modern rule in Delaware

2015Ch. 1997). 62 Id. at 334 (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency § 82 (1958)). 63 Because “[r]atification, in the usual sense, involves shareholders’ affirmatively sanctioning earlier board action, the effect of which is to validate that action,” the Court has described the notion of “advance ratification”—i.e., board action consistent with 21 The modern doctrine of stockholder ratification under Delaware law in the director compensation context can be traced to three cases decided in 1952 in which stockholders challenged the adequacy of consideration the corporation received in exchange for op

2009The Superior Court explained that with regard to appeals brought in the Supreme Court, this Court adopted the modern rule that "de-emphasizes the technical procedural aspects of appeals and stresses the importance of reaching and deciding the substan *310 tive merits of appeals whenever possible.” Id. at 11-12 (citing State Pers.

1989This Court adopted the modern rule that: the applicable law to the determining of a class following the termination of a life interest is the law as it exists on the date of ascertainment, unless the documents themselves demonstrate a clear intent on the part of the creator to limit the class as it was defined by law on the date of execution of the trusts. 304 A.2d at 54 . 2 A similar interpretation was given to Haskell in Jackson v. Riggs National Bank of Washington, D.C., Del.

1978The Trial Judge's rulings must be measured against the standards announced in Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, Del.Supr., 144 A.2d 123 (1958), wherein this Court held that: "... the modern rule is well-settled that a new trial may be had upon limited issues when such issues are severable from the other issues, and no injustice will result from retaining the verdict upon those other issues." Id. at 136 .

1978The Trial Judge's rulings must be measured against the standards announced in Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby, Del.Supr., 144 A.2d 123 (1958), wherein this Court held that: "... the modern rule is well-settled that a new trial may be had upon limited issues when such issues are severable from the other issues, and no injustice will result from retaining the verdict upon those other issues." Id. at 136 .

1977The third argument made by defendant is that the agreement is unenforceable in that any restraint of trade is generally held to be unreasonable if (a) it is greater than is required for the protection for which the restraint is imposed, or (b) it imposes undue hardship upon the restricted person, see Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 515 (1932), the modern rule being that a restrictive covenant should be enforced only to the extent that it is reasonable so to do, Knowles-Zeswitz Music, Inc. v. Cara, Del.Ch., 260 A.2d 171 (1969).

1973The Court reversed the sentence imposed for the latter offense, stating: “Several recent decisions establish the modern rule that a defendant may not be punished both for possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used, where the evidence does not show possession for any other purpose.” Insofar as Watts v. State, 3 Md.App. 454 , 240 A.2d 317 (1968) and State v. Jones, 94 N.J.Super. 137 , 227 A.2d 145 (1967) are at variance with the conclusion we reach here, we find those cases unpersuasive; the statutory schemes are distinguishable in each.

1973The Court reversed the sentence imposed for the latter offense, stating: “Several recent decisions establish the modern rule that a defendant may not be punished both for possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used, where the evidence does not show possession for any other purpose.” Insofar as Watts v. State, 3 Md.App. 454 , 240 A.2d 317 (1968) and State v. Jones, 94 N.J.Super. 137 , 227 A.2d 145 (1967) are at variance with the conclusion we reach here, we find those cases unpersuasive; the statutory schemes are distinguishable in each.

1973The Court reversed the sentence imposed for the latter offense, stating: “Several recent decisions establish the modern rule that a defendant may not be punished both for possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used, where the evidence does not show possession for any other purpose.” Insofar as Watts v. State, 3 Md.App. 454 , 240 A.2d 317 (1968) and State v. Jones, 94 N.J.Super. 137 , 227 A.2d 145 (1967) are at variance with the conclusion we reach here, we find those cases unpersuasive; the statutory schemes are distinguishable in each.

1973The Court reversed the sentence imposed for the latter offense, stating: “Several recent decisions establish the modern rule that a defendant may not be punished both for possession of a weapon and for another offense in which the weapon is used, where the evidence does not show possession for any other purpose.” Insofar as Watts v. State, 3 Md.App. 454 , 240 A.2d 317 (1968) and State v. Jones, 94 N.J.Super. 137 , 227 A.2d 145 (1967) are at variance with the conclusion we reach here, we find those cases unpersuasive; the statutory schemes are distinguishable in each.

