registration requirement in North Carolina

2022“The only reason for establishing that an accused is [a] habitual felon is to enhance the punishment which would otherwise be appropriate for the substantive felony which he has allegedly committed while in such a status.” Allen, 292 N.C. at 435 , 233 S.E.2d at 588 . ¶ 13 A similar statutory sentencing enhancement applies to certain sex offenses that fall within the classification of statutorily defined “reportable convictions”: [F]or offenders sentenced for a Class B1 through E felony that is a reportable conviction subject to the registration requirement of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the G

2022“The only reason for establishing that an accused is [a] habitual felon is to enhance the punishment which would otherwise be appropriate for the substantive felony which he has allegedly committed while in such a status.” Allen, 292 N.C. at 435 , 233 S.E.2d at 588 . ¶ 13 A similar statutory sentencing enhancement applies to certain sex offenses that fall within the classification of statutorily defined “reportable convictions”: [F]or offenders sentenced for a Class B1 through E felony that is a reportable conviction subject to the registration requirement of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the G

2022App. at 460 , 503 S.E.2d at 113 , and the statute clearly indicates that subsection (f) applies only to those “sentenced for a Class B1 through E felony that is a reportable conviction subject to the registration requirement of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes,” N.C.

2022App. at 460 , 503 S.E.2d at 113 , and the statute clearly indicates that subsection (f) applies only to those “sentenced for a Class B1 through E felony that is a reportable conviction subject to the registration requirement of Article 27A of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes,” N.C.

2022In Borden, after his conviction in Kentucky of “Rape 1” or “Sexual Abuse 1st Degree,” the defendant was ordered to register as a sex offender, which he did in 1995. 216 N.C.

2022In Borden, after his conviction in Kentucky of “Rape 1” or “Sexual Abuse 1st Degree,” the defendant was ordered to register as a sex offender, which he did in 1995. 216 N.C.

2024Id.

2022App. at 283-84 , we held that this sole conclusion of law did not make any conclusion about whether “Detective O’Hal was justified in initiating the stop based upon either the alleged registration violation or the alleged inspection violation . . . .” Baskins, 247 N.C.

2019Pell, 211 N.C.

2016This Court has reviewed a similar occurrence in State v. McFarland, 234 N.C.App. 274 , 758 S.E.2d 457 (2014) : The "conclusions of law" in the written order were simply statements of law[.] *100 Generally, a conclusion of law requires "the exercise of judgment" in making a determination, "or the application *611 of legal principles" to the facts found.

2016This Court has reviewed a similar occurrence in State v. McFarland, 234 N.C.App. 274 , 758 S.E.2d 457 (2014) : The "conclusions of law" in the written order were simply statements of law[.] *100 Generally, a conclusion of law requires "the exercise of judgment" in making a determination, "or the application *611 of legal principles" to the facts found.

2016However, because “the ultimate decision of whether to terminate a sex offender’s registration requirement still lies in the trial court’s discretion,” id. at 362, 753 S.E.2d at 197 (quoting In re Hamilton, 220 N.C.

2016App. at 359 , 725 S.E.2d at 399 (citing N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A(al) (2012))), the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order and remanded this case to the trial court for the entry of a new order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law based upon a correct understanding of the applicable law and, in the event that the trial court determined that defendant was eligible to be relieved from his existing obligation to comply with the sex offender registration program, the making of a discretionary decision concerning the extent to which defendant’s petition should be all

2013Id.

2012E.g., Wood v. Weldon, 160 N.C.

2004Ed. 2d 228 , 78 S. Ct. 240 (1957), in which the United States Supreme Court confronted the question whether a municipal ordinance imposing a registration requirement on convicted felons who remained in the city of Los Angeles for more than five days violated due process.

2004Emphasizing that the conduct involved was wholly passive (a mere failure to register), the Court noted that the defendant “on first becoming aware of her duty to register was given no opportunity to comply with the law and avoid its penalty, even though her default was entirely innocent.” Id. at 229 , 2 L.

2004Id. at 9 , 535 S.E.2d at 385 .

2004Id. at 9 , 535 S.E.2d at 385 .

1994This Court recently addressed the registration requirement of the exemption provision in National Fruit Product Co. v. Justus, 112 N.C.

1994App. 495 , 436 S.E.2d 156 (1993), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 771 , 442 S.E.2d 519 (1994).

1994App. 495 , 436 S.E.2d 156 (1993), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 771 , 442 S.E.2d 519 (1994).

1994App. 495 , 436 S.E.2d 156 (1993), disc. review denied, 335 N.C. 771 , 442 S.E.2d 519 (1994).