registration requirement in Pennsylvania

2018See Commonwealth v. Bundy, 96 A.3d 390, 394 (Pa.Super. 2014) (discussing the procedure for challenging the retroactive application of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement); see also Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245, 247 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, [ 97 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2014)] (concluding that a challenge to the duration of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement was “properly reviewed as a petition for habeas corpus” (emphasis in original)).

2018See Commonwealth v. Bundy , 96 A.3d 390 , 394 (Pa.Super. 2014) (discussing the procedure for challenging the retroactive application of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement); see also Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245 , 247 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, [ 626 Pa. 698 , 97 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2014) ] (concluding that a challenge to the duration of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement was "properly reviewed as a petition for habeas corpus " (emphasis in original) ).

2024Citing Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), abrogated on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Santana, 266 A.3d 528 , 536 (Pa. 2021), Ortiz claims that the registration requirement constitutes a punishment that may not be imposed post sentencing without violating the ex post facto clauses of the U.S. and Pennsylvania Constitutions.

2023See Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2017); see also Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660 , 667 n.9 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“[T]he binding precedent emerging from Muniz is confined to the determination that SORNA’s registration requirement is punishment that runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of the -5- J-S09026-23 Pennsylvania Constitution when applied retroactively.”).

2021On appeal, this Court affirmed, deciding that Hainesworth’s “plea agreement appears to have been precisely structured so that [he] would not be subjected to a registration requirement.” Id.

2016See also Hainesworth, 82 A.3d at 448 (where “the plea agreement appears to have been precisely structured so that Hainesworth would not be subjected to a registration requirement,” he was entitled to the benefit of his bargain); Farabaugh, 2016 WL 1072110 at *6 (where the record made clear that Farabaugh pled guilty to an offense that had no sex offender registration/reporting requirement and that factor was part of the negotiated plea agreement, this court refused to allow Farabaugh’s plea bargain to be reformed with the addition of new conditions (i.e., 25 years of sex offender registration

2018See Commonwealth v. Bundy, 96 A.3d 390, 394 (Pa.Super. 2014) (discussing the procedure for challenging the retroactive application of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement); see also Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245, 247 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, [ 97 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2014)] (concluding that a challenge to the duration of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement was “properly reviewed as a petition for habeas corpus” (emphasis in original)).

2018See Commonwealth v. Bundy , 96 A.3d 390 , 394 (Pa.Super. 2014) (discussing the procedure for challenging the retroactive application of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement); see also Commonwealth v. Partee, 86 A.3d 245 , 247 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, [ 626 Pa. 698 , 97 A.3d 744 (Pa. 2014) ] (concluding that a challenge to the duration of SORNA's registration requirement in light of a plea agreement was "properly reviewed as a petition for habeas corpus " (emphasis in original) ).

2016See Majority Opinion at 13-14 (quoting Gehris, 54 A.3d at 878 (OISR)).

2016Gehris, 54 A.3d at 866 (OISA).

2019In our prior determination, we concluded that Moose was subject to the registration requirement of SORNA, relying on Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747, 760 (Pa. Super. 2014).

2015In determining whether Moose is subject to the registration requirement of SORNA, we find the recent case of Commonwealth v. Perez, 97 A.3d 747, 760 (Pa. Super. 2014), to be dispositive.

2017Thus, even had Appellant preserved his OGS claim for our review, we would deem it meritless. -6- J-S33013-17 definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on [a defendant’s] punishment.” Benner, 853 A.2d at 1070 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).2 Thus, Appellant’s challenge to the registration requirement imposed by the court does not implicate the legality of his sentence.

2015Nonetheless, in rejecting Benner’s claim that he should not be subject to registration at all, this Court stated in passing, “We have concluded accordingly that the principles of due process that require the court to inform the defendant of the length of his prospective sentence prior to accepting his plea do not compel the court to inform him of the registration requirement.” Id. at 1070-1071 .

2017Our Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, relying on Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 2002), which held that the registration requirement was not punishment, and, therefore, could not constitute a violation of the ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.

2017Our Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, relying on Commonwealth v. Fleming, 801 A.2d 1234 (Pa. Super. 2002), which held that the registration requirement was not punishment, and, therefore, could not constitute a violation of the ,ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution.

2019See Groulx v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 121 M.D. 2018, filed January 24, 2019), slip op. at 12-14.6 “Without the infliction of a greater punishment, the ex post facto clause is not violated.” Id., slip op. at 14 (citing Com. v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), and Com. v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163 (Pa. 2012)).

2019See Groulx v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 121 M.D. 2018, filed Jan. 24, 2019), slip op. at 12- 14.7 “Without the infliction of a greater punishment, the ex post facto clause is not violated.” Id., slip op. at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163 (Pa. 2012)). 7 We cite Groulx for its persuasive value in accordance with Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 (a). 10 Here, as explained above, Mr. Cao is subject to the same registration obligation – lifetime registration – that has a

2019See Groulx v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 121 M.D. 2018, filed January 24, 2019), slip op. at 12-14.6 “Without the infliction of a greater punishment, the ex post facto clause is not violated.” Id., slip op. at 14 (citing Com. v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), and Com. v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163 (Pa. 2012)).

2019See Groulx v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 121 M.D. 2018, filed Jan. 24, 2019), slip op. at 12- 14.7 “Without the infliction of a greater punishment, the ex post facto clause is not violated.” Id., slip op. at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163 (Pa. 2012)). 7 We cite Groulx for its persuasive value in accordance with Section 414(a) of this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414 (a). 10 Here, as explained above, Mr. Cao is subject to the same registration obligation – lifetime registration – that has a

2019We held that section 9718.4 is not unconstitutional under Alleyne because the “fact” triggering application of the statute—the length of the defendant’s registration requirement—“was mechanical and capable of objective proof.” Pennybaker, 121 A.3d 530, 534 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2016We reasoned that the ‘fact’ triggering application of the statute—ie., the length of the defendant’s registration requirement—did not “require[ ] a subjective assessment^]” but was instead “mechanical and capable of objective proof,” thus obviating the “need for the jury to determine the issue.” Id. at 534.

