registration requirement in Kansas

2023And although the Supreme Court found the "more expansive language" of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3602(a) covered the district court's deadly weapon finding in Marinelli's case, it noted that even those instances where the registration requirement springs from the convicted offense merely "should be caught up in the jurisdictional net cast by the first sentence in K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3602(a)"—but "should be" does not a definitive answer make. 307 Kan. at 787 .

2020Therefore, it believes the registration requirement is not yet ripe for appellate review because "the District Court did not order Defendant to register nor did the District Court enter a judgment against him, the Court merely provided Defendant with a Notice of Duty to Register." In State v. Marinelli, 307 Kan. 768, 769 , 415 P.3d 405 (2018), the Kansas Supreme Court addressed appellate court jurisdiction in a criminal defendant's direct appeal of his KORA registration responsibilities.

2018The sentencing court had jurisdiction to include the registration requirement in the journal entry without making it a part of the sentence imposed from the bench ." ( Emphasis added.) 291 Kan. at 37 , 238 P.3d 246 .

2018The sentencing court had jurisdiction to include the registration requirement in the journal entry without making it a part of the sentence imposed from the bench ." ( Emphasis added.) 291 Kan. at 37 , 238 P.3d 246 .

2016The Court reasoned that although a sex offender may be prosecuted for a registration violation, such prosecution is separate from the individuals original offense. 538 U.S. at 102 .

2016The Court reasoned that although a sex offender may be prosecuted for a registration violation, such prosecution is separate from the individual's original offense. 538 U.S. at 102 .

2016“The Eleventh Circuit addressed this registration requirement in W.B.H, and held that SORNA is no different than the Alaska act at issue in Smith. 664 F.3d at 858-59 .

2016The Eleventh Circuit addressed this registration requirement in W.B.H. and held that SORNA is no different than the Alaska act at issue in Smith. 664 F.3d at 858-59 .

2010Even lawfully owned firearms were required to be “ ‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device.’ ” 554 U.S. at 575 .

2009Even lawfully owned firearms were required to be “ ‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device.’ ” 128 S. Ct. at 2788 .

2008In Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603 , Syl. ¶ ¶ 8, 9, this court found no due process violation in a registration requirement that does not allow a hearing to determine the degree of threat posed by the defendant.

2000In State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 610 , 9 P.3d 1 (2000), the Kansas Supreme Court commented on an earlier case involving KORA and stated “the registration requirement imposed no affirmative disability or restraint, and that, while the burden of registering may cause discomfort, the act of registration alone was not punishment.” See State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 695-96 , 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).

2000In State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 610 , 9 P.3d 1 (2000), the Kansas Supreme Court commented on an earlier case involving KORA and stated “the registration requirement imposed no affirmative disability or restraint, and that, while the burden of registering may cause discomfort, the act of registration alone was not punishment.” See State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 695-96 , 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).

2000In State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 610 , 9 P.3d 1 (2000), the Kansas Supreme Court commented on an earlier case involving KORA and stated “the registration requirement imposed no affirmative disability or restraint, and that, while the burden of registering may cause discomfort, the act of registration alone was not punishment.” See State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 695-96 , 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).

2022Although the registration violation was classified as a nonperson felony at the time of Terrell's guilty plea in 2005, the presentence report reclassified it as a person felony under State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560 , 357 P.3d 251 (2015).

2022Although the registration violation was classified as a nonperson felony at the time of Terrell's guilty plea in 2005, the presentence report reclassified it as a person felony under State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560 , 357 P.3d 251 (2015).

2020The court also pointed out that convicted sex offenders typically would be informed of their statutory duty to register and, therefore, would have 52 actual notice. 222 Ill. 2d at 513 .

2019Rocheleau, 307 Kan. at 765 ; State v. Marinelli, 307 Kan. 768, 786 , 415 P.3d 405 (2018).

2019Rocheleau, 307 Kan. at 765 ; Marinelli, 307 Kan. at 786 .

2017Because the registration requirement is not part of her sentence, we necessarily conclude there is no merit to Simmons' claim that her sentence was illegally modified." Simmons, 50 Kan.

2016All of this being said, we further acknowledge that todays decision by a new majority in State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192 , 377 P.3d 1127 (2016), argued a year after Doe v. Thompson, may influence whether the KORA holding of this case is available to be relied upon by violent offenders whose appeals have yet to be decided.

