registration requirement in Maryland

2008As to appellant’s first argument, the State responds that “by agreeing to be evaluated by the Department of Parole and Probation to determine his status as a sexual predator, [appellant] implicitly agreed to the registration requirement if recommended to do so as a result of the evaluation.” In the alternative, the State avers that “because the order to register is not punitive,” pursuant to Young v. State, 370 Md. 686 , 806 A.2d 233 (2002), the “court’s order in this instance was collateral to [appellant’s] plea agreement and does not violate the terms of his agreement.” With regard to appell

2008As to appellant’s first argument, the State responds that “by agreeing to be evaluated by the Department of Parole and Probation to determine his status as a sexual predator, [appellant] implicitly agreed to the registration requirement if recommended to do so as a result of the evaluation.” In the alternative, the State avers that “because the order to register is not punitive,” pursuant to Young v. State, 370 Md. 686 , 806 A.2d 233 (2002), the “court’s order in this instance was collateral to [appellant’s] plea agreement and does not violate the terms of his agreement.” With regard to appell

2020The defendant “argue[d] that the elements of the crime of assault for which he was convicted negate[d] the registration requirement, while the State assert[ed] that the underlying facts to which [he] pled guilty mandate[d] registration.” Id. at 329 , 872 A.2d at 686 .

2020The defendant “argue[d] that the elements of the crime of assault for which he was convicted negate[d] the registration requirement, while the State assert[ed] that the underlying facts to which [he] pled guilty mandate[d] registration.” Id. at 329 , 872 A.2d at 686 .

2017Id. at 541 , 62 A.3d 123 .

2017Id. at 541 , 62 A.3d 123 .

2014The State relies on United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009), for its contention that, irrespective of Maryland law, Appellees must register as sex offenders in Maryland because SORNA imposes a registration requirement on individuals that is “independent of the requirement imposed on the States to implement the enhanced registration and notification standards of SORNA.” Gould, 568 F.3d at 465 .

2014The State relies on United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459 (4th Cir. 2009), for its contention that, irrespective of Maryland law, Appellees must register as sex offenders in Maryland because SORNA imposes a registration requirement on individuals that is “independent of the requirement imposed on the States to implement the enhanced registration and notification standards of SORNA.” Gould, 568 F.3d at 465 .

2020App. 668, 673, 700 , 123 A.3d 229, 232, 247-48 (2015), a case in which the trial court ordered a child respondent to register as a sex offender, the Court of Special Appeals observed: One aspect of [the Registry Act] that was important to the holding of a violation of the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws by the Court of Appeals . . . and by this Court . . . was the automatic imposition of the registration requirement because of a conviction for a particular sex crime.

2020Cf. Cain, 386 Md. at 338, 340 (holding that sentence including sex offender registration as condition of probation was illegal where individual pled guilty to assault, which was not one of the enumerated crimes qualifying an individual as an “offender” under the then- current statute).6 Second, although the 2006 version of MSORA included a role for the Maryland Parole Commission in administering extended parole supervision, see, e.g., § 7-206(6) of 6 We recognize that the Court of Appeals held recently that sex offender registration requirements—pursuant to more recent versions of MSORA—are “i

2015See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (“As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....”), cer t. denied, 559 U.S. 974 , 130 S.Ct. 1686 , 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322 , 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of “failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender’s change of address” is that “the defendant is a ‘person required ... to register’ ”).

2015See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (“As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....”), cer t. denied, 559 U.S. 974 , 130 S.Ct. 1686 , 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322 , 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of “failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender’s change of address” is that “the defendant is a ‘person required ... to register’ ”).

2015See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (“As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....”), cer t. denied, 559 U.S. 974 , 130 S.Ct. 1686 , 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322 , 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of “failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender’s change of address” is that “the defendant is a ‘person required ... to register’ ”).

2015See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (“As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....”), cer t. denied, 559 U.S. 974 , 130 S.Ct. 1686 , 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322 , 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of “failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender’s change of address” is that “the defendant is a ‘person required ... to register’ ”).

2015See United States v. Gould, 568 F.3d 459, 470 (4th Cir.2009) (“As noted above, the elements of a SORNA failure to register offense ... are that the defendant (1) was required to register....”), cer t. denied, 559 U.S. 974 , 130 S.Ct. 1686 , 176 L.Ed.2d 186 (2010); see also State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322 , 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (holding that one essential element of the crime of “failing to notify the appropriate sheriff of a sex offender’s change of address” is that “the defendant is a ‘person required ... to register’ ”).

2014Id.

2014Kennedy, 612 F.3d at 264 .

