modern rule in Wisconsin

2009Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660, 668-69 , 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967)).

2009Ass'n v. City of Milwaukee, 35 Wis. 2d 660, 668-69 , 151 N.W.2d 750 (1967)).

1996It is true that the initial paragraph in that decision states our conclusion that the plaintiff’s complaint "is sufficient to state a cause of action in inverse condemnation or private nuisance." A reading of the entire opinion immediately reveals that the holding of the case is that the complaint stated a claim for both claims. 6 If the Village pursues its direct condemnation claim to permanently take the property, the amount of plaintiffs' damages will no doubt be reduced by the fact of the prior reduction in value. 7 The evidence reveals that one of the plaintiffs purchased his property few

1975Muench v. Public Service Comm. (1952), 261 Wis. 492, 506 , 53 N. W. 2d 514 , 55 N. W. 2d 40 , established the modern test of navigability: “[A]ny stream is ‘navigable in fact’ which is capable of floating any boat, skiff, or canoe, of the shallowest draft used for recreational purposes.” There was evidence in the instant case to show that modern recreational canoes and kayaks could successfully be used for recreational purposes in as little as three inches of water.

1979It prohibits the prosecu-torial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness. [Footnotes omitted.] [Emphasis in original.] 6 In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) the court held that an immunity statute must afford transactional immunity if testimony is to be compelled.

1979It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the witness. [Footnotes omitted.] [Emphasis in original.] [6] In Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) the court held that an immunity statute must afford transactional immunity if testimony is to be compelled.

2021Although this rule remains in place, see Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2123 , it is quite apparent that it supplanted the Constitution's separation of powers. ¶63 The Constitution "contain[s] a discernible, textually grounded non-delegation principle that is far removed from the modern doctrine." Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 Va. L.

2009"While the statute must be given a strict construction in favor of taxation, the modern rule is that the statute must be given a 'strict but reasonable' construction." Id. (citing Columbia Hosp.

2001Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931 -32 (citing Semayne's Case, 77 Eng.

1997The modern test for the propriety of a tax on interstate commerce was first set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

1997The modern test for the propriety of a tax on interstate commerce was first set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

1982Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York , 397 U.S. 664 (1970).

1978We interpret the Code as incorporating the rationale of the Peterson ease, i.e., that the debtor may sell the collateral; that the debtor’s transfer of collateral will not destroy the secured party’s interest; and that if the transfer of collateral occurs at a time when the debtor is not in default (and the transfer is not an event of default), the secured creditor has no immediate *17 remedy against either the debtor or the transferee. 19 We do not reach the question whether a transfer of collateral which constitutes a default or which occurs after the debtor’s default is a conversion, becaus

1978We interpret the Code as incorporating the rationale of the Peterson ease, i.e., that the debtor may sell the collateral; that the debtor’s transfer of collateral will not destroy the secured party’s interest; and that if the transfer of collateral occurs at a time when the debtor is not in default (and the transfer is not an event of default), the secured creditor has no immediate *17 remedy against either the debtor or the transferee. 19 We do not reach the question whether a transfer of collateral which constitutes a default or which occurs after the debtor’s default is a conversion, becaus

1978This is in accordance with the modern rule that for all practical purposes chattel mortgages are mere liens.” Midland National Bank & Trust Company v. Peterson, 229 Wis. 19, 20 , 281 N.W. 688 (1938). 18 As the Peterson case illustrates, prior to enacting the Code Wisconsin recognized the debtor’s right to transfer his or her interest.

1978This is in accordance with the modern rule that for all practical purposes chattel mortgages are mere liens.” Midland National Bank & Trust Company v. Peterson, 229 Wis. 19, 20 , 281 N.W. 688 (1938). 18 As the Peterson case illustrates, prior to enacting the Code Wisconsin recognized the debtor’s right to transfer his or her interest.

1930Jur. p. 95 : “While the rule has been too often declared to be ignored, it seems to be founded upon a misconception of the maxim to which it is traced, and the efforts of the courts to engraft exceptions have led practically in many cases to an annulment of the rule itself.” The modern rule is well stated in Hazard v. Warner, 122 Wash. 687 , 211 Pac. 732 , 31 A. L.