2016Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Mountain, 711 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa.Super.1998), the Superior Court found no merit to a sexual offender’s substantive due process claim, to Megan’s Law I because the appellant "cannot present any evidence suggesting alienation would result from the registration requirement.” Id. at 476 .

2016Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Mountain, 711 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa.Super.1998), the Superior Court found no merit to a sexual offender’s substantive due process claim, to Megan’s Law I because the appellant "cannot present any evidence suggesting alienation would result from the registration requirement.” Id. at 476 .

2015In Commonwealth v. Leidig, 850 A.2d 743, 748 (Pa.Super.2004) aff'd, 956 A.2d 399 (Pa.2008), this Court found that registration is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea and does not render it involuntary: In view of our conclusion that the registration requirement of Megan’s Law II is a collateral consequence of Appellant’s guilty plea, if Appellant had been unaware of the registration requirement at the time of his plea, such lack of awareness would not have rendered his plea unknowing or involuntary.

2004In reliance on Williams , this Court determined that the registration requirement “is properly characterized as a collateral consequence of [the defendant’s] plea,” as it cannot be considered to have a “definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on [a defendant’s] punishment.” Commonwealth v. Leidig, 850 A.2d 743 (Pa.Super.2004).

2014Sept. 7, 2013) (sex offender classifications under SORNA could not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for the same reasons that SORNA was found not to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, i.e. because the registration requirement is not punitive); United States v. Under Seal, 709 F.3d 257, 266 (4th Cir. 2013) (SORNA is a non-punitive, civil regulatory scheme and its registration requirements do not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); United States v. Davis, 352 F. App'x 270, 272 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that registration of convicted sex offenders un

2014Sept. 7, 2013) (sex offender classifications under SORNA could not constitute cruel and unusual punishment for the same reasons that SORNA was found not to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, i.e. because the registration requirement is not punitive); United States v. Davis, 352 F. App'x 270, 272 (10th Cir. 2009) (Footnote Continued Next Page) -5- J-S50044-14 Judgment of sentence affirmed.

2002Additionally, we note that: “a registration requirement is perhaps the least burdensome among the various modes of regulation a state may seek to impose.” Commonwealth v. Mountain, 711 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 672 , 749 A.2d 469 (2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. National Federation of the Blind, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 291 , 335 A.2d 832, 835 (1975), aff'd at 471 Pa. 529 , 370 A.2d 732 (1977)).

2002Additionally, we note that: “a registration requirement is perhaps the least burdensome among the various modes of regulation a state may seek to impose.” Commonwealth v. Mountain, 711 A.2d 473, 477 (Pa.Super.1998), appeal denied, 561 Pa. 672 , 749 A.2d 469 (2000) (quoting Commonwealth v. National Federation of the Blind, 18 Pa.Cmwlth. 291 , 335 A.2d 832, 835 (1975), aff'd at 471 Pa. 529 , 370 A.2d 732 (1977)).

2004Id. at 523-24 , 832 A.2d at 984 ; see also Commonwealth v. Anthony, 841 A.2d 542 (Pa.Super.2004). ¶ 14 In view of our Supreme Court’s determination that the registration requirements of Megan’s Law II do not constitute criminal punishment, it follows that the registration requirement cannot be considered to have a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on Appellant’s punishment.

2004Id. at 523-24 , 832 A.2d at 984 ; see also Commonwealth v. Anthony, 841 A.2d 542 (Pa.Super.2004). ¶ 14 In view of our Supreme Court’s determination that the registration requirements of Megan’s Law II do not constitute criminal punishment, it follows that the registration requirement cannot be considered to have a definite, immediate, and largely automatic effect on Appellant’s punishment.

2018With respect to the registration requirement, the court applied Buckley and determined that "the statute's registration requirement limits the number of voices who will convey the Green Party message and cuts down the size of the audience its proponents can reach," id. at 898 , having the effect of eliminating almost 4 million Pennsylvania citizens who are un-registered to vote.

2004See Morrill v. Weaver, 224 F.Supp.2d 882 , 896-97 & n. 16 (E.D.Pa.2002) (predicting that this Court will construe the term "qualified elector” as used in Section 951 to exclude a registration requirement, and finding that inclusion of such a requirement as to petition circulators would render the statute unconstitutional). 11 .

2020See Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 526, 528 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017)).7 Because a ____________________________________________ 7 The theory that a party may challenge a registration requirement as a matter of the legality sentence was set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2020See Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 526, 528 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017)).7 Because a ____________________________________________ 7 The theory that a party may challenge a registration requirement as a matter of the legality sentence was set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017).

2018Appellant asserts that application of § 9122.1(b)(9) to his 2002 conviction is prohibited by Commonwealth v. Richardson , 784 A.2d 126 (Pa.Super. 2001) (holding that the registration requirement under Megan's Law I did not apply to a sexual offender who previously served the full sentence for his sex offense by the date of the statute's enactment), and Commonwealth v. Muniz , 640 Pa. 699 , 164 A.3d 1189 (2017) (concluding that a retroactive application of SORNA's registration provisions violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution).

2002Appellant’s brief at 3. 5 ¶ 5 Initially, we note: “[a] trial court’s application of a statute is a question of law, and our standard of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Richardson, 784 A.2d 126, 129 (Pa.Super.2001), appeal denied, — Pa. -, 793 A.2d 907 (2002) (citation omitted).