2014We explained Maryland’s constitutional protections for vested rights, stating: “Together, Maryland’s Declaration of Rights and Constitution prohibit the retrospective reach of statutes that would have the effect of abrogating vested rights.” Muskin, id. at 555 , 30 A.3d at 968 (citation omitted).

2014We explained Maryland’s constitutional protections for vested rights, stating: “Together, Maryland’s Declaration of Rights and Constitution prohibit the retrospective reach of statutes that would have the effect of abrogating vested rights.” Muskin, id. at 555 , 30 A.3d at 968 (citation omitted).

2011See Sinclair v. State, 199 Md.App. 130, 137 , 20 A.3d 192, 196 (2011) ("Declaratory judgment has been recognized as the procedure for obtaining, under appropriate circumstances, a ruling on the constitutionality of a statute, the violation of which carries criminal sanctions.”).

2011See Sinclair v. State, 199 Md.App. 130, 137 , 20 A.3d 192, 196 (2011) ("Declaratory judgment has been recognized as the procedure for obtaining, under appropriate circumstances, a ruling on the constitutionality of a statute, the violation of which carries criminal sanctions.”).

2010See In re Stephen K., 289 Md. 294, 298 , 424 A.2d 153 (1981) (“the legislative intention must be gathered from the entire statute, rather than from only one part”) (citations omitted).

2010See In re Stephen K., 289 Md. 294, 298 , 424 A.2d 153 (1981) (“the legislative intention must be gathered from the entire statute, rather than from only one part”) (citations omitted).

2002Consequently, once it is determined that the registration statute is punitive, imposing a registration requirement pursuant to ž 792 is additional punishment that enhances the maximum sentence for the underlying offense, whatever the amount of actual jail time imposed. [13] A majority of the court applied a test that considered "whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment and, if not, whether the provision is so punitive in nature or effect that it must be found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature's contrary intent," but declined to apply the multifacto

2002Consequently, once it is determined that the registration statute is punitive, imposing a registration requirement pursuant to ž 792 is additional punishment that enhances the maximum sentence for the underlying offense, whatever the amount of actual jail time imposed. [13] A majority of the court applied a test that considered "whether the Legislature intended the provision to constitute punishment and, if not, whether the provision is so punitive in nature or effect that it must be found to constitute punishment despite the Legislature's contrary intent," but declined to apply the multifacto

2000The Court of Special Appeals held that the resolution of the State’s appeal of the trial court’s grant of suppression was controlled by Battaglia v. State, 119 Md.App. 349 , 705 A.2d 36 (1998), a decision unavailable to the Circuit Court at the time of its ruling. 8 The Battaglia court had determined that the registration requirement outlined in § 10-411, as the State contends, is a provision intended to facilitate administrative goals.

2000The Court of Special Appeals held that the resolution of the State’s appeal of the trial court’s grant of suppression was controlled by Battaglia v. State, 119 Md.App. 349 , 705 A.2d 36 (1998), a decision unavailable to the Circuit Court at the time of its ruling. 8 The Battaglia court had determined that the registration requirement outlined in § 10-411, as the State contends, is a provision intended to facilitate administrative goals.

2000See Kassap v. Seitz, 315 Md. 155, 164-65 , 553 A.2d 714, 718 (1989) (explaining that because “[w]e have often recognized that the Act finds its genesis in and is substantially patterned after Title III ... we have on occasion sought guidance from federal cases interpreting or applying Title III” (citing Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 15, 21-24 , 537 A.2d 612, 614, 616-18 (1988) and other cases)).

2000See Kassap v. Seitz, 315 Md. 155, 164-65 , 553 A.2d 714, 718 (1989) (explaining that because “[w]e have often recognized that the Act finds its genesis in and is substantially patterned after Title III ... we have on occasion sought guidance from federal cases interpreting or applying Title III” (citing Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 15, 21-24 , 537 A.2d 612, 614, 616-18 (1988) and other cases)).

2000See Kassap v. Seitz, 315 Md. 155, 164-65 , 553 A.2d 714, 718 (1989) (explaining that because “[w]e have often recognized that the Act finds its genesis in and is substantially patterned after Title III ... we have on occasion sought guidance from federal cases interpreting or applying Title III” (citing Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 15, 21-24 , 537 A.2d 612, 614, 616-18 (1988) and other cases)).

2000See Kassap v. Seitz, 315 Md. 155, 164-65 , 553 A.2d 714, 718 (1989) (explaining that because “[w]e have often recognized that the Act finds its genesis in and is substantially patterned after Title III ... we have on occasion sought guidance from federal cases interpreting or applying Title III” (citing Ricks v. State, 312 Md. 11, 15, 21-24 , 537 A.2d 612, 614, 616-18 (1988) and other cases)).