registration requirement in Florida

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2012Cf. State v. Partlow, 840 So.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Fla.2003) (sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of defendant’s plea and the registration requirement has no effect on the range of defendant’s punishment for the crime).

2019See, e.g., Richards v. State, 237 So. 3d 426, 430-31 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (holding that the defective information, which failed to allege any essential elements and merely cited section 775.21(10)(a) as opposed to the violation of the registration requirement on which the State proceeded at trial, prejudiced Richards because defense counsel clearly demonstrated at the beginning of trial that he had been misled regarding which registration requirement the State was intending to prove that Richards had violated).

2018Cf. Richards, 237 So. 3d at 430-31 (holding that the inadequate information, which failed to allege any essential elements and merely cited section 775.21(10)(a) as opposed to the violation of the registration requirement on which the State proceeded at trial, prejudiced Richards because defense counsel clearly demonstrated at the beginning of trial that he had been misled regarding which -4- registration requirement the State was intending to prove that Richards had violated).1 Our affirmance, however, is without prejudice for Cowart, after issuance of the mandate in this appeal, to either ti

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2025Without deciding, or even reaching, the issue of whether the trial court violated rule 3.172(c)(9), or whether Rodriguez’s trial counsel was 3 See, e.g., State v. Partlow, 840 So. 2d 1040, 1043 (Fla. 2003) (concluding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has “absolutely no effect” on the “range of the defendant’s punishment” for the offense); Morgan v. State, 911 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (denying post-sentence motion to withdraw plea, stating: “Defense counsel is not required t

2025See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 740 F.3d 1032, 1035 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that the registration requirement of the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”) does not unconstitutionally compel speech); Martin v. Hayes, No. 2:24-CV-3-FL-KS, 2025 WL 634833 , at *6 (E.D.N.C.

2024Cf. State v. Hobbs, 974 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (noting that statutory construction canons "should only come into play when it is necessary to construe an ambiguous statute, not to create an ambiguity in a clearly worded statute" (citing Jacobo v. Bd. of Trs. of Miami Police, 788 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001))).

2024Cf. State v. Hobbs, 974 So. 2d 1119, 1121 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (noting that statutory construction canons "should only come into play when it is necessary to construe an ambiguous statute, not to create an ambiguity in a clearly worded statute" (citing Jacobo v. Bd. of Trs. of Miami Police, 788 So. 2d 362, 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001))).

2023Nor could it properly be considered by the trial court as a rule 3.800(a) or 3.850 motion for it is well-settled that the sexual offender registration requirement is not punishment and is not part of a sentence.”); State v. Whitt, 96 So. 3d 1125, 1126 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (affirming denial of defendant’s motion, which sought the removal of his name from FDLE’s Sexual Offender Registry, and holding: “Because the sexual offender designation was not part of the plea or sentence, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to consider this matter.”). 2

2019In support of its position, the State cites to State v. Lee, 651 So. 2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), in which we held that "[a]n information is sufficient if it tracks the statute, and the state need not present proof with which it intends to establish its case." See also Cantrell v. State, 403 So. 2d 977, 978 (Fla. 1981) ("The language of the information tracked the language of the - 10 - statute and sufficiently alleged the existence of a criminal 'enterprise.' The information was sufficient . . . .").

2019In support of its position, the State cites to State v. Lee, 651 So. 2d 1221, 1222 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), in which we held that "[a]n information is sufficient if it tracks the statute, and the state need not present proof with which it intends to establish its case." See also Cantrell v. State, 403 So. 2d 977, 978 (Fla. 1981) ("The language of the information tracked the language of the - 10 - statute and sufficiently alleged the existence of a criminal 'enterprise.' The information was sufficient . . . .").

