modern rule in Kentucky

2025A few years later, our highest court decided Haney, supra, a case, like Neighbors, adjudicating who has the right of a decedent’s original interment.

2025Citing an opinion by Judge Cardozo while he was still on the New York Court of Appeals, the Court said many cases hold that “where the question is one of disinterment for the purposes of reinterment, the modern rule is not as broad as the rule is stated in the Neighbors Case . . . .” Id. at 740 (citing Yome v. Gorman, 152 N.E. 126, 128 (N.Y. 1926)).

2024Co., 992 S.W.2d 79 (Ark. 1999) (collecting cases and discussing the history of the accepted work doctrine). 13 In a well-reasoned opinion, which we find illuminating, the Supreme Court of South Carolina adopted the modern rule that acceptance/approval, even by the State, does not cut off a private contractor’s negligence.

2021The modern rule for a writ of the first class states: “A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court[.]” Id. at 10 .

2012Restatement Second of Conflicts, Sec. 188 (1971). [2] Lewis, supra, pp. 581-582 .

2012Restatement Second of Conflicts, Sec. 188 (1971).[ 2 ] Lewis, supra, pp. 581-582 .

2010We first note that the cases cited by the Respondents in support of the injunction, Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d 1200 and In re Davis, 347 B.R. 607 (W.D.Ky.2006), follow the modern rule as described above, and provide no support for the temporary injunction.

2010We first note that the cases cited by the Respondents in support of the injunction, Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d 1200 and In re Davis, 347 B.R. 607 (W.D.Ky.2006), follow the modern rule as described above, and provide no support for the temporary injunction.

2010We first note that the cases cited by the Respondents in support of the injunction, Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d 1200 and In re Davis, 347 B.R. 607 (W.D.Ky.2006), follow the modern rule as described above, and provide no support for the temporary injunction.

2010We first note that the cases cited by the Respondents in support of the injunction, Lothschuetz, 898 F.2d 1200 and In re Davis, 347 B.R. 607 (W.D.Ky.2006), follow the modern rule as described above, and provide no support for the temporary injunction.

2006Id. at 630-31 , 125 S.Ct. at 2013 .

2006Id. at 630-31 , 125 S.Ct. at 2013 .

1993A notable and recent example of our willingness to change the law to accomplish a just result is found in Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984), in which we overruled the ancient doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery and adopted in its place the modern doctrine of comparative negligence.

1993A notable and recent example of our willingness to change the law to accomplish a just result is found in Hilen v. Hays, Ky., 673 S.W.2d 713 (1984), in which we overruled the ancient doctrine of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery and adopted in its place the modern doctrine of comparative negligence.

1985They rely on Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal.3d 358 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 636 P.2d 1121 (1981).

1985They rely on Sprecher v. Adamson Companies, 30 Cal.3d 358 , 178 Cal.Rptr. 783 , 636 P.2d 1121 (1981).

1967In Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Company, Inc. et al., Ky., 357 S.W.2d 694 we said: “The modern rule, generally accepted, is that a motorist so blinded is not required .to stop instantly but his duty is determinable by the standard of ordinary care under the particular circumstances, although the rule is subject to a number of exceptions.

1952In Ayers v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 343 , 242 S.W. 624, 625 , we quoted with approval this language from an earlier case: “ ‘ * * * but the modern rule in Kentucky is that whether he should stand his ground or give back is a question for the jury to determine under an instruction declaring apparent necessity a legal excuse for the homicide and the measure and only test of his right to slay his assailant.’ ” We believe the court properly overruled appellant’s motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.

1952In Ayers v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 343 , 242 S.W. 624, 625 , we quoted with approval this language from an earlier case: “ ‘ * * * but the modern rule in Kentucky is that whether he should stand his ground or give back is a question for the jury to determine under an instruction declaring apparent necessity a legal excuse for the homicide and the measure and only test of his right to slay his assailant.’ ” We believe the court properly overruled appellant’s motion for a directed verdict of not guilty.

1947Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728 , 88 S. W. 2d 969 ; First State Bank of Eubank v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 255 Ky. 800 , 75 S. W. 2d 517 ; City of Newport v. Dorsel Co., 281 Ky. 372 , 136 S. W. 2d 11 .

1947Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728 , 88 S. W. 2d 969 ; First State Bank of Eubank v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 255 Ky. 800 , 75 S. W. 2d 517 ; City of Newport v. Dorsel Co., 281 Ky. 372 , 136 S. W. 2d 11 .

