registration requirement in Illinois

2019Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009), In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003), People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 424 (2000), People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991), and People v. Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150, ¶¶ 27, 30 . ¶ 13 ANALYSIS ¶ 14 Before this court, defendant argues that the registration requirement of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him on substantive

2018Birkett v. Konetski , 233 Ill.2d 185 , 207, 330 Ill.Dec. 761 , 909 N.E.2d 783 (2009), In re J.W. , 204 Ill.2d 50 , 75, 272 Ill.Dec. 561 , 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003), People v. Malchow , 193 Ill.2d 413 , 424, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000), People v. Adams , 144 Ill.2d 381 , 386-90, 163 Ill.Dec. 483 , 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991), and People v. Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶¶ 58-61, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App

2020He notes Malchow did not look at the current Act’s restrictions and requirements which he contends “are much more onerous” and do not “comply with substantive due process.” ¶ 41 In Malchow, the court referenced its finding in People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381 (1991), upholding an earlier version of the Act having concluded the Act’s registration requirement did not constitute punishment.

2019Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009), In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003), People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 424 (2000), People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991), and People v. Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150, ¶¶ 27, 30 . ¶ 13 ANALYSIS ¶ 14 Before this court, defendant argues that the registration requirement of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him on substantive

2019Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009), In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003), People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 424 (2000), People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991), and People v. Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150, ¶¶ 27, 30 . ¶ 13 ANALYSIS ¶ 14 Before this court, defendant argues that the registration requirement of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him on substantive

2018Birkett v. Konetski , 233 Ill.2d 185 , 207, 330 Ill.Dec. 761 , 909 N.E.2d 783 (2009), In re J.W. , 204 Ill.2d 50 , 75, 272 Ill.Dec. 561 , 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003), People v. Malchow , 193 Ill.2d 413 , 424, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000), People v. Adams , 144 Ill.2d 381 , 386-90, 163 Ill.Dec. 483 , 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991), and People v. Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶¶ 58-61, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App

2019Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009), In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003), People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 424 (2000), People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991), and People v. Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150, ¶¶ 27, 30 . ¶ 13 ANALYSIS ¶ 14 Before this court, defendant argues that the registration requirement of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him on substantive

2018Birkett v. Konetski , 233 Ill.2d 185 , 207, 330 Ill.Dec. 761 , 909 N.E.2d 783 (2009), In re J.W. , 204 Ill.2d 50 , 75, 272 Ill.Dec. 561 , 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003), People v. Malchow , 193 Ill.2d 413 , 424, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000), People v. Adams , 144 Ill.2d 381 , 386-90, 163 Ill.Dec. 483 , 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991), and People v. Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶¶ 58-61, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App

2002According to the Adams appellate court, there was no indication in the legislative history “that the registration requirement was intended to serve the purpose of deterrence or retribution, two goals of punishment.” Adams, 198 Ill.

2002According to the Adams appellate court, there was no indication in the legislative history "that the registration requirement was intended to serve the purpose of deterrence or retribution, two goals of punishment." Adams, 198 Ill.App.3d at 80 , 144 Ill.Dec. 402 , 555 N.E.2d 761 .

2019Birkett v. Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d 185, 207 (2009), In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 75 (2003), People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 424 (2000), People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 386-90 (1991), and People v. Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶¶ 58-61 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App (1st) 143150, ¶¶ 27, 30 . ¶ 13 ANALYSIS ¶ 14 Before this court, defendant argues that the registration requirement of the Act is unconstitutional as applied to him on substantive

2018Birkett v. Konetski , 233 Ill.2d 185 , 207, 330 Ill.Dec. 761 , 909 N.E.2d 783 (2009), In re J.W. , 204 Ill.2d 50 , 75, 272 Ill.Dec. 561 , 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003), People v. Malchow , 193 Ill.2d 413 , 424, 250 Ill.Dec. 670 , 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000), People v. Adams , 144 Ill.2d 381 , 386-90, 163 Ill.Dec. 483 , 581 N.E.2d 637 (1991), and People v. Fredericks , 2014 IL App (1st) 122122 , ¶¶ 58-61, 383 Ill.Dec. 293 , 14 N.E.3d 576 , it concluded that the requirement of sex offender registration does not amount to punishment and there was therefore no violation of the ex post facto clauses. 2017 IL App

2015This is particularly true given that no hearing is conducted prior to mandated adult registration.” Id. ¶ 54. ¶ 44 In addressing this issue, we find the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), to be controlling.

2015This is particularly true given that no hearing is conducted prior to mandated adult registration.” Id. ¶ 54. ¶ 44 In addressing this issue, we find the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), to be controlling.

2021See, e.g., People v. Stavenger, 2015 IL App (2d) 140885, ¶ 12 (“[W]e reject defendant’s contention that he has standing under the [Post- Conviction Hearing] Act by virtue of his having to register as a sex offender.”). ¶ 70 Defendant alternatively claims that he has standing to challenge his conviction of failing to register because it was premised on the registration requirement arising - 16 - from the unlawful restraint conviction.

