registration requirement in California

2014DISCUSSION Under section 290, any person who is convicted of violation of one of the enumerated offenses—including section 314, subdivision (1)—must register as a sex offender “for the rest of his or her life while residing in California .…” (§ 290, subds. (b) & (c).) “The purpose of the section 290 registration requirement is to ensure that convicted sex offenders are readily available for police surveillance.” (People v. Williams (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1667, 1672 .) The registration requirement is automatic and mandatory and “is ‘not a permissible subject of plea agreement negotiation’ [cita

2014(People v. McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 380 .) For these reasons, the trial court’s order striking the registration requirement may not be affirmed on the basis that it merely corrects a clerical error.

2021Therefore, mandatory registration did not apply to defendant. 5 “If the conviction is for an offense other than those automatically requiring registration, the [trial] court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to impose a registration requirement if the [trial] court finds the offense was sexually motivated or compelled, and that registration is justified by the defendant’s risk of reoffense.” (People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044, 1048 ; People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1197-1198 (Hofsheier) [stating that under the predecessor statute to section 290.006 the trial court may r

2016(People v. Castellanos (1999) 21 Cal.4th 785, 796 .) Consequently, the registration requirement furnishes no basis for a jury trial as defendant claims.

2023(See In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 268, fn. 8 [After the Supreme Court in In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914 held registration was cruel or unusual punishment for one convicted of public lewd solicitation under § 647, subdivision (a), the Legislature amended § 290 to delete the registration requirement for persons convicted of that offense.

2022Convicted sex offenders such as defendant must register with law enforcement officials in the communities in which they reside. (§ 290, subd. (c).) “ ‘The purpose of section 290 is to assure that persons convicted of the crimes enumerated therein shall be readily available for police surveillance at all times because the Legislature deemed them likely to commit similar offenses in the future.’ ” (Wright v. Superior Court (1997) 15 Cal.4th 521, 527 .) The registration requirement of section 290 protects public safety “[b]y providing for the collection of information about the identity and where

2025Defendant contends “that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring him to register because the court failed to make a finding that the offense was the product of sexual compulsion or gratification,” and “there is no evidence to support the decision to impose registration.” A court “may require lifetime registration if it finds the crime to have a sexual purpose.” ( Hofsheier, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1197–1198.) Section 290.006 requires a sentencing court to provide its reasons for imposing the registration requirement.

2024By requiring a separate statement of reasons for requiring registration even if the trial court finds the offense was committed as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification, the statute gives the trial court discretion to weigh the reasons for and against registration in each particular case.” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , 1197-1198 overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 875 .) Here, while the trial court stated its reasons for imposing the registration requirement, those reasons focused on the fact that

2023(See In re Alva (2004) 33 Cal.4th 254, 268, fn. 8 [After the Supreme Court in In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914 held registration was cruel or unusual punishment for one convicted of public lewd solicitation under § 647, subdivision (a), the Legislature amended § 290 to delete the registration requirement for persons convicted of that offense.

2014Citing Kelly, In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914, 919 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 ], states: “A misdemeanant may be released from this ‘penalty or disability’ [(the sex offender registration requirement)] pursuant to section 1203.4 . . . ,” 6 However, Reed's characterization of the registration requirement as punitive was considered and rejected by the California Supreme Court in Alva. ( Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 291-292 [“intervening developments . . . render unpersuasive Reeds characterization of sex offender registration as punitive”].) Second, in In re Birch (1973) 10 Cal.3d 314 [

2021(See People v. 2 That Bell understood this is supported by Bell’s giving the facility’s address as his own on his hospital paperwork. 16 Garcia, supra, at p. 755 [concluding that failure to instruct on requirement that the defendant actually know that he had a duty to register as a sex offender was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where there was “strong” circumstantial evidence that the defendant knew of the registration requirement].) B.

2021The Supreme Court has said that section 7 “correctly requires a showing of purpose or willingness to act, or (as in this case) fail to act.” ( Garcia, supra, 25 Cal.4th at pp. 753–754.) However, it “was incomplete in failing clearly to require actual knowledge of the registration requirement.” (Id. at p. 754.) Here, the jury was instructed that the People must prove Ray “actually knew he had a duty . . . to register as a sex offender.” The instruction complies with Garcia.

