registration requirement in Washington

2020From this analysis we held that the registration requirement was not a direct consequence because it was not “punishment,” thus “it does not enhance [the] sentence or punishment.” Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 513 .

2019App. 772, 787 , 192 P.3d 949 (2008). (quoting State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 513-14 , 869 P.2d 1062 (1994)). 13 No. 77913-7-1/14 misinformation concerning a collateral consequence when deciding to plead guilty.48 Here, the plea agreement included the following provision: This offense is a felony firearm offense. and the judge may . . impose a requirement that I register with the sheriff in the [c]ounty where I reside . .If this offense, or an offense committed in . . conjunction with this offense . was committed against a child . . under 18, or was a serious violent offense, the judge must impo

2020RCW 9.41.330; State v. Sherman, 59 Wn. App. 763 , 767 n.2, 801 P.2d 274 (1990).

2020RCW 9.41.330; State v. Sherman, 59 Wn. App. 763 , 767 n.2, 801 P.2d 274 (1990).

2018In other words, those convictions fell within a statutory time period "gap" in the registration requirement. 162 Wash.App. 791 , 799, 259 P.3d 289 (2011). ¶8 Nevertheless, in 2013, the State charged Arnold with failure to register and first degree trafficking in stolen property.

2018In other words, those convictions fell within a statutory time period "gap" in the registration requirement. 162 Wash.App. 791 , 799, 259 P.3d 289 (2011). ¶8 Nevertheless, in 2013, the State charged Arnold with failure to register and first degree trafficking in stolen property.

2016Ed. 2d 738 (1982) (citing 355 U.S. at 232 ).

2016While 17 No. 33575-5-111 State v. Cole Lambert found that a Los Angeles felony registration ordinance violated due process, it is clearly distinguishable, having turned on a critical characteristic of that ordinance: it criminalized wholly passive conduct-the failure to register with Los Angeles police as a felon after being or remaining in the city for a period of more than five days-without even requiring that the individual have notice of the registration requirement. 355 U.S. at 225-230 . 3 As the Supreme Court observed 25 years after deciding Lambert (and 34 years before the decision we r

2002Murphy, 79 Wash.2d at 422 , 486 P.2d 1080 .

2002Murphy, 79 Wn.2d at 422 .

2021State v. Bennett, 154 Wn. App. 202, 206-08 , 224 P.3d 849 (2010).

2021State v. Bennett, 154 Wn. App. 202, 206-08 , 224 P.3d 849 (2010).

2015Clark, 75 Wn.

1996State v. Clark, 75 Wn.

2015Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 ; Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 510-11 .

2015Smith, 538 U.S. at 97 ; Ward, 123 Wn.2d at 510-11 .

2010Id. ¶ 8 The purpose of the registration requirement is to aid law enforcement by providing notice of the whereabouts of convicted sex offenders within the law enforcement agency's jurisdiction.

2010Id. ¶8 The purpose of the registration requirement is to aid law enforcement by providing notice of the whereabouts of convicted sex offenders within the law enforcement agency’s jurisdiction.

2010"Manifest injustice includes instances where ... `the plea was not voluntary' [or] `effective counsel was denied.'" Zhao, 157 Wash.2d at 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (quoting Marshall, 144 Wash.2d at 281 , 27 P.3d 192 ). ¶ 40 We conclude that court appointed counsel's representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution and that A.N.J. was prejudiced. [18] When asked about the "record," Anderson responded by saying the registration requirement could be removed.

2010“Manifest injustice includes instances where ‘... the plea was not voluntary [or] effective counsel was denied.’ ” Zhao, 157 Wn.2d at 197 (quoting Marshall, 144 Wn.2d at 281 ). ¶40 We conclude that court appointed counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution and that A.N.J. was prejudiced. 18 When asked about the “record,” Anderson responded by saying the registration requirement could be removed.

2010"Manifest injustice includes instances where ... `the plea was not voluntary' [or] `effective counsel was denied.'" Zhao, 157 Wash.2d at 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (quoting Marshall, 144 Wash.2d at 281 , 27 P.3d 192 ). ¶ 40 We conclude that court appointed counsel's representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution and that A.N.J. was prejudiced. [18] When asked about the "record," Anderson responded by saying the registration requirement could be removed.

