8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Doegreen2 sentences2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carel, Jr.green2 sentences2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 | 1 | 1 |
Femedeer v. Haungreen2 sentences2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 2014It reasoned that the negative consequences imposed on sex offenders from the notification system-and impliedly from the underlying registration requirement-imposed "only a civil burden upon sex offenders." Id. at 1253 . 32 The reasons identified by the Feme-deer court in the context of the notification system are persuasive to us in determining that the registration requirement itself is a civil remedy. | 1 | 1 |
Kipp v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, eg., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 , 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (digeuss-ing a number of civil deprivations as a collateral consequence); Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 841-42 (Del.1998) (discussing prohibition of deadly weapon possession); Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 325 (Iowa 1986) (collecting cases on distinction between direct and collateral consequences). | 1 | 1 |
Spencer v. Kemnagreen2 sentences2014See, eg., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 , 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (digeuss-ing a number of civil deprivations as a collateral consequence); Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 841-42 (Del.1998) (discussing prohibition of deadly weapon possession); Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 325 (Iowa 1986) (collecting cases on distinction between direct and collateral consequences). 2014See, eg., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 , 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (digeuss-ing a number of civil deprivations as a collateral consequence); Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 841-42 (Del.1998) (discussing prohibition of deadly weapon possession); Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 325 (Iowa 1986) (collecting cases on distinction between direct and collateral consequences). | 1 | 1 |
Saadiq v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See, eg., Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 , 118 S.Ct. 978 , 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) (digeuss-ing a number of civil deprivations as a collateral consequence); Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 841-42 (Del.1998) (discussing prohibition of deadly weapon possession); Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 325 (Iowa 1986) (collecting cases on distinction between direct and collateral consequences). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Stategreen2 sentences2014For example, the Georgia court of appeals in Taylor v. State ruled to extend Padilla's reasoning to a registration requirement by relying on three primary justifications: the prevailing professional norms, the automatic nature of the requirement, and the severity of the requirement. 304 Ga.App. 878 , 698 S.E.2d 384, 388-89 (2010). 2014For example, the Georgia court of appeals in Taylor v. State ruled to extend Padilla's reasoning to a registration requirement by relying on three primary justifications: the prevailing professional norms, the automatic nature of the requirement, and the severity of the requirement. 304 Ga.App. 878 , 698 S.E.2d 384, 388-89 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
State v. McFaddengreen1 sentence2014See McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1304 ; see also Peque, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280 , 3 N.E.3d at 628 (identifying sex offender registration as a collateral consequence). | 1 | 1 |
Chaidez v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2014See Chaidez - U.S. at --, 133 S.Ct. at 1109 (noting the strong judicial consensus that "counsel's failure to inform a defendant of the collateral consequences of a guilty plea is never a violation of the Sixth Amendment" (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Pequegreen1 sentence2014See McFadden, 884 P.2d at 1304 ; see also Peque, 980 N.Y.S.2d 280 , 3 N.E.3d at 628 (identifying sex offender registration as a collateral consequence). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Figueroa-Soloriogreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). 1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marshallgreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). 1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sierragreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). 1992See, e.g., State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276, 281-82 (Utah App.1992) (Orme J., concurring); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-80 (Utah App.1988). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences1992In that we have concluded his reasonable suspicion was an adequate basis for the stop, we have no need to address whether the registration violation also permitted the stop or defendant's related argument that insofar as the stop was based on the expired registration it was impermissibly pretextual under State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah App.1992). [2] The Utah Supreme Court appears to have recognized a greater degree of protection to automobiles under article I, section 14, of the Utah Constitution than that provided by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 1992In that we have concluded his reasonable suspicion was an adequate basis for the stop, we have no need to address whether the registration violation also permitted the stop or defendant’s related argument that insofar as the stop was based on the expired registration it was impermissibly pretex-tual under State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah App.1992). . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Laroccogreen1 sentence1992See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Rojas-Martinezred2 sentences2014Thus, if the registration requirement is to be treated like deportation, it must be based not only on its automatic nature, but also on its severity. ] 21 We evaluated the severity of deportation and its impact on defendants when we decided State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86 , 125 P.3d 930 , overruled by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 . 2014Thus, if the registration requirement is to be treated like deportation, it must be based not only on its automatic nature, but also on its severity. ] 21 We evaluated the severity of deportation and its impact on defendants when we decided State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86 , 125 P.3d 930 , overruled by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Meneses v. Salander Enterprises
green
