10 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
COM., OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER v. Barkergreen2 sentences2013The trial court concluded that the lack of a specific determination of the minor status of the victim and notification of the right to withdraw the plea *547 was harmless error. 2 This appeal followed. *548 ANALYSIS “This appeal presents a matter of statutory interpretation and is subject to de novo review by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Barker, 275 Va. 529, 536 , 659 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2008) (citing Wright v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 77, 80-81 , 655 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2008)). 2013The trial court concluded that the lack of a specific determination of the minor status of the victim and notification of the right to withdraw the plea *547 was harmless error. 2 This appeal followed. *548 ANALYSIS “This appeal presents a matter of statutory interpretation and is subject to de novo review by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Barker, 275 Va. 529, 536 , 659 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2008) (citing Wright v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 77, 80-81 , 655 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2008)). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Com.green2 sentences2013The trial court concluded that the lack of a specific determination of the minor status of the victim and notification of the right to withdraw the plea *547 was harmless error. 2 This appeal followed. *548 ANALYSIS “This appeal presents a matter of statutory interpretation and is subject to de novo review by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Barker, 275 Va. 529, 536 , 659 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2008) (citing Wright v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 77, 80-81 , 655 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2008)). 2013The trial court concluded that the lack of a specific determination of the minor status of the victim and notification of the right to withdraw the plea *547 was harmless error. 2 This appeal followed. *548 ANALYSIS “This appeal presents a matter of statutory interpretation and is subject to de novo review by this Court.” Commonwealth v. Barker, 275 Va. 529, 536 , 659 S.E.2d 502, 504 (2008) (citing Wright v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 77, 80-81 , 655 S.E.2d 7, 9 (2008)). | 1 | 1 |
Phlegar v. Virginia Foods, Inc.green2 sentences2012See Phlegar v. Virginia Foods, Inc., 188 Va. 747, 749-51 , 51 S.E.2d 227, 228-230 (1949). 2012See Phlegar v. Virginia Foods, Inc., 188 Va. 747, 749-51 , 51 S.E.2d 227, 228-230 (1949). | 1 | 1 |
Baldwin v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 570, 574 , 125 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1962) (construing Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in light of Act’s purpose “to correct an evil — the illegal traffic in narcotics”). 2006Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 203 Va. 570, 574 , 125 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1962) (construing Uniform Narcotic Drug Act in light of Act’s purpose “to correct an evil — the illegal traffic in narcotics”). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006It would be inconsistent, therefore, to impose the offender registration requirement on one convicted of attempted indecent liberties with a minor, in the absence of an actual minor victim, and yet not impose the registration requirement on one convicted of computer solicitation for sex with a minor, where there also was no actual minor victim. 10 The prefatory language in Code § 9.1-902(A)(2) at issue here does not dictate, and should not be construed to yield, such a result. “ ‘[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction whic 2006It would be inconsistent, therefore, to impose the offender registration requirement on one convicted of attempted indecent liberties with a minor, in the absence of an actual minor victim, and yet not impose the registration requirement on one convicted of computer solicitation for sex with a minor, where there also was no actual minor victim. 10 The prefatory language in Code § 9.1-902(A)(2) at issue here does not dictate, and should not be construed to yield, such a result. “ ‘[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction whic | 1 | 1 |
Hix v. Com.green2 sentences2006That language simply implements the Act’s delineation between offenses against adults (addressed elsewhere in Code § 9.1-902) and offenses specifically targeted against minors, or otherwise those who are physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, for separate treatment under the Act. 6 Accordingly, we conclude that the Act’s offender registration requirement was clearly applicable to Colbert upon his conviction under Code § 18.2-874.3(B)(iv), being one of subsection (A)(2)’s listed offenses against minors — regardless of the fact that there was no actual minor victim, as that was not a nec 2006That language simply implements the Act’s delineation between offenses against adults (addressed elsewhere in Code § 9.1-902) and offenses specifically targeted against minors, or otherwise those who are physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, for separate treatment under the Act. 6 Accordingly, we conclude that the Act’s offender registration requirement was clearly applicable to Colbert upon his conviction under Code § 18.2-874.3(B)(iv), being one of subsection (A)(2)’s listed offenses against minors — regardless of the fact that there was no actual minor victim, as that was not a nec | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Com.green2 sentences2006See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004) (noting that “our case law uses the phrase ‘absurd result’ to describe situations in which the law would be internally inconsistent”). 