2010“Manifest injustice includes instances where ‘... the plea was not voluntary [or] effective counsel was denied.’ ” Zhao, 157 Wn.2d at 197 (quoting Marshall, 144 Wn.2d at 281 ). ¶40 We conclude that court appointed counsel’s representation fell below the objective standard guaranteed by the constitution and that A.N.J. was prejudiced. 18 When asked about the “record,” Anderson responded by saying the registration requirement could be removed.

2009As indicated above, no such argument is made here. [33] See Knight, 162 Wash.2d at 813 , 174 P.3d 1167 . [34] At oral argument, defense counsel stated that except for the registration requirement, all the conditions would be permissible as terms of sentence on remand. [35] Id. at 813, 174 P.3d 1167 . [36] Id. at 812, 174 P.3d 1167 . [37] State v. Kier, 164 Wash.2d 798, 803-04 , 194 P.3d 212 (2008). [38] None of the relevant statutes addresses whether multiple convictions for a single act of assault with intent to rape have been authorized.

2009As indicated above, no such argument is made here. [33] See Knight, 162 Wash.2d at 813 , 174 P.3d 1167 . [34] At oral argument, defense counsel stated that except for the registration requirement, all the conditions would be permissible as terms of sentence on remand. [35] Id. at 813, 174 P.3d 1167 . [36] Id. at 812, 174 P.3d 1167 . [37] State v. Kier, 164 Wash.2d 798, 803-04 , 194 P.3d 212 (2008). [38] None of the relevant statutes addresses whether multiple convictions for a single act of assault with intent to rape have been authorized.

2006In Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.1962), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals permitted a seller, Smith, to assert common law defenses in an action brought under section 10(b) of the federal *595 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even though Smith had made misrepresentations in a prospectus sent to an investor.

2006In Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals permitted a seller, Smith, to assert common law defenses in an action brought under section 10(b) of the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, even though Smith had made misrepresentations in a prospectus sent to an investor.

2006And, even if Molino's violation had been a failure to comply with the registration requirement, Midwest and Logan would have to be weighed against the Missouri Supreme Court's contrary decision in Covert v. Cross, 331 S.W.2d 576 (Mo.1960).

2006And, even if Molino’s violation had been a failure to comply with the registration requirement, Midwest and Logan would have to be weighed against the Missouri Supreme Court’s contrary decision in Covert v. Cross, 331 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. 1960).

2006The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the restaurant seller could assert an estoppel defense since the purchasers "were not induced to buy the stock through any misrepresentation of the defendant as to the financial condition of the restaurant ... [and had] actively participated in the management and control of the corporation during the course of their investment." 293 N.W.2d at 363-64 . ¶ 13 In sum, Midwest and Logan would be analogous to the present case only if Go2Net's basis for rescinding its purchase of FreeYellow had been the Act's registration requirement, RCW 21.20.140, rather than i

2006The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the restaurant seller could assert an estoppel defense since the purchasers “were not induced to buy the stock through any misrepresentation of the defendant as to the financial condition of the restaurant [and had] actively participated in the management and control of the corporation during the course of their investment.” 293 N.W.2d at 363-64 . ¶13 In sum, Midwest and Logan would be analogous to the present case only if Go2Net’s basis for rescinding its purchase of FreeYellow had been the Act’s registration requirement, RCW 21.20.140, rather than its an

1996Heiskell, 77 Wash.App. at 947-48 , 895 P.2d 848 .

1996Heiskell, 77 Wash.App. at 947-48 , 895 P.2d 848 .

1995State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 115 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993).

1995State v. Halstien, 122 Wn.2d 109, 115 , 857 P.2d 270 (1993).

1995The Court of Appeals affirmed the disposition ( see Halstien, 65 Wn.

1995The Court of Appeals affirmed the disposition (see Halstien, 65 Wn.

2023“To determine the plain meaning, we look to the text of the statute, as well as ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’” State v. Donaghe, 172 Wn.2d 253, 262 , 256 P.3d 1171 (2011) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). 3 Senior’s counsel did not object when the resentencing court imposed the registration requirement.

2023“To determine the plain meaning, we look to the text of the statute, as well as ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’” State v. Donaghe, 172 Wn.2d 253, 262 , 256 P.3d 1171 (2011) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). 3 Senior’s counsel did not object when the resentencing court imposed the registration requirement.

2023“To determine the plain meaning, we look to the text of the statute, as well as ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’” State v. Donaghe, 172 Wn.2d 253, 262 , 256 P.3d 1171 (2011) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). 3 Senior’s counsel did not object when the resentencing court imposed the registration requirement.