2023(See People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 339 [a defendant in actual or constructive custody may challenge his or her obligation to register as a sex offender by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus; out-of-custody defendants may seek such relief by filing a petition for writ of mandate].) As the People appropriately note, even if defendant is entitled to relief from mandatory sex offender registration under amended section 290, subdivision (c)(2), as he asserts, the trial court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to order defendant to continue to register as a sex offender

2014Although punishments are limited to consideration of facts found true by a jury, “‘sex offender registration is not . . . a form of punishment’” (People v. Picklesimer, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 343-344; People v. Presley (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1032-1033 ) and a court in a registration hearing should consider all relevant information available to it (People v. Garcia, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at pp. 483-485).

2025(Jeha, at pp. 1068, 1073.) The court rejected 18 The registration requirement itself has been described as a nonpunitive civil mechanism to protect the public from danger and not punishment for a crime. ( Smith, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 93, 96, 105–106 [holding Alaska’s sex offender registration requirement not punishment under ex post facto prohibition]; see People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044, 1050 .) 30.

2015By contrast, section 3003.5(b) clearly “imposes an affirmative disability or restraint” that suggests its punitive character. ( Smith, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 97.) “Here, we inquire how the effects of the [statute] are felt by those subject to it.” (Id. at pp. 99-100.) Unlike a registration requirement, which “imposes no physical restraint” and “leaves [sex offenders] free to change . . . residences” (id. at p. 100), the residency restriction directly limits where sex offenders may live and establish a home.

2010(In re Kazuo G. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 155 ]; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ].) J.V.’s gang-related crime subjected him to imposition of the registration requirement.

2010(In re Kazuo G. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1, 5-6 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 155 ]; People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [ 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627 , 885 P.2d 1040 ].) J.V.’s gang-related crime subjected him to imposition of the registration requirement.

2003"A penalty offends the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when it is `so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' ( In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .)" ( King, supra 16 Cal. App.4th at p. 571, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 ; cf. Reed, supra 33 Cal.3d at p. 923 , 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 .) King upheld a registration requirement for a conviction of misdemeanor indecent exposure as not cruel or unusual after considering the "aggressive, even hostile

2003"A penalty offends the proscription against cruel and unusual punishment when it is `so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.' ( In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424 , 105 Cal.Rptr. 217 , 503 P.2d 921 .)" ( King, supra 16 Cal. App.4th at p. 571, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 220 ; cf. Reed, supra 33 Cal.3d at p. 923 , 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 .) King upheld a registration requirement for a conviction of misdemeanor indecent exposure as not cruel or unusual after considering the "aggressive, even hostile

2004(Ibid.; see also In re Eduardo C., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 ; People v. Monroe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1205, 1209 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 51 ].) The trial court relied upon the provision in subdivision (b)(3) of section 186.30, that the “crime” was “gang related,” to impose the registration requirement on defendant. 5 Section 186.30, subdivision (b)(3), does not offer any guidance to define those crimes that are “gang related.” The Attorney General submits that not just the crime, but the defendant’s “history of gang membership” and his “criminal record” may be considered to determine that a crime

2004(Ibid.; see also In re Eduardo C., supra, 90 Cal.App.4th 937, 943 ; People v. Monroe (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1205, 1209 [ 215 Cal.Rptr. 51 ].) The trial court relied upon the provision in subdivision (b)(3) of section 186.30, that the “crime” was “gang related,” to impose the registration requirement on defendant. 5 Section 186.30, subdivision (b)(3), does not offer any guidance to define those crimes that are “gang related.” The Attorney General submits that not just the crime, but the defendant’s “history of gang membership” and his “criminal record” may be considered to determine that a crime

2021Code, § 457.1) are likely to repeat their offenses and therefore are subject to registration requirements.’” (Luisa Z., supra, at p. 982 ; accord, Johnson, supra, at pp. 881–882; Alva, supra, at p. 265, fn. 5 .) Subsequent to the decision in Luisa Z., the Legislature also determined that defendants who commit gang related crimes should be subject to a registration requirement, to “help[] authorities monitor the location of those associating with gangs and thereby promote[] the goal of protecting the public from gang-related violent crime.” (People v. Bailey, supra, at p. 244 [§ 186.30].) The P

2021The registrant [was] subject to police inquiry in the event crimes similar to those for which he or she … registered ha[d] occurred,” and “[a]nyone who fail[ed] to comply with the registration requirement [was] guilty of a misdemeanor.” (Luisa Z, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 983 , citing former Health & Saf.

