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16 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1980–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Urserygreen2 sentences2018In United States v. Ursery , 518 U.S. 267 , 271-72, 278, 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), the Court employed the "intent-effects" test to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applied when an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding of property used in connection with illegal drug transactions had preceded a criminal prosecution based on the same underlying drug transactions. 2018In United States v. Ursery , 518 U.S. 267 , 271-72, 278, 116 S.Ct. 2135 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549 (1996), the Court employed the "intent-effects" test to determine whether the Double Jeopardy Clause applied when an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding of property used in connection with illegal drug transactions had preceded a criminal prosecution based on the same underlying drug transactions. | 2 | 2 |
Cannon v. Igborzurkiegreen2 sentences2009See Cannon v. Igborzurkie, 779 A.2d 887, 890 (D.C.2001) (citing legislative history of the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1999); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub.L. 2009See Cannon v. Igborzurkie, 779 A.2d 887, 890 (D.C.2001) (citing legislative history of the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1999); see also Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub.L. | 2 | 2 |
Fushek v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The Arizona Supreme Court has also determined that “[t]he duration of the registration requirement makes this statutory consequence much more severe than a comparatively short probation period.” Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 542 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc); see id. at 539 (holding that requirement of lifetime sex offender registration triggers right to jury trial under Arizona Constitution, the text of which is “virtually identical” and “construed . . . consistently” with the Sixth Amendment). 2023The Arizona Supreme Court has also determined that “[t]he duration of the registration requirement makes this statutory consequence much more severe than a comparatively short probation period.” Fushek v. State, 183 P.3d 536, 542 (Ariz. 2008) (en banc); see id. at 539 (holding that requirement of lifetime sex offender registration triggers right to jury trial under Arizona Constitution, the text of which is “virtually identical” and “construed . . . consistently” with the Sixth Amendment). | 1 | 1 |
Tyree v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2013Tyree v. United States, 629 A.2d 20, 22-23 (D.C.1993), holding that CPWL and UF do not merge, still governs. | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. Hellergreen2 sentences2010See 554 U.S. 570 , ___, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2822 , 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). [30] We observed in Logan that it is no more difficult for the government to show the defendant's lack of registration than it is for the defendant to show that he complied with the registration requirement. 2010See 554 U.S. 570 , ___, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2822 , 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). [30] We observed in Logan that it is no more difficult for the government to show the defendant's lack of registration than it is for the defendant to show that he complied with the registration requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Russell v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2010Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485 , 493 n. 10 (D.C.1985). [31] We note that the other three affirmative defenses enumerated in the UA statute, which permit a person to possess ammunition if he is a licensed dealer, an authorized government employee, or a properly certified ammunition collector, do not "require the defendant to disprove any element of the offense." Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. 1997). 2010Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485 , 493 n. 10 (D.C.1985): .We note that the other three affirmative defenses enumerated in the UA statute, which permit a person to possess ammunition if he is a licensed dealer, an authorized government employee, or a properly certified ammunition collector, do not "require the defendant to disprove any element of the offense.” Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C.1997). | 1 | 1 |
Meier v. District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Commissiongreen2 sentences1980The Commission commendably expressed its fear that to invalidate this registration statement would “give every tenant a hunting license to comb through the registration files in hope of discovering some minor omission or technical defect . . . .” However, in this case the Administrator’s findings hardly reflected a “minor omission or technical defect.” In the Commission’s decision, it concluded “that the landlord had substantially complied with the law and that the registration forms filed were valid [because nothing indicated that the mistakes were] willful [or] that the landlord should be pe 1980Rental Accommodations Commission, supra. B. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2021Appellant asserted that the evidence that SORA has caused him to lose housing and employment opportunities and subjects him to in-person reporting distinguishes this case from the record in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (holding that the registration requirement and notification system of the 1994 Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act did not constitute retroactive punishment prohibited by the Ex Post Facto Clause). 2018For example, in Smith v. Doe , 538 U.S. 84 , 89-90, 92-93, 105-06, 123 S.Ct. 1140 , 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), the Court employed the "intent-effects" test to determine whether, in imposing a registration requirement for sex offenders under Alaska Stat . § 12.63.010 with retroactive effect, the legislature intended to establish non-punitive civil proceedings or to impose punishment in deciding whether the Ex Post Facto Clause applied. | 2 | 2018–2021 |
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v. Walsh, Acting Commissioner, Maine Department of Human Services
green
2 sentences2004In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 , 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), the Court held that Connecticut’s act did not deny procedural due process by requiring sex offenders to register without affording them a hearing on dangerousness, inasmuch as the registration requirement was based on the fact of conviction without regard to dangerousness. 2004In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 , 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), the Court held that Connecticut's act did not deny procedural due process by requiring sex offenders to register without affording them a hearing on dangerousness, inasmuch as the registration requirement was based on the fact of conviction without regard to dangerousness. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe
green
2 sentences2004In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 , 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), the Court held that Connecticut’s act did not deny procedural due process by requiring sex offenders to register without affording them a hearing on dangerousness, inasmuch as the registration requirement was based on the fact of conviction without regard to dangerousness. 2004In Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 , 123 S.Ct. 1160 , 155 L.Ed.2d 98 (2003), the Court held that Connecticut’s act did not deny procedural due process by requiring sex offenders to register without affording them a hearing on dangerousness, inasmuch as the registration requirement was based on the fact of conviction without regard to dangerousness. | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Staples v. United States
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 603 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 . 2000Id. at 603 , 114 S.Ct. 1793 . | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Quality Management, Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission
green
2 sentences1987E.g., Quality Management, Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 505 A.2d 73 (D.C.1986). 1987E.g., Quality Management, Inc. v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 505 A.2d 73 (D.C.1986). | 2 | 1987–1987 |
Hill-Lanham, Inc. v. Lightview Development Corp.
green
1 sentence2024Section 29-105.02 generally requires entities conducting business in the District to register in order to “bring such corporations under the supervision and the regulation of public officials . . . to the end that the public may have the same information respecting their background and financial standing . . . which is demanded of domestic corporations, and as a consequence, also to render them amenable to ordinary legal process.” Hill-Lanham, 163 F. Supp. at 476 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Logan v. United States
green
2 sentences2010Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485 , 493 n. 10 (D.C.1985). [31] We note that the other three affirmative defenses enumerated in the UA statute, which permit a person to possess ammunition if he is a licensed dealer, an authorized government employee, or a properly certified ammunition collector, do not "require the defendant to disprove any element of the offense." Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. 1997). 2010Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485 , 493 n. 10 (D.C.1985): .We note that the other three affirmative defenses enumerated in the UA statute, which permit a person to possess ammunition if he is a licensed dealer, an authorized government employee, or a properly certified ammunition collector, do not "require the defendant to disprove any element of the offense.” Russell v. United States, 698 A.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C.1997). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.