2023“To determine the plain meaning, we look to the text of the statute, as well as ‘the context of the statute in which that provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole.’” State v. Donaghe, 172 Wn.2d 253, 262 , 256 P.3d 1171 (2011) (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 600 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005)). 3 Senior’s counsel did not object when the resentencing court imposed the registration requirement.

2020Thus, under Baldwin, it is not subject to a vagueness challenge. 150 Wn.2d at 461 .

2020We similarly rejected a vagueness challenge to RCW 9.41.330 in an unpublished decision in State v. Miller, noted at 195 Wn. App. 1026 , 2016 WL 4087307 (August 1, 2016), and concluded: As with the sentencing guideline statutes at issue in Baldwin, the statute herein grants a court discretion in determining whether to 4 impose the registration requirement on felony firearm offenders.

2019Although these fees were mandatory when imposed, the Washington Supreme Court has since held in State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 746-50 , 426 P.3d 714 (2018), that courts may not impose discretionary legal financial obligations on an indigent criminal defendant.

2019Although these fees were mandatory when imposed, the Washington Supreme Court has since held in State v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 746-50 , 426 P.3d 714 (2018), that courts may not impose discretionary legal financial obligations on an indigent criminal defendant.

2019App. 772, 787 , 192 P.3d 949 (2008). (quoting State v. Ward, 123 Wn.2d 488, 513-14 , 869 P.2d 1062 (1994)). 13 No. 77913-7-1/14 misinformation concerning a collateral consequence when deciding to plead guilty.48 Here, the plea agreement included the following provision: This offense is a felony firearm offense. and the judge may . . impose a requirement that I register with the sheriff in the [c]ounty where I reside . .If this offense, or an offense committed in . . conjunction with this offense . was committed against a child . . under 18, or was a serious violent offense, the judge must impo

2019Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 28 , 195 P.3d 940 (2008)). _21_ NO. 79077-3-| /22 disregard any remarks, statement or argument that is not supported by the law in my instructions So, refer to your instructions in regard to what the law is.” The State said, “So, for knowinglyl that is supported by the fact that, well, he did show up, albeit late so he did know that he had to be there And based on the prior warnings that he was given back in September, he knew what the consequences were going to be.” ln his closing, l\/chona|d’s attorney said that the State was “trying to pull a bit of a fast one” and res

2019Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 28 , 195 P.3d 940 (2008)). _21_ NO. 79077-3-| /22 disregard any remarks, statement or argument that is not supported by the law in my instructions So, refer to your instructions in regard to what the law is.” The State said, “So, for knowinglyl that is supported by the fact that, well, he did show up, albeit late so he did know that he had to be there And based on the prior warnings that he was given back in September, he knew what the consequences were going to be.” ln his closing, l\/chona|d’s attorney said that the State was “trying to pull a bit of a fast one” and res

2018RCW 18.27.140; Williamson, Inc. v. Calibre Homes, Inc., 147 Wn.2d 394, 400 , 54 P.3d 1186 (2002).

2018RCW 18.27.140; Williamson, Inc. v. Calibre Homes, Inc., 147 Wn.2d 394, 400 , 54 P.3d 1186 (2002).

2018Because the registration requirement is not immediate, definite, and automatic, it is a collateral consequence of Hutton's guilty plea. 22 168 Wn.2d 91, 115 , 225 P.3d 956 (2010). 23 RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a). -7- No. 75548-0-1/ 8 Misinformation about a collateral consequence does not make a defendant's guilty plea involuntary.24 But affirmative misinformation about a collateral consequence may create a manifest injustice and necessitate allowing withdrawal of the plea "if the defendant materially relied on that information when deciding to plead guilty."25 Hutton, however, does not claim that the c

2018Because the registration requirement is not immediate, definite, and automatic, it is a collateral consequence of Hutton's guilty plea. 22 168 Wn.2d 91, 115 , 225 P.3d 956 (2010). 23 RCW 9A.44.130(1)(a). -7- No. 75548-0-1/ 8 Misinformation about a collateral consequence does not make a defendant's guilty plea involuntary.24 But affirmative misinformation about a collateral consequence may create a manifest injustice and necessitate allowing withdrawal of the plea "if the defendant materially relied on that information when deciding to plead guilty."25 Hutton, however, does not claim that the c