1999Being thus severely limited in his freedom of movement and continuously under police surveillance, all stemming from the conviction which has been set aside, the conclusion seems irresistible that this registration requirement is one of the `penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted'...." [4] ( 160 Cal.App.2d at p. 41 , 324 P.2d 990 .) *363 Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914 , 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 , contains the most extensive discussion of the question of the punitive nature of sex offender registration and for that reason will be discu

1999Being thus severely limited in his freedom of movement and continuously under police surveillance, all stemming from the conviction which has been set aside, the conclusion seems irresistible that this registration requirement is one of the `penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been convicted'...." [4] ( 160 Cal.App.2d at p. 41 , 324 P.2d 990 .) *363 Reed, supra, 33 Cal.3d 914 , 191 Cal. Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 , contains the most extensive discussion of the question of the punitive nature of sex offender registration and for that reason will be discu

2013In both cases, the court held a person could not be criminally convicted for failing to register under unique circumstances where the defendant did not know and would not have reasonably known of the registration requirement. ( Lambert, supra, at pp. 229-230 ; Mancuso, supra, at pp. 558-559 .) Courts have repeatedly declined to expand the exception beyond the particular facts of these cases.

2005The high court has held that due process principles forbid applying the proscriptions of a registration act to one having `no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and where no showing is made of the probability of such knowledge.' ( Lambert v. California (1957) 355 U.S. 225, 227 , 78 S.Ct. 240 , 2 L.Ed.2d 228 ( Lambert ).) ... [¶] Assuming Lambert controls here (but see U.S. v. Kafka (9th Cir.2000) 222 F.3d 1129, 1132-1133 [ Lambert does not apply where the circumstances, including any notice expressly or impliedly provided by the criminal statute, should have alerted defendant to the reg

2010(See People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 380 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 739 , 862 P.2d 739 ] ["the sex offender registration requirement... *1291 is ... a statutorily mandated element of punishment for the underlying offense"]; Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 825 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 464 P.2d 483 ] [§ 290 "applies automatically when a person is convicted of one of the enumerated offenses" (italics added)].) Indeed, the current registration law in effect requires eligible offenders to register even before they are released from prison. (§ 290.016.) Clearly, the registration requirem

2010(See People v. McClellan (1993) 6 Cal.4th 367, 380 [ 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 739 , 862 P.2d 739 ] ["the sex offender registration requirement... *1291 is ... a statutorily mandated element of punishment for the underlying offense"]; Barrows v. Municipal Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 821, 825 [ 83 Cal.Rptr. 819 , 464 P.2d 483 ] [§ 290 "applies automatically when a person is convicted of one of the enumerated offenses" (italics added)].) Indeed, the current registration law in effect requires eligible offenders to register even before they are released from prison. (§ 290.016.) Clearly, the registration requirem

2025(Jeha, at pp. 1068, 1073.) The court rejected 18 The registration requirement itself has been described as a nonpunitive civil mechanism to protect the public from danger and not punishment for a crime. ( Smith, supra, 538 U.S. at pp. 93, 96, 105–106 [holding Alaska’s sex offender registration requirement not punishment under ex post facto prohibition]; see People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1044, 1050 .) 30.

2021(But see Mosley, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1048 [“If the conviction is for an offense other than those automatically requiring registration, the court may nonetheless exercise its discretion to impose a registration requirement if the court finds the offense was sexually motivated or compelled, and that registration is justified by the defendant’s risk of reoffense.”].) We need not resolve this disagreement because substantial evidence supports a finding that Howardkidd was likely to commit a similar sexual offense in the future.

2016(See People v. Brun (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 951, 954 .) But because the court’s December 17 order vacated the registration requirement, the issue is now moot.

2016(See People v. Brun (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 951, 954 .) But since the court’s October 14 order vacated the registration requirement, the issue is now moot.