2006See Cook v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 111, 116 , 597 S.E.2d 84, 87 (2004) (noting that “our case law uses the phrase ‘absurd result’ to describe situations in which the law would be internally inconsistent”). | 1 | 1 |
Holly Hill Farm Corp. v. Rowegreen2 sentences1991The constitutional prohibitions against special laws do not prohibit legislative classifications; they merely require that such classifications be “natural and reasonable, and appropriate to the occasion.” Benderson, 236 Va. at 140-41 , 372 S.E.2d at 753 ; accord Holly Hill Farm Corp. v. Rowe, 241 Va. 425, 430 , 404 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1991). 1991The constitutional prohibitions against special laws do not prohibit legislative classifications; they merely require that such classifications be “natural and reasonable, and appropriate to the occasion.” Benderson, 236 Va. at 140-41 , 372 S.E.2d at 753 ; accord Holly Hill Farm Corp. v. Rowe, 241 Va. 425, 430 , 404 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Benderson Development Co. v. Sciortinogreen2 sentences1991Specifically, they contend (1) that the registration requirement offends paragraph 18 of that section, which prohibits the General Assembly from “[g] ranting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity,” and (2) that the Fund offends paragraph 3, which prohibits the General Assembly from “providing or changing the methods of collecting debts or enforcing judgments.” To withstand a challenge under the Virginia Constitution’s prohibitions against special laws, a statute must bear “a rea sonable and substantial relation to the obje 1991Specifically, they contend (1) that the registration requirement offends paragraph 18 of that section, which prohibits the General Assembly from “[g] ranting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity,” and (2) that the Fund offends paragraph 3, which prohibits the General Assembly from “providing or changing the methods of collecting debts or enforcing judgments.” To withstand a challenge under the Virginia Constitution’s prohibitions against special laws, a statute must bear “a rea sonable and substantial relation to the obje | 1 | 1 |
Mandell v. Haddongreen2 sentences1991Specifically, they contend (1) that the registration requirement offends paragraph 18 of that section, which prohibits the General Assembly from “[g] ranting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity,” and (2) that the Fund offends paragraph 3, which prohibits the General Assembly from “providing or changing the methods of collecting debts or enforcing judgments.” To withstand a challenge under the Virginia Constitution’s prohibitions against special laws, a statute must bear “a rea sonable and substantial relation to the obje 1991Specifically, they contend (1) that the registration requirement offends paragraph 18 of that section, which prohibits the General Assembly from “[g] ranting to any private corporation, association, or individual any special or exclusive right, privilege, or immunity,” and (2) that the Fund offends paragraph 3, which prohibits the General Assembly from “providing or changing the methods of collecting debts or enforcing judgments.” To withstand a challenge under the Virginia Constitution’s prohibitions against special laws, a statute must bear “a rea sonable and substantial relation to the obje | 1 | 1 |
Marchetti v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1974The standard is whether the requirement “created for petitioner ‘real and appreciable,’ and not merely ‘imaginary and unsubstantial,’ hazards of self-incrimination”, Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968), or “whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and ‘real,’ and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.” 390 U.S. at 53. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bryan v. United States
green
2 sentences2011As the United States Supreme Court noted in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 , 118 S.Ct. 1939, 1946 , 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998), “unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.” Second, we find support for our reading of Code § 18.2-472.1(B) from other provisions of the Code where the term “knowingly” is defined. 2011As the United States Supreme Court noted in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 , 118 S.Ct. 1939, 1946 , 141 L.Ed.2d 197 (1998), “unless the text of the statute dictates a different result, the term ‘knowingly’ merely requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.” Second, we find support for our reading of Code § 18.2-472.1(B) from other provisions of the Code where the term “knowingly” is defined. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe
green
