registration requirement in Rhode Island

2018In Germane , we held that the retroactive imposition of the duty to register did not implicate "the Rhode Island ex post facto clause because the registration requirement is simply part of a nonpunitive, civil regulatory scheme." Id.

2011Here, the amended statute's registration requirement is neither a sentence, nor is it "punishment." With respect to registration as compared to sentencing, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has determined that registration is merely a "civil regulatory process." State v. Germane , 971 A.2d 555 , 593 (R.I. 2009); In re Richard A. , 946 A.2d 204 , 213 (R.I. 2008).

2018See In re Richard A. , 946 A.2d at 213 .

2011Here, the amended statute's registration requirement is neither a sentence, nor is it "punishment." With respect to registration as compared to sentencing, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has determined that registration is merely a "civil regulatory process." State v. Germane , 971 A.2d 555 , 593 (R.I. 2009); In re Richard A. , 946 A.2d 204 , 213 (R.I. 2008).

2022The trial justice also found that the 2009 and 2010 charges were filed before June 19, 2010, but that Atryzek was convicted by plea in 2012, after the registration requirement had expired.9 8 Whether a person breaches a legal duty “is a question of fact that must be resolved by the fact-finder[,]” Martin v. Marciano, 871 A.2d 911, 919 (R.I. 2005), which is a function of the trial justice in the context of a postconviction-relief application.

2022It is well established that, absent narrow exceptions, “a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal [or on certiorari] if it was not raised before the trial court.” Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Rohena v. City of Providence, 154 A.3d 935, 938 (R.I. 2017)).

2022It is well established that, absent narrow exceptions, “a litigant cannot raise an objection or advance a new theory on appeal [or on certiorari] if it was not raised before the trial court.” Cusick v. Cusick, 210 A.3d 1199, 1203 (R.I. 2019) (quoting Rohena v. City of Providence, 154 A.3d 935, 938 (R.I. 2017)).

2022See Kuzniar, 709 A.2d at 1055 (“The existence of a legal duty is purely a question of 16 Whereas in Atryzek I and on remand in the Superior Court, the state asserted that § 11-37.1-2(e)(7) (2008) and § 11-37.1-10 applied, here, the state asserts that §§ 11-37.1-2(e)(7) (2008), 11-37.1-10, 11-37.1-3(a), and 11-37.1-4(a) together create a new duty, as the failure to register was, at the time of Atryzek’s failure-to- register offenses, considered a “[c]riminal offense against a victim who is a minor[.]” ‐ 19 ‐ law, and the court alone is required to make this determination.”).

2022See, e.g., Jolly v. Wall, 59 A.3d 133, 138 (R.I. 2013). 9 Specifically, the trial justice found that the criminal information for the 2009 offense was filed on June 30, 2009, and that the criminal information for the 2010 offense was filed on March 5, 2010. ‐ 11 ‐ The offenses of failure to register were alleged to have occurred on May 22, 2009, and January 28, 2010, respectively.

2018Furthermore, the duration of the duty to register neither "imposes an affirmative disability or restraint" on Gibson nor does it "promote[ ] the traditional aims of punishment." See Doe I , 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 .

2018Furthermore, the duration of the duty to register neither "imposes an affirmative disability or restraint" on Gibson nor does it "promote[ ] the traditional aims of punishment." See Doe I , 538 U.S. at 97 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 .

2008Additionally, this Court consistently has held that “where two apparently inconsistent provisions are contained in a statute, every effort should be made to construe and apply the provisions as consistent.” Fals taff Brewing Corp., 637 A.2d at 1051 (citing Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 637 (R.I.1987)).

2000“For a guilty plea to be valid, it must be affirmatively shown that it was both intelligently and voluntarily given, and made with a full understanding both of what the plea connotes and of its possible consequences.” In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1177 (R.I.1984) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969)).

2000“For a guilty plea to be valid, it must be affirmatively shown that it was both intelligently and voluntarily given, and made with a full understanding both of what the plea connotes and of its possible consequences.” In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1177 (R.I.1984) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969)).

2000“For a guilty plea to be valid, it must be affirmatively shown that it was both intelligently and voluntarily given, and made with a full understanding both of what the plea connotes and of its possible consequences.” In re John D., 479 A.2d 1173, 1177 (R.I.1984) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 , 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1712 , 23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-80 (1969)).