2014Citing Kelly, In re Reed (1983) 33 Cal.3d 914, 919 [ 191 Cal.Rptr. 658 , 663 P.2d 216 ], states: “A misdemeanant may be released from this ‘penalty or disability’ [(the sex offender registration requirement)] pursuant to section 1203.4 . . . ,” 6 However, Reed's characterization of the registration requirement as punitive was considered and rejected by the California Supreme Court in Alva. ( Alva, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 291-292 [“intervening developments . . . render unpersuasive Reeds characterization of sex offender registration as punitive”].) Second, in In re Birch (1973) 10 Cal.3d 314 [

2014In Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 . . . , we cited the registration requirement contained in section 290 as an example of the plea consequences of which a defendant must be informed. ( Bunnell, supra, at p. 605 . . . ; see also In re Birch, supra, 10 Cal.3d 314, 322 [registration requirement constitutes a ‘grave and direct consequence of [the defendant’s] guilty plea; in the absence of counsel the responsibility for such advice rested with the court’].) We therefore conclude that Bunnell error has occurred where the trial court fails to advise a defendant that, as a consequence

2004A violation of section 314, subdivision 1 triggers the mandatory registration requirements of section 290. (§ 290, subd. (a)(2)(A).) However, the trial court declined to impose the registration requirement, relying on In re King (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 554 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 39 ], a decision from this court.

2004A violation of section 314, subdivision 1 triggers the mandatory registration requirements of section 290. (§ 290, subd. (a)(2)(A).) However, the trial court declined to impose the registration requirement, relying on In re King (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 554 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 39 ], a decision from this court.

2021(See Grosso v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 62 [prosecution for failure to pay excise tax on illegal wagering activity should have been dismissed because compliance with statute would have infringed defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination]; Haynes v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 85 [prosecution for failure to register firearms should have been dismissed because the registration requirement violated the privilege against self-incrimination]; Leary v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 6 [invocation of privilege against self-incrimination should have provided a full defense to a prosecutio

2012Amend, right against self-incrimination]; Haynes v. United States (1968) 390 U.S. 85 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 923 , 88 S.Ct. 722 ] (Haynes) [prosecution for failure to register firearms acquired in a manner out of compliance with other applicable laws should have been dismissed on defendant’s motion because the registration requirement violated the defendant’s 5th Amend, privilege against self-incrimination]; Leary v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 6 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 57 , 89 S.Ct. 1532 ] (Leary) [invocation of 5th Amend, privilege against self-incrimination should have provided a full defense to a prosecution

2012This court held that because the registration requirement was statutorily mandated, it was “not a permissible subject of plea agreement negotiation” (McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 380 ) and its imposition did not violate the plea bargain (id. at p. 381). 4 Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th 342 , and McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th 367 , are not inconsistent with this court‟s 1991 decision in Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1013 .

2012This court held that because the registration requirement was statutorily mandated, it was “not a permissible subject of plea agreement negotiation” (McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 380 ) and its imposition did not violate the plea bargain (id. at p. 381). 4 Moser, supra, 6 Cal.4th 342 , and McClellan, supra, 6 Cal.4th 367 , are not inconsistent with this court‟s 1991 decision in Walker, supra, 54 Cal.3d 1013 .

2024By requiring a separate statement of reasons for requiring registration even if the trial court finds the offense was committed as a result of sexual compulsion or for purposes of sexual gratification, the statute gives the trial court discretion to weigh the reasons for and against registration in each particular case.” (People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 , 1197-1198 overruled on other grounds by Johnson v. Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 875 .) Here, while the trial court stated its reasons for imposing the registration requirement, those reasons focused on the fact that

2022(Id. at p. 876.) The defendant argued that the registration requirement violated the equal protection doctrine under the reasoning of People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185 (Hofsheier), which “interpreted the federal and state equal protection clauses as invalidating mandatory sex offender registration for a 22-year-old defendant convicted of nonforcible oral copulation with a person 16 years of age (§ 288a, subd. (b)(1)), for the reason that a same- aged defendant convicted of unlawful sexual intercourse with a same-aged minor (§ 261.5) is subject to discretionary registration.” (Johnson,