 ; (2) there was no showing that he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to conduct a voluntar | 3 | 1978–1986 |
Nacoff v. State
green
2 sentences1978This Court has held that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of rights, the test is whether “. . . looking at all the circumstances, the confession was free and voluntary and not induced by any violence, threats, promises, or other improper influences.” Nacoff v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 101 , 267 N.E.2d 165, 167 . 1978This Court has held that in determining the voluntariness of a waiver of rights, the test is whether “. . . looking at all the circumstances, the confession was free and voluntary and not induced by any violence, threats, promises, or other improper influences.” Nacoff v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 97, 101 , 267 N.E.2d 165, 167 . | 3 | 1975–1982 |
Berghuis v. Thompkins
green
2 sentences2011Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2261 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). 2011Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2261 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
North Carolina v. Butler
red
2 sentences2011Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2261 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). 2011Berghuis v. Thompkins, — U.S.-, 130 S.Ct. 2250, 2261 , 176 L.Ed.2d 1098 (2010); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 , 99 S.Ct. 1755 , 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Lego v. Twomey
green
2 sentences2011See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ; Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind.2009). . 2011See Connelly, 479 U.S. at 168 , 107 S.Ct. 515 ; Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 , 92 S.Ct. 619 , 30 L.Ed.2d 618 (1972); Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 680 (Ind.2009). . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Holleman v. State
green
2 sentences1990Although appellant’s argument is that the tapes were per se excludable because the advisement of rights and his waiver of them do not appear on the tapes, he correctly states that the appropriate standard for evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver of rights is the totality of the circumstances test, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Holleman v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 534 , 400 N.E.2d 123 . 1990Although appellant’s argument is that the tapes were per se excludable because the advisement of rights and his waiver of them do not appear on the tapes, he correctly states that the appropriate standard for evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver of rights is the totality of the circumstances test, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Holleman v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 534 , 400 N.E.2d 123 . | 2 | 1990–1992 |
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences1990Although appellant’s argument is that the tapes were per se excludable because the advisement of rights and his waiver of them do not appear on the tapes, he correctly states that the appropriate standard for evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver of rights is the totality of the circumstances test, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Holleman v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 534 , 400 N.E.2d 123 . 1990Although appellant’s argument is that the tapes were per se excludable because the advisement of rights and his waiver of them do not appear on the tapes, he correctly states that the appropriate standard for evaluating the voluntariness of a waiver of rights is the totality of the circumstances test, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and Holleman v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 534 , 400 N.E.2d 123 . | 2 | 1982–1990 |
Barrett v. State
green
1 sentence2024Rather, through expert testimony, she seeks to show that she lacked criminal intent due Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 24A-CR-627 | October 16, 2024 Page 30 of 34 to the circumstances and associated trauma of being a victim of human sexual trafficking. 7 In my view, McClain does not apply here. [56] Nor do I believe that we should look to Barrett v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1112 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans. denied, to counsel our decision here. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kellems v. State
green
1 sentence2009Although the trial court admirably engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Garcia concerning his right to have a jury determine whether he had committed the offenses requisite for the two enhancements, the court here, as in Kellems did not question Garcia "regarding the voluntariness of his waiver nor elicit ] any statement ... of his waiver for the record." See 849 N.E.2d at 1112 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Musselwhite v. California
green
1 sentence2000In judging the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of rights, we will look to the totality of the circumstances, see Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 , 119 S.Ct. 807 , 142 L.Ed.2d 667 (1999), to ensure that a defendant’s self-incriminating statement was not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant’s free will, see Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.1993). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Martinez v. United States
green
1 sentence2000In judging the voluntariness of a defendant’s waiver of rights, we will look to the totality of the circumstances, see Allen v. State, 686 N.E.2d 760, 770 (Ind.1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1073 , 119 S.Ct. 807 , 142 L.Ed.2d 667 (1999), to ensure that a defendant’s self-incriminating statement was not induced by violence, threats, or other improper influences that overcame the defendant’s free will, see Wilcoxen v. State, 619 N.E.2d 574, 577 (Ind.1993). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Currie v. State green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Moore v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Bivins v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Craig v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Johnson v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Johnson v. Indiana green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Sparks v. State green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Edwards v. Arizona green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Harrison v. State green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Dawson v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Michigan v. Tucker green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Michigan v. Mosley green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Payne v. State green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Jackson v. Denno green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.