6 Alaska opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alaska courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ridgelygreen2 sentences2015State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1987) (explaining that voluntariness is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981) (explaining that waiver is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313, 318 (Alaska 1980) (explaining the standard at length, including giving deference to the superior court for the historical facts recited in its presence, but not making any reference to the impo 2015State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1987) (explaining that voluntariness is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981) (explaining that waiver is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313, 318 (Alaska 1980) (explaining the standard at length, including giving deference to the superior court for the historical facts recited in its presence, but not making any reference to the impo | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sivongxxaygreen2 sentences2020If defendants are informed on the record of the defining features of a jury trial, courts may more confidently answer the critical question of whether a criminal defendant understands that he has the right to have a jury decide the facts of his case — and that he is agreeing to forgo that right in favor of having his case decided solely by a judge.5 4 See Sivongxxay, 396 P.3d at 437 (recommending that “the trial judge take additional steps as appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant comprehends what the jury trial right entails” — which may include “asking whether the defendant 2020If defendants are informed on the record of the defining features of a jury trial, courts may more confidently answer the critical question of whether a criminal defendant understands that he has the right to have a jury decide the facts of his case — and that he is agreeing to forgo that right in favor of having his case decided solely by a judge.5 4 See Sivongxxay, 396 P.3d at 437 (recommending that “the trial judge take additional steps as appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant comprehends what the jury trial right entails” — which may include “asking whether the defendant | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blanngreen1 sentence2020Va. 1997); see also State v. Blann, 90 A.3d 1253, 1253 (N.J. 2014) (requiring that “an official jury waiver form containing the . . . four items be prepared for use” and that “trial judges engage in a colloquy with defendants that includes those four items, at a minimum, to assess the voluntariness of a waiver request”); Commonwealth v. Williams, 312 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. 1973) (holding that, for a defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to a jury trial, the defendant must know “the essential ingredients of a jury trial,” including that the jurors will be drawn from members of th | 1 | 1 |
Ciummei v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2020If defendants are informed on the record of the defining features of a jury trial, courts may more confidently answer the critical question of whether a criminal defendant understands that he has the right to have a jury decide the facts of his case — and that he is agreeing to forgo that right in favor of having his case decided solely by a judge.5 4 See Sivongxxay, 396 P.3d at 437 (recommending that “the trial judge take additional steps as appropriate to ensure, on the record, that the defendant comprehends what the jury trial right entails” — which may include “asking whether the defendant | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2020Va. 1997); see also State v. Blann, 90 A.3d 1253, 1253 (N.J. 2014) (requiring that “an official jury waiver form containing the . . . four items be prepared for use” and that “trial judges engage in a colloquy with defendants that includes those four items, at a minimum, to assess the voluntariness of a waiver request”); Commonwealth v. Williams, 312 A.2d 597, 600 (Pa. 1973) (holding that, for a defendant to knowingly and intelligently waive the right to a jury trial, the defendant must know “the essential ingredients of a jury trial,” including that the jurors will be drawn from members of th | 1 | 1 |
Troyer v. Stategreen1 sentence2015State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1987) (explaining that voluntariness is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981) (explaining that waiver is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313, 318 (Alaska 1980) (explaining the standard at length, including giving deference to the superior court for the historical facts recited in its presence, but not making any reference to the impo | 1 | 1 |
Giacomazzi v. Stategreen1 sentence2015State v. Ridgely, 732 P.2d 550, 554 (Alaska 1987) (explaining that voluntariness is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981) (explaining that waiver is a mixed question without making any reference to the inquiry happening out of the presence of the court); Troyer v. State, 614 P.2d 313, 318 (Alaska 1980) (explaining the standard at length, including giving deference to the superior court for the historical facts recited in its presence, but not making any reference to the impo | 1 | 1 |
Missouri v. Seibertgreen1 sentence2004Seibert, 124 S.Ct. at 2619-2620 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). | 1 | 1 |
Cooksey v. Stategreen1 sentence1988See Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d 1251 (Alaska 1974). | 1 | 1 |
Quick v. Stategreen1 sentence1987In Quick v. State, 599 P.2d 712, 719 (Alaska 1979), we expressly rejected a per se rule that juveniles are incapable of waiving their Miranda rights without the guidance of an adult, adopting instead a totality of the circumstances rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alaska. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lisenba v. California
green
2 sentences1996Indeed, the goal of ensuring reliability appears to be secondary to others. 16 Speaking of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has said: “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 814 U.S. 219 , 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290 , 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). 1996Indeed, the goal of ensuring reliability appears to be secondary to others. 16 Speaking of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has said: “The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence whether true or false.” Lisenba v. California, 814 U.S. 219 , 236, 62 S.Ct. 280, 290 , 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Blackburn v. Alabama
green
2 sentences1996This focus on eoereiveness also comports with the basic due process values reflected in the voluntariness requirement itself. “[A] complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary[J” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 , 80 S.Ct. 274, 280 , 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). ‘While it is fair to say that ensuring the reliability of confessions is a goal under the due process volun-tariness standard, it is incorrect to define the standard in terms of that one objective.” LaFave & Israel, supra, at 442 (e 1996This focus on eoereiveness also comports with the basic due process values reflected in the voluntariness requirement itself. “[A] complex of values underlies the stricture against use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient shorthand, this Court terms involuntary[J” Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 , 80 S.Ct. 274, 280 , 4 L.Ed.2d 242 (1960). ‘While it is fair to say that ensuring the reliability of confessions is a goal under the due process volun-tariness standard, it is incorrect to define the standard in terms of that one objective.” LaFave & Israel, supra, at 442 (e | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.