14 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1981–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Anderson v. Hensrudgreen2 sentences2000Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410, 412 (N.D.1996). [¶ 7] Rubey cites N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(3), which provides, After a person has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a crime against a child or an attempted crime against a child, or after a person has pled guilty or been found guilty as a sexual offender, the court shall impose ... a requirement that the person register, within ten days of coming into a county in which the person resides or is temporarily domiciled.... (emphasis added). [¶ 8] The registration requirement did not exist when Rubey pled guilty in 1988 or when his probation wa 2000Anderson v. Hensrud, 548 N.W.2d 410, 412 (N.D.1996). [¶ 7] Rubey cites N.D.C.C. § 12.1-32-15(3), which provides, After a person has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a crime against a child or an attempted crime against a child, or after a person has pled guilty or been found guilty as a sexual offender, the court shall impose ... a requirement that the person register, within ten days of coming into a county in which the person resides or is temporarily domiciled .... (emphasis added). [¶8] The registration requirement did not exist when Rubey pled guilty in 1988 or when his probation wa | 2 | 2 |
State v. Burrgreen2 sentences2011We have previously held that registration as a sexual offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea: “The purpose of the registration requirement is protection of a legitimate public interest, which imposes a collateral consequence upon conviction, not added punishment.” State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36 , 598 N.W.2d 147 . 2011We have previously held that registration as a sexual offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea: “The purpose of the registration requirement is protection of a legitimate public interest, which imposes a collateral consequence upon conviction, not added punishment.” State v. Burr , 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36 , 598 N.W.2d 147 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Burrgreen2 sentences2011We have previously held that registration as a sexual offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea: “The purpose of the registration requirement is protection of a legitimate public interest, which imposes a collateral consequence upon conviction, not added punishment.” State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36 , 598 N.W.2d 147 . 2011We have previously held that registration as a sexual offender is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea: “The purpose of the registration requirement is protection of a legitimate public interest, which imposes a collateral consequence upon conviction, not added punishment.” State v. Burr , 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36 , 598 N.W.2d 147 . | 1 | 3 |
People v. McClellangreen2 sentences1997See McClellan, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d at 746 , 862 P.2d 739 (“when the trial court formally imposed the registration requirement later in the sentencing hearing, the defense had a second opportunity to challenge it but failed to do so” so “defendant waived any claim of prejudice arising from the trial court’s error”). 1997See McClellan, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d at 746 , 862 P.2d 739 (“when the trial court formally imposed the registration requirement later in the sentencing hearing, the defense had a second opportunity to challenge it but failed to do so” so “defendant waived any claim of prejudice arising from the trial court’s error”). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Berkleygreen1 sentence2025See American Heritage Dictionary 1896 (5th ed. 2018) (defining “unless” to mean “Except on the condition that; except under the circumstances that”); Webster’s New World Dictionary 692 (5th ed. 2016) (defining “unless” to mean “except if; except that”); New Oxford American Dictionary 1893 (3d ed. 2010) (defining “unless” to mean “except if”); Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary 1370 (11th ed. 2005) (defining “unless” to mean “except on the condition that: under any other circumstance than”); see also Berkley, 2025 ND 134, ¶ 14 (referring to “except if (or unless)”). [¶14] Section 12.1-32-15(1)(g), N. | 1 | 1 |
Santos v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Santos v. State, 284 Ga. 514 , 668 S.E.2d 676 (2008) (registration statute is unconstitutionally vague as to homeless offenders because it does not provide sufficient notice of how they can comply with the registration requirement). 2010See Santos v. State, 284 Ga. 514 , 668 S.E.2d 676 (2008) (registration statute is unconstitutionally vague as to homeless offenders because it does not provide sufficient notice of how they can comply with the registration requirement). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kellygreen2 sentences2003See State v. Kelly, 2001 ND 135, ¶ 10 , 631 N.W.2d 167 . 2003See State v. Kelly, 2001 ND 135, ¶ 10 , 631 N.W.2d 167 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schumachergreen2 sentences2000Abdi , at ¶ 12; see also State v. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d 345, 346 (N.D.1990) ("The purpose of the procedure outlined in Rule 11(b) is to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters his plea."). [¶ 9] Davenport argues the trial court did not comply with Rule 11(b)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P., because Davenport was not aware of the sex offender registration requirement resulting from his guilty plea before he entered his plea, and the registration requirement is a consequence of his guilty plea. [¶ 10] In State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36 , 598 N.W.2d 147 2000Abdi at ¶ 12 ; see also State v. Schumacher, 452 N.W.2d 345, 346 (N.D.1990) (“The purpose of the procedure outlined in Rule 11(b) is to ensure that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before he enters his plea.”). [¶ 9] Davenport argues the trial court did not comply with Rule 11(b)(2), N.D.R.Crim.P., because Davenport was not aware of the sex offender registration requirement resulting from his guilty plea before he entered his plea, and the registration requirement is a consequence of his guilty plea. [¶ 10] In State v. Burr, 1999 ND 143, ¶ 36 , 598 N.W.2d 147 , | 1 | 1 |