1930Jur. p. 95 : “While the rule has been too often declared to be ignored, it seems to be founded upon a misconception of the maxim to which it is traced, and the efforts of the courts to engraft exceptions have led practically in many cases to an annulment of the rule itself.” The modern rule is well stated in Hazard v. Warner, 122 Wash. 687 , 211 Pac. 732 , 31 A. L.

1930And this is so although the parties knew what words were employed and their ordinary meaning/ ” The following Wisconsin cases clearly show that the decisions of this court are in harmony with the modern rule: In Lardner v. Williams, 98 Wis. 514, 521 , 74 N. W. 346 , Mr. Justice WiNSLOW, speaking for the court, said: “In the present case it was conclusively shown, not only by the circumstances but by direct evidence, that both mortgagor and mortgagees intended and agreed that the fee of .the land should be mortgaged, and not the mere life estate, and that they knew that the power to mortgage ca

1930And this is so although the parties knew what words were employed and their ordinary meaning/ ” The following Wisconsin cases clearly show that the decisions of this court are in harmony with the modern rule: In Lardner v. Williams, 98 Wis. 514, 521 , 74 N. W. 346 , Mr. Justice WiNSLOW, speaking for the court, said: “In the present case it was conclusively shown, not only by the circumstances but by direct evidence, that both mortgagor and mortgagees intended and agreed that the fee of .the land should be mortgaged, and not the mere life estate, and that they knew that the power to mortgage ca

1923The modern rule laid down by Lord LaNgdale in Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552, has been expressly accepted by this court in Shuman v. Shuman, 83 Wis. 250 , 53 N. W. 455 .

1923The modern rule laid down by Lord LaNgdale in Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beav. 552, has been expressly accepted by this court in Shuman v. Shuman, 83 Wis. 250 , 53 N. W. 455 .

1923See 1 Brandt, Suretyship (3d ed.) § 103 and cases cited; Builders L. & S. Co. v. Chicago B. & S. Co. 167 Wis. 167 , 166 N. W. 320 .

1923See 1 Brandt, Suretyship (3d ed.) § 103 and cases cited; Builders L. & S. Co. v. Chicago B. & S. Co. 167 Wis. 167 , 166 N. W. 320 .

1906This court is in harmony therewith, as suggested by counsel for appellant, referring to Matteson v. Ellsworth, 28 Wis. 254, 256 , and Glenwood Mfg.

1900In U. S. v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414 , a case generally cited as giving a very clear definition of duress according to the modern doctrine on the subject, Mr. Justice Clieeord said: “Unlawful duress is a good defense to a contract if it includes such degree of constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, as is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.” On the same line, Mr. Justice Coleeick, in Hines v. Comm’rs of Hamilton Co. 93 Ind. 266 , said, citing from 4 Wait, Act. & Def. 490: “ Mere threats of vio

1900As was said by this court in effect, in Cotzhausen v. Simon, 47 Wis. 103 , if representations by a vendor be material and false, and the-vendee rely upon them to his injury, he may recover of the vendor on the ground of fraud the damages he sustains thereby which are the natural and proximate results of the wrong; and such is the case whether the falsehood be wilful or not, for a vendor has no right to make even a mistake in facts material to a contract except under penalty of responding in damages.

1900There must be a reasonable ground for creating an apprehension that the threats will be carried into execution, in the mind of a man of ordinary firmness and courage, and must operate upon him directly, so as to overcome his will.” Similar language is used in legal opinions of courts of many of the states, as will be shown by reference to the following: Youngs v. Simm, 41 Ill.

1900In U. S. v. Huckabee, 16 Wall. 414 , a case generally cited as giving a very clear definition of duress according to the modern doctrine on the subject, Mr. Justice Clieeord said: “Unlawful duress is a good defense to a contract if it includes such degree of constraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending, as is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.” On the same line, Mr. Justice Coleeick, in Hines v. Comm’rs of Hamilton Co. 93 Ind. 266 , said, citing from 4 Wait, Act. & Def. 490: “ Mere threats of vio