8 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 2008–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hendrix v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2011Exam'rs , 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental fairness are "usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration requirement (citation omitted)). 3. 2011Exam'rs , 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental fairness are "usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration requirement (citation omitted)). 3. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bryantgreen2 sentences2010See State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554 , 614 S.E.2d 479, 487 (2005) (distinguishing the Supreme Court’s holding in Lambert and finding North Carolina’s and all other states’ sex offender registration statutes are statewide registration programs specifically directed at sex offenders with the ultimate purpose of *97 protecting the public). 2010See State v. Bryant, 359 N.C. 554 , 614 S.E.2d 479, 487 (2005) (distinguishing the Supreme Court’s holding in Lambert and finding North Carolina’s and all other states’ sex offender registration statutes are statewide registration programs specifically directed at sex offenders with the ultimate purpose of *97 protecting the public). | 2 | 2 |
Sloan v. South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examinersgreen2 sentences2011Exam'rs , 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental fairness are "usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration requirement (citation omitted)). 3. 2011Exam'rs , 370 S.C. 452, 484-85 , 636 S.E.2d 598, 615 (2006) (providing that the requirements of fundamental fairness are "usually deemed to apply in a contested case or hearing which affects an individual's property or liberty interest . . . ."); Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 325 (2003) (holding that a sex-offender's due process challenge to sex-offender registration failed because the sex-offender failed to "first 'show that he has a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest'" affected by the registration requirement (citation omitted)). 3. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Taubgreen2 sentences2011As to whether the South Carolina Code pardons Squires from the registration requirement: State v. Taub , 336 S.C. 310, 317 , 519 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." (citation omitted)); see also S.C. 2011As to whether the South Carolina Code pardons Squires from the registration requirement: State v. Taub , 336 S.C. 310, 317 , 519 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute prevails over a more general one." (citation omitted)); see also S.C. | 1 | 1 |
Whitehead v. Stategreen2 sentences2011As to whether the doctrine of laches estopped SLED from enforcing the registration requirement against Squires: Rule 210(h), SCACR ("The appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."); Whitehead v. State , 352 S.C. 215, 219 , 574 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (providing that laches is not available as a defense where the party asserting the defense fails to establish "the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage" against her) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 2011As to whether the doctrine of laches estopped SLED from enforcing the registration requirement against Squires: Rule 210(h), SCACR ("The appellate court will not consider any fact which does not appear in the Record on Appeal."); Whitehead v. State , 352 S.C. 215, 219 , 574 S.E.2d 200, 202 (2002) (providing that laches is not available as a defense where the party asserting the defense fails to establish "the delay has worked injury, prejudice, or disadvantage" against her) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2010We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authority: Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 550-552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 324-25 (2003) (holding the sex offender registry does violate the defendant's due process and equal protection rights); Williams v. State , 378 S.C. 511, 515-16 , 662 S.E.2d 615, 617-18 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act "is not so punitive in purpose or effect as to constitute a criminal penalty" and finding instead the registration requirement to be a collateral consequence of the defendant's sentence). 2010We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authority: Hendrix v. Taylor , 353 S.C. 542, 550-552 , 579 S.E.2d 320, 324-25 (2003) (holding the sex offender registry does violate the defendant's due process and equal protection rights); Williams v. State , 378 S.C. 511, 515-16 , 662 S.E.2d 615, 617-18 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry Act "is not so punitive in purpose or effect as to constitute a criminal penalty" and finding instead the registration requirement to be a collateral consequence of the defendant's sentence). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lambert v. California
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 227 , 78 S.Ct. 240 . 2012The court declined to apply the notification requirement of section 23-3^40 into section 23-3^60, finding a clear reading of that statute “reveals the statute only requires the State to give notice of the registration requirement to a sex offender within one day of the sex offender’s release from prison.” Id., slip op. at 1. | 2 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Latimore
green
2 sentences2012In Latimore , we held that “to satisfy due process a convicted sex offender must have actual notice of the 2006 change to section 23-3-460, which imposed an additional registration requirement, to be convicted of violating section 23-3-470 of the South Carolina Code.” Id., at 13 , 723 S.E.2d at 591 . 2012In Latimore , we held that “to satisfy due process a convicted sex offender must have actual notice of the 2006 change to section 23-3-460, which imposed an additional registration requirement, to be convicted of violating section 23-3-470 of the South Carolina Code.” Id., at 13 , 723 S.E.2d at 591 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Hazel v. State
green
2 sentences2012We affirm the circuit court's order pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Hazel v. State , 377 S.C. 60 , 659 S.E.2d 137 (2008) (citing section 15-53-20 of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provides that courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, and concluding that the Court of Common Pleas had the power to make a factual finding as to whether respondent's kidnapping conviction required him to register as a sex offender); S.C. 2012We affirm the circuit court's order pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities: Hazel v. State , 377 S.C. 60 , 659 S.E.2d 137 (2008) (citing section 15-53-20 of the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provides that courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed, and concluding that the Court of Common Pleas had the power to make a factual finding as to whether respondent's kidnapping conviction required him to register as a sex offender); S.C. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Joseph F. Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution
green
1 sentence2008“The distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘collateral’ consequences of a plea, while sometimes shaded in the relevant decisions, turns on whether the result represents a definite, immediate and largely automatic effect on the range of the defendant’s punishment.” Cuthrell, 475 F.2d at 1366 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.