1952C. 203, 113 F. 2d 729, 736 , where it is stated: “The statute involved in the present case was interpreted in United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, and the decision in that case, is equally applicable here. ‘It is settled,’ says the court in the Ulysses case, ‘that works of physiology, medicine, science, and sex instruction are not within the statute, though to some extent and among some persons they may tend to promote lustful thoughts.’ It should be equally true of works of sociology, as of physiology, medicine and other sciences — to say nothing of general literature and the arts — th

1952C. 203, 113 F. 2d 729, 736 , where it is stated: “The statute involved in the present case was interpreted in United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, and the decision in that case, is equally applicable here. ‘It is settled,’ says the court in the Ulysses case, ‘that works of physiology, medicine, science, and sex instruction are not within the statute, though to some extent and among some persons they may tend to promote lustful thoughts.’ It should be equally true of works of sociology, as of physiology, medicine and other sciences — to say nothing of general literature and the arts — th

1935The leading case of Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 333 , 72 N. W. 697, 699 , in speaking of the exception to the rule says, “There seems to be very little left of it, unless it be in cases of * * * warrants of attorney to appear and confess judgment in court.” So, too, Williston, after approving the modern rule of the general voidable character of infants’ contracts, says: “Probably Courts would still hold an infant unable to authorize a confession of judgment or to appoint an attorney for judicial proceedings.” 1 Williston on Contracts, § 227. 3 Freeman on Judgments, page 2708, says:

1935The leading case of Coursolle v. Weyerhauser, 69 Minn. 328, 333 , 72 N. W. 697, 699 , in speaking of the exception to the rule says, “There seems to be very little left of it, unless it be in cases of * * * warrants of attorney to appear and confess judgment in court.” So, too, Williston, after approving the modern rule of the general voidable character of infants’ contracts, says: “Probably Courts would still hold an infant unable to authorize a confession of judgment or to appoint an attorney for judicial proceedings.” 1 Williston on Contracts, § 227. 3 Freeman on Judgments, page 2708, says:

1933Harr. (35 Del.) 380, 165 A. 562 , the modern rule, making corporate stock the subject of conversion, is particularly applicable when the statutes, as in Delaware (Section 16, General Corporation Law [Revised Code 1915, § 1950]; Section 95, c. 65 [Section 2009] Revised Code 1915 [as amended by 33 Del.

1900In Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 387 , 7 Sup.Ct. 612 , 30 L.Ed. 718 , the defense was made by demurrer, and the modern rule is stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: “When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer”- — citing: Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210 , 12 L.Ed. 1051 ; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 567 , 25 L.Ed. 815 ; Lansden v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391 , 1 Sup.Ct. 350 , 27 L.Ed. 219 .

1900In Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 387 , 7 Sup.Ct. 612 , 30 L.Ed. 718 , the defense was made by demurrer, and the modern rule is stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: “When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer”- — citing: Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210 , 12 L.Ed. 1051 ; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 567 , 25 L.Ed. 815 ; Lansden v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391 , 1 Sup.Ct. 350 , 27 L.Ed. 219 .

1900In Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 387 , 7 Sup.Ct. 612 , 30 L.Ed. 718 , the defense was made by demurrer, and the modern rule is stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: “When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer”- — citing: Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210 , 12 L.Ed. 1051 ; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 567 , 25 L.Ed. 815 ; Lansden v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391 , 1 Sup.Ct. 350 , 27 L.Ed. 219 .

1900In Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 387 , 7 Sup.Ct. 612 , 30 L.Ed. 718 , the defense was made by demurrer, and the modern rule is stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: “When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer”- — citing: Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210 , 12 L.Ed. 1051 ; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 567 , 25 L.Ed. 815 ; Lansden v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391 , 1 Sup.Ct. 350 , 27 L.Ed. 219 .

1900In Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 387 , 7 Sup.Ct. 612 , 30 L.Ed. 718 , the defense was made by demurrer, and the modern rule is stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: “When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer”- — citing: Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210 , 12 L.Ed. 1051 ; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 567 , 25 L.Ed. 815 ; Lansden v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391 , 1 Sup.Ct. 350 , 27 L.Ed. 219 .

1900In Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 387 , 7 Sup.Ct. 612 , 30 L.Ed. 718 , the defense was made by demurrer, and the modern rule is stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: “When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer”- — citing: Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210 , 12 L.Ed. 1051 ; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 567 , 25 L.Ed. 815 ; Lansden v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391 , 1 Sup.Ct. 350 , 27 L.Ed. 219 .

1900In Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 387 , 7 Sup.Ct. 612 , 30 L.Ed. 718 , the defense was made by demurrer, and the modern rule is stated by Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, as follows: “When the bill shows upon its face that the plaintiff, by reason of lapse of time and of his own laches, is not entitled to relief, the objection may be taken by demurrer”- — citing: Maxwell v. Kennedy, 8 How. 210 , 12 L.Ed. 1051 ; National Bank v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 567 , 25 L.Ed. 815 ; Lansden v. Smith, 106 U.S. 391 , 1 Sup.Ct. 350 , 27 L.Ed. 219 .