1 sentence2007Because the registration requirement was based solely on the fact of a prior conviction, not a determination of current dangerousness, the Court concluded that "due process does not require the opportunity to prove a fact that is not material to the State's statutory scheme." Id. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Brooker v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006That language simply implements the Act’s delineation between offenses against adults (addressed elsewhere in Code § 9.1-902) and offenses specifically targeted against minors, or otherwise those who are physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, for separate treatment under the Act. 6 Accordingly, we conclude that the Act’s offender registration requirement was clearly applicable to Colbert upon his conviction under Code § 18.2-874.3(B)(iv), being one of subsection (A)(2)’s listed offenses against minors — regardless of the fact that there was no actual minor victim, as that was not a nec 2006That language simply implements the Act’s delineation between offenses against adults (addressed elsewhere in Code § 9.1-902) and offenses specifically targeted against minors, or otherwise those who are physically helpless or mentally incapacitated, for separate treatment under the Act. 6 Accordingly, we conclude that the Act’s offender registration requirement was clearly applicable to Colbert upon his conviction under Code § 18.2-874.3(B)(iv), being one of subsection (A)(2)’s listed offenses against minors — regardless of the fact that there was no actual minor victim, as that was not a nec | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Auer v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006It would be inconsistent, therefore, to impose the offender registration requirement on one convicted of attempted indecent liberties with a minor, in the absence of an actual minor victim, and yet not impose the registration requirement on one convicted of computer solicitation for sex with a minor, where there also was no actual minor victim. 10 The prefatory language in Code § 9.1-902(A)(2) at issue here does not dictate, and should not be construed to yield, such a result. “ ‘[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction whic 2006It would be inconsistent, therefore, to impose the offender registration requirement on one convicted of attempted indecent liberties with a minor, in the absence of an actual minor victim, and yet not impose the registration requirement on one convicted of computer solicitation for sex with a minor, where there also was no actual minor victim. 10 The prefatory language in Code § 9.1-902(A)(2) at issue here does not dictate, and should not be construed to yield, such a result. “ ‘[W]here a particular construction of a statute will result in an absurdity, some other reasonable construction whic | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Snyder v. State
green
1 sentence1996Snyder, 912 P.2d at 1131 (citing De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160 , 80 S.Ct. at 1154-55 ). [2] Other state statutes allow a court to impose the registration requirement retroactively, after the sex offender's original sentence is imposed. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Starnes
green
2 sentences1996For example, in People v. Starnes, 273 Ill.App.3d 911 , 210 Ill.Dec. 417 , 653 N.E.2d 4 , appeal denied, 163 Ill.2d 581 , 212 Ill.Dec. 434 , 657 N.E.2d 635 (1995), the trial court’s sentencing order required the defendant to register as a firsts time sex offender, even though at the time of the offense, Illinois required only second-time sex offenders to register. 1996For example, in People v. Starnes, 273 Ill.App.3d 911 , 210 Ill.Dec. 417 , 653 N.E.2d 4 , appeal denied, 163 Ill.2d 581 , 212 Ill.Dec. 434 , 657 N.E.2d 635 (1995), the trial court’s sentencing order required the defendant to register as a firsts time sex offender, even though at the time of the offense, Illinois required only second-time sex offenders to register. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
De Veau v. Braisted
green
2 sentences1996Snyder, 912 P.2d at 1131 (citing De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160 , 80 S.Ct. at 1154-55 ). [2] Other state statutes allow a court to impose the registration requirement retroactively, after the sex offender's original sentence is imposed. 1996Snyder, 912 P.2d at 1131 (citing De Veau, 363 U.S. at 160 , 80 S.Ct. at 1154-55 ). [2] Other state statutes allow a court to impose the registration requirement retroactively, after the sex offender's original sentence is imposed. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Colbert v. Ashland Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1992We disagree with Hayes’s assertion that Colbert v. Ashland Construction Co., 176 Va. 500 , 11 S.E.2d 612 (1940), requires a different result. 1992We disagree with Hayes’s assertion that Colbert v. Ashland Construction Co., 176 Va. 500 , 11 S.E.2d 612 (1940), requires a different result. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Joyner v. Centre Motor Co.
green
1 sentence1990Challenges to the Licensing Act The ability of the state, through the exercise of its police power, to reasonably regulate the sale of new and used motor vehicles, and to require those engaged in that business to be licensed is beyond question, See Joyner v. Centre Motor Co., 192 Va. 627 (1951). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.