2016All of this being said, we further acknowledge that todays decision by a new majority in State v. Petersen-Beard, 304 Kan. 192 , 377 P.3d 1127 (2016), argued a year after Doe v. Thompson, may influence whether the KORA holding of this case is available to be relied upon by violent offenders whose appeals have yet to be decided.

2014Like Mishmash , the court’s reference in State v. Denmark-Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, 884 , 258 P.3d 960 (2011), to the registration requirement as part of the defendant’s sentence is not a legal conclusion creating binding precedent but, again, appears to have been phrased that way for purposes of simplicity and brevity.

2014Like Mishmash , the court’s reference in State v. Denmark-Wagner, 292 Kan. 870, 884 , 258 P.3d 960 (2011), to the registration requirement as part of the defendant’s sentence is not a legal conclusion creating binding precedent but, again, appears to have been phrased that way for purposes of simplicity and brevity.

2013In rejecting this analysis, the Supreme Court reasoned it was “counterintuitive” to think the legislature went to the trouble of omitting the misdemeanor crime from the list simply to eliminate the registration requirement for the “rare, if not nonexistent” circumstance in which a person commits the crime without sexual motivation. 294 Kan. at 94 .

2013The court said this court’s interpretation rendered this section of the statute superfluous, stating: “Why carve out a registration requirement where the victim is age 16 or 17, if the catch-all provision is intended to pull in all sexually motivated defendants anyway?” 294 Kan. at 95 .

2012State v. Mishmash, No. 103, 158, 2011 WL 426664 , at s4-5 (Kan.

2009Without engaging in any significant analysis, the Supreme Court apparently determined that an officer asking a passenger for his name, birth date, and identification, questioning him about his gang membership, ordering him out of the vehicle, and patting him down for officer safety did not “measurably extend the duration of the stop.” See 555 U.S. at 333 .

2009Permitting an agent such as MERS purports to be to step in and act without a recorded lender directing its action would wreak havoc on notice in this state.” Southwest Homes, 2009 Ark. 152 ,____. *544 In any event, the legislature has established a registration requirement for parties that desire service of notice of litigation involving real property interests.

2009App. 2d 600, 603 , 154 P.3d 1120 (2007), where the Court of Appeals held: “When an appellate court has remanded a case for further proceedings consistent with its mandate, a district court is obligated to effectuate the mandate and may consider only those matters essential to the implementation of the ruling of the appellate court.” *765 Garcia further argues that the district court’s finding of sexual motivation from the original sentencing — as evidenced by the court’s reference there to the registration requirement — referred exclusively to the rape, which conviction has been reversed and i

2008In State v. Armbrust, 274 Kan. 1089 , 59 P.3d 1000 (2002), we considered a situation in which defendants who failed to register *770 with law enforcement entities were convicted of underlying sex offenses committed when violating the registration act was a misdemeanor.

2008In State v. Armbrust, 274 Kan. 1089 , 59 P.3d 1000 (2002), we considered a situation in which defendants who failed to register *770 with law enforcement entities were convicted of underlying sex offenses committed when violating the registration act was a misdemeanor.

2006If K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-4904(b)(l) is interpreted so that a registration violation exists for failing to notify the law enforcement agency where the offender was last registered, a provision specifically deleted by the legislature in 1997, then it would run contrary to the rule of statutory construction which states: “When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law from how it existed prior to the amendment, and it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.” State v. Van Hoet, 277 Ka

2006If K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 22-4904(b)(l) is interpreted so that a registration violation exists for failing to notify the law enforcement agency where the offender was last registered, a provision specifically deleted by the legislature in 1997, then it would run contrary to the rule of statutory construction which states: “When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law from how it existed prior to the amendment, and it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation.” State v. Van Hoet, 277 Ka

2000In State v. Wilkinson, 269 Kan. 603, 610 , 9 P.3d 1 (2000), the Kansas Supreme Court commented on an earlier case involving KORA and stated “the registration requirement imposed no affirmative disability or restraint, and that, while the burden of registering may cause discomfort, the act of registration alone was not punishment.” See State v. Myers, 260 Kan. 669, 695-96 , 923 P.2d 1024 (1996), cert. denied 521 U.S. 1118 (1997).