registration requirement in Nebraska

2018In A.W. by and through Doe, supra , the Eighth Circuit rejected the State's argument that under § 29-4003 (1)(a)(iv), the determination of whether one is required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction is to be determined based on that other jurisdiction's definition of the term "sex offender." The Eighth Circuit reasoned instead that whether one is required to register as a sex offender in the other jurisdiction depends on whether the registration requirement in that other jurisdiction is based on the person's being a "sex offender" as that term is defined by Nebraska law.

2018In A.W. by and through Doe, supra, the Eighth Circuit rejected the State’s argument that under § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv), the determination of whether one is required to register as a sex offender in another jurisdiction is to be determined based on that other jurisdiction’s definition of the term “sex offender.” The Eighth Circuit reasoned instead that whether one is required to register as a sex offender in the other jurisdiction depends on whether the registration requirement in that other jurisdiction is based on the person’s being a “sex offender” as that term is defined by Nebraska law.

2018As our statute now reads, we conclude § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) requires registration based on a registration requirement from another state even if the requirement in the other state is based on a juvenile adjudication. - 615 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 300 Nebraska R eports STATE v. CLEMENS Cite as 300 Neb. 601 [11] In Skaggs v. Nebraska State Patrol, 282 Neb. 154 , 804 N.W.2d 611 (2011), we held that a sex offender registrant’s actual registration under another jurisdiction’s law is con- clusive evidence that the registrant was required to register within the meaning of § 29-4003(1)(

2016Ed. 2d 644 (1963). - 922 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports STATE v. BOCHE Cite as 294 Neb. 912 repeated in Smith v. Doe22 to determine whether the effect of the registration requirement was nevertheless so punitive that it should be regarded as punishment.

2009In State v. Worm, 268 Neb. 74, 80 , 680 N.W.2d 151, 158 (2004), the Supreme Court held that "the registration requirement for an offender convicted of an aggravated offense under [SORA's] amended provisions is part of the sentencing court's judgment for purposes of filing an appeal." The charge, as stated at the plea hearing, was that Simnick had subjected A.M., who was under age 16 between the dates of January 1, 2003, and *209 July 31, 2006, and had a birth date of October 24, 1996, to "sexual penetration." State v. Hamilton, 277 Neb. 593 , 763 N.W.2d 731 (2009), clearly allows the factual p

2009In State v. Worm, 268 Neb. 74, 80 , 680 N.W.2d 151, 158 (2004), the Supreme Court held that "the registration requirement for an offender convicted of an aggravated offense under [SORA's] amended provisions is part of the sentencing court's judgment for purposes of filing an appeal." The charge, as stated at the plea hearing, was that Simnick had subjected A.M., who was under age 16 between the dates of January 1, 2003, and *209 July 31, 2006, and had a birth date of October 24, 1996, to "sexual penetration." State v. Hamilton, 277 Neb. 593 , 763 N.W.2d 731 (2009), clearly allows the factual p

2002Schneider asks this court to analyze the penal nature of the registration requirement under the Act using the intent-effects factors first set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S. Ct. 554 , 9 L.

2002Schneider asks this court to analyze the penal nature of the registration requirement under the Act using the intent-effects factors first set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 , 83 S. Ct. 554 , 9 L.

2002The court also found that State v. Torres, 254 Neb. 91 , 574 N.W.2d 153 (1998), supported a finding that the registration was a collateral consequence of Schneider’s pleas.

2002The court also found that State v. Torres, 254 Neb. 91 , 574 N.W.2d 153 (1998), supported a finding that the registration was a collateral consequence of Schneider’s pleas.

1997Id.

1996See, e.g., Poritz , 662 A.2d 367 at 380-422; State v. Ward , 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994); Snyder v. State , 912 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1996); Artway v. Attorney General of State of New Jersey , 81 F.3d 1235 (3rd Cir. 1996).

1996See, e.g., Poritz , 662 A.2d 367 at 380-422; State v. Ward , 869 P.2d 1062 (Wash. 1994); Snyder v. State , 912 P.2d 1127 (Wyo. 1996); Artway v. Attorney General of State of New Jersey , 81 F.3d 1235 (3rd Cir. 1996).

1996See Bernbeck v. Moore , 4:CV96-3263 (D.Neb., Aug. 15, 1996); Stenberg v. Beermann , 240 Neb. 754 (1992); Op. Att'y Gen.