2 sentences2024And in Meneses, we held that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a UCSPA violation when the debt collector’s only asserted unlawful act was “its failure to comply with the UCAA’s registration requirement.” See 2023 UT App 117, ¶ 17 . ¶28 But in Meneses, we suggested that the plaintiffs might have stated a valid cause of action under the UCSPA if the debt collector had “represent[ed] that it was a debt collector operating in full compliance with the laws of Utah.” See id. ¶ 19. 2023Whether Salander Was Bound by the Registration Requirement ¶8 The UCAA’s registration requirement (with our bracketing) provided as follows: No person shall [1] conduct a collection agency, collection bureau, or collection office in this state, or [2] engage in this state in the business of soliciting the right to collect or receive payment for another of any account, bill, or other indebtedness, or [3] advertise for or solicit in print the right to collect or receive payment for another of any account, bill, or other indebtedness, 20210720-CA 4 2023 UT App 117 Meneses v. Salander Enterprises | 2 | 2023–2024 |
Haskell v. Wakefield and Associates
green
1 sentence2024It accordingly dismissed the case with prejudice. 20230243-CA 8 2024 UT App 123 Haskell v. Wakefield & Assocs. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Blanke v. Board of Pardons
neutral
2 sentences2020When Blanke pleaded guilty to attempted child kidnapping, he could not have known that the registration requirement for that offense would “come roaring back” and result in a requirement of sex offender treatment as a precondition to his early release—a precondition 32 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Lee, A.C.J., concurring in the judgment that will significantly extend the sentence that everyone would have contemplated “based on the sentencing matrix at the time.” See id. 2020When Blanke pleaded guilty to attempted child kidnapping, he could not have known that the registration requirement for that offense would “come roaring back” and result in a requirement of sex offender treatment as a precondition to his early release—a precondition 32 Cite as: 2020 UT 16 Lee, A.C.J., concurring in the judgment that will significantly extend the sentence that everyone would have contemplated “based on the sentencing matrix at the time.” See id. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Holste v. State
neutral
1 sentence2019And so we want to be careful and we feel like this bill helps address those concerns and making it so that Utah is not a more friendly state for those [sex offenders] that may want to come here.”). 6 Cite as: 2019 UT 52 Opinion of the Court ¶15 So when all of the provisions of the sex offender registry statute are read together, we find no indication that the legislature intended for someone who meets the definition of “sex offender” to nevertheless be exempt from the registration requirement under the statute. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Padilla v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2014Thus, if the registration requirement is to be treated like deportation, it must be based not only on its automatic nature, but also on its severity. ] 21 We evaluated the severity of deportation and its impact on defendants when we decided State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86 , 125 P.3d 930 , overruled by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 . 2014Thus, if the registration requirement is to be treated like deportation, it must be based not only on its automatic nature, but also on its severity. ] 21 We evaluated the severity of deportation and its impact on defendants when we decided State v. Rojas-Martinez, 2005 UT 86 , 125 P.3d 930 , overruled by Padilla, 559 U.S. 356 , 130 S.Ct. 1473 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2014Accordingly, the State argues that the Sixth Amendment did not compel Mr. Trotter's defense counsel to inform him that he would be required to register as a consequence of his guilty plea. 113 Generally, to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we would apply the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which requires the defendant to demonstrate that his or her defense counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance that resulted in prejudice. 2014Accordingly, the State argues that the Sixth Amendment did not compel Mr. Trotter's defense counsel to inform him that he would be required to register as a consequence of his guilty plea. 113 Generally, to resolve a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we would apply the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), which requires the defendant to demonstrate that his or her defense counsel provided constitutionally deficient performance that resulted in prejudice. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan
green
2 sentences2014We recognized that deportation is an especially severe consequence because it is essentially the " 'equivalent of banishment or exile"" Id. 119 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 , 68 S.Ct. 374 , 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948)). 2014We recognized that deportation is an especially severe consequence because it is essentially the " 'equivalent of banishment or exile"" Id. 119 (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 , 68 S.Ct. 374 , 92 L.Ed. 433 (1948)). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Holt
green
2 sentences2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 2014See, eg., Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95-96 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003) (holding that Alaska's registration requirement was a civil remedy and nonpuni-tive); United States v. Carel, 668 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir.2011) (determining that the registration requirement of the federal sex offender registry law is a "civil component"); Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1249-53 (evaluating aspects of Utah's registration laws and determining that they constitute a "civil remedy"); State v. Holt, 2010 UT App 138 , ¶ 12 n. 7, 233 P.3d 828 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 2012 UT 68 , 29 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Smit
green
2 sentences2014State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ¶ 29 , 95 P.3d 1203 . 2014State v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, ¶ 29 , 95 P.3d 1203 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Aldus v. State
green
1 sentence2014Aldus v. State, 748 A.2d 463 , 469 n. 6 (Me.2000). 130 We hold that the registration requirement is properly characterized as a collateral consequence because, although automatic in effect, it is unrelated to the range of the defendant's punishments. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Ellis v. SOCIAL SERVICES DEPT., ETC.
green
1 sentence1995The supreme court remanded the case to the trial court because it found that the putative father was not given an opportunity to show it was impossible for him to timely file his notice of paternity because of the mother’s deception. 4 Therefore, to protect the father’s due process rights, the court recognized an “impossibility” exception to the registration requirement, and held that the putative father “should be deemed to have complied with the statute” when “it [was] impossible for the father to file the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of his own,” | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.