2013See § 943.04354(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“The court shall rule on the petition and, if the court determines the person meets the criteria in subsection (1) and removal of the registration requirement will not conflict with federal law, it may grant the petition and order the removal of the registration requirement.” (emphasis added)); Vann v. State, 99 So.3d 633, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“In order to qualify for removal of the registration requirement, appellant had to establish he was ‘not more than 4 years older than the victim’ pursuant to section 943.04354(l)(c), Florida Statutes.”); Stat

2013See § 943.04354(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“The court shall rule on the petition and, if the court determines the person meets the criteria in subsection (1) and removal of the registration requirement will not conflict with federal law, it may grant the petition and order the removal of the registration requirement.” (emphasis added)); Vann v. State, 99 So.3d 633, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“In order to qualify for removal of the registration requirement, appellant had to establish he was ‘not more than 4 years older than the victim’ pursuant to section 943.04354(l)(c), Florida Statutes.”); Stat

2013See § 943.04354(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“The court shall rule on the petition and, if the court determines the person meets the criteria in subsection (1) and removal of the registration requirement will not conflict with federal law, it may grant the petition and order the removal of the registration requirement.” (emphasis added)); Vann v. State, 99 So.3d 633, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (“In order to qualify for removal of the registration requirement, appellant had to establish he was ‘not more than 4 years older than the victim’ pursuant to section 943.04354(l)(c), Florida Statutes.”); Stat

2012See Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189 (Fla.2007).

2005State v. Partlow, 840 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Fla.2003)(holding that the sexual offender registration requirement is a collateral consequence of a plea to a sexual offense because the registration requirement has absolutely no effect on the range of the defendant's punishment for the crime); Gunn v. State, 841 So.2d 629, 631 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003)(confirming that designation as either a sexual offender or predator is a collateral consequence about which a defendant does not have to be advised at the time of a plea).

2005See Giorgetti v. State, 821 So.2d 417 .

2004Id. at 218. [5] See Kelly v. State, 795 So.2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review denied, 851 So.2d 729 (Fla. 2003), and cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1442 , 158 L.Ed.2d 103 (2004); Rickman v. State, 714 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ("This court has previously held that the registration requirement of sec. 775.21, F.S.

2004(Supp.1996) are [sic] procedural and regulatory in nature and do not constitute punishment."); Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ("[S]ection 775.21 violates neither the ex post facto clause nor Rule 3.800 because the designation `sexual predator' is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes."), review denied, 707 So.2d 1124 (Fla.1998); see also State v. Erickson, 852 So.2d 289 , 291 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("Since the courts of Florida have uniformly recognized that the Florida Sexual Predators Act is regula

2004Id. at 218. [5] See Kelly v. State, 795 So.2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review denied, 851 So.2d 729 (Fla. 2003), and cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1442 , 158 L.Ed.2d 103 (2004); Rickman v. State, 714 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ("This court has previously held that the registration requirement of sec. 775.21, F.S.

2004Id. at 218. [5] See Kelly v. State, 795 So.2d 135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001), review denied, 851 So.2d 729 (Fla. 2003), and cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1442 , 158 L.Ed.2d 103 (2004); Rickman v. State, 714 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) ("This court has previously held that the registration requirement of sec. 775.21, F.S.

2004(Supp.1996) are [sic] procedural and regulatory in nature and do not constitute punishment."); Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ("[S]ection 775.21 violates neither the ex post facto clause nor Rule 3.800 because the designation `sexual predator' is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes."), review denied, 707 So.2d 1124 (Fla.1998); see also State v. Erickson, 852 So.2d 289 , 291 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("Since the courts of Florida have uniformly recognized that the Florida Sexual Predators Act is regula

2004(Supp.1996) are [sic] procedural and regulatory in nature and do not constitute punishment."); Fletcher v. State, 699 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) ("[S]ection 775.21 violates neither the ex post facto clause nor Rule 3.800 because the designation `sexual predator' is neither a sentence nor a punishment but simply a status resulting from the conviction of certain crimes."), review denied, 707 So.2d 1124 (Fla.1998); see also State v. Erickson, 852 So.2d 289 , 291 n. 1 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ("Since the courts of Florida have uniformly recognized that the Florida Sexual Predators Act is regula

2000This case does not involve a law "retrospective in its effect," the first prong of the test described in Simmons. 753 So.2d at 763 .

2000See id.