registration requirement in Massachusetts

2008See also id. at 150 (Fried, J., concurring) (“[U]rgency . . . shown by the severity of the harm and the likelihood of its occurrence” is necessary to justify imposition of the registration requirement.

1997See Doe No. 3, 426 Mass. at 146 (“the public interest in having [sex offender) information in the hands of local law enforcement officials may justify the registration requirement in the face of whatever liberty and privacy interests the registration requirement implicates”).

2013Although the registration requirement is remedial and not punitive, see Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. 1201, 1241 (1996), criminal penalties may be imposed on a defendant who is required to register and fails to do so.

1997Public Access to a Level One Juvenile Sex Offender’s Registration Data The Opinion of the Justices, supra, did not consider the constitutionality of §§1781 and 178J concerning the public availability of a level one juvenile sex offender’s registration data. 12 The issue of whether the availability of this information constitutes “punishment” presents a more difficult question than the constitutionality of the registration provisions.

2017See Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. 418, 442 (2001) (facial validity of statute does not preclude as applied due process challenges). 22 not precluded from seeking relief from the registration requirement at stage two.

2008“The omnibus, catch-all nature of some of the offenses included in this statute are at a far remove from such a showing”); Roe v. Attorney Gen., 434 Mass. at 434 (“[t]he statutory classification [of persons as ‘sex offenders’] . . . expressly recognizes that some persons who have committed such offenses in the past will not pose any current danger”); id. at 442-443 (Cowin, J., concurring) (“I believe that the statute sweeps too broadly as applied to individuals . . . who could not rationally be deemed a threat to vulnerable persons”); id. at 446 (Marshall, C.J., concurring in part and dissenti

2014See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 595-597 (2013) (Doe No. 205614); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 614-615 (2010) (Doe No. 151564); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3844 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 768, 768-772 (2006) (Doe No. 3844).

2014Because criminal penalties may be imposed on a defendant who is required to register and fails to do so, we apply the “rule of lenity” in interpreting the registration requirement and “ ‘resolve any ambiguities’ against the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 202, 212 (2013), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 618 (2010).

2014Because criminal penalties may be imposed on a defendant who is required to register and fails to do so, we apply the “rule of lenity” in interpreting the registration requirement and “ ‘resolve any ambiguities’ against the Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Ventura, 465 Mass. 202, 212 (2013), quoting Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 618 (2010).

2013See Ventura, supra. We must presume that the Legislature intended the term “register” to have a consistent meaning throughout the sex offender registration act, whether in G.

2013See Commonwealth v. Ronald R., supra (“a sex offender may not appeal from a judge’s decision not to waive the registration requirement . . . [except] pursuant to G.

2012See Commonwealth v. Ronald R., 450 Mass. 262, 266 (2007) (“Although a sex offender may not appeal from a judge’s decision not to waive the registration requirement, we conclude that either party may petition a single justice of this court, pursuant to G.

2022Id. at 790 .

2009It is a continuing, intrusive, and humiliating regulation of the person himself.’ ” Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 8725 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 450 Mass. 780, 792 (2008), quoting Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 149 (1997) (Fried, J., concurring).

2018See Commonwealth v. Scipione , 69 Mass. App. Ct. 906 , 907 (2007).

2017Moe v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 467 Mass. 598, 605 (2014), citing D.J.

2014Therefore, if the statute were “found plausibly to be ambiguous, the defendant is given the benefit of the ambiguity.” Commonwealth v. Wotan, 422 Mass. 740, 742 (1996).

2014See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 595-597 (2013) (Doe No. 205614); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 614-615 (2010) (Doe No. 151564); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3844 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 768, 768-772 (2006) (Doe No. 3844).

2014See, e.g., Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 205614 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 466 Mass. 594, 595-597 (2013) (Doe No. 205614); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 151564 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 456 Mass. 612, 614-615 (2010) (Doe No. 151564); Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 3844 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 447 Mass. 768, 768-772 (2006) (Doe No. 3844).

2013In fact, this case is a prime example of why we cannot look beyond the essence of the crimes, because for purposes of an attempt “[e]very question of proximity must be determined by its own circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 170 Mass. 18, 22 (1897) (Holmes, J.).

2013See Commonwealth v. Saferian, supra. That a later court decision may have proved this advice to be incorrect does not render otherwise reasonable advice ineffective.

2012The Legislature intended that CPSL serve as an “enhanced penalty for sex offenders.” Commonwealth v. Renderos, 440 Mass. 422, 429 (2003).

2012There seemingly is some uncertainty whether the art. 12 analysis of enhanced penalty set forth in Commonwealth v. Pagan, 445 Mass. 161, 169-170 (2005) (Pagan), applies to violations of the registration requirement.

2001In Doe v. Attorney Gen., 426 Mass. 136, 139 (1997) (Doe [No. 3]), we said the major premise underlying the then-existing Massachusetts statute 2 was to “protect minors and other persons vulnerable to becoming victims of sex crimes.” In Doe v. Attorney Gen., 430 Mass. 155, 165 (1999) (Doe [No. 5]), we held that a statute tailored with particularity to meet that need would be valid under the Massachusetts Constitution.

2001In Doe v. Attorney Gen., 430 Mass. 155, 166 (1999) (Doe [No. 5]), supra, we held that “[t]he burden of proof will be on the sex offender board to establish at the hearing that the offender poses a risk to vulnerable populations.” I note that the 1999 Act places the burden of proof on persons wishing to be relieved of the registration requirement: The burden of proof “shall be on the offender to prove” that the offender’s “criminal history do[es] not indicate a risk of reoffense or a danger to the public.” G.

1997Assuming the plaintiff would be able to show he has a limited liberty or privacy interest that is violated by the registration requirement, but see Vaccaro v. Vaccaro, 425 Mass. 153, 161-62 (1997), I believe that interest would be outweighed by the State’s strong concern for the protection of minors and other vulnerable categories of persons from future harm: the purpose of the Act.