1947Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728 , 88 S. W. 2d 969 ; First State Bank of Eubank v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 255 Ky. 800 , 75 S. W. 2d 517 ; City of Newport v. Dorsel Co., 281 Ky. 372 , 136 S. W. 2d 11 .

1947Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728 , 88 S. W. 2d 969 ; First State Bank of Eubank v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 255 Ky. 800 , 75 S. W. 2d 517 ; City of Newport v. Dorsel Co., 281 Ky. 372 , 136 S. W. 2d 11 .

1947Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728 , 88 S. W. 2d 969 ; First State Bank of Eubank v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 255 Ky. 800 , 75 S. W. 2d 517 ; City of Newport v. Dorsel Co., 281 Ky. 372 , 136 S. W. 2d 11 .

1947Pennington v. Black, 261 Ky. 728 , 88 S. W. 2d 969 ; First State Bank of Eubank v. Crab Orchard Banking Co., 255 Ky. 800 , 75 S. W. 2d 517 ; City of Newport v. Dorsel Co., 281 Ky. 372 , 136 S. W. 2d 11 .

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942At least four later cases in which we continued to apply such modern rule are: Campbell v. Prestonsburg Coal Company, 258 Ky. 77 , 79 S. W. (2d) 373 ; Elrod v. Schroader, 261 Ky. 491 , 88 S. W. (2d) 12 ; Preston v. Harlow, 276 Ky. 799 , 125 S. W. (2d) 726 ; and Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S. W. (2d) 768 , 132 A. L.

1942Perhaps one of the strongest cases, portraying this court’s transition in the adoption of the modern rule referred to, is that of Preston v. Wells, 187 Ky. 417 , 219 S. W. 173 , and in which the writer cites a number of prior cases, some of which are listed in the annotation supra. Under that rule — permitting and requiring a survey of the whole instrument by the court — these facts are made to appear in this case as embodying the intention and purpose of the vendor in executing the above inserted instrument: (1) That he intended it to be an *180 inter partes deed, and not a testamentary paper

1942Perhaps one of the strongest cases, portraying this court’s transition in the adoption of the modern rule referred to, is that of Preston v. Wells, 187 Ky. 417 , 219 S. W. 173 , and in which the writer cites a number of prior cases, some of which are listed in the annotation supra. Under that rule — permitting and requiring a survey of the whole instrument by the court — these facts are made to appear in this case as embodying the intention and purpose of the vendor in executing the above inserted instrument: (1) That he intended it to be an *180 inter partes deed, and not a testamentary paper

1941In the case of Shehan v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 191 , 153 S. W. 243, 244 , we said: “Under the common law, generally, the father was entitled to the custody of his infant child; but the more modern doctrine requires the chancellor to look to the happiness, welfare, and comfort of the child, and to confide its keeping to that parent whose ability, time, and attention can best be devoted to its care and welfare.

1941In the case of Shehan v. Shehan, 152 Ky. 191 , 153 S. W. 243, 244 , we said: “Under the common law, generally, the father was entitled to the custody of his infant child; but the more modern doctrine requires the chancellor to look to the happiness, welfare, and comfort of the child, and to confide its keeping to that parent whose ability, time, and attention can best be devoted to its care and welfare.

1940Lee v. Alexander, 48 Ky. 25 , 9 B.

1940Lee v. Alexander, 48 Ky. 25 , 9 B.

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is

1939“The modern doctrine in such cases, and the one supported by the great weight of authority, is, as stated in Becker v. Neurath, and approved in ■Chapman’s Ex’r v. Chapman, supra: “ ‘To enforce a trust of this character when it *449 is shown that it would be unconscientious to permit the grantee to hold the estate in violation of the promise, although there may be no evidence of ac- ' tual fraud on the part of the grantee in obtaining the conveyance.’ ” Compare also the cases of Motley’s Adm’rs v. Tabor, 208 Ky. 702 , 271 S. W. 1064 , and Huff v. Byers, 209 Ky. 375 , 272 S. W. 897 , wherein is

1938The result is that, whether .the estate progresses under the will as far as it is legally possible and is then divided, or whether it is held the will is void and the division of the estate is made as if there were no will, the division is precisely the same.” To like effect was this rule declared in Ligget et al. v. Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. et al., 274 Ky. 387 , 118 S. W. (2d) 720 , where we said [page 725]: “The modern rule permits the estate to progress under the will up to the point where the rule against perpetuities begins to operate and creates a fee in the person who, under the st