2020Id. at 146-47 ; see also Stavenger, 2015 IL App (2d) 140885, ¶ 12 (rejecting the “defendant’s contention that he has standing under the Act by virtue of his having to register as a sex offender”). ¶ 20 Similarly, here, defendant does not have standing under the Act based upon the fact that he has to register as a sex offender.

2018See People v. Brock, 2015 IL App (1st) 133404, ¶¶ 18, 24 (finding that section 6 of the Act does not impose a registration requirement and “one can ‘report’ without registering”).

2017See People v. Brock , 2015 IL App (1st) 133404 , ¶¶ 18, 24, 398 Ill.Dec. 864 , 45 N.E.3d 295 (finding that section 6 of the Act does not impose a registration requirement and "one can 'report' without registering.").

2014Our supreme court has recognized that these amendments "significantly reduce the impact of the minor's registration requirement." Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 203 ; see also In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750 , & 106. ¶ 62 The supreme court has also recognized that the amendments to the Registration Act were prompted by the legislature's recognition that "in many instances, juveniles who engage in sexually inappropriate behavior do so because of immaturity rather than predatory inclinations.

2014Our supreme court has recognized that these amendments “significantly reduce the impact of the minor’s registration requirement.” Konetski, 233 Ill. 2d at 203 ; see also In re Jonathon C.B., 2011 IL 107750, ¶ 106 . ¶ 62 The supreme court has also recognized that the amendments to the Registration Act were prompted by the legislature’s recognition that “in many instances, juveniles who engage in sexually inappropriate behavior do so because of immaturity rather than predatory inclinations.

2014See also, People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595 , & 39 (recognizing that Miller declares a new substantive rule that applies retroactively). ¶ 29 The State dismisses the foregoing authorities as inapposite because they concern the issue of whether sentences imposed on juveniles violate the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment whereas this case deals with a registration requirement similar to one our supreme court has determined does not constitute "punishment." In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 , 75 (2003) (finding that requiring a juvenile to register under the Sex Offender

2014See also People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 39 (recognizing that Miller declares a new substantive rule that applies retroactively). ¶ 29 The State dismisses the foregoing authorities as inapposite because they concern the issue of whether sentences imposed on juveniles violate the eighth amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment whereas this case deals with a registration requirement similar to one our supreme court has determined does not constitute “punishment.” In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50 , 75 (2003) (finding that requiring a juvenile to register under the Sex Offender Re

2007Generally, “where a challenged statute is amended while the cause is pending, the question of the statute’s validity becomes moot, thus rendering unnecessary its review by the court.” People v. B.DA., 102 Ill. 2d 229, 233 (1984).

2007Generally, "where a challenged statute is amended while the cause is pending, the question of the statute's validity becomes moot, thus rendering unnecessary its review by the court." People v. B.D.A., 102 Ill.2d 229, 233 , 80 Ill.Dec. 90 , 464 N.E.2d 1073 (1984).

2007See 363 Ill.

2007See 363 Ill.App.3d at 364 , 300 Ill.Dec. 176 , 843 N.E.2d 434 (Wolfson, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).

2005See Riggs v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C. , 351 Ill.

2005See Riggs v. Woman to Woman Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 351 Ill.

2020Id. at 146 .

2020Id. at 146-47 ; see also Stavenger, 2015 IL App (2d) 140885, ¶ 12 (rejecting the “defendant’s contention that he has standing under the Act by virtue of his having to register as a sex offender”). ¶ 20 Similarly, here, defendant does not have standing under the Act based upon the fact that he has to register as a sex offender.

2016Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶ 74 (citing J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 66 , which held that requiring juveniles to register as a sexual offender for the rest of their natural life does not implicate a fundamental right, and Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 204 , which held that dissemination of sex offenders’ personal information does not impact fundamental rights).

2009See People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 206-09 (2004).

2019Thus, defendant’s 2014 felony theft conviction now requires him to register with the appropriate law enforcement agency as a sex offender for his commission of attempted criminal sexual assault in 1983. ¶ 11 On appeal to the appellate court, defendant first argued that the registration requirement of the Act violated his substantive due process rights as applied because under the particular facts of this case, where such a long time had passed since defendant’s sex offense, there was no reasonable relationship between the Act’s requirement to register and its purpose of protecting the public f

2019Id. ¶ 12 Defendant next argued that the registration requirement of the Act is a new and ongoing punishment for the attempted criminal sexual assault offense he committed in 1983 and therefore violates the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Illinois Constitutions.

2016Rather, it is his position that the additional burdens imposed by these and other amendments to the SORA Statutory Scheme are so significant that the statutes have become punitive, under the factors set out in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), regardless of the legislature’s intent. ¶ 63 We agree that the current statutory scheme goes far beyond the basic registration requirement first enacted in 1987.

1990Ed. 2d 644 , 83 S. Ct. 554 , in arguing that the registration requirement constitutes punishment thereby implicating the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.

2015Id. at 91 .

2012See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 104-05 (2003) (holding a retroactive Alaska law requiring sex offenders and child kidnappers to register as such did not violate the ex post facto doctrine because the purpose of the registration requirement was to protect the public). ¶ 24 In support of its argument, the State cites Neville, 376 Ill.

2005California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 , 29 L.

2005California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 427 , 29 L.