registration requirement in Connecticut

2024(Emphasis added.) For the same reason, we also are not persuaded by the acquittee’s argument that adopting the state’s interpretation of the statute will lead to the absurd result of ‘‘[conflating] punishment with treatment . . . [and] blur[ring] the lines between the Department of Correction and the [board], each formed and operated under distinct statutory schemes to accomplish very different purposes.’’21 Indeed, our Supreme Court has recognized that the registration requirement ‘‘is regula- tory and not punitive in nature.’’ State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 94 , 770 A.2d 908 (2001); see also

2024(Emphasis added.) For the same reason, we also are not persuaded by the acquittee’s argument that adopting the state’s interpretation of the statute will lead to the absurd result of ‘‘[conflating] punishment with treatment . . . [and] blur[ring] the lines between the Department of Correction and the [board], each formed and operated under distinct statutory schemes to accomplish very different purposes.’’21 Indeed, our Supreme Court has recognized that the registration requirement ‘‘is regula- tory and not punitive in nature.’’ State v. Kelly, 256 Conn. 23, 94 , 770 A.2d 908 (2001); see also

2008Id., at 507 , 306 Ill.Dec. 116 , 857 N.E.2d 209 .

2008Id., at 507 , 306 Ill.Dec. 116 , 857 N.E.2d 209 .

2024Thus, prohibiting offenders from petitioning to restrict the dissemination of their registration information if they do not meet the statutory criteria is not a punish- ment but instead serves to advance the legislature’s ‘‘nonpunitive goals of protecting the public and facilitat- ing future law enforcement efforts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, supra, 92 . 20 Indeed, our Supreme Court has noted that ‘‘the focus of the inquiry with respect to [the confinement of] [an] acquittee is upon the protection of the community, the same consideration which is of primary concern i

2024Thus, prohibiting offenders from petitioning to restrict the dissemination of their registration information if they do not meet the statutory criteria is not a punish- ment but instead serves to advance the legislature’s ‘‘nonpunitive goals of protecting the public and facilitat- ing future law enforcement efforts.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Kelly, supra, 92 . 20 Indeed, our Supreme Court has noted that ‘‘the focus of the inquiry with respect to [the confinement of] [an] acquittee is upon the protection of the community, the same consideration which is of primary concern i

2024We also decline to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that his sentence is unconstitutional under General Statutes § 53a-31 (a).10 The defendant has not requested review of his unpreserved constitutional claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), either in name or substance.

2024We also decline to review the defendant’s unpreserved claim that his sentence is unconstitutional under General Statutes § 53a-31 (a).10 The defendant has not requested review of his unpreserved constitutional claim pursuant to State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015), either in name or substance.

2021We note that the respondent does not claim otherwise. 16 In Alaska v. Wright, supra, 141 S. Ct. 1467 , a case with remarkable similarities to the present case, the petitioner was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor under Alaska law.

2015Id., 240 n.2, 242.

2015Citing State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582 , 953 A.2d 630 (2008), Judge Nazzaro stated that the petitioner’s ‘‘registration as a sexual offender does not increase the punishment for the sentence imposed for the kidnapping conviction.’’ Pierce v. Warden, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-05- 4000609-S (Nazzaro, J.). 7 Judge Nazzaro also found that the petitioner’s appellate counsel had raised a claim that Judge Gaffney improperly ordered the petitioner to register as a sex offender; see State v. Pierce, supra, 69 Conn. App. 520 ; but noted that our Supreme Court had concluded that Judge Gaffne

2015Citing State v. Arthur H., 288 Conn. 582 , 953 A.2d 630 (2008), Judge Nazzaro stated that the petitioner’s ‘‘registration as a sexual offender does not increase the punishment for the sentence imposed for the kidnapping conviction.’’ Pierce v. Warden, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-05- 4000609-S (Nazzaro, J.). 7 Judge Nazzaro also found that the petitioner’s appellate counsel had raised a claim that Judge Gaffney improperly ordered the petitioner to register as a sex offender; see State v. Pierce, supra, 69 Conn. App. 520 ; but noted that our Supreme Court had concluded that Judge Gaffne

2007Furthermore, we note that “[i]n criminal cases, to determine whether a change in the law applies to a defendant, we generally have applied the law in existence on the date of the offense, regardless of its procedural or substantive nature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Graham, 56 Conn. App. 507, 510 , 743 A.2d 1158 (2000).

2007Furthermore, we note that “[i]n criminal cases, to determine whether a change in the law applies to a defendant, we generally have applied the law in existence on the date of the offense, regardless of its procedural or substantive nature.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Graham, 56 Conn. App. 507, 510 , 743 A.2d 1158 (2000).

2005The “object [of the registration requirement] is to enable a person dealing with another trading under a name not his own, to know the man behind the name, that he may know or make inquiry as to his business character or financial responsibility . . . .” DiBiase v. Garnsey, 103 Conn. 21, 27 , 130 A. 81 (1925).

2005The “object [of the registration requirement] is to enable a person dealing with another trading under a name not his own, to know the man behind the name, that he may know or make inquiry as to his business character or financial responsibility . . . .” DiBiase v. Garnsey, 103 Conn. 21, 27 , 130 A. 81 (1925).

2005As Judge Schaller noted in his dissent in Metro Bulletins Corp. v. Soboleski, supra, at 503, 620 A.2d 1314 , the trade regulation statute, by itself, however, provides only minimal protection to the public because trade name certificates are recorded in any one of the many towns across the state.

2003Although the defendant conceded at oral argument before this court that Smith v. Doe, supra, 538 U.S. 84 , and Doe v. Dept. of Public Safety ex rel.

2002Pet'r Br., at 3. "[A] habeas petition is not rendered moot by the release of the petitioner from custody where the petition attacking the legality of the conviction was filed while the petitioner was still in custody." Smith v. Commissioner of Correction , 65 Conn. App. 172 , 175 , 82 A.2d 201 (2001), citing Barlow v. Lopes , 201 Conn. 103 , 105 n. 2, 513 A.2d 132 (1986).

2002Pet'r Br., at 3. "[A] habeas petition is not rendered moot by the release of the petitioner from custody where the petition attacking the legality of the conviction was filed while the petitioner was still in custody." Smith v. Commissioner of Correction , 65 Conn. App. 172 , 175 , 82 A.2d 201 (2001), citing Barlow v. Lopes , 201 Conn. 103 , 105 n. 2, 513 A.2d 132 (1986).

2002Pet'r Br., at 3. "[A] habeas petition is not rendered moot by the release of the petitioner from custody where the petition attacking the legality of the conviction was filed while the petitioner was still in custody." Smith v. Commissioner of Correction , 65 Conn. App. 172 , 175 , 82 A.2d 201 (2001), citing Barlow v. Lopes , 201 Conn. 103 , 105 n. 2, 513 A.2d 132 (1986).