James A. Burr v. Leo Snider, Sheriff of Morton County, North Dakotagreen2 sentences2000See also Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir.2000). 2000See also Burr v. Snider, 234 F.3d 1052 (8th Cir.2000). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Breiner
green
2 sentences1999In State v. Breiner, 1997 ND 71, ¶ 21 , 562 N.W.2d 565 , three justices concluded the failure of the district court to advise a defendant of the registration requirement at the time of sentencing required a reversal of the order denying a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. 1999In State v. Breiner, 1997 ND 71, ¶ 21 , 562 N.W.2d 565 , three justices concluded the failure of the district court to advise a defendant of the registration requirement at the time of sentencing required a reversal of the order denying a motion to withdraw the guilty plea. | 3 | 1999–2000 |
In Re Birch
green
2 sentences1997It stretches the imagination to believe any innocent person would plead guilty, even with a mild sentence, to a crime of this nature, regardless of the registration requirement. [¶ 18] Compare this case, where the charge involves a defendant, represented by counsel, who pled guilty to an offense involving a sexual act with a minor, with the decision in In re Birch 10 Cal.3d 314 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 212 , 515 P.2d 12 (1973), cited by the majority, wherein the California Supreme Court held the trial court should have informed a defendant who appeared in Municipal Court mth-out counsel his plea of gui 1997It stretches the imagination to believe any innocent person would plead guilty, even with a mild sentence, to a crime of this nature, regardless of the registration requirement. [¶ 18] Compare this case, where the charge involves a defendant, represented by counsel, who pled guilty to an offense involving a sexual act with a minor, with the decision in In re Birch 10 Cal.3d 314 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 212 , 515 P.2d 12 (1973), cited by the majority, wherein the California Supreme Court held the trial court should have informed a defendant who appeared in Municipal Court mth-out counsel his plea of gui | 3 | 1997–1999 |
State v. Myers
green
2 sentences1999The Kansas Supreme Court was correct when it concluded “Noble implies that if disclosure of the information had not been statutorily limited, it would be regarded as the kind of affirmative disability or restraint usually associated with criminal punishment.” Myers, 923 P.2d at 1037 . [¶ 88] The majority also cites State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488 , 869 P.2d 1062 , 1076 (1994), to support its conclusion our registration statute is not excessive. 1999Myers, 923 P.2d at 1042 . | 2 | 1999–1999 |
Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald
green
2 sentences2017We have discussed a party’s high burden in seeking to declare a statute unconstitutional: We have said that “a party waives an issue by not providing supporting argument and, without supportive reasoning or citations to relevant authorities, an argument is without merit.” [Riemers v.] Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 11 , 688 N.W.2d 167 (quotations omitted). 2017We have discussed a party’s high burden in seeking to declare a statute unconstitutional: We have said that “a party waives an issue by not providing supporting argument and, without supportive reasoning or citations to relevant authorities, an argument is without merit.” [Riemers v.] Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192, ¶ 11 , 688 N.W.2d 167 (quotations omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Kinsella v. State
green
2 sentences2014Had Olsen presented these two issues to the district court, the first argument would have been subject to the affirmative defense of misuse of process under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(2)(a) for presenting “a claim for relief which the applicant inexcusably failed to raise ... in a proceeding leading to judgment of conviction and sentence.” See, e.g., Kinsella v. State, 2013 ND 238, ¶ 19 , 840 N.W.2d 625 . 2014Had Olsen presented these two issues to the district court, the first argument would have been subject to the affirmative defense of misuse of process under N.D.C.C. § 29-32.1-12(2)(a) for presenting “a claim for relief which the applicant inexcusably failed to raise ... in a proceeding leading to judgment of conviction and sentence.” See, e.g., Kinsella v. State, 2013 ND 238, ¶ 19 , 840 N.W.2d 625 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Ward
green
1 sentence1999The Kansas Supreme Court was correct when it concluded “Noble implies that if disclosure of the information had not been statutorily limited, it would be regarded as the kind of affirmative disability or restraint usually associated with criminal punishment.” Myers, 923 P.2d at 1037 . [¶ 88] The majority also cites State v. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488 , 869 P.2d 1062 , 1076 (1994), to support its conclusion our registration statute is not excessive. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Bunnell v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1997The Court also stated the defendant must be “advised of the direct consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute, registration requirements, if any_” (Emphasis supplied.) 119 Cal.Rptr. at 310 , 531 P.2d at 1094 . [¶ 20] Thus, in Bunnell the requirement to advise of the registration requirement as a direct consequence is dicta and is akin to what this Court now requires by rule. 1997The Court also stated the defendant must be “advised of the direct consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute, registration requirements, if any_” (Emphasis supplied.) 119 Cal.Rptr. at 310 , 531 P.2d at 1094 . [¶ 20] Thus, in Bunnell the requirement to advise of the registration requirement as a direct consequence is dicta and is akin to what this Court now requires by rule. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Country Kitchen of Mount Vernon, Inc. v. Country Kitchen of Western America, Inc.
green
2 sentences1981In Country Kitchen, Etc. v. Country Kitchen, Etc., 293 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1980), we dealt with the registration requirement but did not have an issue regarding the civil liability provision of the North *96 Dakota franchise law before us. 1981In Country Kitchen, Etc. v. Country Kitchen, Etc., 293 N.W.2d 118 (N.D.1980), we dealt with the registration requirement but did not have an issue regarding the civil liability provision of the North *96 Dakota franchise law before us. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.